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Abstract 
 
The historical account of Queensland’s record in the Australian federation 
movement constitutes one of the unresolved ‘dark spots’ of the movement’s 
historiography. The Queensland pattern of participation in the federal process was 
contemporarily described as being ‘somewhat different to the other colonies’. This 
departure from the conventional emphasis on the movement’s ‘progress’ towards 
the inevitable attainment of nationhood has resulted in most accounts ‘gloss[ing] 
over the Queensland chapter.’ The principal objective of this thesis is to construct 
a more complete understanding of Queensland’s involvement in the movement 
towards the political federation of the Australian colonies.  
 
The catalyst for the analytical approach adopted by this thesis was Brian de Garis’ 
1972 assertion that there were ‘six federation movements rather than one, and the 
march of each colony towards the inauguration of the Commonwealth needs to be 
‘placed’ in the context of its own history.’ Building on this premise it is argued that 
the federal movement was a distinct yet peripheral movement that intersected with 
the internal political and social dynamics of each colony. The discrete nature of 
these colonial contexts therefore shaped the course of the movement in each 
colony rather than the movement itself being an overarching and altering force. 
This thesis is not a detailed account of the negotiations between the colonies but a 
contextual analysis of the Queensland matrix of social, political and economic 
factors that the broader movement for political federation negotiated.  
 
As the idiosyncratic quality of Queensland’s involvement originated in the political 
culture that developed consequent to the colony’s late settlement and attainment 
of self-government, this thesis has taken the colony’s 1859 separation from New 
South Wales as its start date. The particular features that emerged from the 
colony’s developmental process and assumed wide-ranging significance were the 
colony’s decentralised pattern of settlement, the influence of regionalism and the 
importation of Pacific Island labour. The notable derivatives of these factors were 
the enduring coloured labour question, the advent of separatist demands in 
Central and North Queensland and the politicisation of white labour. These 
iv 
domestic issues had both a local and intercolonial impact on the consideration of 
the federal question and therefore are a focal point of this thesis’ examination.  
 
Broadly stated this thesis’ fundamental argument is that Queensland’s indifference 
to and inconsistency in the federal movement was a consequential result of the 
colony’s political and populist fixation on the rapid development of its vast 
resources, which prompted a series of volatile political and social issues. In 
essence Queensland was too preoccupied with its own internal matters to 
consider the development of a peripheral movement. Yet, alternatively these 
domestic Queensland issues galvanised the federal movement in the other 
Australian colonies by presenting a concrete practical issue that required federal 
action. The final convolution in the Queensland account was that the principal 
domestic impediments to the colony’s consideration of the federal question in the 
late 1890s, the separation and labour movements, emerged as decisive factors in 
Queensland’s narrow affirmative vote to enter into the federal compact.  
 
This thesis does not promote a ‘Queensland is different’ or more important or 
instrumental argument, but rather portrays the complexity of the federal story 
within the dynamics of one colony. In reinstating the individualism of the 
Queensland account it presents a more workable understanding of Queensland’s 
‘paradoxical’ performance. 
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Introduction 
 
To the accompaniment of ‘the boom of cannon, military pomp and splendour, the 
waving of a myriad of flags, [and] triumphal processions’ the six Australian 
colonies officially federated on the 1st of January 1901 to create the ‘world’s 
newest nation’ the Commonwealth of Australia.1 The inauguration of the 
indissoluble political union between the six hitherto separate and autonomous 
colonies was contemporarily acknowledged as ‘the greatest event that has ever 
happened to Australia in all its hundred years of history’.2 Accordingly, a body of 
literature developed to record how this nationally defining event came to pass.  
 
A distinguishable feature of the historical accounts of the Australian Federation 
Movement, as the historians Geoffrey Bolton and Duncan Waterson have 
observed, is the tendency of ‘most accounts of the coming Federation…to gloss 
over the Queensland chapter.’3 No manifest reason is offered, within the 
conventional accounts, to explain the application of an interpretative framework 
that has resulted in Queensland’s story becoming ‘one of the dark spots in the 
history of federation’.4 To determine what set of variables sanctioned the cursory 
coverage of Queensland necessitates an examination of how the movement itself 
was contemporarily portrayed and the relation that this had on the subsequent 
historiographical process. In charting the establishment of an inherent criterion, 
which graded colonial participation in the movement on the basis of conformity to 
the ‘mainstream’, the consequent limitations in the historiography will be outlined 
                                                 
1
 ‘Editorial’, Brisbane Courier, 2 January 1901; ‘The Commonwealth of Australia’, Ibid, 1 January 1901. 
2
 ‘The Commonwealth “Courier”’, Ibid, 1 January 1901. 
3
 Geoffrey Bolton and Duncan Waterson, ‘Queensland’, Helen Irving, (ed.), The Centenary Companion to 
Australian Federation. Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 1999: 93-127. 
2 
as a means to define the approach and rationale of the thesis. The underlying 
premise of this thesis is that the conventional historiographical approach has, by 
design, extracted the federation movement from the context-dependent 
environments of each of the Australian colonies. Yet, it was within these 
geographically and politically bounded communities that the federal idea was 
considered, ignored and decided upon. As the historian Brian de Garis 
acknowledged in 1972: 
the story in each colony was different. In a sense there were six federation 
movements rather than one, and the march of each colony towards the 
inauguration of the Commonwealth needs to be ‘placed’ in the context of its 
own history.5  
 
To construct a practical understanding of Queensland’s part in the political 
movement to create a federal system government is the purpose of this thesis. It is 
not a detailed account of the negotiations between the colonies but a contextual 
analysis of what sort of community Queensland had been, was and was 
becoming, and how the federal idea interacted with this distinctive environment.  
 
The shortcomings in the coverage of Queensland’s involvement in the federation 
movement cannot be attributed to a lack of interesting features. On the contrary, 
‘no colony…[wa]s more brimful of questions’ than Queensland and these parochial 
issues fashioned a dynamic colonial response to the federal initiative.6 This 
response however resulted in Queensland’s participation in the federal movement 
being contemporarily described as ‘especially lukewarm’, ‘wayward and backward’ 
                                                                                                                                                    
4
 Alan Jenkins, 'Attitudes Towards Federation in Queensland', Unpublished MA Thesis, University of 
Queensland, 1979: vi. 
5
 B.K. de Garis, 'Some Reflections on the Problems Involved in Writing a History of the Australian Federation 
Movement,' Early Days: Journal of the Royal Western Australian Historical Society, 7: 4 (1972): 29-35. 
6
 ‘An Australian M.P. Some Colonial Problems’, Daily Chronicle, 22 January 1894, 'James. G. Drake Papers 
UQFL 96', Fryer Library, University of Queensland .  
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and ‘somewhat different from that of the other colonies’.7 Such distinctions served 
not to highlight the idiosyncratic qualities of the Queensland situation but only to 
mark it as deviating from the movement’s purported orthodoxy.  
 
A core dynamic of the federal scheme was its conceptualisation as a national 
movement cultivated through repeated ‘appeals to the sentiment and patriotism of 
Australian Unity’.8 The rhetorical underpinning of this was the subjective emphasis 
on Australia’s purported geographical unity, ethnic homogeneity and cultural 
uniformity.9 The main implication was that Australia was destined by its geographic 
and socio-political sameness to become one nation - ‘all our paths converge 
towards union’.10 The ‘imagined community’ of Australia was an aspect dwelt upon 
in the speeches and literature on the federal topic and was epitomized in the 
movement’s slogan ‘One People, One Destiny’.11 The implied extension of this 
blend of sentiment and idealism was that the six Australian colonies were moving 
in unison towards the inevitable goal of a united Australia. Much credence was 
attached to the rendering of federation as a national movement and it ultimately 
functioned as the central view or category against which ‘alternatives’ were 
marginalised. It was however an artificial construct. Moreover, it was counter-
factual, as by design it endeavoured to overlay and therefore obscure the reality of 
                                                 
7
 Sir James Garrick to Sir Samuel Griffith, 16 September 1896, 'Sir Samuel Walker Griffith Papers. 
Correspondence, 1894 - 1900. MSQ 189', Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, Sydney ; Sir 
George Turner cited in Speeches on Australian Federation by the Premiers of Victoria, South Australia, 
Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia. Mr Deakin and Lord Brassey. Melbourne: Messers Geo 
Robertson and Co, 1899: 11; ‘Press Cutting', 3 September 1899, 'James Dickson Papers: OM 67-13', John 
Oxley Library, State Library of Queensland .  
8
 Undated clipping from Table Talk, UQFL 13/57, 'George Essex Evans Papers UQFL 13', Fryer Library, 
University of Queensland, Brisbane .  
9
 Douglas Cole, ''The Crimson Thread of Kinship': Ethnic Ideas in Australia, 1870-1914,' Historical Studies: 
Australia and New Zealand, 14: 56 (1971): 511-23. 
10
 Sir John Cockburn, ‘Federal Constitution: Resolutions, 10 March 1891’, Official Report of the National 
Australasian Convention Debates: Sydney, 2 March to 9 April, 1891. Sydney: George Stephen Chapman, 
Acting Government Printer, 1891: 203. 
4 
the Australian situation in which there existed significant geographic, economic, 
social and political differences between the colonies. More decisively, there 
existed an enduring suspicion, rivalry and jealousy amongst the Australian 
colonies engendered by the geographical distances between them and the 
distinctive process by which each had been settled and developed. As the 
historian H.L. Harris phrased it ‘‘the crimson thread of kinship’ ran through them all 
but it did not bind them together….In short the spirit of narrow provincialism had 
developed’.12  
 
In the Australian context, the extent of provincialism was such that each of the 
colonies regarded themselves as the administrators of their own ‘national 
existence’.13 Six separate national entities proved a formidable barrier to the 
fostering of an overarching Australian nationalism. The Brisbane labour weekly the 
Worker therefore sceptically asked in July 1899: ‘“For Australia!” What is 
Australia.…Under existing conditions, it is nothing more than five syllables of 
wind.’14 Isolationism was an associative trait of the colonies’ separate identities. In 
alignment with each colony’s identification of themselves as a distinct country each 
treated their neighbours as a foreign state. This aspect of colonial relations was 
profiled in the first edition of the Commonwealth in 1894, as a significant problem 
that federation would optimistically abolish:  
At the present time it is an undoubted fact that notwithstanding our 
community of origin, language, and religion, a feeling of alienism is rapidly 
developing in each colony against persons coming from other colonies. 
                                                                                                                                                    
11
 At the banquet to mark the occasion of the 1891 National Australasian Convention Sir Henry Parkes 
proposed the main toast of ‘One People, One Destiny’. It was increasingly employed as the slogan for 
federation appearing in literature and on badges, flyers and banners. 
12
 H.L. Harris, Australia in the Making: A History. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1940: 294. 
13
 ‘A New View of Federation’, Sydney Morning Herald, 2 October 1898.  
14
 ‘Federation, Higgs and the Bulletin’, Worker, 1 July 1899.  
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Such new-comers are often regarded as strangers and intruders. Now, this 
fatal tendency would be checked, if not destroyed by Federation.15  
 
The most compelling testament to the pervasive and enduring force of separatism 
was the pragmatic adoption of federalism as the political system that best suited 
the Australian conditions. The aim of a federal system, Karl Cramp outlined:  
is to bring together under a political bond a number of States without 
sacrificing their individuality. The States still retain their separate existence 
and independence in some particulars, though they surrender their powers 
to a central government in matters that affect the Federated States in 
common.16  
 
A federal system of governance accommodates existent regional differences by 
recognising the rights of the component areas to continue their individual 
characters.17 The manner in which this is practically implemented is through the 
creation of two spheres of political rights and two spheres of citizenship, 
colonial/state and federal. Federalism, as a contemporary described it is ‘a ship of 
State with two keels.’18 Defining the boundaries of the federal sphere was the 
fraught and protracted phase of the Australian deliberations. The dominant motif in 
the extensive debates on the federal idea was the sanctity of each colony’s 
independent and autonomous existence.  
 
The formidable influence that provincialism had on the federal cause was formally 
acknowledged at the 1891 National Australasian Convention. To appease the self-
protective traits of provincialism four resolutions were introduced by the president 
of the Convention, Sir Henry Parkes to ‘establish an enduring foundation for the 
                                                 
15
 The Commonwealth was a publication of the Australasian Federation League. Commonwealth, 1 October 
1894 cited in R. Norris, The Emergent Commonwealth. Australian Federation: Expectations and Fulfilment 
1889-1910. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1975: 31. 
16
 K.R. Cramp, The State and Federal Constitutions of Australia. Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1914: 106. 
17
 K.W. Robinson, 'Sixty Years of Federation in Australia,' Geographical Review, 51: 1 (January 1961): 1-20. 
18
 Hutcheson Macaulay Posnett, 'The Federal Constitution of Australia,' Fortnightly Review, 75 (January - 
June 1901): 969-88. 
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structure of a Federal Government’.19 The first of these Parkes claimed was 
‘imperative’ 
to satisfy the mind of each of the colonies that we have no intention to 
cripple their powers, to invade their rights, to diminish their authority….that 
neither their territorial rights nor their powers of legislation for the well-being 
of their own country will be interfered with in any way that can impair the 
security of those rights, and the efficiency of their legislative powers.20  
 
Given that the federalists were required, through necessity, to formally 
accommodate the individualism of each of the six Australian colonies to advance 
the cause of federation, we might expect that this decisive feature of the 
movement would be addressed in the historical accounts of federation. The 
recognition of the independence of these colonial societies would provide the 
essential context for understanding the complexity of the processes through which 
nationhood was achieved. The initial body of literature on the federal cause, 
however, did not incorporate such a focus. Rather, it followed in tenor and style 
the conceptualisation of federation as ‘the inevitable ultimate welding of these 
colonies into “one people one destiny.”’21 The complexity of the multiple realities 
within the Australian context was largely expunged from the collective national 
account of the celebrated moves that shaped the destiny of Australia.  
 
A distinguishing feature of the collection of works that developed on the federal 
achievement in the first two decades of the Commonwealth was the proportion 
that were written by the prominent ‘actors in the political drama’ that had resulted 
in the federation of the colonies.22 These personal accounts and memoirs built 
                                                 
19
 Sir Henry Parkes, ‘Federal Constitution: Resolutions’, 4 March 1891, Official Report of the National 
Australasian Convention Debates: Sydney, 2 March to 9 April, 1891.: 24. 
20
 Ibid.  
21
 ‘The New Order’, Brisbane Courier, 1 January 1901.  
22
 Henry Gyles Turner, The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth. A Chronicle of Contemporary 
Politics 1901-1910. Melbourne: Mason, Firth, & McCutcheon, 1911: ix; John Cockburn, Australian Federation. 
London: Horace Marshall & Son, 1901. Digital text version: http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/fed; W. Harrison 
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upon the official chronicle of the federal movement, The Annotated Constitution of 
the Australian Commonwealth by John Quick and Robert Garran, published in 
1901. The drawback to this distinction however was that the selection and 
depiction of events offered by these triumphant federalist’s had an enduring 
influence for they remained under examined by Australian historians. This was a 
problem allied with the embryonic state of Australian history as a professional 
discipline. 
 
Encumbering the process of writing the history of the Australian Federation 
Movement were a variety of problems that were associated with the slow 
development of Australian history as a professional discipline. A core reason for 
this slow development was the generic absence amongst Australians of an 
historical consciousness of their own past. In 1883, the distinguished British 
historian, James Froude was struck by the Australian lack of historical awareness 
during his tour of the colonies.23 A decade later Flora Shaw, drawing on her much 
celebrated Australian tour, declared that:  
It has been said that Australia is uninteresting because she has no past; but 
the interest of Australia lies forward, not behind….She alone of all the 
continents has no history. So be it! She is content.24  
 
The apparent lack of a past prompted little demand for the establishment of a 
specialised field in Australian history. Thus in 1913 the historian A.C.V. Melbourne 
                                                                                                                                                    
Moore, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia. London: John Murray, 1902. Digital text version: 
http://setis.library.usyd.edu.au/fed; B.R. Wise, 'The Struggle for Union: Episodes in the Movement for 
Australian Federation. Part 1,' Lone Hand, (1 August 1912); B.R. Wise, The Making of the Australian 
Commonwealth 1889-1900: A Stage in the Growth of the Empire. London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1913; Sir 
George Reid, My Reminiscences. London: Cassell & Co, 1917; Alfred Deakin, The Federal Story: The Inner 
History of the Federal Cause. Melbourne: Robertson and Mullens, 1944. The inclusion of Deakin’s account in 
this collective is based on the fact that it was written at the close of events though not published until 1944 
Deakin never revised the manuscript after he completed it in September 1900 - three months before Quick 
and Garran completed their 1000 page volume. 
23
 ‘Aspects of Australian History’, Sydney Morning Herald, 27 October 1923 cited in ‘Press Clippings’, Gall 
Collection, UQFL 43/G/280, Fryer Library, University of Queensland. 
24
 Flora Shaw, 'The Australian Outlook,' Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, 25 (January 1894): 137-
65. 
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beseeched that ‘it is time that Australian history was taken seriously by 
Australians’.25 History, as a specialised discipline, was on the curriculum of 
Australian universities but not until 1927 did there exist a specific subject or field of 
research in Australian history.26 The subject however generally remained 
unappealing, except to a small vanguard of honours students, until the 1950s. This 
factor proved to be a significant and compounding problem in the development of 
a historiography of federation.  
 
Though ‘Australia, a Nation’ or similarly named chapters were incorporated into 
the general history texts of Australia immediately after 1901, the majority were not 
written by Australian based or trained historians.27 Furthermore, the initial detailed 
studies on Australian federation were largely produced overseas. The 1907 
publication, The Early Federation Movement in Australia was written for example 
by the Canadian Cephas Allin.28 Additionally, the only doctorates submitted on the 
topic of Australian Federation in this early period, were submitted by two 
candidates at the University of Paris.29 At a more fundamental level, the absence 
                                                 
25
 Melbourne, ‘Methods of Historical Research’: 18.  
26
 The first full-time course in Australian history was offered in 1927 however no full-time lecturer in the subject 
was appointed until 1948. Stuart Macintyre, 'The Writing of Australian History,' D.H. Borchardt and Victor 
Crittenden, (eds.), Australians: A Guide to Sources. Sydney: Fairfax, Syme, and Weldon Associates, 1987: 22. 
27
 Joseph Finney, The History of the Australian Colonies. Sydney: W.A. Gullick Government Printer, 1901; J. 
Grattan, Grey, Australasia Old and New. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1901; T.A. Coghlan, The Seven 
Colonies of Australasia. Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1902; Arthur W. Jose, History of Australasia: From the 
Earliest Times to the Present Day, with a Chapter on Australian Literature. 3rd Edition Revised and Enlarged. 
Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1909; A. Wyatt Tilby, The English People Overseas. Volume V. Australia 1688 -
1911. London: Constable and Company Ltd, 1912; Ernest Scott, A Short History of Australia. London: Oxford 
University Press, 1916; F.L.W. Wood, A Concise History of Australia. Revised Edition. Sydney: Dymocks Book 
Arcade, 1944. 
28
 C.D. Allin, The Early Federation Movement of Australia. Kingston, Ontario: The British Whig Publishing 
Company, 1907. 
29
 French academic work on Australian Federation was an extension of the interest shown towards the topic 
particularly from 1897 when federation seemed likely to succeed. Initially, the forthcoming federation prompted 
discussions over the need to formulate a strategic regional plan to safeguard French interests in the Pacific. 
Georges Biard d’Aunet the French Consul General in Sydney anticipated that Australian unity was likely to 
result in the growth of Australia’s ‘desire for outside expansion…and its ambition to reign over the Pacific will 
take a menacing dimension.’ The advantages of Federation were however the main basis of French interest. 
France supported the process of centralisation as Australia’s first step towards severing the links with Great 
Britain. Independence from Britain would furnish the means of developing more direct and closer links with 
Australia, especially in trade. Edouard Picard, ‘La Federation Australeinne’, unpublished Doctor of Letters 
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of a specialised field of research in Australian history poses questions of the 
standard of the earlier body of historical work. Of particular concern was the 
general practice of drawing heavily on testimony or first hand experience to 
overcome the absence of a body of documentation.30  
 
A.C.V. Melbourne outlined the dynamics of the problem in 1913. In a paper 
presented at the inaugural meeting of the Historical Society of Queensland, 
Melbourne essentially denounced the value of the existent body of work on 
Australian history: 
Brilliant literary men have attempted to write history. The results of their 
efforts have often been valueless, because their facts are wrong. Their 
authorities were unreliable; they did not make use of original sources of 
information. They depended upon secondary authorities; men who did not 
write disinterestedly….The consequence is that their work, while being 
literature, is not history….All attempts which have been made to write the 
history of Australia so far have failed. Either the evidence of contemporary 
documents has been insufficiently made use of or the historian has allowed 
himself to reflect a distorted view of the past, and a view the truthfulness of 
which has been destroyed by his own partiality. 31  
 
The salient issue that Melbourne was contesting was the standard of objectivity in 
historical writing. In the first phase of publications on the federal topic this is a 
pertinent concern. The core body of authors were politicians who had also been 
                                                                                                                                                    
thesis, University of Paris, Sorbonne, 1900; Rene Guyon, ‘La Constitution Australeinne de 1900’, unpublished 
PhD thesis, University of Paris, Sorbonne, 1902; Ivan Barko, 'French Perceptions of Australian Federation,' 
New Federalist: 7 (June 2001): 32-43.  
30
 In 1887 Henry Parkes unsuccessfully advocated the establishment of a State House, which would include ‘a 
suite of rooms suitable for the proper keeping and exhibition of such archives, records and memorials of the 
colony as may hereafter be collected and preserved.’ Parkes recognised a connection between 
documentation, historical writing and the development of an Australian historical consciousness: ‘If ever we 
were to become a great people it would only be by feeling that we had a history, and if we were ever to feel 
that we had a history the ideas must inculcated upon the youth of the country.’ It is not however until the early 
1920s that South Australia became the first state to establish an archive for the systematic deposit of the 
state’s official records. Investigations by the Commonwealth government led to the preparation of a bill in the 
1920s but it was not until the post World War II era that a national archive was created for the systematic 
collection and preservation of Australia’s historical records. Queensland appointed an official archivist in 1959; 
it was the last State to do so. Parkes cited in Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: 
Manipulation, Conflict and Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994: 169; Macintyre, 'The Writing of Australian History’: 17; Geoffrey Bolton, 'Duncan Waterson: A 
Lapidary Historian,' Journal of Australian Studies, 66 (September 2001): 9-19. 
31
 A.C.V. Melbourne, 'Methods of Historical Research,' The Historical Society of Queensland Journal, 1: 1 
(1913): 17-24. 
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key figures in the federal movement. Undeniably, these personal accounts on the 
internal workings of the movement are valuable to the student of history - this was 
their acknowledged purpose. Bernhard Wise stressed in his 1913 publication, The 
Making of the Australian Commonwealth 1889-1900: A Stage in the Growth of the 
Empire that: 
This is not a historie documentee of the movement towards Australian 
Federation, (that should be the work of an Australian University), - nor 
another study of the constitution, nor a memoir, but the record by an eye-
witness of the making of the Commonwealth during the critical period from 
1889 to 1900, which aims at giving to a later generation a more vivid picture 
of that time.32  
 
In the preface of The First Decade of the Australian Commonwealth, Henry Gyles 
Turner reflected on the historical value of a contemporary record: 
It is generally held that personal predilection, or unconscious bias, renders 
an impartial review of contemporary history an all-but-impossible 
task….The setters-forth of those facts, “the hodmen of literature” are not 
without their value to the philosophic student, who, in another century, may 
seek to work out the harmonious relations of cause and effect in connection 
with national development.33 
 
Fundamentally, the accounts of the ‘federation fathers’ are narrative historical 
documents, as they were not written ‘disinterestedly’.34 They are coloured not only 
with an inevitable contemporary bias to promote/record the historical significance 
of the federal movement but also by the personal inclination of the authors to 
assert their own key involvement, and often their colony’s, in the ‘political drama’.35 
The problem that developed with these texts is that they long-remained the 
principal accounts of federation. A more detailed examination of the federal 
process, drawing on these and other sources and written with the assistance of a 
                                                 
32
 Deakin also left it ‘to the student of the future to comprehend and criticise their work…to digest and 
comprehend its significance and the circumstances of its adoption.’ Wise, The Making of the Australian 
Commonwealth 1889-1900: iii; Deakin, The Federal Story: 3.  
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degree of distance from the event did not eventuate for seven decades after the 
inauguration.36  
 
A significant contributor to the void in the federal historiography was the formidable 
bearing that Australia’s participation in World War I had on the Australian 
perception of their nationhood. The poignancy of the symbolism ascribed to ‘the 
grand epic of our part in the Great War’, particularly Australia’s ‘baptism of fire and 
bloodshed’ on the Gallipoli peninsula in Turkey on 25th April 1915, was such that it 
superseded the inauguration of the Commonwealth as a more definitive 
representation of Australia’s achievement of nationhood.37 ‘A nation’s born where 
the shells fall fast’ wrote the poet Henry Lawson.38  
 
The interface between military conflicts and the forging of national entities and 
identities is a dynamic feature of the histories of all nation states. Australia’s 
nationhood had however ‘not come to birth under pressure of war’ but was built 
‘under peaceful skies’ and though this attribute was rhetorically praised it failed to 
engender an emotional sense of national unity or greatness.39 Discernible in 
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12 
Professor G.A. Wood’s overview of ‘our political story’, presented in his 1914 
introduction to Karl Cramp’s The State and Federal Constitutions of Australia, is a 
palpable sense that there was a missing element in Australia’s history and in the 
federal achievement: 
The political story of Australia is not an obviously interesting story….There 
have been no wars of conquest, for a handful of people were dowered with 
a continent; no wars of defence, for the continent was protected by the fleet 
of Nelson….The great battles of freedom had been already fought and won 
before Australia came of age….Our story has not been the story of a people 
striving to be free….We miss the great battles for great causes; the 
heroisms and the martyrdoms; the inspiration of the lives of famous men.40  
 
War was the revered marker of history and thus Australia’s involvement in ‘their 
first great war’ was accorded particular significance.41 The heroics of the first 
Australian Imperial Forces engendered a ‘thrill of [national] pride’, which fashioned 
a collective self-definition and identity.42  
Gallipoli! Gallipoli! A name – 
A name? A people’s coronet! A signed  
And sealed certificate of nationhood.43 
 
Australia’s then Prime Minister William Hughes unequivocally endorsed war as the 
dominant symbol of nationhood: ‘Australia became a nation…We had earned that, 
or, rather our soldiers had earned it for us.’44 The nationalist tradition created 
through the public commemoration of war summarily displaced the political 
formation of nation.45 The federal topic, as a result, was largely consigned to the 
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margins of the national story or as Geoffrey Blainey aptly phrased it, the subject 
became ‘a no man’s land in Australian history’.46 Without scrutiny the interpretation 
presented in the early works on federation was preserved as the true and orthodox 
account of the federal movement.  
 
Celebratory or triumphal in tone and purpose these texts were heavily imbued with 
the prevailing nineteenth century concept of ‘Progress’. They were, in the main, 
works that functioned as a fulfilment of an obligation to document and publicise the 
progressive unfolding nature of the federal movement towards the inevitable 
accomplishment of nationhood. The inherent problem with such terms of reference 
is that deviations from the dominant paradigm are often silenced. The Queensland 
case can be advanced as an illustrative example of this dynamic in that it can be 
argued that there is an evident correlation between the colony’s ‘somewhat 
different’ involvement and the tendency to ‘gloss over’ Queensland’s part in the 
movement.47 The general brevity of space allocated to Queensland in the 
accounts of federation is not however an isolated incident. A similar fate has 
befallen Western Australia, Tasmania and to a lesser extent South Australia. 
Arguably, a significant contributor to this ostensible bias is that New South Wales 
and Victorian statesmen wrote the majority of the early accounts on the federal 
movement and introduced the themes for much subsequent work.48 Within these 
texts considerable weighting was placed on detailing and promoting the key 
contribution that the author’s own colony made. In his preface Bernhard Wise 
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made this point quite apparent: ‘If the narrative appears to Australians to move too 
much in New South Wales, they, also need to be reminded that this was the 
pivotal Colony of the Australian group, and that in no other was there any 
contest.’49 At its core such partiality was symptomatic of the enduring rivalry and 
jealousy between the Australian colonies. Against this backdrop the construction 
of a single cohesive version of the federal movement, which covered the process 
by which the federal union was achieved between a group of colonies identifying 
themselves as six separate countries, was logistically a patently difficult task.  
 
The approach adopted to minimise the evident tensions between the existent 
provincialism and the inspired sentiment of nationalism was a focus on the formal 
political negotiations between each colony’s political leaders, undertaken 
principally during the 1890s at the various intercolonial meetings, conferences and 
conventions on the federal question. The result was a narrative of the making of 
the Australian Constitution, which established a chain of political events or 
markers that delineated the movement’s progress towards its objective. It was 
therefore heavily imbued with the idea of national destiny and the growth of 
national sentiment. Such a viewpoint afforded little scope for the detailing of the 
separate internal colonial issues that shaped a colony’s response to the federal 
idea or for the consideration of the workings of a significant opposition. In effect 
the federation movement was artificially lifted out of the individual dynamic settings 
of the six Australian colonies to establish a ‘shared’ national narrative. Evaded 
were the complex antecedent forces and factors of each colony’s distinctive 
political culture.  
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The ‘Historical Introduction’ to Quick and Garran’s ‘monumental tome’ The 
Annotated Constitution of the Australian Commonwealth was the exemplar of the 
consultative forum approach, but it did nevertheless furnish the most detailed and 
arguably the most objective of the early accounts of Australia’s federal history.50 
Though neither were historians, a distinctive feature of the collaboration between 
these two eminent lawyers and significant participants in the federal movement 
was that John Quick was from Victoria and Robert Garran from New South Wales. 
This ostensibly tempered the rivalry between the two colonies for pre-eminence in 
their account of federation.51 Their volume has long been regarded as the ‘Book of 
Authority’ on federation, yet approached from the perspective of the smaller 
colonies its subjective selection of the political markers to illustrate the 
movement’s progressive character effectively negated variations, and upheld the 
leading role of the larger colonies in the federal drama.52 The absence of an 
authoritative counter voice to Quick and Garran’s ‘historical exegesis’ and the 
‘narratives’ of key federalists, in conjunction with the general neglect of the topic 
by historians ensured, by default, that this restricted focus on the intercolonial 
negotiations became the template for analysis.53 Its interpretative influence 
remains decisive.  
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Despite significant developments in the study of Australian history, historians 
continue to adopt a framework of analysis, as the historian Bryan Jamison argued, 
that largely follows the ‘orthodox contours of writing on the history of federation, 
with the intercolonial conferences and conventions of the 1890s providing the 
primary staging posts for their extended narratives.’54 The essentially static 
character of the analytical approach to the federal topic consequently offers little 
scope to redress the partiality shown towards to the smaller colonies and to what 
was assessed to be non-conventional. Identifiable in the standard treatment of the 
federal movement are three elements that continue to enforce its delimiting 
qualities. First, an enduring focus on the 1890s period; second, an emphasis on 
the larger colonies and thirdly, the avoidance of internal provincial circumstances, 
which at crucial times significantly affected events.  
 
There has been a manifest trend in the federal historiography to concentrate on 
the 1890s as the decade that constituted as Robert Garran phrased it, the ‘real 
federation movement’.55 Taken as a whole, this decade did represent the most 
concerted and productive phase of the federal movement yet its pre-eminence in 
the federal story belies the movement’s longevity and equates to examining the 
end without exploring the beginning or middle. Quarantining the 1890s is at odds 
with the contemporary view of the movement’s protracted existence. In 1881, the 
journalist John Henniker Heaton satirically commented that he would like to entitle 
a paper ‘A History of the Thousand-and-one Attempts and Failures to bring about 
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Federation in Australia.’56 Ten years later, Sir Henry Parkes remarked in the 
opening debate of the 1890 Federal Conference that:  
The first thing that occurs to me is that most of us have little thought how 
old a question this subject of federation really is amongst us. I have been 
really surprised myself, in going back to the earlier records, to find that it 
was the child — the fondled child — of the greatest men we ever had in any 
of the colonies.57 
 
Continuity was an additional element that was increasingly emphasised, for it 
demonstrated past progress and conferred an historical lineage and therefore 
authenticity to the federal movement. A recurrent feature in significant speeches, 
editorials and publications on the federal question in the 1890s was a review of the 
‘history of the Australian Federal movement’.58 This attention established a line of 
progress from all ‘past’ proposals for some form of Australian union to the ‘present’ 
consideration of the federal question. The general perception was therefore, as a 
1900 publication outlined, that ‘the Federal story is a long one – one is almost 
afraid to say just when the beginning was.’59 Quick and Garran confirmed that the 
federal ‘roots penetrate deep into the past’ by locating the ‘Germ of Federation’ in 
Governor Fitzroy’s 29th September 1846 despatch.60 This was, the authors argued, 
‘the first recorded suggestion of the need of some central intercolonial authority.’61 
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From this professed starting point, Quick and Garran proceeded to outline the 
evolution of the movement through a chronological review of the various 
manifestations of the federal question in the lead up to ‘the great effort at 
Federation’.62 Each episode (though separated by time) was placed on a 
continuum linking all prior considerations of the federal scheme and the 1890s. 
This trend of tracing the ‘gradual evolution’ of the federal idea was at variance to 
the far narrower timeframes proposed by the various participants’ in their federal 
accounts.63  
 
The ‘Federal Beginnings’, the New South Wales politician and federalist George 
Reid submitted, occurred at the November 1883 Australasian Convention in 
Sydney:  
This gathering of Australasian statesmen had two main objects in view, the 
extension of British annexations and protectorates in the Western Pacific, 
and the establishment of a Federal Union of limited scope as the beginning 
of greater things.64  
 
Alternatively, the South Australian federalist John Cockburn claimed in 1900 that 
‘the period occupied in the gestation of the Commonwealth has been eleven 
years.’65 Bernhard Wise was in agreement and explained that:  
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On October 24, 1889, Sir Henry Parkes made the great speech, 
which…marks in decisive fashion the beginning of a new era in Australian 
politics. Others before him had advocated Federation; but he was the first 
who made his appeal directly to the patriotism of the people; so that, from 
this day forward, the desire for Union, which had floated before men's 
minds as a vague aspiration for many years, took definite shape.66  
 
Such opinions constructed an artificial divide between all previous efforts in the 
cause of federation and the new ‘higher movement’.67 That the principal 
chroniclers of the federal movement were most active in 1890s arguably presents 
a viable motive for favouring this period. Historians however, from the first 
analytical interest in the federal topic engendered by the commemorative impulse 
of the 50th anniversary of the inauguration in 1951 to the present, have most 
commonly adopted Parkes’ 1889 Tenterfield Address as the springboard for the 
historical examination of the federal movement.68 As a result, the 1890s are 
conventionally accepted as the ‘usual period for the study of federation’.69 
Certainly, during the 1860s, 1870s, and to a lesser extent the 1880s the federal 
idea had a ‘painful and languid existence’ yet to entirely disregard the ‘early’ 
federal endeavours distorts the historical account.70 Broadly stated it obscures the 
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evolution of the federal idea from an idealistic vision to that of practical politics. 
Additionally, it conceals the dynamic and enduring impact that the Australian 
process of colonial settlement and development had on the federal question. More 
specifically the focus on the later phase of the movement displaces and devalues 
the contribution of those developments that occurred in the preceding decades.  
 
The perfunctory treatment of the 1886 formation of Australia’s first federal body, 
the Federal Council of Australasia, is the clearest example of the diminutive status 
accorded to earlier developments. From the Queensland perspective this is 
especially problematic, for Queensland laid claim to being ‘the parent of the 
‘national’ movement in Australia’ based on its key role in activating the process 
that led to the establishment of the Federal Council.71 Moreover, the inaugural 
January 1886 session of the Federal Council was declared to be ‘the first beat of a 
national pulse’.72 Yet in the federal historiography, as Professor La Nauze outlined, 
‘it is customary to look back on its [the Council’s] existence…as fruitless’.73 The 
historical accent on the Council’s lack of legislative results has obscured the 
overarching fact that in November 1883 a unanimous agreement, between all the 
colonies, was for the first time reached on the question of federation and this 
constituted the movement’s most significant and practical advancement after more 
than thirty years of advocacy. To the Melbourne correspondent of the Sydney 
Morning Herald, the significance of the 1883 achievement was such that he 
declared that ‘when the history of this epoch comes to be written, this first 
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beginning of comprehensive Australian nationality will occupy several chapters.’74 
Contrary to this contemporary expectation the extraordinary circumstances that 
brought about, in November 1883, ‘the most remarkable meeting that has ever 
taken place in these Australian colonies’ occupies little more than a brief 
acknowledgement in the federal story.75 This can largely be accounted for by the 
succession of the ‘real federation movement’, which has marginalised this period 
of the movement’s history. Yet, at odds with this is the almost universal coverage 
given to the June 1883 linkage of the railway systems of Victoria and New South 
Wales. The symbolism attached to the ‘iron wedding’ between the two larger 
colonies was such that it was claimed to be ‘the first step towards welding the 
Australian colonies as one great nation’ but as an event it did not substantially 
alter the prospects of the federal movement.76 That the ‘extraordinary undertaking’ 
of Queensland’s Premier Sir Thomas McIlwraith in April 1883, acknowledged as 
the catalyst for the concerted colonial action on the federal question, has been 
allocated less space in the federal account than the New South Wales/Victoria rail 
union highlights a significant discrepancy and/or bias.77 Other antecedents to 
federalism have been similarly devalued. Certainly, the independent and 
unprecedented action taken by Queensland in attempting to annex the eastern 
half of New Guinea to prevent ‘the Island being taken possession of by a foreign 
power’ does not bear the hallmarks of a federal initiative. In fact it was an action 
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that portrayed the strength and utility of colonial individualism rather than 
demonstrating any need for a federal body to coordinate colonial action on matters 
of mutual concern. Yet, as a result of Queensland’s ‘adventurous’ act (or more 
particularly the Imperial Government’s refusal to sanction the annexation) two key 
matters emerged that would propel the federal idea from an idealistic vision to that 
of practical politics: specifically, the issue of defence and an escalating 
antagonism over Queensland’s maintenance of a coloured labour force.78 There is 
a distinct correlation between these two factors and McIlwraith’s declared and 
suspected motives. As is discussed below (Chapter 3), McIlwraith consistently 
argued that his action was one of defence to thwart German designs in New 
Guinea. The suspected ulterior motive was that he undertook the annexation 
solely to obtain a new field for the recruitment of coloured labour.79 The unresolved 
nature of this ‘startling’ event within the standard account of federation, in 
conjunction with Queensland’s associated claim that it was the ‘parent’ of the 
federal movement, is the basis for the New Guinea annexation and the 
establishment of the Federal Council being a particular focus area of this thesis.80 
The objective is to coalesce the complex and diverse elements of Queensland’s 
domestic political situation, McIlwraith’s renowned ‘bold, prompt, and masterful’ 
style of leadership; increased French activity in the Pacific; the public campaign by 
British and Victorian humanitarian/religious groups against Queensland’s labour 
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policies; the British Government’s anti-Imperialist policy and its establishment of 
successive enquiries into labour recruitment with McIlwraith’s ‘precipitate’ action.  
 
This approach is particularly pertinent as no Queensland federalist furnished an 
account of the movement and therefore the merit of Queensland’s action has been 
reliant on the assessment of the other colonies.81 An inclination ‘to be a little 
censorial with regard to the conduct of Queensland’ was a feature generally noted 
by Queensland’s premier Sir Hugh Nelson in 1897.82 The judiciousness of this 
statement is largely corroborated by the larger colonies’ account of the events of 
1883.83 The Victorian record acknowledged Queensland as the provider of the 
necessary stimulus for federal action, yet the greater emphasis was placed on the 
November 1883 Federation Convention or more particularly the decisive work of 
their premier James Service. Deakin therefore claimed that ‘it was Mr. Service’s 
Convention, in fact as well as in name, for he supplied it with all its motive power 
and material.’84 New South Wales, in contrast, suspected the motives of Victoria, 
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and though it voted for the Council’s establishment it later refused to join the 
Federal Council which it branded ‘a Victorian invention. As such it became a point 
of patriotism with many New South Welshmen to belittle and oppose it.’85 The New 
South Wales account consequently evaded the whole episode by commencing its 
federal account with the 1889 initiative of its premier Sir Henry Parkes.86 The 
centrality of the larger colonies in their versions was representative of an 
operational bias that was neither new nor specific to the historiography of 
federation. The Queensland Figaro reproachfully declared in early 1883 that: 
There is one feature of all these federal schemes which crops to the 
surface. Our big neighbours always think of themselves as playing first 
fiddle in the Australian concert with all the little(!) colonies like Queensland 
keeping time obediently.87  
 
In 1959, Professor La Nauze presented the broader historiographical ramifications 
declaring that ‘any general account of Australia still seems more or less off-centre 
to any student outside New South Wales and Victoria.’88 Alternative versions that 
concentrated on the role of the smaller colonies began to emerge under the 
commemorative impulse engendered by the 50th anniversary of the Inauguration of 
the Commonwealth. 
 
In 1951 the subject of Australia’s federation remained a ‘huge, barely tapped field 
of research’ despite the growing ‘discovery’ of Australian history as a legitimate 
and professional field of study.89 In the cluster of interpretative work that was 
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produced at this time on the federal topic, primarily at the journal article and thesis 
level, a modified approach emerged that both aided and hindered the development 
of a fuller understanding of the dynamic colonial elements associated with the 
federal achievement. The most noteworthy was the 1949/1950 article exchange 
between R.S. Parker and G. Blainey that asked new questions of the ‘formation of 
our federation.’90 Parker, based on his statistical analysis of the different colony’s 
campaigns for the 1898, 1899 and 1900 referendums on the Constitution Bill, 
endeavoured to determine what it was that the popular majority voted for.91 He 
concluded that ‘the people in general…judged it [federation] not on a class basis, 
and not on a State right basis, but in terms of regional economic interest.’92 
Blainey in response had ‘serious doubts whether the federal impulse is really 
dependent on the concurrence of…economic interests.’93 Moreover, he argued: 
Faced with an array of arguments, patriotic, political, economic, racial, 
personal, it is dangerous to simplify the electors’ motives without making a 
thorough study of the Federation campaign in particular localities.94  
 
The intrinsic value of this debate is not in the dispute over definitive causes, but its 
broader contribution in initiating further research work that applied a new set of 
interpretative paradigms to the federal topic.95 In applying the points raised by 
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Parker and Blainey, historians moved away from the collective national account 
and adopted a more colonial based focus.  
 
On two fronts this proved problematic. First, there was a tendency by the smaller 
colonies in particular Western Australia, South Australia and Queensland to 
decisively offset the larger colony view and retrieve their colony from its marginal 
significance in the federal account. Through a decidedly subjective approach to 
the topic, substantive evidence was submitted to prove their leading or influential 
role in the movement. Two representative titles illustrate this objective, R.L. Reid’s 
‘The South Australian Influence on the Proposals for Federation’ and C.G. 
Austin’s, ‘Influence of Queensland on Federation’.96 What was presented in 
general was a set of broad statements based on a prejudicial selection of 
particular events. In the case of Queensland, Austin declared without elaboration 
that ‘this State which had led the Federal Movement, now dropped to the rear’ and 
that ‘Queensland played as prominent part at the end of the Federal story as she 
had at the beginning’.97 Three events were outlined: the 1883 New Guinea 
annexation, Sir Samuel Griffith’s 1891 role in ‘drawing up the first draft of the 
Australian Constitution’ and the 1900 determined stand by Queensland’s delegate 
to London James Dickson to have ‘the right of appeal to the Privy Council’ 
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incorporated into the Constitution.98 Austin made no attempt to explain what 
factors contributed to Queensland’s withdrawal from the federal movement; thus 
his overall contribution to the federal historiography is diminutive. The second 
problematic feature of the new interpretative focus was the further contraction of 
the period under examination from the conventional 1890s period to one specific 
event, typically a colony’s referendum campaign.  
 
Employing the same-targeted focus of Parker and Blainey, Louis Green limited his 
1951 analysis ‘The Queensland Attitude to Federation’ to Queensland’s 
September 1899 referendum on the Constitution Bill. Green stressed that his 
thesis was not an account of Queensland’s contribution to the movement nor was 
it a description of the various historical stages but ‘rather a picture of the 
complexion of public attitudes on the question at the time when Queensland 
decided to enter the federation.’99 The idea that the referendum campaigns were 
the decisive events in the federation movement is an accurate but also a 
problematic supposition.  
 
The referendum campaigns in each colony do notionally offer a discrete case 
study of the pivotal issues raised with regard to the federal question, as each was 
a colonially specific event. Yet such a concentration on a singular event 
necessarily separates it from the complexities of what has gone before. The 
antecedent forces and factors that determined the trajectory of the federal cause 
towards these specific events are as a result generally under-acknowledged. 
Green’s analysis of Queensland’s ten-week referendum campaign in 1899 did 
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present a ‘reference to previous developments’ but only if the issue was judged to 
have had a direct influence on the referendum results. Such a retrospective 
approach presupposes that only those events or arguments that had prominence 
in the referendum campaign shaped the outcome. Thus, because the question of 
territorial separation was ‘more important’ in Central Queensland during the 
referendum campaign it occupied the focus of Green’s enquiry.100 Relegated 
therefore were the significant and recurrent interactions between North 
Queensland’s separatist demands and the federal movement.101 Yet, when 
juxtaposed against the limited body of interpretative work available in 1951 on the 
developmental history of each colony, Green’s analysis is notable for it introduced 
into the federal account the workings of some of the key idiosyncratic traits of 
Queensland’s development; regionalism, coloured labour and separation.  
 
The slow development of an Australian historiography did undeniably impede the 
initiation of a more comprehensive interpretation of the federal cause. The 
segmentation of the federal movement, by historians into manageable units such 
as the 1890s or the federal referenda was arguably a manifestation of the 
significant gaps that existed in Australia’s historical knowledge. Brian de Garis 
accordingly noted in 1972 that:  
One obvious reason why historians have been slow to come to grips with 
the federation movement is the sheer volume of research involved….The 
would-be historian of the federation movement could hardly be expected to 
carry out all the background research himself and until very recently little 
detailed work had been done on the history of the colonies in the late 
nineteenth century…but the years between 1860 and 1900 tended to 
remain the Cinderella of Australia historiography.102  
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From the 1960s, there did develop the interpretative basis for constructing the 
historical and political context of the colonies in the mid to late nineteenth century. 
In the body of work that was produced primarily from within the emerging 
subdisciplines of Australian history (that of social, race, labour and regional 
history), new and alternative versions were presented to the standard monumental 
account of Australia’s history. To the historian John Hirst, the ‘preoccupation’ with 
these new fields of enquiry ‘led to the abandonment by historians of any interest in 
federation whatsoever.’103 Allan Martin corroboratively recalled that during the 
1970s ‘Federation seemed, for all but a few of us, a dismal and unexciting subject. 
So speculation did not continue.’104 Indirectly, however, this period was of great 
assistance to the federal historian for the innovative modes of historical 
scholarship presented a new comprehensive basis for understanding the 
dynamics of the late nineteenth century. In essence they provided the foundational 
tools to construct a fuller treatment of the federal story than the conventional 
celebratory version. In the particularly neglected field of Queensland history the 
foundational work produced in this period by Geoffrey Bolton on North 
Queensland, Beverly Kingston on pastoral settlement and land policy; Duncan 
Waterson on the Darling Downs and Queensland politicians; Raymond Evans, Kay 
Saunders and Kathyrn Cronin’s on race relations and Denis Murphy on the labour 
movement delineated the matrix of dynamic forces that resulted from 
Queensland’s process of colonial development: pastoralism, regionalism, sugar, 
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coloured labour, separatism and labour.105 The development of new perspectives 
on Australian and Queensland history did not however immediately influence the 
historiography of federation. These insights, particularly those of Queensland 
historians, have not yet been fully incorporated into a Queensland account of 
federation. Thus in 1979 the distinguished political scientist L.F. Crisp argued:  
The fact is we have yet to produce a comprehensive and authoritative 
account of the Federation Movement of 1883-1901. J.A. La Nauze has 
given us his The Making of the Australian Constitution, a masterly ‘standard 
work’ on the actual constitution-making. But for the wider story we still do 
not have even some of the principal constituents. No senior Queensland 
historian has yet brought together the issue of personalities, the inter-House 
rivalries, the Kanaka issue in the sugar areas, the separation movements in 
Central and North Queensland, which contributed to making the 
Queensland Federation story distinctive.106 
 
Almost anticipating this critique was Alan Jenkins’ 1979 Master thesis ‘Attitudes 
Towards Federation in Queensland’. Jenkins’ comprehensive research and his 
integration of the key regional, social and labour dynamics with the question of 
federation constitutes the most significant contribution to topic of Queensland and 
Federation to date, an achievement that belies his narrow focus on Queensland’s 
referendum and the accent placed on testing Parker’s theory of the causal primacy 
of economic factors.   
 
The only alternative to Jenkins’ work has been the scholarly attention directed 
towards the role of Queensland’s prominent political figures. Ross Johnston’s 
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1963 Masters thesis ‘The Role of the Legal Profession in Queensland in the 
Federation Movement, 1890-1900’, examined the significance of the legal and 
idealistic contributions that were made to the federation movement by nine of 
Queensland’s lawyer-politicians, with a particular focus on the ‘very special role’ of 
Sir Samuel Griffith. In the Queensland chapter of the historiography of federation 
Griffith has occupied ‘the centre of our Federation mosaic’ to an extent that 
Queensland’s involvement in the movement largely equates to Griffith’s 1891 
triumph as being the principal draftsmen of the Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth.107 Roger Joyce’s biography of Griffith does concentrate on 
Griffith’s federal work but this is offset by the insight given into his premierships 
and complex personality. In form and focus these works follow the ‘orthodox’ 
historical account of federation as the various federal conferences and 
conventions are the key connectors of these narratives.  
 
At various stages individual historians began to pinpoint some of the restrictions 
inherent in the orthodox and post-1950 causal approaches to the topic of 
federation as a means of mapping a way forward to a more comprehensive 
account. Brian de Garis in his 1972 review of the problems involved in writing a 
history of the federation movement argued principally that the federal ‘story in 
each colony was different’.108 Furthermore, he stressed the need to move beyond 
‘just the negotiations between premiers about federation’ and the concentration on 
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the referenda as a means to explain why the colonies federated and direct 
attention to the ‘complex interaction of economic and social changes [and] the 
vagaries of local politics’.109 In 1975 the New South Wales federal historian 
Rosemary Pringle rejoiced, prematurely from the perspective of the Queensland 
work that ‘at last the economic interpretations of the federation movement are 
being knocked off their lone pedestal and the movement is being given the fuller 
treatment it deserves.’110 Pringle argued that nothing was inevitable about 
federation, as it was required to negotiate ‘the normal pattern of party and 
personal rivalries on which colonial politics were based.’111 Any fuller explanation 
‘must keep the parliamentary scene in focus throughout the period.’112 Twenty 
years later the matter of the historical approach of seeking a definitive cause of 
federation occupied the political scientist Glenn Rhodes. In his work on the 
federation referenda, Rhodes outlined the fallacies inherent in endeavouring to 
determine the specific causes or hierarchy of causes for ‘it invites a simplified 
response…and over-simple answers inevitably fail to do justice to the complexity 
of the topic.’113 The establishment of a satisfactory historical and political context 
was all-important to his examination of the voting returns of the various 
referendums as each was ‘a spatially and temporally-specific event’.114 Context 
and the individuality of each colony’s method of integrating a national issue into 
the framework of colony’s political, economic and social were the two core 
recommendations of these historians.  
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The opportunity for a renewed effort developed in the late 1990s with the 
commemorative impulse engendered by the Centenary of Federation. A vast array 
of publications were produced on all manner of topics associated with federation. 
These ranged from pictorial depictions of Australian life in 1901 to documentary 
collections to biographies of prominent participants to the ‘first comprehensive 
general history of Federation’, The Centenary Companion to Australian 
Federation. Many of the more serious academic works remained tied to the 
orthodox approach; limiting the timeframe to the 1890s and preserving the ‘larger 
state’ view and consequently they present as predictable chronicles. From the 
Queensland perspective, Geoffrey Bolton and Duncan Waterson’s chapter on 
Queensland in The Centenary Companion to Australian Federation was the sole 
contribution in this period. Limited by the constraints of a chapter and 
acknowledging that ‘much basic research has still to be done to supplement and 
revise the rather elderly theses of writers…on the Queensland federal movement 
and its opponents’ the authors only managed to touch on many of the distinctive 
features of Queensland’s involvement in the movement. Despite these efforts to fill 
the ‘big black hole’ in Australian history, Marian Simms argued that broad 
questions remain: ‘What was the relative role of particular groups, classes and 
individuals in its construction? Did the process of constructing the Federation 
occur differently in the component parts?….These are some of the questions the 
Sesquicentenary of Federation may well be asked to answer.’115 
 
This thesis aspires to address these questions in the Queensland context. Its 
central argument is that course undertaken by the Australian colonies towards 
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political union needs to be examined from within each’s individual colonial setting. 
It was within these distinct territorial units that each addressed, shelved and 
reconsidered the question of federation. Additionally this thesis claims the 
necessity of a period of study that extends from the first intersection of the federal 
topic with the domestic political arena in order to distinguish the origins and 
identify the development of distinctive patterns in the colonial contemplation of this 
nationally defining question. The central ambition is to present a regionally defined 
perspective to reconstruct a purported national movement as a colonial 
experience. The focus on Queensland is not underscored by a ‘Queensland is 
different’ argument. Certainly, Queensland’s social and political background was 
different, but only in the sense that this applies to each of the other Australian 
colonies/states. All had differences in their political, social and economic 
arrangements, and their history.  
 
Chapter 1 surveys the principal traits of Queensland’s development in the first 
twenty years of self-government. The focus and style of the colony’s early 
governments laid the foundation of enduring and distinctive Queensland policies 
and qualities. The early manifestations of the federal idea are overviewed in 
chapter 2. This discussion extrapolates from an 1879 article by Sir Henry Parkes 
on the federal topic. An intriguing feature of this article was Parkes’ exclusion of 
Queensland from his proposed scheme for a partial federation. Chapter 3 
examines in detail the domestic, intercolonial and Imperial factors concerned with 
Queensland’s attempted annexation of New Guinea in April 1883 and argues for 
this episode’s significance in the federation movement. The colonial reaction to the 
Imperial Government’s refusal to sanction Queensland’s action and the 
subsequent establishment of Australia’s first federal body, the Federal Council of 
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Australasia is the focus of chapter 4. The premiership of Sir Samuel Griffith in 
particular his platform of liberal reforms and the intensity of the ensuing social, 
political and economic response are outlined in chapter 5. This matrix of local 
issues preoccupied Queensland in the late 1880s and into the 1890s and distinctly 
influenced the federal movement internally and in the broader intercolonial sphere. 
The final chapter explores the 1890s progress of the ‘real’ federation movement 
from the Queensland perspective and argues that while local issues continued to 
eclipse any consideration of the federal proposal, the broader question of 
federation exerted an influence on internal matters.  
 
Uncertainty, indifference, and suspicion were recurrent motifs in Queensland’s 
deliberations on the federal question of a political union with the other five 
Australian colonies. Similar features marked the discussions in the other colonies. 
Deakin reflected in September 1900 that:  
The Fortunes of Federalism have visibly trembled in the balance twenty 
times during the past ten years and have from the first moment to the last 
been subject to endless unforeseen and unpreventable interruptions, every 
one of which might have definitely postponed its triumph. Again and again it 
was made the sport of ministries and Parliaments and local agitations and 
just as often, indeed at every step, it benefited by their necessities and 
purely selfish actions.116 
 
The discussion that follows seeks to restore a sense of the complexity and 
uncertainty that surrounded the issue of federation within one of the Australian 
colonies. It is a departure from the collective all colonies under examination 
account of the inevitable federation, towards a more detailed examination of a 
predominantly political issue within the framework of an independent sociopolitical 
unit drawing out its particular characteristics.  
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Chapter 1 
  
‘Mistress in Her Own Home’1 - 1859 – 1880 
 
QUEENSLAND AN INDEPENDENT COLONY 
To the Editor of the Moreton Bay Courier 
Sir, - The barque of State is at last afloat and proclaimed by Imperial authority to 
be ready to navigate the dangerous seas of Politics, full of sunken rocks not 
apparent to a casual observer, and shoals as deceptive as they are dangerous.2 
 
 
The most contested issue throughout the protracted and often bitter 1850s 
campaign for the territorial separation of the Moreton Bay District from the colony 
of New South Wales was the capacity of the District to manage its own political 
and economic affairs. In the Imperial arena, Thomas Elliot, the Colonial Office’s 
Assistant Under-Secretary, concluded in 1852 that ‘there cannot be said to be the 
means at Moreton Bay of forming a good separate government.’3 Herman 
Merivale, the Permanent Under-Secretary, concurred and recommended, that 
while separation was ‘ultimately, not only desirable but inevitable’, a ‘simpler’ form 
of government was needed in the northern district.4 Merivale argued that a Crown 
colony, in which power was divided between a governor and a single legislature of 
elected and nominated members, was ‘more suitable to the present circumstances 
of Moreton Bay’.5 In 1859, under instruction from the new Secretary of State for 
the Colonies Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton, Merivale sought the advice of the British 
Crown Law Office on whether a crown colony government could be granted rather 
than responsible self-government. Merivale reiterated that the latter was ‘unfitted 
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for the early condition of a Colony like Moreton Bay.’6 The political inexperience of 
the colonists in the Northern District of New South Wales, in conjunction with 
Moreton Bay’s small population and ‘scanty’ revenue was the basis of the Colonial 
Office’s endorsement of a Crown colony form of government.7 In the colonial 
arena, the debate over the District’s separatist objective was a more lively and 
bitter rhetorical duel over competence and motives. 
 
Sydney, as the centre of governance for New South Wales, initially expressed its 
assessment of the Northern District’s ‘utter unfitness’ to govern its own affairs 
through ‘portions of laughter, pity, and contempt’.8 Criticism of the ‘misguided’ 
northerner’s demand for separation became more derisive when it was 
accompanied by the ‘desperate extremity of asking for convicts’.9 New South 
Wales was at the time fervently protesting to the Imperial government over its 
plans to resume convict transportation. The inclusion therefore in the northerner’s 
petition for separation of a declared willingness to accept convict labour provoked 
Sydney’s immediate censure of northern separation as a repugnant ‘false step’.10 
Conversely, it indicated the degree of frustration felt in the north by the District’s 
chronic shortage of labour and by the ‘middle district’s’ wholesale retention of 
assisted immigrants.11 This was ‘enough’, the Sydney Morning Herald 
uncharacteristically acknowledged, ‘to rouse very angry feelings, and to provoke 
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the adoption of very rash expedients.’12 By the mid-1850s calls for separation with 
‘exiles’ had waned and from then until 1859 the basis of the appeal was solely for 
independence. Southern opponents of the measure critiqued the district’s revenue 
raising ability and managerial skills. New South Wales’ Solicitor-General, J.B. 
Darvall argued that: 
To my mind never was so weak, so mischievous, so insane a measure as 
this proposed separation….look at the expense that must be incurred for 
the necessary Government staff that will be required. At least £100,000 a 
year will be required to cover this….And all this at a time when the revenue 
of Moreton Bay is hardly sufficient to support a corporal’s guard in a watch-
house.13 
 
The Sydney Morning Herald reproached the ‘lazy folks of Brisbane’ for their failure 
to utilise their own material resources and more particularly their inability to work 
together: 
They have never been able to establish a steam communication with 
Sydney, but, as much as they desire to be independent of the ‘middle 
district,’ are forced to rely upon a Sydney company to furnish them with 
steamboats, and upon Sydney merchants to undertake their whole external 
commerce….Their great staple of wool is endangered by the presence of a 
dangerous epidemic amongst their sheep, and yet they cannot agree 
among themselves as to what measures should be taken to check the evil 
and provide against its recurrence. A stock insurance company – the 
obvious remedy – was talked of, and went so far as to be organised, but 
like every similar movement of the kind in the north, it never survived the 
issue of the prospectus.14  
 
Evidence of Sydney’s mismanagement was the counter to these charges. 
Separatists protested, through the press and numerous petitions to the Colonial 
Office, that southern interests located in a distant government had impeded the 
progress of Moreton Bay by withholding immigrants, despite the north’s 
contribution to the immigration fund through local land sales and by the unjust 
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allocation of colonial revenue.15 Merivale acknowledged that their case had 
substance:  
The greatness of a colony, importance of its amount of population and 
revenue, etc., are poor compensations to men for being governed by a knot 
of townsfolk living 600 or 700 miles off: and this the Sydney [Legislative] 
Council practically is. The very Executive Council, though they give very 
temperate and reasonable answers to certain statements of the 
Memoralists, yet speak of them evidently rather as inhabitants of a distant 
dependency than as integrally one with themselves.16 
 
Northerners were resolute that for the district to prosper self-government was 
essential. Intimations that the Colonial Office contemplated conferring a Crown-
colony government were met with vocal animosity. The Moreton Bay Courier 
warned that ‘Separation should be resisted almost to the death on such terms.’17 
Delay by the Imperial authorities ultimately guaranteed self-government for the 
Northern district.18  
 
A provision of the 1855 Imperial Act, New South Wales Constitution Statute, 
bound the Colonial Office to grant to the new colony a legislature ‘in manner as 
nearly resembling the form of government…established in New South Wales.’19 
This Act had conferred responsible government to New South Wales and 
accordingly the new colony ‘Queen’s land’ was to commence its career with a 
bicameral legislature, consisting of a nominated Legislative Council and an elected 
Legislative Assembly.20 News of this decision arrived in Brisbane on the 10th July 
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1859 and ‘never was there such rejoicing’.21 The new colony, the contemporary 
historian J.J. Knight declared, had been ‘liberated from the galling position of being 
a mere dependency of a dependency’.22 Though the Northern District had been 
promoted to the status of a self-governing colony the nature of the settlement 
remained rudimentary. Queensland’s first Governor, Sir George Ferguson Bowen 
therefore found the colony in December 1859: 
small in numbers, poor in circumstances and its inhabitants only unanimous 
in their strong desire to have a Government and Governor of their own and 
to manage their own affairs in their own way, coupled moreover with a high 
notion of their capabilities as legislators, all the stronger because 
unaccompanied by any practical knowledge of legislative duties.23 
 
Yet in the face of these political, economic and geographical realities, there was 
unbounded optimism. The Moreton Bay Courier declared that ‘the great event of 
our history stands recorded. A new epoch in the annals of Australia has come to 
pass; ‘our era’ has commenced’.24 This chapter will survey the principal traits of 
Queensland’s development in the first twenty years of self-government. The 
formative stages of Queensland’s economic, social and political development are 
crucial to the construction of a more workable understanding of Queensland’s 
participation in the federation movement. The broad rationale for this examination 
of Queensland’s early history is drawn from the historian Brian de Garis’ 
observations that to present a judicious account of the federation movement it is 
essential ‘to understand what sort of communities the colonies had been, were 
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and were becoming.’25 More specifically, it is evident that the foundation of certain 
enduring and distinctive Queensland policies and qualities were established in this 
first phase of its independence. An overarching determinant and the wellspring of 
this new colony’s strident enthusiasm was an awareness that within their 
geographical boundaries existed a ‘potentiality of wealth beyond the dreams of 
avarice’.26 The desire of Queensland’s colonists to harvest these riches resulted in 
the idea of ‘progress’ through ‘development’ being particularly pronounced in this 
‘favoured infant nation’.27 The creation and application of practical legislation to tap 
the various resources of the colony became the axis around which Queensland 
politics immediately and persistently rotated. Land, railway and labour policies 
summarily emerge as the fundamental underpinning of the new colony’s political 
and populist platform for development. An imperative in Queensland’s 
developmental directive was rapid ‘progress’ to redress the colony’s delayed start 
and to propel it towards ‘a leading position among the other colonies.’28 Within 
these parameters, rapid economic development of the colony’s vast resources 
consistently superseded moral considerations; in Lewis’ words, these ‘conditions 
did not usually favour other worldly justifications of everyday actions…colonists felt 
a more or less sacred duty to develop their new environment.’29 Set in this 
formative phase of Queensland’s development was an enduring fixation on 
internal progress, which would consistently prove to be a serious impediment to 
the advancement of the broader ideal of political federation. Moreover, it would 
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produce policies that were particular to Queensland and at odds with the social 
and political principles of the other Australian colonies.  
 
Queensland’s principal asset at separation was the ‘140,000,000 acres’ of land 
within its borders.30 Accordingly, land policy and economic policies contingent on 
land policy dominated the colony’s early politics. The pattern of land development 
that emerged in the new colony during the 1860s and 1870s had had its 
foundations securely laid in the rapid expansion of pastoral settlement during the 
1840s and 1850s. The pre-separation incursions of squatters into the colony’s vast 
expanse of territory had pushed the frontier westward well into the Maranoa district 
and north into the lower Leichhardt district of central Queensland.31 The pace and 
the extent at which this occupation occurred bestowed on the new colony of 
Queensland two dynamic traits: the paramount importance of the pastoral industry 
and a decentralised pattern of settlement.  
 
In 1859, it was evident that Queensland’s future prosperity was dependent on the 
pastoral industry. Statistically, 70 per cent of the revenue and 94 per cent of 
exports were derived from pastoralism: it was the new colony’s only productive 
industry.32 Furthermore, its rapid expansion had continued unabated with 
Governor Bowen reporting in 1860 that: 
Fresh bands of pastoral settlers, driving their thousands of cattle, sheep, 
and horses before them, are fast pushing out into the wilderness; and it is 
confidently expected that, in the course of the next five years, there will be a 
chain of stations from Moreton Bay to the Gulf of Carpentaria…33 
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The economic success of the pastoral industry culminated in the idea of progress 
being inseparably attached to this ‘moving frontier’. The occupation of vast tracts 
of Aboriginal land invariably resulted in violent confrontations between Europeans 
and Aborigines. The whole squatting frontier became, in the words of the early 
Queensland historian William Coote, ‘a line of perpetual conflict, in which it is to be 
feared no small cruelty was exercised….There is selfishness in civilisation’.34 
Sociological theories formulated in the mid-nineteenth century by Herbert Spencer 
and Charles Darwin had presented the ‘perfect rationalisation’ for this violent 
contest over the colony’s principal resource.35  
 
The theoretical maxims of ‘natural selection’ or ‘survival of the fittest’ encouraged 
Europeans to ‘dichotomise humanity’ into ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ or ‘civilised’ and 
‘savage’.36 Deployed practically, these race theorems provided a legitimate 
rationale for the violent process of colonisation that occurred in Australia and 
resulted in the forceful dispossession of the Indigenous population from their land. 
Within Queensland, the strength of the colonists’ demand for the rapid and 
absolute control of its land resources was such that it fostered the most brutal 
application of race theory. 
 
Boyd Morehead, a prominent Queensland conservative and later premier, 
presented the underlying rationale of ‘what was being done in Queensland’ to the 
colony’s Aboriginal population: 
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The colonists had come here as white men and were going to put the black 
man out…The lower race must give way before the superior race…[It was a 
mistake] to try and initiate a course of action by which these poor creatures 
would be enabled to linger out an existence which was bound to cease on 
the advance of the Anglo-Saxon…The blackfellows had to go, and go they 
must.37 
 
The initial nature of the violence was sporadic. Aboriginal resistance to white 
occupation was aggressively countered by colonists in defence of their presumed 
innate and superior right to ‘occupy the country’.38 This state of affairs however 
quickly evolved into a more institutionalised ‘policy tending to extermination.’39 The 
vanguard of this policy was the ‘decimating activities’ of the Government-
sanctioned Native Mounted Police Force.40 Operating in small detachments of two 
white officers and five to ten Aboriginal troopers, this force ruthlessly carried out its 
instructions to ‘disperse any large assemblage of blacks’, and to dispense 
‘retributive justice’.41 These ‘barbarous corps of exterminators’ in collaboration with 
the settlers’ overt acts of violence by the gun, poison and savage dogs instituted in 
Queensland a ‘system of native slaughter…merciless and complete’.42 The 
government and the public in general remained ‘obstinately deaf’ to the various 
‘philanthropic’ voices who opposed the ‘cruelties practised on our blacks.’43 In the 
new colony of Queensland the vital link between economic prosperity, pastoralism 
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and the continual expansion of the frontier immediately and persistently took 
precedence over moral questions of the right or wrong of the frontier society’s 
methods of ‘internal protection.’44 Thus for the pastoralist, Charles Eden, the 
establishment of the force was a ‘question of absolute necessity, a choice between 
the protection of the pastoral industry of the country or the abandonment of that 
pursuit by the colonists.’45 In 1868, William Walsh, the Member for Maryborough, 
articulated in parliament an awareness that the Aboriginal issue was ‘an important 
question – one on which the honour of the country rested….for God’s sake remove 
this [Native Police] force that is such a stain upon us’.46 Internal or external 
concern over the manner in which policies were implemented in Queensland was 
at this time of little consequence. Queensland had been granted ‘the full blow of 
responsible government’ and this entitled the colony to be the ‘administrators of 
their own affairs’ and more importantly, impervious to any external interference in 
their internal affairs.47 Walsh’s estimation that the colony’s Indigenous policy would 
cast an indelible stain on Queensland would in due course prove accurate. In 1883 
the ill-repute engendered by Queensland’s treatment of its Aboriginal population 
would constitute the principal argument of the humanitarian and Imperial case 
against Queensland’s attempt to annex New Guinea. This dynamic event would 
exert a paradoxical influence on the movement for political federation.  
 
In the formative phase of Queensland’s self-government there immediately arose 
the familiar Australian dispute over what form of land usage was most desirable in 
a developing society. The extent of pastoral occupation prior to separation 
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elevated pastoralism as the most obvious means to establish and maintain an 
economic base. Claiming ‘an equal liberality’ was the colony’s burgeoning 
urban/agricultural sector.48 Agriculture, it was contended, was a higher form of 
land use than pastoralism for it offered a permanent improvement of the land, 
diversification of the economy and the encouragement of closer settlement.49 The 
contentiousness of these two differing social visions on how the colony’s lands 
should be utilised and the direction in which the economy should develop 
engendered an inordinate interest in Queensland’s first Land Acts.   
 
Bowen had been forewarned of this ‘irritating contest between rival interests’, and 
endeavoured to present ‘a conciliatory and equitable settlement of the land 
question.’50 Bowen’s objective was partially achieved in the four Land Acts of 1860 
that constituted the new Queensland Government’s land policy.51 A cautious 
compromise was presented through the designation of specific ‘agricultural 
reserves’ around each of the major ports and towns, where blocks between 40 and 
320 acres could be selected. Diminishing the effect of this provision was the 
prohibitive set price of £1 per acre and hence few were able to benefit from this 
tentative step to encourage the diversification of the economy.52 Squatting 
interests, meanwhile, were well satisfied with the provision of fourteen-year leases 
of areas up to 100 square miles (256 sq. km). Fourteen years was considered an 
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adequate timeframe because pastoralists believed that on the expiration of their 
leases, smaller settlers would have encroached upon their boundaries and this 
would require them to occupy new territory. Closer settlement in effect would result 
in a reclassification of the land as settled and this would cause the pastoral rents 
to rise. An additional but intrinsic factor that influenced the pastoralist’s attitude 
was their assumption that there existed an unlimited area of free land still to be 
exploited. Queensland’s first land policy did not, despite Bowen’s laudation, ‘settle 
that long quarrel between pastoral and agricultural interests which has raged in all 
new countries since the days of Abel’, yet it did furnish a notable precedent.53  
 
Both Bowen and Queensland’s first premier, the ‘imported opener’ Robert Herbert, 
attempted to promptly resolve Queensland’s land question, to avert a political 
clash between these two divergent interest groups.54 Two interconnected factors 
barred this endeavour. First, the vital economic importance of the pastoral industry 
to Queensland and second the fact that the new parliament was dominated by 
squatters.55 As a result of a ‘curious mistake’ the franchise arrangement for 
Queensland had not contained the 1858 amendment to New South Wales’ 
Constitution that granted universal suffrage, instead it re-subjected the northerners 
to a propertied franchise that predated New South Wales’ self-government.56 The 
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proclamation of 20th December 1859 by Sir William Denison, the Governor-
General in and over the colonies of New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria, South 
Australia and Western Australia, further compounded the situation.57 Under this 
proclamation, sixteen electorates were established to return twenty-six members 
to the Queensland’s new Legislative Assembly.58 The pattern of unequal 
distribution, Coote argued, had ‘purposely’ granted the pastoral interest an 
overwhelming preponderance in the legislature.59 William Traill’s 1886 account of 
the resultant state of affairs illustrates the discord evoked: 
Sir William Denison…managed…to leave to the new colony a legacy of 
internal feud, which for many subsequent years distracted the politics of the 
country and introduced discordant elements of party warfare, to the 
prejudice of useful and practical legislation.60 
 
Not surprisingly within this context, the new Government’s land policies principally 
accommodated the pastoral interest and this further fortified the political and 
economic primacy of pastoralism.61 Political power essentially remained in the 
hands of pastoralists until the mid-1870s and this fostered a ‘squatting stampede’, 
in which the number of sheep and the area taken up trebled in the 1860s.62 
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Alternatively, the agricultural sector had attained an implicit recognition in the 
Crown Lands Alienation Act of the principle that farmers were a more desirable 
type of settler than pastoralists. This however was effectively neutralised by the 
government’s insistence of an advance payment of £1 per acre.63 The agricultural 
reserves were as a result disparagingly described as the ‘anti-colonisation, or 
resident population obstruction scheme’.64 The pastoral industry’s economic 
dominance was therefore a decisive force in Queensland’s initial phase of 
government-directed development. Devoid of alternative means to generate 
revenue, Queensland was compelled to adopt an economically expedient 
approach rather than one based on principle. The propensity towards this 
approach became a persistent and overarching feature of Queensland’s politics.  
 
Government measures, conducive solely to material advantage, were a direct 
response to the colonists’ want for rapid progress through aggressive internal 
development. Such policies were generally unmindful of principles, moral factors 
or the long-term effects. In this economically reliant context the Courier, amidst its 
1861 anti-squatter campaign, was forced to acknowledge that the pastoralists’ 
demands needed to be heeded if Queensland was to continue to develop:   
Wool, tallow, and hides are the great staple products of our colony. Upon 
the successful working of the princely properties on which this produce is 
raised depends, under present circumstances, the growth and stability of 
the wealth of the country. The demagogue and the agitator may cry 
continually “down with the squattocracy” and denominate it a vast system of 
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monopoly, but their cry must be feeble, and their private opinion lost in the 
great fact that it is the great source of both the supply and demand of the 
country.65 
 
A corollary of the colonist’s demand for aggressive development was the desire for 
an interventionist government. Australians, as Keith Hancock asserted, ‘came to 
view the state as a vast public utility, which would be solicitous of their welfare in 
the dispensing of its blessings’.66 Queenslanders were not merely expectant of the 
Government’s benevolence but positively demanded its beneficence to furnish 
them with further privileges and progress through government legislature and 
expenditure.67 The seed of this mentality can be located in the pre-separation 
Sydney-based management of the Moreton Bay District.  
 
Sydney’s perception of the Moreton Bay District, after the 1842 granting of free 
settlement, was that it was destined to be merely ‘a profitable appanage to the 
parent colony, a mere outpost of not a very refined civilisation.’68 Accordingly, little 
interest or capital was devoted to the development of infrastructure. In spite of this, 
the Moreton Bay Courier detailed in its inaugural publication in June 1846 the 
extent of the community’s progress: ‘[c]hurches, schools, stores, shops, inns, 
dwelling houses, and erections for various purposes, have rapidly risen; 
settlements have become villages, villages towns.’69 Contrary to this apparent 
growth the newspaper argued ‘[w]e have the mortification of seeing…revenue 
squandered by a herd of overpaid official drones, in a manner that too plainly 
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bespeaks them ignorant of our wants and careless of our welfare.’70 While in effect 
the Sydney-based government had been a little more attentive to the settlement 
after 1842, the depreciating description of the Northern District ‘as a miserable 
hole’ was generally maintained.71 Queensland’s internal communication 
infrastructure suffered particularly under the weight of Sydney’s ‘tyranny, 
misrepresentation and neglect’.72 At the time of separation, the new colony had no 
telegraph line, rudimentary port facilities, no railways and a system of roads that 
were little more than a series of tracks.73 Self-government had provided the new 
colony with the means to amend this state of affairs. Bowen declared: 
All contribute to the revenue; all should benefit by its application….to bring 
home to all an equitable share of the advantages which the rapid 
development of your almost inexhaustible resources, due to your own skill 
and industry, will each year enable the Government to extend.74 
 
Not surprisingly ‘young Queensland’ went in ‘for public works on a magnificent 
scale.’75  
 
With no system of local government, the new Parliament held the public purse 
strings for all developmental projects, a situation which instituted a ‘roads and 
bridges’ political mentality. Members of Parliament were therefore the servants of 
their constituents and their needs were chiefly expressed in terms of state 
expenditure. Alert to the necessity of public works, Bowen was also conscious of 
the need to ‘check extravagance arising out of the constant “log-rolling” of a 
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Colonial Parliament.’76 Curtailment proved difficult against the weight of rivalry 
between the colony’s various centres of population to procure the government’s 
beneficent gift. ‘The contemptible history of local squabbles’ in Queensland was a 
direct and potent derivative of the process by which the colony was settled.77 
 
A characteristic feature of Queensland was its decentralised pattern of settlement, 
one that deviated markedly from the centralist tendencies of the other Australian 
colonies. This process was initiated by the official isolation of the Moreton Bay 
penal establishment, which strictly prohibited approach within fifty miles (80.5km) 
of the settlement until 1842. As southern pastoralists drove their sheep northwards 
into the ‘almost unknown interior’ of the Darling Downs district, the ban on access 
to Brisbane’s port facilities dictated the need for an alternative service centre and 
trade route.78 As a result Ipswich developed as an important inland centre for the 
squatters, in conjunction with the port at Cleveland. In 1842, when free settlement 
permitted access to Brisbane, Queensland’s first squatters held little or no 
allegiance to the town. What developed was an ‘altogether antagonistic’ rivalry 
between Ipswich and Brisbane, as each centre laid bare their claim to be the 
colony’s new capital.79  
 
The process of northern settlement further retarded Brisbane’s ascendance. 
Concurrent with the early pastoral occupation of land in the west was a northward 
expansion, and by the early 1840s this northern frontier had reached the Burnett 
and Mary rivers. After a failed attempt in 1842, a port was re-established in 1847 
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at the mouth of the Mary River from which vessels traded with Sydney. By 1850, 
Rockhampton had set up a port to service, direct with Sydney, the supply and 
export needs of the pastoralists in the area. The pastoral origins of these two ports 
highlight a significant feature of Queensland’s settlement: that it was regional 
economic interests rather than government policy that initiated the development of 
ports. In line with this fact the northward wave of pastoral expansion in the early 
1860s resulted in ten ports being established by 1865.80 At this early stage of 
Queensland’s economic growth Brisbane’s late start as a commercial base 
impacted on its growth and its future relations with these outposts.  
 
In contrast, Sydney and Melbourne were well-established, important mercantile 
and financial centres. The direct access they provided to colonial and overseas 
wool markets, and the squatters’ preference in particular for Sydney suppliers over 
the Brisbane’s nascent mercantile sector, resulted in Brisbane initially being 
circumvented.81 Direct communications with Sydney gave rise to the extraordinary 
situation that for northerners, for example from Rockhampton, to travel to Brisbane 
required a sea trip first to Sydney and then back to Brisbane.82 The remote south-
eastern location of Brisbane in an era of limited internal communications between 
the scattered pastoral communities, forestalled Brisbane’s development as the 
colony’s economic centre, a feature divergent from the other Australian capitals. 
By 1859 Brisbane had ‘inched ahead of its rivals’ and did contain the important 
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official and commercial buildings requisite for a capital.83 The most notable 
consequence of Queensland’s scattered pattern of settlement was the firm 
establishment of local or regional affiliations. In a colonial legislature preoccupied 
with the pragmatic demands of the frontier, these local loyalties were a significant 
and disruptive element. As Glen Lewis accurately noted, the ‘importance of 
regionalism in colonial politics at the time seems difficult to exaggerate.’84 
 
Traditionally these formative years of Queensland politics are presented as a 
perpetual contest solely between the rival interests of squatters and 
urban/agrarians based essentially on their contrasting attitudes towards land 
utilisation and settlement. The complexity of the period is more accurately 
described as a ‘kaleidoscope pattern of divisions’, in which alliances were altered 
and amalgamated by circumstances influenced by an overriding developmental 
notion and regionalism.85 To speculate on the contribution that the professed 
inexperience of Queensland’s parliamentarians had on this constantly shifting 
basis of political support is a fraught task. There is concrete evidence that the first 
parliament did lack experience. The Courier remarked in 1862 that it was 
‘composed of the most heterogeneous of materials; all sorts of men have found 
themselves thrust into a position of eminence which they could not have hoped to 
have attained twelve months before.’86 The Assembly’s first Speaker Gilbert Eliott, 
acknowledged that he was unfamiliar with parliamentary ‘business…but as none of 
the members know anything about it, they will not be a bit wiser should I make a 
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mistake.’87 It was, as A.A. Morrison succinctly acknowledged, ‘a band of 
enthusiastic amateurs.’88 More particularly, as the Courier had noted, it was made 
up of dissimilar elements that held a divergent range of ideals based on what 
William Coote critically called, an ‘undercurrent excited by self-interest and selfish 
fear’ over the future direction of Queensland’s development.89 These differing 
ideals were not explicitly embodied into two opposing camps but rather they had a 
vague and amorphous existence to which clarity was often conferred by 
regionalism. Queensland it would seem produced a type of pragmatic yet 
independent politician attracted by the potential economic benefits of the colony’s 
frontier conditions but guided by the more specific influence of their regional 
locality.   
 
While pastoralists had dominated the early entrepreneurial phase of Queensland’s 
development and had established and held a numerically commanding position 
within the parliament, there did also exist a burgeoning urban agrarian collective of 
merchants, shopkeepers and agriculturalists who identified themselves as 
Liberals. Yet beneath the apparent unity of these broad classifications of 
pastoralists and Liberals were disparate interest groups. Both were in essence a 
loosely woven unit of factions based on regionalism. The intersection of these 
regional factors with a political culture that saw the colonial government as a vast 
resource for public expenditure engendered a community-enforced independence 
within the parliament. ‘Local’ representatives avoided commitment to a 
parliamentary leader or ministry and forcefully advocated their regions’ interests to 
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obtain the required distribution of public money for the constituency’s 
advancement.90 A ‘bewildering picture of changing combinations’ was instituted 
under the premise that votes depended on action and actions depended upon 
votes.91 Results therefore, were the priority as the Member for Clermont, Oscar de 
Satge declared:  
the development of a great colony is something like that of “station 
improvements” which are constantly required and no new member of the 
legislature was held worth his salt by his constituents who did not try to get 
a dam made or well sunk on some waterless road, to say nothing of a jail, 
and a court-house for every opening township.92  
 
Regional wrangles over this form of public expenditure paled in comparison to the 
disputes that surrounded larger development schemes. Railways, immigration and 
land settlement were the tripartite focus of Queensland’s development and in the 
resulting fiscal contests over revenue expenditure the politics of territorial and 
economic gain were aggressively played out.  
 
Transport, in the formulation of government policy, was a major priority and the 
most integral mode was railways. Whilst there was uniform agreement on the 
conviction that a railway network would substantially contribute to the prosperity of 
the colony, by encouraging inland settlement and improving access to markets, 
conflict routinely arose over the two core questions of finance and location. The 
limited availability of private capital in the colony presented the Government with 
little alternative but to accept full responsibility for rail construction.93 In May 1863, 
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a Railway Bill was introduced into Parliament which proposed that a loan of nearly 
£1,000,000 be raised in London for Queensland’s first railway line from Ipswich 
‘into the interior’ to service the Darling Downs.94 The strength of opposition against 
the Bill was such that it resulted in the dissolution of Queensland’s first parliament 
in May 1863. The ensuing election, fought on the railway issue, returned the 
Government with a workable majority, which passed the Railway Bill in its first 
session.95 The primary basis of the conflict that surrounded the Bill was the 
general belief that committing the colony to such a huge debt was a reckless 
action and second it reeked of parochialism for it was apparent that the rail line 
would only benefit the southern squatting representatives. More directly, the 
discord was a consequence of the intra-regional rivalry between Brisbane and 
Ipswich and significantly, for later patterns of railway development, the inter-
regional jealousy of the central district.  
 
That Ipswich rather than Brisbane was chosen as the commencement site of the 
westward line left the capital isolated and seething. Additionally, it indicated the 
regional political influence of Ipswich’s member and Secretary for Lands and 
Public Works, Arthur Macalister. Under Macalister’s patronage, Ipswich was to 
maintain the same rate of growth as Brisbane until 1867 and this effectively 
preserved the pre-separation rivalry and antagonism between the two centres.96 
The first section of the westward line to Grandchester was opened in July 1865 
and extended to Toowoomba by 1867. This rail line substantially bolstered 
Ipswich’s standing through its engineered promotion as the colony’s principal 
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outlet for the wool wealth of the western pastoralists. The Brisbane Courier 
critically reflected that:    
We made the mistake at the outset of commencing our main line of railway 
at a distance from the principal port and principal centre of population; it 
starts from one second class provincial town and stops at another, and of 
course does not pay….The line has been constructed amidst gross 
blundering and grosser knavery.97  
 
Legislative approval for the terminus at Ipswich had been achieved through the 
political strength of the Ipswich/Downs pastoral connection. This collective had 
strenuously maintained their opposition to Brisbane’s ascendency as the focal 
point of the south.98 The rigidity of this stance was further detailed in the proposed 
plan for a southern rail line from Toowoomba to the New South Wales border to 
directly connect the Downs with New South Wales’ railway network.99 Proposals to 
extend the line to Brisbane consequently prompted staunch parliamentary 
resistance from this Ipswich/Downs block. The continued expenditure on rail 
developments for the Ipswich terminal was to the Hon. H.B Fitz, in June 1866, 
‘sufficient to convince me that they [the Government] never intend to bring the 
railway to the metropolis.’100 The enmity of this intra-regional rivalry was such that 
it affected the broader development of the colony. The early historian, Matt Fox, 
argued that to this Ipswich/Downs ‘bunch’: 
measures for the welfare of the country as a whole were of no importance. 
Administration might come and go, but for them there was only one bond of 
unity, one cause of opposition, one reason for support, the determination 
that Ipswich should continue to be the terminus of the southern railway.101  
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By 1872, as ‘propitiatory gestures to [the] clamouring Brisbane people’, three 
surveys had been undertaken to determine a railway route between Brisbane and 
Ipswich.102 Construction of the extension finally commenced in January 1873 and 
by July 1876 an uninterrupted railway connection between the two towns had been 
achieved. If Ipswich was, to use Glen Lewis’ phrase, ‘Brisbane’s regional Achilles’ 
heel’ then Brisbane occupied a similar position for Rockhampton.103  
 
The provocation for the conflict between Rockhampton and Brisbane was not 
surprisingly the manner in which parliament had allocated funding for railways. 
This dispute was symptomatic of an established and dynamic set of variables 
derived from Queensland’s regional pattern of settlement. As a port-based town 
Rockhampton, prior to separation, had ‘no connection whatever in commerce or 
trade’ with Brisbane; Sydney was its commercial partner.104 In effect, the 
settlement of the central region of Queensland had come from Sydney and this 
factor was plainly reflected in Rockhampton’s opposition to the Moreton Bay 
District’s separatist agitation. An 1855 memorial to the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies ‘distinctly and earnestly’ expressed the region’s reticence to be 
‘separated from New South Wales’.105 Furthermore, it argued that Rockhampton’s 
‘interests would be materially injured by any forced political connection with 
Moreton Bay as a separate and independent colony.’106 By 1859, this disaffection 
with Brisbane had taken on a new guise. Once separation appeared inevitable, 
Rockhampton campaigned against Brisbane being appointed the new colony’s 
                                                 
102
 Unidentified quote cited in Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland: 269. 
103
 Lewis, A History of the Ports of Queensland: 53 
104
 Petition against Separation from Landholders and Residents in the District of Port Curtis, 10 September 
1855 cited in V.R. de V. Voss, 'Separatist Movements in Central Queensland in the Nineteenth Century', 
Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, University of Sydney, 1952: 17-18. 
105
 Ibid. 
106
 Ibid. 
  61 
capital and presented itself as the more logical site. The generalised feeling of 
discontent against Brisbane was intensified by the practical problems associated 
with the region’s limited representation in the remote parliament. William Walsh 
outlined in 1865 the disproportion in representation:  
While Ipswich and its environs return six members, Rockhampton returns 
but one, although there is scarcely any difference in the population of the 
two places….As long as this House admits such a disparity in the 
representation of the different districts, so long will the northern towns, and 
especially Rockhampton, be justified in asserting that they are unfairly dealt 
with….the north has been for a long time utterly and unfortunately 
neglected. 107 
 
Though ‘literally overwhelmed’ in the Parliament, the northern representatives had 
opposed the Ipswich to Grandchester railway line specifically on the grounds that it 
was unjust to raise a public loan on the security of the whole colony, for it would 
require the appropriation of revenue generated in their region to repay a debt from 
which the area received no benefit.108 Compounding this was the comparatively 
insignificant expenditure on railways within the region in contrast to the amount 
allocated in the south. In 1864 £401,421 was spent from the loan fund, and of this 
the Northern regions received £29,904.109  Collectively these factors gave rise to 
the first venting of separatist agitation by Rockhampton’s pastoralists.  
 
By the mid-1860s, Rockhampton had attained regional supremacy in the centre of 
the colony’s east coast. To foster further inland settlement, a submission was 
tabled in the Brisbane-based parliament for the construction of a railway line west 
from Rockhampton. The 1867 Government response, was a 30 mile (48.3km) line 
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to Westwood derisively referred to as, ‘two sticks of rust leading to a gum tree.’110 
Dissatisfied central representatives from the late 1860s ‘placed all their weight’ on 
securing an extension of the railway. This endeavour was forestalled by the 
political manoeuvres of the south. Brisbane’s representatives would not support 
Rockhampton’s extension to Peak Downs unless the line from Brisbane to Ipswich 
was simultaneously approved. To protest against southern contrivance and to 
overcome the central representative’s numeric weakness within the parliament, an 
alternative course of action was instituted. Simmering separatist agitation from 
1867 consequently ‘reached fever pitch in Rockhampton’ during 1871.111  
 
In January 1871, the acting Governor, Sir Maurice O’Connell, forwarded a 
Separation Memorial to the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Kimberly for 
presentation to Queen Victoria. This memorial requested the territorial separation 
of the region north of the Dawes Range into a new colony to be called ‘Albertland’. 
In an accompanying confidential despatch O’Connell expressed the opinion that:  
there is evidently, as I gather from Mr. Palmer’s [the Premier] answer a 
reluctance on his part to make this matter a cabinet question, and I can only 
therefore forward this petition with the expression of my opinion that the 
matter to which it refers is not yet ripe for legislation.112 
 
Without the pronouncement of any opinion from the Queensland government, the 
Secretary of State was unable to advise the Queen to ‘take any steps’ on the 
separatist’s petition.113 This outcome highlights two factors that became a 
recurrent feature of future separatist agitation. First, the strategic approach of the 
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petitioners to seek Imperial action for what was essentially an internal colonial 
matter. And second, the Queensland government’s reticence to deliberate on 
separatist issues. O’Connell later reasoned that the Ministry’s inaction was closely 
associated with the maintenance of electoral support: 
Mr. Palmer represents a constituency North of Dawes Range and that in the 
event of an election his seat would be endangered by any show of 
opposition to the Petition, whilst all the other Members of the Ministry…are 
representatives of southern constituencies, and therefore in the apparent 
interest of those who return them opposed to it.114   
 
While O’Connell acknowledged there was a ‘stratum of real grievances’ against 
the Brisbane-based government, the early demise of the movement indicated its 
baser origin in Rockhampton’s material demands.115 Archibald Archer, a leading 
Separatist, later remarked that the movement ‘collapsed like a pricked 
bladder….the moment the Government chose to pay the price.’116 Palmer’s 
‘railway compromise’ was the price paid.117 Construction on the westward 
extension commenced in May 1872 and was fairly continuous until the line 
reached Longreach in 1892.118 George Thorn, Postmaster-General in Macalister’s 
1874-1876 ministry, additionally attributed the dormancy of Rockhampton’s 
discontent to the public works he had approved for the region:  
I gave the Rockhampton people that magnificent bridge that spans their 
river, and I gave them their post and telegraph office….The Rockhampton 
people received so many favours from the Government during the 4 to 5 
years I was in office, that during the succeeding Parliaments the separation 
cry [was] dropped.119 
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The root cause of separatist agitation can be broadly located in the languid 
manner with which the centralised administration responded and adjusted to the 
rapid economic development of the outlying frontier districts. Yet, the existing 
framework of regional rivalry did hamper the Government’s ability to respond. The 
legislative process of the Brisbane-based government was frequently stalled by 
political pressure from regional factions on the conviction that it was either a 
perceived local threat or smacked of patronage. In the formulation of government 
policy on railways, the active participation of Queensland’s virulent regionalism 
was unavoidable and resulted in the colony becoming heavy dependent on loans 
to construct the most decentralised rail system of any of the Australian colonies. 
While decentralised for the colony as a whole, the adopted railway policy of 
constructing lines westward from the coast was in effect a centralised policy for 
each of the regions. For once the rail links were established it attracted and 
directed a horizontal flow of inland traffic to each regions seaboard terminus, 
features that effectively strengthened political and economic regionalism.120 In the 
long term, this resulted in four railway networks, originating at the coastal towns of 
Brisbane, Rockhampton, Townsville and Cairns, with each line extending inland to 
the west. An essential requirement to ensure and sustain the anticipated regional 
expansion of settlement created by the construction of railways was the rapid 
introduction of population.  
 
Concern over the size of Queensland’s population had existed since the 1842 
establishment of free settlement in the Moreton Bay District. Progress, the 
colonists argued, had been retarded by an inability to attract large numbers of 
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southern settlers and was further compounded by New South Wales’ retention of 
immigrants, whose passage had been financed by the District’s contribution to the 
immigration fund.121 The District was plagued from the outset with an ‘almost 
insoluble’ labour problem.122 The magnitude and primacy of the District’s chronic 
labour shortage was demonstrated in the Moreton Bay and Darling Downs 
pastoralists’ resolute support for the Colonial Office’s early-1850s push to resume 
convict transportation; significantly deviating from the mother colony’s strong 
opposition. Moreover, as William Coote asserted, the extreme scarcity of labour 
was the initial ‘burden of their cry’ for separation.123 The want of immigrant labour 
remained after separation, as Governor Bowen declared it to be ‘the most pressing 
need of Queensland…to develop the rich and varied resources and capabilities of 
our vast territory’.124 Immigration was therefore considered a paramount issue in 
the concerted drive to accelerate Queensland’s development. Anxious to expand 
its population as rapidly as possible, the Queensland government instituted a 
vigorous program of state-assisted immigration. Statistically, immigration 
accounted for 70 per cent of Queensland’s growth in population, from the 
approximately 25,000 inhabitants on Bowen’s arrival in 1859 to 99,901 in 1868 
and 213,525 in 1881.125 This apparent success was however counteracted by the 
problematic elements of Queensland’s immigration schemes.  
 
Discontent among members of the Government and the community as a whole 
was provoked by the large expense involved and the perceived inefficiency of the 
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administrative machinery required in securing and despatching ‘desirable’ 
immigrants to Queensland. Queensland instituted a generous program of land 
grants and assisted passages to induce settlers to the colony and to overcome the 
appeal of America, Brazil, New Zealand and the other Australian colonies as 
migrant destinations.126 An innate problem in the colony’s ardent desire for 
immigrants was the significant cost incurred in the application of its immigration 
program. Anthony Trollope succinctly detailed the force and persistence of this 
ardency in 1876; the ‘colony, from the first, has been quite alive to the expediency 
– it may be said necessity – of bidding high for Englishmen, Scotchmen, and 
Irishmen, and has been tempted to bid too high.’127 To finance the strong 
commitment to immigration the ‘revenue-poor’ Queensland government expanded 
its borrowing.  
 
By the mid-1860s, Queensland’s increasing cycle of public debt, to underwrite the 
costs of its two major developmental projects of immigration and rail construction, 
had placed the economy on a precarious standing.128 Beset by the effects of a 
prolonged drought, low wool prices and stock losses due to the outbreak of pleuro-
pneumonia, the vulnerability of the colony’s pastoral dependent economy was 
exposed. The onset of an overseas financial crisis was the final assault, paralysing 
Queensland’s economy. Colonial Secretary Arthur Macalister advised the 
Governor on 14 July 1866: 
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The government account at the bank is largely overdrawn; our credit is 
stopped, and the Government cheques dishonoured. We are landing 
thousands of immigrants upon our shores without the means of paying for 
landing them from the ships, or of supporting them for a single hour. We are 
largely indebted for the conveyance of these immigrants from England, 
without the present means of meeting such indebtedness. 129 
 
The resultant curtailment of public works, mass unemployment and the hardship 
experienced by residents and the newly arrived migrants, provoked considerable 
social unrest within the colony and brought the policy of immigration under serious 
public scrutiny. Offsetting the demands for the permanent cessation of immigration 
was the gradual restoration of economic prosperity and the aggravation of labour 
shortages, both stimulated by the discovery of gold at Gympie in 1867.130 Criticism 
was then redirected to the type of immigrant rather than the numbers arriving.  
 
Optimistically, Henry Jordan, Queensland’s first Emigration Agent in Great Britain, 
claimed that the colony’s generous state-assisted immigration program would 
attract ‘the best class of honest, industrious, hard-working men, of good character 
and provident habits.’131 In practice, the type of immigrants introduced into the 
colony failed to meet community expectations. Censure was commonly directed 
towards the inefficiency of the selection process, but an inherent feature of the 
discord over the calibre of immigrants was the divergent social visions on land 
usage between Liberal/agrarianism and pastoralism. Agrarian aspirations, to 
diversify the economy and settle the land with ‘thrifty and contented’ immigrants 
who cultivated the soil, materially challenged the pastoral industry’s dominance of 
the economy.132 Agrarian petitioners consequently argued that:  
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in order to encourage agriculture and make it a great, prosperous and 
permanent interest in this colony, Queensland must be attractive as a field 
of immigration to English agriculturalists who by their skill and capital would 
convert the present barren and unprofitable wilderness into a fruitful field.133 
 
The introduction of the land order system of rewarding adult immigrants who paid 
their own passage to Queensland, with the allocation of land to the value of £18, 
superficially fulfilled the function of enticing a type of immigrant conducive to 
agricultural pursuits. Numerous factors eroded its merit. The location and 
smallness of the farm blocks often proved unworkable. Further, for reasons of 
inexperience, lack of finances or unwillingness to undertake the backbreaking 
labour involved, many migrants preferred to reside in Brisbane or other coastal 
towns. Land orders consequently became a tradable commodity and a boon for 
pastoralists who were the primary purchasers of the orders. It was consequently 
argued, that the failure of the land order system to settle migrants on the land and 
their resultant assemblage in towns was linked to the duplicity of squatters and 
their desire to secure a surplus of labour.134 
 
Liberals argued that pastoralists had deliberately created a pool of labour that, 
when seasonally employed, would bolster the industry and enhance its economic 
supremacy. Externally the land order system presented agrarian features, but its 
central design was an economically rational objective of using the land to entice 
migrants to colony. The offer of land to attract immigrants was a consequential 
solution to the tenuous state of Queensland’s revenue, which precluded the colony 
from offering monetary incentives to obtain a much-needed supply of labour. That 
the land set aside for this purpose did not present the new settlers with the means 
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to attain self-sufficiency was of little consequence and in this aspect the Liberal 
suspicion of the pastoral dominated legislature appears warranted.135 To the 
Liberal collective it was clear-cut that the machinations of pastoral interests 
underpinned the various amendments to the land order system and the assisted 
immigration schemes and were directed towards the creation of a labour pool. The 
Courier therefore considered the system of land orders as being: 
Highly satisfactory to the squatting interests, more especially to the 
members of it who are beginning to find out that their runs are capable of 
improvement, and that a liberal application of labour is necessary….But to 
small employers in the towns – to the small agricultural settlers – to the 
great bulk of the population…the present system is almost useless.136 
 
Pastoral impediments to agricultural settlement were particularly apparent in the 
land legislation. The provision of a system of survey before selection resulted in 
significant delays in the promised immediate settlement of intending 
agriculturalists. The Moreton Bay Courier argued that this was further 
compounded by the ‘culpable dilatoriness and insouciance of the Survey 
Department’.137 New migrants were, as a consequence, forced to remain in 
Brisbane often in ‘miserable and disgusting circumstances’ and to meet these 
financial constraints many were compelled to abandon their claims.138 In contrast 
to the expressed ideal of proclaiming agricultural reserves to attract population, the 
Liberals argued that the location, the limited amount, the high price and often the 
poor quality of the land made available for selection was more conducive as a 
deterrent to settlement.139 The object of the land legislation, the Empire concluded, 
was ‘to keep the newcomer out and retain the whole of the back country – to an 
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unlimited extent – as a commonage for the squatter.’140 The Liberal hope of 
initiating large-scale agricultural settlement in the colony was forestalled by the 
fact that the colony’s immigration scheme was not an independent or discrete 
government policy and featured only as a component of the broader land policy. 
The Government’s desire for population was therefore ostensibly geared towards 
the supply of labour rather than the settlement of agriculturalists.141  
 
The immigration boom of the 1870s and 1880s, attached to the government’s 
policy of aggressive development and financed by the commitment of vast sums of 
borrowed money, occasioned some assurance of government support for the 
establishment of agriculture.142 The Liberal preference for the thrifty farmer type 
was continually frustrated by the persistent problems entailed in the pastoralist 
designed land legislation, migrant departures to the southern colonies, a general 
disinclination for farming and a preference for town life.143 A tenacious feature of 
the Queensland government’s involvement in economic development, through its 
land, rail and immigration policies, was that it revolved around a principal reliance 
on pastoralism. The Brisbane Courier asked despairingly in 1865, ‘are we eternally 
condemned to be buried under a mountain of wool, hides and tallow?’144  
 
Advocates for the diversification of the economy argued that through a surplus 
production of agricultural raw products, an industrial manufacturing sector would 
develop and provide substantial economic support. The fostering of local 
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manufacturing was persistently overpowered by the government’s baser pastoral 
developmental aim, in which capital and labour were too valuable to be employed 
elsewhere. The Registrar-General consequently reported in 1861 that:  
Manufactories can hardly be said to have any existence in Queensland, nor 
does it seem in the least probable that the attention of its inhabitants will be 
turned to them for many years to come; the production of raw materials and 
the occupation of its vast unreclaimed territory will, for a long time, be more 
than sufficient to employ all their capital and energy.145  
 
The government-sanctioned diversion of capital and labour to assist in the 
agricultural pursuit of cotton in the 1860s was a notable variant, though it was 
qualified by the emphasis solely on cultivation rather than the combination of 
primary and secondary production. Interest in the rapid production of cotton in 
Queensland was peaked by two interrelated factors brought about by the Civil War 
in America. First, the war had significantly reduced Britain’s supply of cotton and 
this triggered an upsurge in the market price for cotton. Queensland’s new 
legislature therefore offered growers inducements of land for plantations and a 
cotton subsidy of fourpence a pound to accelerate the development of the existent 
infant industry into an agricultural staple which could re-supply Britain’s mills and 
complement the pastoral stable of wool.146 Aided by these government initiatives, 
the area under cultivation would expanded to 11,034 acres in 1867, with 6,196 
acres concentrated around Ipswich and this instilled a general confidence in 
Queensland’s potential to become a great cotton-growing country.147 Governor 
Bowen reported to the Secretary of State for the Colonies: 
The subject of cotton engrosses at the present moment a large share of the 
attention of the press and of the public generally, in this colony. It is felt that 
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nothing more fortunate for the steady prosperity of Queensland could occur 
than that, while pastoral settlers spread over the highlands and downs of 
the interior, some enterprising capitalist or association of capitalists, should 
introduce on an extensive scale the cultivation of cotton on the eastern 
seaboard and on the banks of the rivers.148 
 
Despite the ostensible promotion of agriculture, the manner in which the 
government directed this development was corrosive to agrarian aspirations. 
Government support of the production of cotton encouraged the development of 
large-scale resource rich plantations in response to the economic position of the 
colony and the requirement of considerable capital, before a viable crop was 
possible; factors that prevented the mass production of cotton by independent 
small-scale holdings. Liberal opinion was outraged by what they perceived as a 
conspiracy to form an agricultural counterpart to the squatter – a new planter 
class. Acrimony was further aroused by the assertion that a plentiful and cheap 
supply of labour was required to ensure the success of the industry. 149 
 
Petitions to the Legislative Assembly in 1860, from cultivators, detailed the 
contentious claim that for the profitable production of cotton, coloured labour was 
indispensable. Bowen was conjointly requested, through further petitions, ‘to 
approach the Government of India with a view to facilitating Coolie immigration to 
Queensland.’150 Bowen was a significant patron for the introduction of this form of 
labour; a position that rested on his sincere conviction that white men were 
incapable of the strenuous work required in the northern areas of the colony. To 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies Bowen argued that:  
All reasonable men of every side admit that if the resources of the vast 
intertropical districts of Queensland are to be developed at all, they must be 
                                                 
148
 Lane-Poole (ed.) Thirty Years of Colonial Government: 116-117.  
149
 Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland: 126-127; Johnston, The Call of the Land: 57; Rolfe, ‘The First 
Parliament of Queensland’: 118 –119. 
150
 Quote cited in Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland: 126. 
  73 
developed by the aid of Asiatics of some race, and that, if capitalists and 
colonising companies are not permitted to introduce Indian labour under 
proper regulations and supervision, they will ere long deluge Northern 
Australia with Chinese, Malays, Polynesians, and hordes of other 
barbarians under no regulations or supervision whatsoever.151 
 
Enlivened to the opportunity to accelerate development, the Queensland 
Parliament passed the Indian Immigration Act in 1862, which provided the 
conditions under which 'Asiatics’ could be indentured to work in the colony.152 In 
essence, the Act restricted government assistance to European migrants and did 
not materially interfere with the private importation of Asiatic labour.153 Although no 
indentured Indian labour was employed in the development of cotton, forestalled 
by the slowness of the negotiations with the Indian Government, the passage of 
the Act did present the government’s tacit approval for the engagement of a cheap 
coloured labour force on economically imperative grounds. Those opposed to 
coloured immigration strongly expounded the potentially degenerative impact that 
Indian labour would have on Queensland’s emergent British society. 
 
‘Coolies are not a mere question of labour or productivity’ declared Reverend John 
Dunmore Lang, the renowned Presbyterian political activist.154 Lang argued that it 
was ‘a question deeply involving both the social and political and the moral and 
religious advance of our adopted country.’155 Opponents therefore feared that the 
introduction of coloured labour would create a caste system and divide the colony 
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into two antagonistic classes of patricians and poor labourers. In a petition to the 
Queen, drafted at a public meeting in July 1862, opposition to the government’s 
‘Coolie Bill’ was directed towards its perceived goal: 
to crush the democratic tendencies natural to a new colony like this, and to 
throw the country into the hands of a few princely squatters and planters 
each lording isolated grandeur in the midst of serfs who will never dream of 
calling or thinking themselves his equals.156 
 
The non-introduction of Indian labour, and the disintegration of the cotton industry, 
with the cessation of the Civil War in America did not negate the bitter debate over 
coloured labour, the issue was effectively transferred, with increased intensity into 
‘the germ of an industry which will very probably become hereafter of great 
importance to the Colony’.157  
 
Prompted by the success of experiments in the cultivation of sugar, the 
Queensland government instituted legislation to expedite the development of this 
potentially profitable industry. Gazetted in 1864, the Sugar and Coffee Regulations 
offered similar inducements to those that were presented to cotton growers: 
beneficent lease arrangements for land to establish plantations and bounties. 
Following this legislative encouragement and southern and overseas capital 
investment, sugar production rapidly expanded from the 20 acres under cultivation 
in 1862, to just over 14,600 acres in 1874, with a concentration around Mackay, 
Maryborough and Beenleigh.158 In this early expansionary period, the extremity of 
labour shortages again loomed as the major obstacle to the prospective economic 
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success of sugar cultivation. The desperate labour situation prompted the Courier 
to appeal in December 1863, ‘[w]here can we get labourers to meet our 
requirements?’159 The August 1863 experimental introduction, by the ‘enterprising 
capitalist’ Captain Robert Towns, of 67 Pacific Islanders from the New Hebrides 
and Loyalty Islands presented the long-term yet controversial solution.160 
 
Charles Bernays’ succinct overview of the enduring impact of Towns’ experimental 
introduction is a useful gauge of the political, social and economic repercussions 
of Queensland’s adoption of a coloured labour policy, which commenced a forty-
year trade in Pacific Island labour: 
Who could have believed, that the advent of this, perhaps the least 
objectionable class of black labour, would in time to come have led…to the 
division of political parties, to bitter political strife, to acute personal 
differences among our leading politicians, to numerous social evils of 
varying kinds, and in the ultimate to shocking tragedy – murder, rapine, 
kidnapping, and all the violence attendant upon buccaneering in its very 
worst form. So large a part did this trade play in legislation and 
administration extending over a long series of years, that the subject could 
by no means be overlooked when relating the political history of the 
State.161   
 
The pervasiveness of the coloured labour question was not solely confined to the 
Queensland context. Its influence was far-reaching and extended into the wider 
political and social realms of the other Australian colonies and into the Imperial 
domain. As a prominent and enduring issue Queensland’s employment of a 
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coloured labour force would permeate the broader question of political federation 
in a decisive and diverse manner. 
 
Local opposition to the introduction of this form of labour into Queensland was 
immediate. Theophilus Pugh162 fervently asserted within days of the Islanders 
arrival in Brisbane, that Towns’ had instituted a ‘slave trade in Queensland’.163 
Further, he professed that ‘it is clear that the Government are winking at the 
disgraceful transaction; it behoves the representatives of the people, therefore, to 
be up and doing, to suppress this traffic in its infancy.’164 The two main 
components of Pugh’s remonstration, the categorisation of the labour force as 
slavery and the government’s perceived complicity in this process comprised the 
core arguments that were repeatedly used in the progressively more authoritative 
and vocal external and internal campaign opposed to Queensland’s continued 
employment of a coloured labour force.  
 
The nature of indentured service, adopted in Queensland for Pacific Islanders, 
was continually and variously decried by numerous opponents of the trade, as 
temporary slavery or a cousin of slavery.165 Melanesians in Queensland were 
never ‘slaves’, yet as indentured labourers they were a form of highly unfree 
labour subject to stringent legal and social discrimination.166 Recruitment practices 
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were from the outset the most problematic feature. Kay Saunders conservatively 
estimated that between twenty-five and thirty per cent of the Islanders brought to 
Queensland were recruited through illegal or nefarious methods.167 Within the 
narrower confines of Queensland’s prevailing emphasis on rapid development the 
employment of coloured labour was ‘acclaimed as a means by which Queensland 
might exalt itself into an immensely wealthy State.’168 In this categorical 
manifestation of economic expediency overriding moral considerations, emphasis 
must be directed not solely towards its initial introduction as a temporary measure 
but to the set of variables that ensured its continued existence.  
 
Queensland’s particularly strident developmental aspirations are generally 
identified as being the result of the colony’s late settlement and attainment of self-
government in conjunction with the under-developed nature of its vast resources. 
The early pattern of development that evolved after the colony’s 1859 separation 
from New South Wales was as a consequence of these factors heavily influenced 
by an interaction of individual and co-operative material desires and ideologies, 
that emphasised aggressive economic progress to overhaul the colony’s delayed 
start. To generate momentum, contentious methods to advance and establish 
settlement and to overcome labour shortages were largely condoned. The 
viewpoint advanced to rationalise the introduction of coloured labour was, as 
Bernays’ argued, simply that Queensland was ‘a British colony endeavouring to 
solve its economic problems by the importation of labour.’169 The insistence then, 
by the pastoral/sugar sector, that Melanesians would be a temporary labour aid to 
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activate growth, initially restricted their period of employment to within 
Queensland’s early developmental phase.170 Controlling factors persistently 
delayed the abolition of coloured labour.  
 
By 1868, 1,763 Pacific Island labourers had been brought to Queensland and 
were primarily employed, in equal numbers, in the pastoral and sugar industries.171 
The success of this experimental phase had demonstrated both the ease of 
importation and its economical advantages. Planters in the expanding sugar 
industry became alert to the potential benefits of this plentiful and cheap source of 
labour and rapidly the labour of indentured Melanesians became an indispensable 
condition to the profitable cultivation of sugar. The 1881 census statistics 
illustrates the concentration of labour in the sugar industry. Of the 6,348 Islanders 
in the colony, 5,075 were categorised as agricultural labourers.172 The ascendancy 
of sugar as an agricultural staple, from the late 1860s, was hailed as a direct 
reflection of the involvement of Melanesian labour. Sugar-planters, such as 
William Canny, the plantation owner of Eaton Vale at Maryborough, were therefore 
keen to impress upon the public their need for the maintenance of this form of 
servile labour:  
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From my own knowledge of the district, I believe there would not be a stick 
of cane growing if this description of coloured labour was stopped and 
some other form of cheap labour was not substituted for it.173  
 
More directly, the Queenslander asserted that it was ‘not because we have any 
love of black skins and high favours, but simply because it is impossible to carry 
out certain industries at profit with whites.’174 The economic success of sugar and 
its continual northward expansion, along with the conventional wisdom that white 
men were incapable of the arduous labour involved in tropical agriculture, 
increasingly confirmed Liberal fears that the use of imported coloured labour was 
becoming a permanent part of the colony’s economic development.  
 
The absence of any government legislation to regulate the recruitment or 
employment of Pacific Island labour, W.H. Palmer supportively declared, ‘enables 
any capitalist to import and employ what labour he pleases.’175 Government 
sanction, through legislative inaction, prevailed until the public’s vocal reproach of 
the horrific abuses perpetuated in the recruiting process demanded legislative 
redress. In the face of this sustained pressure, the Queensland Parliament 
passed, in March 1868, ‘An Act to Regulate and Control the Introduction and 
Treatment of Polynesian Labourers’. 176 This legislation contained provisions that 
were inadequate to furnish the effective regulation of recruitment practices. The 
missionary John Inglis therefore observed that: ‘It looks as if [the] Acts were 
passed rather with a view to blind the public rather than to operate as a means of 
protecting the poor natives.’177. The problematic features of the labour trade 
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continued as the Reverend W. Osbourne Lilley’s biography of the staunch 
opponent of coloured labour William Brookes detailed:  
the labour trade went on with its vile characteristics little lessened. It 
became evident to the most unbelieving that robbery, pillage, rapine, 
drunkenness, lust, murder, kidnapping were exceedingly hard to ‘regulate’, 
and that there was something dishonourable in even trying to ‘regulate’ 
such abominations; but the efforts to do so were continued on as for 
appearance sake.178 
 
What had been in dispute was not the morality of the whole system of indentured 
coloured labour, but the recruiter’s methods. Regulation rather than abolition of the 
labour trade was the persistent feature of the Queensland government’s 
management of the issue in the 1860s and 1870s. In the minimal and piecemeal 
nature of reform, even in light of further evidence of continued abuses in 
recruitment and employer’s treatment, detailed in two Select Committee inquiries, 
the government demonstrated its reluctance to hinder in any way the numbers of 
Melanesians arriving in the colony.179 Inherent in the government’s approach was 
the resolute domination of economic expediency over moral concerns. A state of 
affairs that George Carrington critically observed in his 1871 publication, Colonial 
Adventures and Experiences by a University Man: ‘The great object of the 
Queensland legislation has been from the beginning, how to get cheap labour in 
the colony; that is the grand legislative idea of prosperity, cheap labour at any 
price.’180 The tenacity with which the Queensland government maintained the 
colony’s commitment to the employment of coloured labour increasingly drew 
widespread and significant condemnation.  
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Enraged by the reported brutality of recruiters from Fiji and Queensland, the British 
parliament enacted its own legislation in 1872. The Pacific Islanders Protection 
Act, more commonly referred to as ‘The Kidnapping Act of 1872’, endeavoured to 
prevent and punish the morally reprehensible recruiting practices of the labour 
trade.181 In 1875 additional ‘drastic provisions’ were enacted, in an amendment to 
the Act, as a measure to further deter any ‘Criminal Outrages upon Natives’ and a 
new regulatory system of government was created, the Western Pacific High 
Commission.182 More vociferous than the British government’s disapproval was 
the British, New South Wales, Victorian and local populace’s opposition. The 
strength of feeling, particularly outside Queensland, against the colony’s 
employment of an imported cheap subservient workforce with few rights and little 
government protection, rested initially on concerns over the broader societal 
ramifications. Opponents, in general, subscribed to the view, expressed in the 
debate over Indian ‘coolie’ labour, that the existence of this ‘class’ of labour would 
have a socially, morally and politically ‘deteriorating influence’ on the type of British 
society being fashioned in Australia.183 Galvanising the fear that a caste system 
would be created in Queensland was the 1870s northward expansion of sugar 
cultivation. The plantation style of production predominated, employing the 
overwhelming majority of Melanesians in the colony. That these plantations were 
seen to resemble, in their ‘benevolent feudalism’, the old plantations of the 
American South intensified external and internal contempt for Queensland’s 
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defiant maintenance of this labour force.184 A British article in the Leeds Mercury 
consequently declared:   
Queensland will be severed from her sister colonies by the character of the 
institutions that her physical conditions must impose upon her. [The author] 
thinks it more likely that the impact of slaves, under the name of free labour, 
from the Indies, China, and the South Seas, may make her a second South 
Carolina – a State ruled by an oligarchy with the vices of a slave-holding 
Government.185 
 
On the local front, the whole question had increasingly become a contentious 
political issue. Remonstrations from Liberals, imbued with racialism, detailed the 
dangers of social contamination from this coloured labour force. It was argued that 
the existence of a different immigrant race and culture could irreparably damage 
the white community through their presence, their inferiority and their vice.186 For 
the Northern Miner then it was:  
not only the right, but the duty of the governing power of the supreme race 
to preserve it from deterioration morally and physically, and to repress by 
statute the unnatural desires and unholy cupidity of planters and squatters 
to associate themselves with “human vermin” for the purpose of making 
money.187  
 
Another developing force in opposition, backed up by Liberal politicians, was the 
burgeoning pressure group of white labour, which saw the extremely cheap 
employment terms of the Melanesians as an economic threat. Anthony Trollope 
indicated that by 1873 white labourers had become ‘quite as zealous in the cause 
as the philanthropist at home; but he in his zeal hates the shining 
Polynesian….for…underselling the white man’s labour after a fashion most 
nefarious to the white labourer’s imagination!’188 White workers campaigned for 
the restriction of this imported class of labourers to tropical or semi-tropical 
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agriculture, initiating the first semblance of a platform that demanded the racial 
segregation of the labour force.  
 
The accelerant in the crystallisation of a determined policy of racial division was 
the mid-1870s ‘Chinese invasion’ of Queensland’s expanding mining frontier, in 
particular their concentration on the colony’s latest discovered goldfields.189 By 
1877 the estimated number of Chinese resident in Queensland was 12,801.190 In 
their apparent success the Chinese were perceived as a real threat, both 
economically and socially.191 The Darling Downs Gazette consequently invoked 
racial theorems to argue that the Chinese: 
have to be utterly destroyed after a struggle and a slaughter such as the 
world has never yet witnessed….in the most stupendous struggle for 
supremacy and existence since the globe was created. Either there must be 
a fusion or a survival of the fittest!192 
 
Anti-Chinese legislation was enacted in 1877. The Chinese Immigrants Regulation 
Act introduced a poll tax of £10 on each Chinese entering the colony and placed a 
limit on the number of Chinese that each vessel entering a Queensland port was 
permitted to carry; the proportion was one to every ten tons of the ship’s 
capacity.193 Furthermore, restrictions were introduced which debarred the Chinese 
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from entering any new goldfield for three years. The overarching intention of these 
discriminatory measures, John Douglas, Queensland’s then premier later 
recounted, was ‘to prevent the typical character of our colonisation from being 
imperilled’.194 Exhibited in the initial opposition to ‘kanaka’ labour and the more 
fervent campaign against the Chinese were the characteristic racialist arguments 
of social contamination and economic threat repeatedly employed to protest the 
existence of a ‘servile race amongst us’.195 It would however require the further 
development of oppositional organisations and a series of fundamental shifts in 
white colonists’ attitudes before the more pervasive economically expedient 
approach was counteracted. 
 
Aided by their numeric dominance in the legislature, the squatter/planter alliance 
presented a powerful blockade to any Liberal endeavours to alter materially the 
system of private importation and employment of coloured labour. Introduced into 
parliament in 1877 and 1878, the ‘Polynesian Labourers Act Amendment Bills’ 
attempted to address the concerns of a growing section of the community, in 
particular the unrestricted nature of Pacific Islander employment. Both pieces of 
legislation met with the same fate and were shelved once they reached the second 
reading stage.196 The most politically effective and frequent retort to any 
ideological opposition to indenture labour was the application of the economic 
argument, which directed attention to the sugar industry’s increasing contribution 
to the Queensland economy and this routinely exacted government compliance. 
Sugar production was described as a ‘pillar of the state’ and statistically this was 
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substantiated.197 In 1874, exports of rum and both raw and refined sugar 
amounted to £118,500, a figure that positioned sugar production as the third 
biggest export earner for Queensland, behind wool and minerals.198 Sugar cane 
had developed into the most important economic crop in Queensland and its 
continued prosperity, it was repeatedly asserted, was dependant on a cheap 
coloured labour force. In the political arena the broader economic considerations 
were accorded more importance than narrower moral objections. Yet the enduring 
nature and intensity of the debate inside and outside of parliament fostered the 
development of particular features in Queensland’s political culture. Two of note 
was the developing intersection between sugar interests and regionalism and 
second, the gradual refinement of the diverse and changeable political 
combinations into a more defined party-aligned motivation in political divisions. 
 
In 1872 Anthony Trollope portrayed the expansion of sugar cultivation along the 
coast of the northern parts of the colony not yet occupied by white colonists as the 
‘coming golden era of sugar…destined to bless a region nearer to the sun’.199 The 
ascendancy of the northern region of Queensland as the major centre for sugar 
cultivation is affirmed through a statistical portrait of Mackay. By 1875 Mackay had 
seventeen major mills in operation and almost 5000 acres of sugarcane under 
cultivation, one-third of Queensland’s crop.200 Incorporated in Mackay’s pre-
eminent rise as the ‘Sugaropolis’ of Queensland was its attainment by 1877 of the 
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dubious distinction of being the largest importer of Melanesian labour, a situation 
that was maintained, except for one year, until 1884.201 One distinct consequence 
of Mackay’s advance was that it tied the district’s prosperity with the maintenance 
of Melanesian labour. In the political wrestle over coloured labour, Liberal 
objections were increasingly seen as a distinctly southern opposition to northern 
interests. Initially lacking sufficient political representation, sugar planters aligned 
themselves with other conservative interests, particularly pastoralists, to contest 
any ‘obstructions thrown in the way of their importation of coloured labour’.202 This 
emergent regional antagonism between the north and south matured into a 
strident cry for northern separation by the mid-1880s, with the Mackay planters 
adopting a prominent but controversial protagonist role. The essential irritant in 
this ongoing discord was the Liberals’ active censure of the development of large-
scale rural capitalism as the basic economic and social system for the young 
colony.  
 
Disagreement over contrasting attitudes towards land use and settlement had 
been an important and persistent feature of Queensland since its inception as a 
self-governing colony. In the initial period of development this apparent division 
was not a distinct Liberal urban/agrarian versus conservative squatter dispute. 
Neither group was, in any sense, a homogeneous collective rather an assembly of 
factions often splintered by the strength of regionalism. The crystallisation of two 
broad political movements, Liberal and Conservative, was initiated in the 1870s 
debates over coloured labour. In objecting to the continued abuses and the 
societal fears connected with the labour trade and the associated strengthening of 
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the squatter/planter’s economic and political hegemony, a well-organised and 
allied opposition emerged. With ‘Anti-Black Labour’ as its political battle cry, this 
essentially Liberal-led alliance gained momentum and began to challenge the 
political influence of the pastoral/sugar collective and their sponsorship of large-
scale rural capitalism.203 Further assistance to this Liberal assault was provided in 
the provisions of the 1872 Elections Act and the 1878 Electoral Districts Act.204 
Through the additional representation and the redistribution of electorates enacted 
under these Acts, the numeric dominance of the squatter/planter block in the 
legislature was eroded through the introduction of new members into parliament, 
largely representing urban constituencies, the wellspring of Liberal support. The 
emergent Liberal leader, Samuel Walker Griffith consequently viewed the divisions 
taken in parliament in 1878 as reflecting the existence of political parties in 
Queensland, one, a popular party and the other based on property ownership and 
wealth.205 Conditions were not yet favourable for solid and continuous political 
associations, yet in the bitterness engendered in the coloured labour question, a 
transient though coherent political strategy had been presented and these 
affiliations indicated the future basis of political divisions. The more permanent and 
characteristic political groups of Liberal and Conservative became more 
distinguishable in the 1880s and 1890s in response to revenue problems, fiscal 
accord and the coloured labour question. The delineation of the political groupings 
in Queensland did extend the longevity of each government but did not introduce a 
semblance of ‘political peace’. Rather it deepened old divisions and more intensely 
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focused public attention on internal matters.206 A state of affairs that proved 
obstructive to the development of the broader ideal of political federation.  
 
In the newly formed colony of Queensland in 1859 the granting of a bicameral 
legislature was widely lauded as an ‘exceedingly auspicious’ commencement to 
the colony’s career.207 Further, the Queensland government claimed during its 
half-centenary celebrations that it was an ‘emphatic expression of confidence in 
the self-governing competence of the people of North-eastern Australia’.208 Yet in 
the new colony’s practical application of self-government numerous factors 
emerge that arguably detract from such accolades. The political route taken by 
Queensland was heavily influenced by the lateness of its establishment, the non-
existence of any tradition of government, the ramifications and resentment of 
years of neglect by the Sydney-based administration and the pre-existent 
hegemony of pastoral interests throughout its territory. The political culture that 
evolved under these influences was one rigidly bent towards aggressive progress 
for the rapid attainment of ‘abundant prosperity’.209 Under this mantra the 
Queensland parliament initiated a regime of large-scale development financed 
through a heavy dependency on loans. The divergent views on how the colony 
should be advanced and a virulent form of regionalism coloured the pragmatic 
realisation of this development.  
 
Eager to lay Queensland’s economic foundations at an accelerated pace, the new 
parliament employed its principal asset, the land, to foster the expansion of the 
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colony’s only productive industry, pastoralism. The pace and force of this phase of 
pastoral expansion was disastrous for the colony’s Indigenous population. The 
‘unparalleled’ use of force in Queensland would result, the Sydney Morning Herald 
decried in 1875, in Queensland having ‘a heavy debt to pay for its treatment of 
aboriginals’ and this would decisively come into play in Queensland’s 1883 
attempted annexation of New Guinea.210  
 
The new Queensland government’s economically expedient patronage of the 
pastoralists’ zeal to maximise profits exacerbated the decentralised pattern of 
settlement inaugurated in the 1840s and 1850s expansion of pastoralism into the 
Moreton Bay District. The resultant scattered nature of settlement, at a time when 
the means for internal communication other than coastal shipping was almost non-
existent, entrenched the primacy of local or regional affiliations. Regional loyalty 
instituted a political mentality that prioritised the independence of individual 
members within parliament in their intense pursuit of government-financed public 
works. The resultant parliamentary system was one organised around a pattern of 
constantly changing factions rather than stable political parties. The active 
involvement of this regional factionalism was particularly pronounced in the 
government’s principal developmental project, railway construction, and effected 
the establishment of the most decentralised rail system of the Australian colonies 
and further strengthened economic and political regionalism within Queensland.  
 
The establishment of a substantial population base or more particularly an 
adequate supply of labour was an integral adjunct to the rapid access to 
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Queensland’s vast resources provided through rail construction. Large-scale 
immigration programs were geared towards the supply of this labour, as it was 
believed that labour was ‘all we want to be the most prosperous colony in the 
world’.211  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1:  Queensland's decentralised rail system.212 
 
Yet, despite the numeric success, evident through the number of new colonists 
that arrived and the expense incurred, there continued to develop a demand for an 
alternative source of labour. Encouragement of two potentially profitable and 
                                                                                                                                                    
210
 Lang, The Aborigines of Australia: 46; Sydney Morning Herald cited in ‘Alleged Outrages Committed on the 
Aborigines in Queensland by the Native Mounted Police, Queensland Votes and Proceedings. 1 (1875): 2. 
211
 Patrick Leslie, pastoralist and prominent early settler cited in Cronin, ‘‘From Plodding ‘Paddy’ to ‘The 
Ching-Chong Chinaman’’: 237. 
212
 Ronald Lawson, Brisbane in the 1890s: A Study of an Australian Urban Society. St Lucia: University of 
Queensland Press, 1973. 
  91 
labour intensive agricultural pursuits, initially cotton and then more substantially 
sugar created an unremitting need for a ready and cheap labour force. To fulfil this 
need, labour was privately imported from the South Sea Islands, as a temporary 
labour aid. Installed however was a contentious forty-year dependence on 
coloured labour. The Queensland government’s defiant maintenance of this servile 
coloured labour force, against the loud rebuke of external and internal authorities 
and communities, was the clearest expression of the colony’s persistent 
devoutness to economically expedient outcomes. What had consequently 
unfolded in the practical exercise of self-government in Queensland since 
separation, was critiqued by William Coote: 
We have had twenty-one years of mimicry of politics, and of reality of class 
and personal interests and strife; we have the dignity of a public debt equal 
to that of some sovereign states of almost secondary eminence, - larger in 
proportion to our numbers than that of our own neighbours….One thing the 
colony has been a long time discovering – the value of self-dependence – 
the other, which it has yet to learn, is the adjustment of ends to means.213 
 
The characteristic feature then of this early period of self-government was the 
existence and adherence to a particularly strident developmental regime in which 
the argument of economic expediency transcended broader social considerations. 
The success and momentum with which this crude policy of aggressive progress 
was implemented ensured its maintenance by consecutive parliaments as 
Queensland strove to redress a delayed start and to consolidate its wealth. The 
survival and diligence of Queensland’s entrepreneurial pattern of power and 
influence, provoked Coote to warn ‘that there is no country whose future may be 
more marred by the greed of classes, or of individuals, who cloak an insatiable 
avarice of power or wealth beneath ample folds of an ostensible patriotism.'214  
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The dynamics of the Queensland situation instituted certain individualistic policies 
and qualities, which would have an enduring and often turbulent impact on the 
colony’s local political environment. The intersection of Queensland’s 
individualistic undercurrents and the emergent subject of federation would fashion 
a distinctive quality to the colony’s participation in the political movement towards 
the union of the Australian colonies. The emergent traits of particular note were a 
narrow and self-interested focus on internal development, the contribution of 
regionalism and its offshoot separatism and the employment of a highly unfree 
coloured labour force. The interesting properties of these Queensland issues was 
that they functioned both as an oppositional force to the development of the 
federal idea in Queensland, essentially obstructing local interest in the movement 
while conversely they later contributed to the mobilisation of the federal movement 
by furnishing an imperative and practical objective for federal action. Yet, the 
manifest interest of the new colony on its own internal development differed little in 
intensity to the provincial focus of the other Australian colonies at their 
corresponding stage of development. The distinguishing aspect of Queensland 
was that this phase of early development occurred twenty to thirty years after that 
of the other principal southern colonies.215 This difference between Queensland’s 
developmental time-line and that of the other more established colonies was that it 
set Queensland’s vision of national progress on a narrower provincial framework in 
contrast to the developing broader national Australian idea of progress canvassed 
in the emerging concept of political federation.  
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Chapter 2 
 
The Federal Movement and Provincialism.  
1840s – 1880s  
 
Writing in the Melbourne Review in October 1879, Sir Henry Parkes1, Premier of 
New South Wales and prominent federal advocate, lamented that despite 
repeated and often eloquent and powerful arguments for the political federation of 
the six Australian colonies, no real progress had been achieved; ‘no two twigs 
have been put together towards the bundle of sticks. No single venture has been 
made in the trial of federal strength.’2 Parkes attributed the ‘stationary position’ of 
the federal cause to the ‘intangibility’ of the aims of federation, and a ‘narrowness 
of view, and that reluctance to surrender authority’.3 The absence of a ‘complete 
and convincing exposition of the advantages’ of federation, Parkes argued, had 
facilitated the continual rejection of the federal proposal, by each colonial 
parliament. This was based on the colonies’ concern that the removal of the 
‘grander subjects’ from their own legislative control would significantly restrict their 
‘fields of ambition and diminish their importance.’4 To initiate change, and in 
‘respect’ to the federal cause, Parkes submitted a scheme of federation not ‘on the 
old lines of projection’.5  
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The objective of this chapter is twofold: first to explore the issues Parkes raised in 
1879 as a means to review the earlier proposals for an Australian federation, in 
particular the principal obstacles the movement confronted. This ‘early’ history of 
the federal movement rarely occupies any significant space in the historical 
account of the ‘nativity’ of the Australian Commonwealth.6 Certainly, a contributive 
factor to this was the lack of any real practical success or, as the contemporary 
federalist Sir Charles Gavan Duffy floridly phrased it ‘the flowers gathered from so 
much seed made but a scanty bouquet.’7 Yet, a summary appraisal of these earlier 
attempts to advocate the federal model not only establishes the longevity of the 
federal movement but also identifies and presents the initial workings of a key 
dynamic; the enduring and formidable impact that the Australian process of 
colonial settlement and development had on the federal idea. To illustrate this 
dynamic the second section will examine the key aspects of Queensland’s 
development that resulted in Queensland being excluded from Parkes’ 1879 
federal proposal. Incongruously, it was these same questions of climatic and policy 
difference that contributed to Queensland’s decisive 1883 attempted annexation of 
New Guinea, which was heralded as the catalyst for the later federation 
movement.  
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Parkes conceded, in 1879, that the complete federation of the Australian colonies 
had ‘little prospect of early consummation’ and for that reason advocated the 
immediate union of three of the colonies into the ‘United Provinces of British 
Australia’.8 The basis for his selection of New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia was their geographical proximity, the comparable nature of their key 
interests, and ‘their equality of promise in their future capabilities’.9 The 
advantages of this partial union, Parkes postulated, would be the ‘strengthening of 
their institutions of government, economizing their revenues, and consolidating 
their power…[and] giving them a new destiny’.10 More practically, the union would 
eradicate the jealousy or rivalry entailed in the construction of railways and confer 
a more efficient civil service and system of defence against invasion.11 The 
abstract nature of these objectives and the absence of any discussion on the 
process by which this union was to be achieved, exposed Parkes to criticism along 
the same lines as he himself had identified, that the aims of his plan were ‘not 
sufficiently tangible.’12 The generality of the terms used to expound the federal 
ideal was a perceptible feature of the earlier campaigns.  
 
Federation, it was argued, would assuredly provide ‘the future grandeur and…the 
inevitable magnitude of an Australian Dominion’.13 The idealistic vision of the 
associated prosperity and security reportedly made ‘young Australian nationalists 
stroke their beards with a sense of expanding power’.14 While these ‘nationalists’ 
were clearly enlivened to the potentialities, their numeric support was insufficient 
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to propel the federal cause from prophesy towards a practical political strategy. 
Tactically, the aim of the repeated advocacy of the federal goal on chiefly idealistic 
terms was to ‘warm the coldest imagination into fervour, to kindle the most brilliant 
hopes’, or, as Parkes indirectly claimed, they were ‘preparing the ground’.15 The 
inherent paradox in this approach was that while these advocates endeavoured to 
generate enthusiasm to propel the cause from the realms of idealism to practical 
consultation, they were charged with not providing what they had hoped to set in 
motion, the collaborative development of practical federal outcomes. The federal 
idea was consequently dispatched by the majority of pragmatic colonial politicians, 
as premature or fantasy, for it was a question that ‘they were partly unable, partly 
unwilling, to grasp.’16 A secondary, though interconnected indictment was that the 
elevation of the ideal failed to account for the existent conditions of the Australian 
situation. Vincent Cavendish critically asserted in his 1880 article ‘An Australian 
Dominion’, that ‘by the action of a vivid imagination’, Sir Henry Parkes, Sir 
Hercules Robinson,17 Sir Charles G. Duffy and ‘other eminent men’ had been 
‘rendered indifferent’ to the obstacles which impeded a federal union.18 Parkes’ 
1879 judgment that the ‘real cause of failure, so far’ was the absence of a 
complete or convincing account of federation’s real advantages, seemingly 
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positioned a secondary concern above more fundamental impediments.19  In an 
1881 article, Parkes more fully expressed the internal dynamics of the situation:  
The critics will discuss the abstract question of a federal policy….But the 
moment that any attempt is made to try these doctrines by the test of 
practical application, the grand federal object is submerged under a flood of 
local objections and sectional interests.20  
 
The formidable barrier to the propagation of the federal idea was not the lack of 
convincing advantages but more directly linked to each colony’s stalwart 
identification as a separate or independent entity within the geographical landmass 
of Australia.21 The formative process by which the Australian colonies were settled 
was the defining force in the development of these independent colonial identities 
that factored so decisively in determining the momentum and direction of the 
federal initiative. 
 
The division of the continent into six distinct territorial units was a progressive 
process activated by the interplay of geography and economics, to which 
responsible government later added political potency. Despite the variants of time 
and circumstance22 that shaped the foundation of each of Australia’s principal 
settlements, the response of the colonies to the pressures caused by the 
geographical distances between them was relatively uniform. In an environment 
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devoid of the infrastructure required for mass communication and rapid transport,23 
each settlement was effectively alienated from the other, and as a result, this 
placed inordinate value upon physical proximity. The regional cohesion that this 
engendered was further enhanced by materialism, which inspired an accordant 
and untiring quest for economic prosperity. Isolated and immersed in the economic 
development of their respective territories, each cultivated their own discrete 
requirements and interests.24 The inevitable derivative of this separateness of 
development on a concentrated regional basis was provincialism.25 The resulting 
configuration of widely scattered settlements with introverted provincial aspirations 
established and reinforced isolationism as a governing directive. This isolationist 
agenda underpinned the relationships between the bounded communities and 
effected a significant reduction in New South Wales’ original territorial limits.26 
 
It was repeatedly argued, on the eastern half of the continent, that Sydney’s 
administration of New South Wales’ vast colonial territory was the most significant 
impediment to each settlement’s progress.27 Economic matters factored as the key 
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irritant in these interactions between Sydney and the various settlements within 
the colony of New South Wales. The subordinate ranking of these settlements to 
Sydney, confirmed by the unjust allocation of the colony’s revenue, was 
increasingly challenged as each developed on provincial lines and saw 
themselves ‘not as satellites of Sydney but as economic rivals’.28 The centrifugal 
influence of provincialism and the important precedent established by the 
separation of Van Diemen’s Land in 1825 activated the bitter process of the 
territorial dismemberment of New South Wales ‘by her vigorous offspring’.29 
Throughout the 1840s and 1850s successive agitations ‘to obtain the local 
expenditure of the local revenue and the local management of local affairs’ 
resulted in the territorial separation of the Port Phillip and Moreton Bay Districts 
from New South Wales, to create the independent colonies of Victoria and 
Queensland.30 The intensity of the ‘ill-feeling’ generated in the course of this 
continental subdivision and colonial re-definition served to accentuate the force of 
separatism and consequently ‘proved a serious evil’ in the relations between the 
colonies.31 
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Within the redefined colonial boundaries, political autonomy and separateness of 
development emerged as the twin obsessions. It was therefore recognised, as the 
contemporary historian William Hearn wrote, that if the colonies were to attain the 
full extent of the power and functions associated with colonial autonomy this would 
require ‘that great change to our colonial system which is known as the 
introduction of Responsible Government’.32 During 1853 and 1854 the colonies of 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Van Diemen’s Land individually 
petitioned the Imperial government for the establishment of bicameral 
legislatures.33 The accompanying draft constitutions were judged by the British 
crown law officer, Sir Frederic Rogers, as amounting to ‘little less than a 
Legislative Declaration of Independence on the part of the Australian 
colonies….you cannot please the colonists with anything short of absolute 
independence’.34 This resolute spirit of independence was fortified by the grant of 
responsible government. 
 
‘Placed under distinct and altogether independent legislatures’ each colony 
politically and economically demonstrated their intent to maintain an autonomous 
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existence.35 Each exerted their absolute authority through the implementation of 
policies for internal development, framed solely in accordance with their own 
immediate interests, and informed by the overriding objective of ‘dignifying our 
own particular little province by depreciating our neighbours’.36 Legislative 
differences in respect to fiscal policies, postal arrangements, defence, gold and 
land regulations were consequently enacted and served to ‘widen existing 
severances’.37 Whilst provincialism was the stimulus for this policy of independent 
action, the tenacity with which it was enforced reflected the intensified state of 
rivalry, jealousy and antagonism that existed between the colonies. The historian 
Cephas Allin depicted the colonies attitude of suspicious wariness as such: 
They were in the habit of constantly analysing the motives and intentions of 
the sister colonies, and ofttimes discovered, through a faculty of splenetic 
psychology, mysterious and dangerous designs in the simple proposals of 
their neighbours. They were supersensitive of their weakness and of their 
local autonomy….They each and all had their special grievances against 
one another….they approached intercolonial questions from the standpoint 
of provincial hucksters anxious to drive a good bargain at the expense of a 
sister colony….The whole tendency was to develop the spirit of a narrow 
localism which masqueraded around under the guise of patriotism….As a 
result of the adoption of this narrow-minded policy, the interests of the 
colonies tended to diverge further and further apart, and to be ofttimes 
treated as antagonistic….The policy of provincialism was everywhere 
triumphant.38  
 
In the decades after the 1850s, with each colony transfixed on the development of 
their respective territories, colonial individualism and independence was pushed to 
its utmost effect. The ‘systematic treatment of each colony by its neighbours, as 
though it were a foreign state’, the South Australian Colonial Secretary, E.G. 
Waterhouse pointed out in 1862, ‘may eventually render impossible that federation 
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which all look forward to as ultimately desirable.’39 This entrenched model of 
separatism constituted in practice a series of obstacles to the federal cause.  
 
Colonial indifference to the utility of federation was a subtle though most effective 
force in preventing any joint consideration of the federal question. Prior to the 
separation of Victoria and the colonies’ attainment of responsible government, 
Imperial statesmen, led by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Earl Grey, 
advocated the advantages of a central legislative authority. The ‘General 
Assembly’ would enable ‘the various legislatures of the several Australian colonies 
to co-operate with each other in the enactment of such laws as may be necessary 
for regulating the interests common to those possessions collectively’.40 The 
merits of such a scheme were beyond each colony’s sole objective of securing the 
authority to manage their own affairs. Colonial disinterest and criticism in this first 
step in the process of federal consideration led the Imperial government to 
conclude that the federal initiative must in future emanate, in concurrence, from 
the Australian colonies themselves.41 After the attainment of self-government the 
Australian proponents of federation took up the Imperial submission on colonial 
federation. Thus an 1857 Victorian Select Committee called for an intercolonial 
conference on the federal question based on their conviction that it was ‘not too 
soon to invite a mutual understanding on the subject’ and that ‘a negotiation 
demanding so much caution and forbearance, so much foresight and experience, 
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must originate in the mutual action of the colonies’.42 In stark contrast to this 
perception of the matter were the attitudes of the majority of colonial politicians.  
 
The protracted negotiations between the various colonial legislatures, which 
occupied five years, failed to cement a concurrence of opinion on the necessity for 
an intercolonial conference on federation.43 The ‘fatal impediment to action’, Sir 
Charles Duffy concluded, was the obstructive influence of the New South Wales 
legislative assembly.44 Duffy isolated in particular the attitude of the New South 
Wales Colonial Secretary, Charles Cowper,45 who believed that the time was not 
right ‘for bringing forward such a question, or at all events that there was more 
urgent business to be dealt with by the legislature of New South Wales.’46 This 
stance was not peculiar to New South Wales and similar preoccupations emerged 
from the other colonies and ultimately contributed to the collapse of the 
negotiations for a conference on the federal proposal.47 Responsible government 
was too new and the colonial administrations too pre-occupied with the business 
of domestic politics to cultivate popular and parliamentary interest in the federal 
question. In Queensland, Arthur Macalister, Member for Ipswich, argued in 1870 
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that the ‘parties here fail to discover what Federation, at present, would effect for 
this colony.’48 Macalister additionally raised the logistical problem entailed in 
sending representatives to the hypothesised Federal parliament, for in 
Queensland:  
the greatest difficulty now exists in obtaining representatives to the 
Queensland Parliament for the distant districts of the colony, and I fear that 
to obtain representatives required to attend probably one thousand miles 
still further away, would with our limited population, be an impossibility.49 
  
The primacy of domestic considerations remained a significant obstacle to the 
promotion of the federal ideal, for it precluded the development of a broader or 
national view on intercolonial questions. ‘The Essayist’, in the first of a series of 
articles published in the Queenslander in 1875, entitled ‘The Federation of 
Australia’, criticised the ‘petty spirit of provincialism’, which persistently rendered 
the interests of the single parts over the whole:  
Absorbed by local matters, occupied with questions of no more than 
provincial interest, essential yet not supreme, the Australian colonies 
appear to have no time to spare for the consideration of those subjects of 
weightier import which tower a head and shoulders above minor 
themes….things of national importance, intimately connected with the future 
of Australia, are allowed to pass without notice.50 
 
A further factor in the colonies’ lack of enthusiasm on the federal question was 
their inherent fear of any ‘outside’ encroachment on the individual rights of their 
local legislatures. Queensland’s Executive Council, at the commencement of its 
independent colonial career in 1860, ‘entertained serious doubts’ on the question 
of federal union, for they: 
perceived obstacles of a serious character to any project which might by the 
creation of a central authority, tend to limit the complete independence of 
the scattered communities peopling this continent one of the other.51  
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Parkes astutely attempted to accommodate the colonies’ intrinsic defence of their 
political individualism, in his 1879 proposed scheme for a partial federation. To 
counter the colonies’ fear that federation would remove the ‘grander subjects’ from 
their legislative control and thus restrict their ‘fields of ambition and diminish their 
importance’, Parkes argued that an Australian nation ‘might start into existence’ 
without ‘altering the familiar proportions of our system of government’.52 His 
proposal, he stressed, would: 
instead of sinking the character of parliament by withdrawing from its hands 
the more ennobling work of statesmanship, would disencumber it of the 
irksome weight of municipal labours, and free it from the impediments to a 
higher and more glorious political life.53   
 
In Parkes’ tactical attempt to defuse suspicion of any outside political infringement 
he in effect verified the extent of the colonies ‘narrowness of view, and that 
reluctance to surrender authority’.54  
 
Reservations existed over the sincerity or soundness of Parkes’ advocacy of a 
federal compact between New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia.55 His 
article did however present an authoritative insight into the opposing forces 
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against federation at this point in time. Of paramount concern was the 
development and maintenance of six separate political entities, in which each 
steadfastly held that they each already possessed ‘all the elements of national life 
and prosperity.’56 The definitive markers of this colonial insularity and its 
derivatives intercolonial rivalry and jealousy were; the establishment of divergent 
and often-antagonistic tariff policies, separately constructed intracolonial railway 
networks, competitively developed telegraphic communication systems and 
shifting colonial alliances.57 Furthermore, no formal relationships existed between 
the colonies and consequently matters of ‘mutual’ concern were addressed 
irregularly at Intercolonial conferences.58 This consultative forum provided the 
colonies with the means to adjust relations without the sacrifice of any of their 
legislative powers. Yet, they required the participants to negotiate the massive 
obstacle of the vested interests that each of the colony’s delegates had in their 
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own local independence.59 Parkes held that despite the ‘uniform discouragement’ 
of these intercolonial gatherings they were the ‘natural nurseries of the federal 
principle’, though he conceded that the ‘sources of [Australian] national life are not 
sufficiently cleared of the mud of local interests for the stream to flow 
uninterruptedly and freely.’60 In their pursuit of ‘careers of careless or of deliberate 
isolation’ each colony had fortified and defended their individualism and 
independence.61 The resultant colonial formation was frankly portrayed in 1881:   
Australia as at present divided into the several colonies….alienated from 
each other by simple land marks or rivers, laid down with 
severity…alienated by their respective laws, and the imposition of border 
fiscal duties, which have generated narrow and unnatural prejudices as well 
as isolated semi-nationalities almost as much as France is alienated from 
Germany, Germany from Russia, and Russia from Turkey. The inhabitants 
of these several colonies are first Victorians, New South Welshmen, or 
Queenslanders, and then diluted Australians. They think of, dream of, hope 
for, and work for the progress and ultimate prosperity of the individual 
colony, and by those selfishly isolated thoughts, dreams, and hopes and 
works, they forget and ignore the greater, the higher, the nobler, the 
worthier aim of the progress and ultimate prosperity of a united Australia.62 
 
In this framework of separate principalities, each had been indifferent to the idea of 
a federal compact or repudiated it as a potential sacrifice of their individual 
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importance. ‘No “Australian nation”’, John Douglas63 declared in reply to Parkes’ 
proposed union, ‘will “start into existence” without a complete alteration of the 
relations which at present subsist between the Australian colonies.’64 Federation 
remained ‘a dream in the minds of statesmen’ for it was, in short, an abstract idea 
antithetical to the prevailing policy of colonial individualism.65  
 
The ‘great colony of Queensland’ was specifically excluded from Parkes’ 1879 
scheme of partial union: 
because her capabilities of soil and climate so clearly mark out for her a 
colonising career dissimilar from that of her elder sisters, while her noble 
extent of territory affords more than ample scope for the growth of a mighty 
nation.66  
 
Douglas challenged this cursory explanation by Parkes and concluded that his 
reasons were insufficient to justify the ‘reservation of our Queensland territory for 
the growth of a new nationality.’67 Yet in conjunction with Parkes’ rationale that the 
three colonies of New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia were included 
due to the ‘corresponding character of their leading pursuits’, it is plausible to infer 
that the allusion to ‘soil and climate’ and a ‘dissimilar colonising career’ were 
muted references to Queensland’s economic pursuit of tropical agriculture or more 
specifically the sugar industry’s continued employment of a highly unfree coloured 
labour force.68 Parkes’ line of reasoning though veiled was certainly consistent 
with the ongoing southern and British disquiet over Queensland’s introduction and 
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maintenance of this form of labour. The central concern was over the type of 
society that was being permanently established in the northern colony.69  
 
Numerous petitions and a vigorous press campaign repeatedly emphasised 
Queensland’s deviance and anticipated that the ‘character of the institutions’ 
imposed by the colony’s climate and environment would result in Queensland 
being ‘severed from her sister colonies’.70 Queensland repudiated any attempt to 
‘fix the stigma of slavery’ upon the colony and was aggrieved at the external 
incursion on a distinctly provincial matter.71 The Honourable St. George. R. Gore,72 
Member of the Queensland Legislative Council, objected to the ‘substance’ of an 
1869 petition that was adopted at a public meeting in Sydney.73 Gore argued that it 
was ‘highly disrespectful to the House and the colony….[and] He did not see how 
persons in Sydney, few or many, should lecture the Parliament on their morals, or 
presume to teach benighted Queenslanders.’74 ‘As far as Queensland was 
concerned’, John Douglas affirmed in parliament in 1869, ‘the [labour] trade was 
carried on with perfect propriety’.75 Queensland routinely dismissed or discredited 
any criticism of its differential methods. Self–government had provided the colony 
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with the authority to manage its own affairs and the manner in which this was 
instituted was strongly influenced by a deep-seated belief in Queensland’s future 
through its vast economic potential. The guiding directive of Queensland 
development was therefore, as the historian Duncan Waterson stated, ‘the Biblical 
concept of Queensland as an environmental tabula rasa upon which the real 
progenitor of progress, the entrepreneur, could and should be allowed to write as 
he willed.’76 Rapid internal development to harvest the colony’s ‘potentiality of 
wealth’ was the priority of the general populace and of successive Queensland 
governments. Within this framework the economic ascendency of the sugar 
industry was a vital component in generating momentum and prosperity and these 
factors transcended broader social considerations.77  
 
Materialist values and an untiring quest for prosperity pervaded each of the 
Australian colonies and bound each community together to produce particular 
colonial interests and characteristics. The developmental context that fashioned 
Queensland’s distinctive traits rested on the colony’s late settlement and 
attainment of independence, the extent and under-developed nature of the 
colony’s vast territory, the hegemony of pastoral interests, an ‘almost insoluble’ 
labour problem and a sharp and enduring suspicion and hostility towards New 
South Wales; the latter the result of Sydney’s pre-separation ‘mismanagement’ 
and the bitterness engendered in the course of territorial separation from the 
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Mother colony.78 This complex amalgam of historical, economic and environmental 
realities all combined to produce an intensified internal focus on territorial 
development. The overarching objective of the new colony was to maximise 
progress through the rapid development of its vast resources to overcome 
Queensland’s delayed start and to propel the ‘colony of youth and enterprise’ 
towards ‘a leading position among the provinces of Australia.’79 The underpinning 
of Queensland’s entrepreneurial pattern of power and influence, adopted to 
implement the colony’s developmental directive, was self-interest and a ‘selfish 
fear’ of any external intrusion on or appropriation of the colony’s wealth.80 This 
blend of self-interest and distrust introduced a particularly defensive or retaliatory 
trait into the Queensland assertion of its independence.81 Furthermore, it aligned 
Queensland patriotism with a covetous desire for instant wealth, which was to be 
practicably accessed through the unrestricted proliferation and grandeur of the 
colony’s developmental schemes. William Coote’s précis of Queensland’s political 
and economic orientation was that there was ‘no country whose future may be 
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more marred by the greed of classes, or of individuals, who cloak an insatiable 
avarice of power or wealth beneath ample folds of an ostensible patriotism.’82  
 
Queensland’s ‘urgent, underlying, and inextinguishable demand for PROGRESS’ 
attained unprecedented magnitude in the 1880s.83 The central figure accredited 
with accelerating and directing the momentum of this era of grand expansion was 
Sir Thomas McIlwraith, Queensland’s premier from 1879-1883 and in 1888.84 
There existed, the Boomerang declared in 1891, ‘abundant evidence in the history 
of Queensland’ that McIlwraith was ‘a statesman of larger grasp, keener insight, 
and inspired by a far wider practical spirit than his quondam rival Sir Samuel 
Griffith’.85 Within the realms of federation Griffith is historically the more prominent 
of the two political leaders yet this was not always the case, as acknowledged in 
1886: 
in justice to Sir Thomas McIlwraith be it said that Mr. Griffith did not first 
show such deep concern upon the questions of Australian Federation, 
Colonial Defence, New Guinea, nor the New Hebrides. Sir Thomas opened 
the door for the display of popular and distinguished Australian 
statesmanship, and suddenly a smart young lawyer slipped in, and gained 
all the kudos that rightly belonged to his predecessor.86  
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In the early 1880s McIlwraith’s ‘bold, prompt, and masterful’ style of leadership 
appealed to and reflected the developmental aspirations of Queenslanders.87 He 
was the archetype entrepreneur who successfully blended personal persuasion, 
political and financial power, with his knowledge of railways, pastoralism and 
investment, to inspire local, intercolonial and British confidence in Queensland’s 
limitless opportunities for financial enterprise.88 ‘In Sir Thomas McIlwraith,’ the 
Queensland Review declared: 
we have one of those men to whom the destinies of a nation can always be 
safely entrusted, whether to assist its prosperous progress…to evolve order 
out of anarchic political discord….In a young nation like Queensland, rising 
like another “Sea Cybele fresh from the ocean”, such a man is like an able 
navigator, standing ever on deck ready to seize the helm when the unskilful 
hands of others have guided the ship of state among dangerous reefs or 
treacherous sandbanks. He is not likely to fall overboard at any stage of the 
voyage….His sole ambition is to place Queensland in the front rank of 
Australian colonies – to have his name transmitted to the future, associated 
with the foundation of the permanent prosperity of his adopted country.89 
 
McIlwraith’s conviction was that Queensland was a great enterprise, whose 
resources must be developed with government direction of public and private 
capital, to acquire the utmost profit. This was neither innovative nor extraordinary. 
What was unique was the force of his personality and the magnitude of his 
vision.90  
 
The inimitable quality of McIlwraith’s dynamism stemmed largely from his 
commanding personality and stature and his overt devotion to Queensland and its 
rapid development. William Corfield recounted his first impression of McIlwraith, 
after he met him in 1881: 
I was greatly struck with his personalty. He was a man, big and broad, both 
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physically and mentally. Yet like most strong men, he was very head-strong 
and impatient of obstruction to or criticism of his proposals. Neither could he 
understand that it was not given to every man to see quickly and to act 
promptly, attributes he possessed in a remarkable degree….McIlwraith was 
a far sighted statesmen, having the interests of Queensland at heart, and 
not a politician ready and willing to secure votes.91 
 
A rough gauge to the idiosyncrasy or individualism of McIlwraith’s personal 
characteristics can be conveyed through the similarity of the descriptive terms 
used by both his supporters and opponents. Gilbert Casey, a long-standing 
adversary of McIlwraith, described him in 1893 as:  
Strong, able and determined. He inspires confidence. He is neither weak, 
vacillating, nor irresolute. He goes the complete pig or none. He has grit, 
force of character, and will power. He is a born leader of men….He is blunt, 
outspoken and brutal almost in his supreme disregard for the opinions of 
others. He is courageous, bold and defiant….He distrusts the people and 
honestly (I think) believes they are unfit for self-government. He believes 
they want an autocratic boss, and he feels quite certain that a divine 
Providence had him specially built for the job.92 
 
McIlwraith’s apparent magnetism did not rest solely on his authoritative personality 
but was inseparably linked, as one contemporary source suggested, to his 
‘comprehensive views and masterful grasp of the processes of material 
advancement’.93  
 
From his entrance into Queensland politics in 1870, as the Member for Warrego, 
McIlwraith ‘brought large and fecund ideas before the people’.94 The essence of 
McIlwraith’s ‘vigorous originality’ was that his progressive vision entailed the 
simultaneous exploitation and management of all of Queensland’s resources.95 His 
platform of broad ‘national’ development did not narrowly conceive the 
Queensland frontier as the terrain solely for ‘an advancing wave of…pastoral 
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settlement propelled by British industrial needs and…British capital’, but rather as 
a series of interacting economic frontiers.96 Capital investment was the vital 
component, required to support the expansion of the colony’s pastoral, sugar, 
mining, maritime, and commercial enterprises and McIlwraith’s strength lay in his 
ability to attract and direct large-scale capital from Britain, Victoria and New South 
Wales.97 His aim, Waterson asserted, was to be ‘not only the catalyst but the 
magnet; not only the exploiter but the developer and the satisfier; not only the 
entrepreneur but the complete colonial man operating on a vast territorial scale.’98 
The appeal of McIlwraith’s ‘large conceptions’ embodied in ‘corresponding 
methods of application’ generated a support base that was at variance with the 
colony’s emergent political culture.99  
 
‘No other man’, the Sydney Morning Herald reflected in 1900, ‘has possessed an 
imagination and foresight of quite the same order; and no other man has had quite 
the same wonderful power of compelling others to believe what he imagined and 
provided for what he foresaw.’100 McIlwraith’s authoritative style, his broad 
business interests and boundless vision for Queensland’s development effectively 
cut across Queensland’s strong regional affiliations and the pastoral versus urban 
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agrarian political division.101 He was as the Queenslander noted during the 
General Election of 1878,  
much more than the squatters’ leader. Otherwise he would certainly not 
have drawn around him the indispensable support of leading men who had 
obviously no special sympathy with the pastoral interest, and who are 
pledged to dispossess the squatters.102 
 
To a large section of the general public McIlwraith was seen as having ‘something 
of the element of the miraculous in him’.103 While this reflected in part his personal 
traits and ideas, it was also relative to the economic and political climate of the late 
1870s. At the time of the 1878 General Election, Queensland was under the 
impact of an economic depression, primarily the result of the negative influences 
of drought on productivity and trade and the fiscal mismanagement of the 
Macalister, Thorn and Douglas Liberal administrations.104 This in turn had 
engendered communal discord and disunity in the Liberal party.105 Under these 
conditions arose the inevitable desire for political change and in unison with 
McIlwraith’s overtly ‘national’ Queensland directive and his ‘considerable 
reputation for energy and independence’, a political context was created that 
facilitated the fusion of a diverse range of rural and urban interests under 
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McIlwraith’s political banner.106 Charles Bernays, Queensland’s political chronicler, 
accredited the government formed by McIlwraith in January 1879, as being 
‘probably one of the strongest that Queensland has ever seen’ and the successful 
return of the colony’s economy to a ‘state of prosperity’ by 1881 was seen as the 
contemporaneous evidence of this strength.107 McIlwraith’s ‘almost magical’ 
results created a heightened sense of colonial confidence, and 
patriotism/nationalism at Queensland’s ‘flourishing’ future.108 Pugh’s Almanac’s 
review of the ‘Progress of the Colony’ for 1881 projected the palpable sense of 
wonder and delight: 
On all sides there are signs of life. Never before have such extensive 
building operations in all the towns of the colony been seen; and foreign 
capital is being introduced to an extent which cannot fail to give them a 
greatly increased development….Never before, either, has the Colony of 
Queensland received such attention at home or in the neighbouring 
colonies. The eyes of a class of capitalists, who have never before looked 
so far a field, are now turned upon this colony…as a new field for the 
disposition of their accumulations….There is now a general feeling of 
confidence, and as this appears to be well founded, there is every reason to 
hope that Queensland will soon be recognised as the Colony of 
Australasia.109  
 
McIlwraith’s ministry was however a ‘heterogenous collection’110 and the 
maintenance of the ‘bonds of union’ relied heavily on the acceptability of his 
government’s actions and its prospective legislation.111  
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Allegations of corruption and ‘connivance’ against McIlwraith’s administration 
initiated a significant though indeterminate degree of public and political suspicion 
of McIlwraith’s ‘headstrong and autocratic’ political style.112 By 1882, ‘the mud had 
been well stirred up’ by three incidents.113 The first was the bitter and protracted 
controversy surrounding the questionable process entailed in the Government’s 
1879 tendering of 15,000 tons of steel rails.114 Next were McIlwraith’s ‘bold and 
insolent defiance of Parliament’ in proceeding with the Torres Strait Mail Contract 
in October 1880 and the Government’s dubious 1882 dealings in the sale of 
portions of land in the Springsure and Peak Downs districts.115 Although McIlwraith 
and his government were exonerated on all charges of misconduct, the composite 
effect of these allegations would have undoubtedly contributed to some weakening 
of public support. The most significant challenge to the ‘robust strength’ of 
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McIlwraith’s government came from the mounting political and popular disquiet 
over two key aspects of his developmental program, the land grant railway 
scheme and the proposed importation of Indian Coolies.116 From mid-1882 these 
‘two matters’ attracted ‘the greatest attention…of the public’ in Queensland and 
engendered a tumultuous political environment resulting in the July 1883 
dissolution of Parliament and McIlwraith’s subsequent loss of power.117  
 
It was from within this developing political context that McIlwraith took the ‘decisive 
action’ to annex New Guinea in April 1883, and it was this ‘spectacular item’ in the 
history of the period which was accredited with being the principal catalyst for the 
later federation movement.118 In the federal account the emphasis has 
consequently been placed on the annexation’s subsequent and unanticipated role 
of activating colonial action on the federal question while the event itself was not 
substantively assessed. Yet it must be understood that this was initially an 
independent colonial action by Queensland and therefore needs to be placed in 
the matrix of Queensland’s internal political environment. The politics of the early 
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1880s testifies to the enduring and forceful presence of two distinctive Queensland 
issues, the strength of regionalism and the socially and politically contentious 
question of coloured labour. The local, intercolonial and Imperial ramifications of 
these particular issues would contribute a peculiar though fluctuating complexity to 
Queensland’s involvement in the federal movement.  
 
Transfixed by his vision for Queensland’s future, McIlwraith resolutely declared 
that ‘I want as a statesman to see…a much greater development of this country 
than there had been in the past.’119 Rail construction, he advanced, was the 
linchpin to the accelerated exploitation of Queensland’s natural resources. Its 
function was both economic and symbolic; a multiplier of capital, population and 
settlement, it was the acknowledged pathway to development, economic success 
and civilisation.120 The prospective benefits of railway construction was 
illustratively depicted by Queensland’s Agent-General in London, Thomas Archer 
in April 1882: 
[Queensland’s] progress has been rapid, solid and satisfactory. But that 
progress has been but tardy when compared with what may be expected in 
the future, when railways shall have pierced the remote 
interior….Queensland may be compared to a fruit with a hard and thick rind 
enclosing a vast amount of the richest and most nutritious aliment, and 
railways may be regarded as instruments for piercing that rind, and making 
the rich interior available for the support of civilised humanity.’121  
 
McIlwraith’s rail policy embodied two distinct courses of action. The standardised 
approach that consisted of government directed rail construction, financed from 
borrowed capital. In accordance with this policy McIlwraith apportioned £2,025,100 
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of the £3,000,000 loan he raised in London in 1880 to railways.122 The second and 
more controversial was the land grant system of railway construction.  
 
Openly impressed with the scope and ‘grand success’ of the American land grant 
railway system, particularly its successful expansion of settlement, its construction 
of commercial empires and its cultivation of nativist sentiments, McIlwraith 
zealously promoted its introduction to Queensland as a means to compliment the 
government’s railway program.123 Queensland’s vast territory and the prevailing 
emphasis on railway construction as the means to force the pace of development, 
had contributed significantly to the colony borrowing ‘more money in proportion to 
its population than any other nation on the face of the earth’, which McIlwraith 
asserted was not economically sustainable.124 The ‘prospect of railways being 
carried on by private enterprise’ was, McIlwraith argued, an economic imperative, 
for it would, without risk to the colony’s economy, effect the desired rail access to 
the untapped wealth of the Western portion of the colony, attract population and 
raise productivity.125  
 
In 1881, to open up what McIlwraith described as ‘a tract of country 300,000 miles 
in extent unequalled for soil in any corner of the globe….[and] rich yields 
of…copper…and indications of auriferous wealth’, he entered into negotiations 
with a British syndicate to construct, on the land grant principle, a new, 
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transcontinental line from Charleville to Point Parker on the Gulf of Carpentaria, 
with branches to Hughenden and Cloncurry.126 The total land to be granted to the 
syndicate as payment for the line’s construction was 12,000,000 acres and the 
time allocated for completion was seven and a half years from the date of the 
passing of the Transcontinental (Land Grant) Railway Bill, which would ratify the 
agreement.127 This ‘astonishingly bold scheme’, Bernays recounted, ‘evoked 
hostility such as has seldom been witnessed in the Queensland Parliament.’128 
 
The nexus between rail construction and the maintenance of political power had 
been a prominent feature of the Australian political landscape.129 Acknowledged 
as the vital precondition for accelerated economic growth, rail construction had 
intensified the regional emphasis of colonial politics, with each region exerting 
political pressure to secure rail extensions and its associated benefits. Political 
survival essentially rested on the reconciliation of these regional interests and 
factions.130 In the Queensland context regionalism existed, a contemporary 
observed, ‘as a perennial contention, marked by virulent abuse and fierce 
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animosity.’131 McIlwraith’s ‘national’ program of development and his 
establishment of Divisional Boards132 had seemingly countered the politically 
narrow outlook engendered by this sectional struggle on a geographical basis. His 
transcontinental railway scheme exposed the fragility of the accord. 
 
In October 1882 the journalist Carl Feilberg133 presented, in a letter to McIlwraith, 
his appraisal of the political situation surrounding the land grant railway proposal. 
Feilberg told the Premier that, ‘I can see you have great difficulties ahead of 
you….From what I know of Queensland I see your party is your difficulty.’134 The 
vocal objections to the transcontinental railway scheme, from within the collective 
of interests unified under McIlwraith’s directorship, corroborated Feilberg’s 
observations. It was these internal divisions that proved to be the most detrimental 
to McIlwraith’s cause.135 The principal source of discontent emanated from the 
western pastoralists, who were alarmed that proposed railway scheme detailed the 
compulsory and large-scale resumption of their pastoral leases. In retaliation the 
pastoralists withdrew their numerically significant support from the Ministry. 
Intensifying the contraction of McIlwraith’s parliamentary support base was the 
apprehension of the northern urban interests of Rockhampton and Townsville, who 
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foresaw in the transcontinental railway an inevitable loss of trade, through the 
anticipated redirection of the inland rail trade away from their ports to Brisbane or 
Point Parker.136 More generally, the ‘bitter and implacable opponents’ of the 
transcontinental railway invoked the spectre of ‘foreign syndicates’ assuming and 
‘exercising a preponderating control over our internal affairs’.137 This stoked 
Queensland’s ‘dread’ of an external incursion and seizure of the colony’s wealth 
and induced many including commercial interests in Brisbane to oppose the 
scheme.138 McIlwraith’s reply to these fears and his claim that the transcontinental 
project would accelerate the development of the colony by thirty years failed to 
arrest the mounting regional concerns over the scheme.139 The weakened political 
position of McIlwraith was further compounded by the opportunistic policies 
advanced by the opposition Liberal leader Samuel Walker Griffith. 
 
By 1883, Griffith had clearly recognised the political mileage to be gained by his 
opposition to the land grant railway scheme, particularly after the formation of the 
anti-Transcontinental League. Accordingly he presented a political platform 
designed to attract the discordant elements of McIlwraith’s Ministry to his party.140 
The western pastoralists were offered security of tenure via twenty-one year 
leases, and northern interests were lured with the return to the more attractive rail 
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policy of government-constructed extensions of the main trunk lines on borrowed 
money.141  
 
 
LIBERALS! “Keep yer heye on your father and he’ll see —” himself though. 
Figure 2.1:  Queensland Figaro, 21st April 1883 
 
In this tactical application of policy Griffith had executed a reversal of his 1880 
support for the land grant principle, articulated in the debates surrounding the 
Railway Preliminaries Act, and demonstrated his ability to adapt his views ‘to take 
advantage of the position.’142 A similar though more complex flexibility was evident 
in his opposition to coloured labour.  
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‘As ever with Griffith’, Roger Joyce noted, ‘it is difficult to identify his own 
convictions about the question’ of coloured labour.143 From the political 
perspective Griffith’s position, throughout his career, presented a pragmatic 
flexibility in relation to economic and populist factors.144 Astute to the economic 
importance of the colony’s sugar industry and its requirement for indentured 
Melanesian labour to maintain its profitability, Griffith’s opposition, from the mid-
1870s, was cautiously confined to the advocacy of tighter regulatory control over 
the labour trade rather than its abolition.145 Griffith’s transition from regulator to 
abolitionist was analogous with the escalating internal and external public 
dissension on the issue in 1882-83.  
 
The convergence of economic and social factors in the early 1880s intensified the 
political contentiousness of Queensland’s employment of coloured labour. 
Through ‘a perfect spasm of speculation’, principally by Victorian investors, ‘money 
was literally shovelled’ into the sugar industry and initiated an explosive phase of 
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expansion.146 A corollary of this ‘spectacular’ development was the industry’s 
significantly increased demand for indentured coloured labour.147 By 1881, it was 
evident to Queensland’s sugar-planters that the supply of labour from the Pacific 
Islands was fast being depleted and pressure was applied to find alternative 
sources.148 In response, McIlwraith’s conservative government, in which the 
planter interests were influential, proposed the importation of ‘labour of the servile 
kind…from British-India’, through the revival of the Coolie Act of 1862, to alleviate 
the sugar industry’s impending shortage of labour.149 Under Queensland’s guiding 
directive of maximising development this proposition represented a basic 
extension of the established policy of maintaining an indentured coloured labour 
force on the grounds that it was economically imperative. McIlwraith therefore 
reasoned that:  
[he] was well aware that the colony was an European one. At the same time 
it was foolish to allow coast lands to go untilled because white labour would 
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not work them. A large amount of the prosperity of the country depended 
upon the sugar industry.150  
 
Prior to the late 1870s, the majority of colonists had enthusiastically endorsed the 
economically expedient policies of successive Queensland governments and 
within this context the opposition aroused by the importation of coloured labour 
had been essentially nullified. John Wisker’s 1882 article entitled ‘The Victim of 
Civilisation’ presented a succinct and sardonic depiction of the supremacy of 
economic factors over moral ones:  
Amongst the sugar planters of Queensland the necessity of employing 
black labour is regarded as an axiom. It is not worthy of discussion. Any 
person who affirms that sugar can be cultivated without assistance of the 
Kanakas may deem himself fortunate if he receives an answer of any kind. 
As a rule he meets with the same treatment as that accorded to a civilian 
who attempts to speak of army organization to a tightly-strapped barnacle 
of the Horse Guard….Those who hold the opinion that grave future evils 
can be averted only by prohibiting this so-called “free labour” are generally 
met with the epithets “humanitarians” and “sentimentalists” – hard names in 
a country where the expression “liar” is rapidly coming to be looked upon as 
a compliment.151 
 
The ‘pouring in’ of the Chinese to Queensland’s northern goldfields during the 
1870s initiated a significant shift in the public and political consideration of the 
coloured labour question.152 In their significant numeric presence on the goldfields 
and their apparent material success, the Chinese were perceived as representing 
a direct economic threat to European miners, who saw their labour and their 
livelihood being undermined by this imported group of ‘coloured’ labourers.153 This 
perception of economic competition quickly evolved into concerted labour action 
against the increasing presence of the Chinese. Public support was invoked 
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through an emphasis on the social threat posed to white Queensland by the 
Chinese.154 That Queensland’s progress was defined only in white ethnocentric 
terms was affirmed and fortified in the Government’s introduction of restrictive 
legislation to prevent further Chinese immigration and therefore remove the 
Chinese ‘menace’.155 John Douglas later recounted the reasoning for his 
government’s recourse to legislation stating that they had done so ‘in order to 
preserve our own autonomy and to prevent the typical character of our 
colonisation from being imperilled’.156 A more forthright interpretation was 
advanced by Queensland’s Governor Cairns, who asserted that the Bill was 
‘brought forward with no other reason than to throw a sop to the jealous 
exclusiveness of the white mining population of the North.’157 The emergent form 
of widespread racial intolerance had as its underlying cause white fears about 
cheap labour. This basic premise became more entrenched and more 
encompassing during the 1880s. White labour progressively evolved into a more 
organised pressure group and targeted all aspects of Queensland’s employment 
of coloured labour in its movement towards a legally mandated racial segregation 
of the labour market.158 
 
By the early 1880s, the manifest parity between the concerns of white labourers 
and the Liberal party’s espoused opposition to coloured labour established a 
forceful alliance that was later to be problematic. To this collective, which Thomas 
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Archer, Queensland’s Agent-General, acknowledged in May 1883 as a ‘very large, 
influential, and constantly increasing party’, the purported practical economic 
benefits of the proposed importation of Coolie labour were superfluous to the 
broader threat it engendered to the colony’s social fabric.159 The ‘Inhabitants of 
Brisbane’ accordingly voiced their ‘deepest anxiety and alarm’ over the proposal in 
a petition drafted at a public meeting held in July 1882: 
That your Petitioners…consider it to be manifestly unjust that they should 
be dispossessed by an alien race whose semi-civilisation is antagonistic to, 
and whose mode of life and social customs have nothing in common with 
our own. That your Petitioners are strongly convinced that the labour 
market will be seriously disturbed…that our political and social institutions 
would be endangered by the presence amongst us of an alien people; and 
that your Petitioners, as members of the Anglo-Saxon race, consider they 
have a stronger claim upon the paternal care of Parliament than Asiatics or 
Coolies, and therefore claim your protection.160 
 
The vocal opposition of the colony’s southern constituents presented, as Douglas 
tendered, a ‘definite expression to our convictions as to the road we have to 
travel’.161 The apparent clarity of these ethnocentric convictions, on the Coolie and 
coloured labour issue in general, became more ambiguous in the central and 
northern regions of the colony. The ‘Residents of the Wide Bay District’ declared in 
a petition that they were ‘not antagonistic to the introduction of Polynesian 
labourers’, yet were ‘decidedly antagonistic to having Chinese and Coolie 
labourers brought into the colony’.162 In the North the employment of ‘a coloured 
race of labourers’ was seen as ‘the secret of their success and a main feature in 
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their future prospects.’163 In essence these diverse opinions on the question of 
coloured labour reflected each regions different stage of development. Thus in the 
more developed south, Queensland’s enduring motivational maxim of 
economically expedient development was under challenge. Griffith therefore 
argued that ‘it was said that a great deal more money would be made with than 
without black labour; but money was not the only object.’164 Alternatively, in the 
north where the process of expansion and development was more recent, 
economic factors governed and in accordance with this the progress driven 
McIlwraith countered Griffith: 
the Hon. Member said that men went to the North as if their only object in 
life was the accumulation of capital – as if the accumulation of capital was 
some unworthy aim to be detested by every well-behaved member of 
Parliament. What were they all trying to do but to accumulate wealth?165 
 
The significant economic relationship between the sugar industry and the north’s 
prosperity resulted in coloured labour, by the early 1880s, being most directly 
associated with North Queensland. Such a demarcation firstly provided the ‘Anti-
Black Labour’ lobby, most vociferous in the South, a focal area for distain, and 
second, exemplified the divergent interests of the northern and southern regions of 
the colony.  
 
Separatism was the symptomatic expression of the growing divide between 
Southern and Northern interests. The July 1882 formation in Townsville of the 
Northern Separation League confirmed the intensification of the North’s general 
discontent with Brisbane’s administration of the region. In this initial stage of 
separation movement there was no obvious link between the formation of the 
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League and the specific issue of coloured labour. This however was not the 
perception of Thadeus O’Kane, the persuasive editor of Charters Tower’s working 
class racialist paper the Northern Miner. O’Kane argued that the motivation for the 
movement was solely based on the sugar planters desire to introduce Coolies. 
Christine Doran, in her detailed analysis of North Queensland Separatism, argued 
that the prominence of Liberals in the movement in Townsville, the absence of 
references to Coolies at the Townsville and Cooktown meetings, and Mackay’s 
indifference collectively discredits O’Kane’s assertion. Doran reasoned that 
O’Kane seemed to ‘grasp any available argument to attack separationists’ and 
thus his association of the movement with Coolies was calculated to arouse the 
opposition of miners and working men in general against the movement.166 
Despite the League refuting the indictment the influence of this negative 
association between coloured labour and separation expanded. In April 1883 the 
Queensland Figaro presented their précis of the North’s purported separatist 
demands: ‘But says the North you fellows down South won’t let us have them; and 
if you won’t we’ll go to the foot of the throne, and pray for Coolies and 
Separation.’167 Indicative of the mounting political tensions engendered by the 
sugar industry’s worsening labour shortage and the broader social debate over 
Indian labour was the League’s decision to suspend its activities. The interplay 
between separation and the coloured labour question however became more 
apparent and forceful in Queensland in 1884. By early 1886 it had tentatively 
intersected with the federal movement and from this point the fused issues of 
separation and coloured labour increasingly occupied the unusual position of 
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being both an impetus for the broader cause of federation and an impediment to 
Queensland’s involvement in this federal mobilisation.  
 
At its core the question of coloured labour and separation was essentially a 
reflection of the regional and social tensions within Queensland. The Planter and 
Farmer therefore argued that ‘except indirectly and remotely, the people of 
Brisbane have no concern in this coolie labour question’.168 Yet in the intensifying 
social debate over ‘Coolie’ labour the strength of the ‘feeling of exclusiveness’ 
espoused by ‘the working men of Brisbane’ in collaboration with the Liberal party’s 
opposition constituted a significant pressure group that further weakened 
McIlwraith’s support base.169 William Brookes confirmed this in July 1882 when he 
declared that ‘the people of Brisbane thoroughly detest the Government’.170 In 
combination with the western pastoralists’ disquiet over the Transcontinental 
Railway scheme, the retraction of southern political support practically effaced the 
‘robust strength’ of McIlwraith’s ‘solid party’ to the extent that William Walsh 
described McIlwraith’s ministry in May 1882 as being ‘in their dying and decaying 
days’.171 The accent of culpability for McIlwraith’s tenuous political position did 
initially lay with the Transcontinental Railway proposal as ‘the question of the day’, 
yet the ‘Coolie’ labour issue was to prove a far more affecting matter.172 For it was 
recognised as a ‘very vexed question’ that ‘singled out’ the sugar industry ‘as the 
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battle ground’ for a broader and progressively more volatile social debate on what 
type of society Queensland was to be.173 It was a question the Queenslander later 
noted that ‘will shake our little society to its very centre’.174  
 
  
THE GOVERNMENT BANNER. 
Artist: “I’m afraid that nigger won’t take somehow, what can I substitute?” 
Figure 2.2:  Queensland Punch, 1 March 1883 
 
Intensifying this societal conflict was the ‘outside’ campaigns of humanitarian and 
missionary groups ‘bitterly hostile’ to Queensland’s continued employment of 
coloured labour.175  
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With ‘reiterative persistency’ throughout 1882 and 1883, the Melbourne and 
London press in particular published letters and articles that depicted the 
‘extraordinary and scandalous’ treatment of coloured races in Queensland.176 
Indictments were laid against Queensland’s application of a ‘doctrine of 
annihilation’ towards its Indigenous population and the colony’s contributive role to 
the ‘barbarities’ associated with labour recruitment, and the ‘ill-treatment’ and 
‘excessive mortality’ of Pacific Islanders in Queensland.177 The weight of this 
public attention on Queensland was chiefly directed towards the sugar industry’s 
employment of indentured coloured labour.178 Queensland was aware of this 
mounting campaign; under the heading ‘Mischievous Slander’ the Queenslander 
acknowledged that ‘Queensland and Queenslanders have had some hard things 
said of them as regards the kanaka trade by recent writers in the Melbourne 
papers.’179 The Queensland government was affronted by ‘unspeakable malignity’ 
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of these ‘scurrilous’, ‘virulent and unjustifiable attacks’ on the colony and 
consistently dismissed the charges as being ‘baseless’ or exaggerated.180 During 
an interview in March 1883, Queensland’s Agent General, Thomas Archer assured 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Derby:  
every precaution had been taken by the Government and Parliament…for 
many years past to remedy any hardship or anomaly….and concluded by 
begging him to accept any statement made to him about coloured labour in 
Queensland ‘with a large handful of salt’.181 
 
The core principle embodied in this essentially conventional retort to any criticism 
of the colony’s coloured labour policy was that Queensland was an independent 
colony whose internal affairs were the exclusive domain of its own legislature and 
therefore shielded from ‘outside’ opinions and intervention.182 The Northern Miner 
therefore reaffirmed that Queensland was, as were the other Australian colonies, 
‘in possession of as perfect liberty and self-control in all domestic affairs as any of 
the nations of the earth.’183 Griffith believed, despite being a staunch opponent of 
the Coolie labour proposal, that ‘it was undesirable that the home authorities 
should interfere in our affairs’.184 This essentially ‘Queensland versus the rest of 
the world’ mindset was endorsed and fortified by the McIlwraith Ministry’s 
progress-driven governance style and had proved to be an effective counterforce 
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to the criticism of the colony’s differential methods yet it had ostracising side 
effect.185  
 
By 1882-83 Queensland’s defiant stance on coloured labour had contributed 
significantly to the denigration of the colony as a backward or unrefined colonial 
society; a point of view which would be most commonly and effectively 
represented by the colony’s caricature as a little ‘hillbilly’ boy distinguished by his 
huge hat, bare feet and inane expression. More specifically, Queensland’s 
ongoing importation of ‘a race of island unfortunates, who serve the purpose of 
making money for their employers’ was seen as a substantial deviation, socially 
and economically, from the other Australian colonies.186 This aspect was well 
demonstrated in 1879 when Parkes excluded Queensland from his proposal for a 
partial federation because Queensland was embarking on ‘a colonising career 
dissimilar from that of her elder sisters’.187 More notably the issue of coloured 
labour, John Wisker argued in September 1882, presented a ‘strong’ and practical 
reason for federation as ‘all the colonies are interested in preventing this 
monstrous legacy from descending to the next generation.’188 Wisker had 
identified what would evolve into a compelling racially motivated argument for 
federation. At this point in time however Wisker’s argument was ineffectual 
because, as William Foster had contended in 1877, the subject of federation 
continued to be advocated through ‘a vast amount of abstract and even 
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transcendental theorising’ and as a consequence it remained outside the ‘range of 
common political experience…little liable to be checked or tested by facts’.189  
 
The ‘painful and languid existence’ of the federal idea within the Australian colonial 
context was essentially the result of two factors.190 First, there had only been a 
‘sort of amateur interest in the subject’ of federation and this had led to an 
indistinct but idealised presentation of the benefits to be attained through the 
political union of the colonies. The focus of this chapter has been on the second 
and more influential factor: the strength of provincialism, a direct consequence of 
the Australian process of colonial development. Geographically isolated from each 
other these ‘young communities’, the historian Wyatt Tilby explained, ‘naturally 
concentrated very largely on their own internal and immediate affairs, often to the 
entire seclusion of more distant matters.’191 Independence was the corollary of this 
separateness of development, embodied in the fervent demands for and the 
successful attainment by the Port Philip and Moreton Bay Districts of their 
territorial separation from the Mother Colony. Self-government solidified the 
autonomous existence of each colony and established an entrenched framework 
of separate principalities in which each framed their own legislation solely in 
accordance with their own immediate interests. Indicative of the pervasiveness of 
colonial individualism and independence was the colonies’ propensity to refer to 
themselves as nations. The Queensland Figaro, for one, asserted that 
‘Queensland has burst through her swaddling clothes….From a little dependency 
of Australia, she is developing into a free and powerful nation’.192 Further each 
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believed that they already possessed ‘all the elements of national life and 
prosperity’ and this persistently prevented the advancement of the federal initiative 
for in effect federation represented an abstract idea antithetical to the prevailing 
policy of colonial individualism.193 Indifference was as a consequence the most 
pervasive response to the federal advocates’ endeavours to persuade the 
colonies’ ‘to emerge from the stifling atmosphere of provincialism, and to breathe 
“a rarer ether, a diviner air” in the larger sphere of a Dominion.’194 Responsible 
government was too new and the colonial administrations too practically occupied 
with the business of developing their respective territories to consider at length the 
implications of this abstract topic.  
 
Queensland presents a dynamic example of the Australian process of colonial 
settlement. As the youngest colony, Queensland adopted a strident developmental 
program to rapidly overhaul the impact of its fiscally stifled pre-separation 
existence and consequent delayed progress. The 1879-1883 premiership of Sir 
Thomas McIlwraith represented the most adept demonstration of the pervasive 
internal desire for aggressive development and as a result the colony experienced 
a period of grand expansion. Yet it was two key aspects of McIlwraith’s program 
for the colony’s material development that proved to be corrosive to his strong 
political position. The land grant railway proposal, though McIlwraith argued that it 
would accelerate the colony’s development by thirty years, proved to be in 
advance of the public’s developmental aspirations. The proposed introduction of 
Indian Coolie labour exacerbated a growing social and regional divide within 
Queensland over the colony’s continued maintenance of a coloured labour force. 
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Intensified was the debate over what type of society Queensland was becoming 
and within these parameters there developed a ‘clamorous popular prejudice 
against coolie labour’.195 Economic rationales had routinely overridden these 
social concerns but were increasingly being contested by the southern-based 
Liberal/white workingman alliance. The regional concentration of opposition in the 
south put it at odds with the north where the bulk of Queensland’s sugar was 
cultivated, exacerbating an already existent antagonism between the north and the 
south. Northern separatist demands were the symptomatic expression of the 
escalating dynamics of regionalism. The retraction of southern support on the 
coolie labour issue further eroded McIlwraith’s political hold.196   
 
McIlwraith’s beleaguered political position was further compounded by the 
increasingly negative external focus on the colony’s coloured labour policy. 
Humanitarian and missionary groups depicted Queensland’s use of an indentured 
coloured labour force as ‘the slave trade under a new name.’197 Internally there 
was a growing awareness that the colony was acquiring an increasingly negative 
profile. William Groom acknowledged that ‘there was something connected with 
black labour that was discreditable to the colony and was bringing it into bad 
repute.’198 Queensland’s defiant stance on coloured labour, despite mounting 
external and internal opposition epitomised the inviolability of colonial 
independence, which reserved to each colony ‘the right to be masters of the 
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situation’.199 Yet it was apparent by 1883 that these external and internal pressure 
groups would continue to rail against Queensland’s stance on coloured labour and 
that Queensland was increasingly under Imperial and inter-colonial scrutiny.200 
There was ‘no wonder that Queensland should be looked upon with disfavour’ 
especially after McIlwraith attempted to annex the eastern half of New Guinea in 
April 1883.201  
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Chapter 3 
 
A ‘Very Cocky’ Act:  
Queensland’s 1883 Annexation of New Guinea.1 
 
On the 14th April 1883 Reuter’s Agent in Brisbane telegraphed London the 
‘extraordinary story that…the Queensland Government ha[d] taken formal 
possession of New Guinea.’2 The reaction to this news was wide-ranging and 
diverse. One London newspaper referred to it as a ‘high-handed action’, because:  
“Taking possession” is a matter for Her Majesty’s Ministers, after ascertaining 
the will of the people through the Parliament. For Sir Arthur Kennedy, the 
Governor of Queensland, and his little Executive Council to usurp this function 
is a liberty that we trust will not be tolerated.3  
 
Alternatively, the announcement by the Under Secretary for the Colonies in the 
House of Commons, of Queensland’s action was made ‘amid some laughter’.4 The 
London Times, satirically remarked that: 
Police magistrates are admirable and versatile officials; but this, we imagine, 
must be the first instance in which one of them has been called upon to play 
the part of a Columbus or a Cortez and to annex a territory larger than 
France.5  
 
Despite the farcical features of Queensland’s ‘adventurous’ act it was quickly 
acknowledged that it was also ‘pregnant with still greater issues [and]…sure to 
provoke discussion.’6 Queensland’s independent and unauthorised annexation of the 
eastern half of New Guinea7 initiated a fiery debate in Britain over the colony’s 
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coloured labour policy, and additionally ‘resuscitated’ the question of the ‘cruelties 
practiced on the Aborigines.’8 New Guinea proved to be an accelerant in a number of 
directions. The campaign of the preceding eighteen months by humanitarian and 
religious groups, opposed to Queensland’s labour policies, intensified. McIlwraith’s 
‘extraordinary undertaking’ in New Guinea was to this collective a problematic and 
startling extension of Queensland’s activities.9 The Imperial Government’s 
responsibilities to the Australian colonies also emerged as a matter of focus in the 
ensuing Imperial/colonial debate. A notable derivative of the Imperial and colonial 
response to the New Guinea annexation was its contradictory influence on the 
movement for political federation. Confirmed by the independent manner in which 
Queensland undertook the annexation was the prevailing force of colonial 
isolationism in the Australian context. This factor was further reinforced by 
Queensland’s continued adherence to a coloured labour policy. Yet, the increasing 
opposition from the Imperial Government and the other colonies to this Queensland 
specific issue had the effect of presenting a question that had a potentially unifying 
result. Paradoxically, it was the Imperial Government’s refusal to sanction 
Queensland’s annexation, largely on the humanitarian grounds that Queensland 
intended to recruit labour from New Guinea, which incited the first practical 
advancement towards colonial federation. This chapter will examine the basis of this 
purported recruitment motive, which gained contemporary and historical legitimacy. 
The relevance of the New Guinea incident to the federal movement is significant for it 
contributed to the movement as a whole, while at the same time denoted the 
complexity of one colony’s local social and political framework.  
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Prior to the April 1883 attempted annexation of New Guinea there existed, to the 
Queensland mind, a disquieting connection between the intensifying intercolonial and 
British denunciation of Queensland’s maintenance of a coloured labour force and the 
Imperial Government’s establishment of successive enquiries into labour recruitment. 
Commodore James Wilson’s10 February 1882 ‘Report on the Labour Trade in the 
Western Pacific’ had concluded that the labour traffic as regards Queensland and Fiji 
was ‘now as a rule carried out legally’ but that it was still ‘objectionable’.11 
McIlwraith’s prickly and dismissive response to this report presents an informative 
gauge of Queensland’s attitude in mid-1882: 
I have carefully investigated the particulars of the various abuses referred to 
by the Commodore in connection with this trade and find that very few indeed 
can be traced, even indirectly, to Queensland. Still, as Queensland employs a 
large number of Islanders, and as the abuses depicted by Commodore Wilson 
are couched in general terms and not sufficiently localised, the inference is left 
to be drawn that they exist in connection with the Queensland trade.12  
 
A more concerned tone is discernible in Queensland’s response to the Imperial 
Government’s January 188313 appointment of a Royal Commission, into the working 
of the Western Pacific Orders, headed by Sir Arthur Gordon14 and Rear Admiral 
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Wilson.15 The Queensland response to this enquiry, particularly from McIlwraith and 
the colony’s northern planters, denoted a defensive awareness of the Imperial 
Government’s growing and authoritative mandate for change. Indicative of this was 
the erroneous belief that the focus of the Commission’s enquiry was ‘the subject of 
Polynesian labour’ or more specifically that this would entail an investigation of ‘the 
treatment of Polynesian labourers in Queensland’.16 A Colonial Office minute, in 
response to the journalist’s Carl Feilberg’s letter to the Times, noted that ‘there 
appears to be a wide spread notion that the Western Pacific Committee is enquiring 
into the labour system in Queensland.’17 The appointment of this Commission so 
soon after Commodore Wilson’s investigation, in combination with the misinterpreted 
focus of enquiry, introduced a more apprehensive tone to Queensland’s response.  
 
The Week, an avowedly anti-coloured labour publication, acknowledged the 
intensification of Imperial scrutiny and predicted almost gloatingly that sugar planters 
should anticipate ‘the almost immediate interference by the Imperial authorities with 
the Pacific Island labour traffic in the direction of more stringent regulations’.18 The 
Western Pacific Royal Commission was consequently regarded as a potential 
challenge to the functional authority of Queensland’s autonomy. The Planters and 
Farmers Associations of Mackay and Maryborough, with McIlwraith’s endorsement, 
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protested that this enquiry, on a question ‘of the greatest importance to Queensland’, 
was a ‘great injustice’.19 McIlwraith additionally emphasised that there were ‘very 
reasonable grounds for protesting’ against the appointment of Gordon and Wilson for 
they ‘are already strongly committed to one side of the question….I think it is too 
much to expect that entire partiality will be observed.’20 The aversion to Gordon in 
particular, rested on his 1875-1880 governorship of Fiji, which had demonstrated, 
Aleck Ivimey claimed, that Gordon ‘was consistently inimical to the planters’ and as a 
result ‘his name is almost invariably received with execration’.21 Conversely, 
Gordon’s reputation as a holder of ‘firm humanitarian views’ buoyed the external and 
internal opponents of the labour trade.22 It was within this developing context of a 
sharpening focus on Queensland’s continued utilisation of an indentured coloured 
labour force that McIlwraith, with no authority from the Imperial Government and 
without consulting the other Australian colonies, independently annexed the eastern 
half of New Guinea.  
 
This ‘most important event’, Pugh’s Almanac recorded was ‘fraught with momentous 
results’.23 The most detrimental to McIlwraith’s cause was the ardency of the 
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campaign invoked by Britain’s humanitarian and missionary pressure groups against 
New Guinea being placed under Queensland’s authority. The central accusation of 
this collective was that McIlwraith had been solely motivated to take possession of 
the Island to secure Papuan labour for Queensland’s labour-depleted sugar industry.  
 
The principal reason conventionally advanced for McIlwraith instructing H.M. Chester, 
the Government’s Resident Police Magistrate on Thursday Island to proceed to Port 
Moresby and formally take possession of the eastern half of New Guinea on the 4th 
April 1883, was the imminent ‘probability of the Island being taken possession of by a 
foreign power.’24 The evidential basis for this perception of Germany’s annexationist 
ambitions in New Guinea rested tenuously on two factors. First, the November 1882 
publication of an article entitled ‘Newguinea’ in the German newspaper Allgemeine 
Zeitung, in which the author, Emil Deckert advocated and presented a compelling 
case for ‘the German Government to annex and colonise New Guinea’.25 Second, the 
March departure from Sydney of the German corvette the Carola whose commission, 
it was rumoured, entailed the annexation of certain islands in the South Pacific.26 
This seemingly corroborated the annexationist agenda outlined in the Allgemeine 
Zeitung article and thus demonstrated the necessity for immediate and decisive 
action.27 Germany, at this point in time, had not devised nor instituted an official 
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colonising policy towards New Guinea and in fact the events consequent to 
McIlwraith’s attempted annexation would prove to be a contributing factor in the 
activation of Germany’s imperialist activities in the region.28 In contrast the 
annexation of New Guinea to the Australian colonies, the Colonial Office 
acknowledged, was ‘a question of continually growing importance’ with regular 
petitions sent to the Imperial authorities appealing for protection against impending 
foreign encroachment.29  
 
At spasmodic intervals throughout the 1870s the Australian colonies had urged the 
Imperial Government to annex the eastern half of New Guinea to secure and protect 
their expanding and prospective interests in and around the island. Colonial interest 
in New Guinea had increased in unison with the growth of economic and commercial 
activity in the Torres Strait. Of particular note was the rapid development of the 
lucrative northern maritime industries of pearl-shelling and beche-de-mer fishing, the 
growing importance of the Torres Straits as a shipping route, described in 1876 as 
‘rapidly becoming the world’s highway’, and the increasing number of positive 
scientific reports that described New Guinea’s prospective ‘natural wealth’.30 Foreign 
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activity in what the Australian colonies increasingly saw as their natural sphere of 
expansion provoked apprehension and prompted appeals throughout the 1870s for 
New Guinea to be annexed to forestall this foreign encroachment.31 These ‘strong 
and repeated’ appeals for annexation were effectively countered by Britain’s 
‘indisposition to extend her jurisdiction’ and by the colonies’ unwillingness to 
contribute financially to the cost of the territory’s administration if annexed.32 Despite 
Queensland’s closer proximity to New Guinea, the colony did not exhibit a 
pronounced fear of foreign intervention nor fervour for annexation.  
 
In February 1875 Queensland’s Governor Cairns informed the Colonial Office that 
‘little real interest is felt as yet in the destiny of New Guinea by either the Ministry or 
the outside public of Queensland’.33 This stance was again confirmed in June 1878 
when Governor Kennedy stated that ‘my Ministers are decidedly averse to assuming 
                                                                                                                                                        
Economy of Pearlshelling,' Economic History Review, 14 (New Series): 1 (1962): 105-14; Moore, New Guinea: 
Crossing Boundaries and History. 127-28;Thomas Archer, Agent General for Queensland to Lord Derby, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 February 1883; Copy of Minute of Proceedings of the Executive Council on 
18th February 1875; Mr. Labilliere on the Annexation of New Guinea to Great Britain in ‘Correspondence 
Respecting the Annexation of New Guinea and the Administration of the Protectorate’. 7 April 1874 - 31 August 
1883 PRV7192/1/1 QSA; Gordon, The Australian Frontier in New Guinea 1870-1885. 97-102; H.C. Brown, 
'Queensland's Annexationist Ambitions In New Guinea 1859-1884', Unpublished BA Honours Thesis, University 
of Queensland, 1968: 16-45. 
31
 The early 1870s exploratory activities of Russia, France and Italy and the rumoured American expedition to 
examine the eastern shores of New Guinea was the basis of these concerns over foreign intervention in the 
region. Governor Cairns to Lord Derby, 22 February 1875, ‘Correspondence Respecting the Annexation of New 
Guinea’ PRV7192/1/1 QSA; Brown, 'Queensland's Annexationist Ambitions In New Guinea 1859-1884': 17-18. 
32
 The colonial refusal to share the financial burden of administration rested on the colonial argument that under 
the proposed arrangements they would be contributing to the expense but would not gain a voice in the way that 
New Guinea was governed. Lord Carnarvon countered this argument by asserting that it was the colonies that 
would materially benefit from the acquisition of New Guinea while the ‘taxpayers’ of Britain would principally bear 
the burden of the cost. Robert Herbert put the Colonial Office’s position succinctly in August 1875, ‘One thing 
which it will be very desirable to say very distinctly is that if the Australian colonies desire such a step as the 
annexation of New Guinea, it will be for them to provide the funds.’ The British Liberal government’s aversion to 
Imperialism was also a significant factor in forestalling colonial annexation but at this point in time it was the 
question of cost. Sydney Morning Herald, 22 February 1871 cited in Gordon, The Australian Frontier in New 
Guinea 1870-1885: 94; Colonial Office Minute, 11 August 1875, Queensland Original Correspondence, CO234/41 
AJCP; Colonial Office Minute, ‘Annexation of New Guinea to Queensland’, 28 February 1883, Queensland 
No.3518, Queensland Original Correspondence, CO234/43 AJCP.  
33
 An influencing factor in Queensland disinclination was the Imperial Government’s aversion to Imperialism for 
Douglas stressed in his letter to Queensland’s Government Agent in Port Moresby William B. Ingham ‘Give no 
encouragement to the idea of the territorial annexation of New Guinea. The Government of Her Majesty the 
Queen of Great Britain has no interest in that sort of aggrandisement.’ Governor Cairns to Lord Derby, 22 
February 1875, ‘Correspondence Respecting the Annexation of New Guinea’, PRV7192/1/1 QSA; John Douglas 
to W.B. Ingham, 1 June 1878. ‘Miscellaneous Correspondence: 11 January 1861 – 7 March 1939’, RSI12848/1/1 
QSA. 
  151 
any responsibility connected with New Guinea.’34 Queensland’s reluctance to embark 
on an expansionist programme in New Guinea at this time rested on the fact the 
reports that it possessed ‘great mineral wealth’ and fertile soil were unsubstantiated, 
and second, that the colony still had its own vast tracts of more accessible territory in 
the north to develop.35 Queensland’s focus was more proximate and centred on the 
Torres Strait in alignment with the colony’s expanding maritime industries.  
 
In 1877 the Imperial Government’s initiative to extend Queensland’s maritime 
boundary ostensibly remedied the colony’s strategic concerns that ‘the establishment 
of the authority of any Foreign State upon her water frontier would be nothing less 
than a permanent disaster’.36 Additionally it would improve the administrative 
difficulties of policing the activities of the ‘somewhat doubtful characters’ that 
operated outside the colony’s 60 nautical mile jurisdictional boundary established in 
1872.37 The extension gazetted in July 187938, after ‘much shilly-shallying’ between 
the Imperial Government and Queensland, annexed to Queensland the islands of 
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Tuan, Saibai, Talbot, and Deliverance near the coast of New Guinea, and other 
islands lying in the Torres Straits.39 Queensland was as a consequence granted the 
full responsibility of governing these islands and their ‘native’ inhabitants and 
additionally, as John Douglas declared, the colony now ‘commanded the passage of 
Torres Straits’.40 Yet this extension of Queensland’s boundary cannot be classified as 
Queensland’s entrée into imperialism. The impetus for this extension had came from 
the Imperial Government and notably the Colonial Office had professed the view that 
‘there cannot be any objection to annexing the Islands in question to Queensland.’41 
But by 1883 simultaneous but opposing developments had brought about a 
significant change in attitude.  
 
In 1880, the new British Liberal Government of William Gladstone adopted a resolute 
policy of anti-imperialism.42 Central to this overt opposition to territorial annexation 
was an abhorrence of the negative impact that colonisation had had on Indigenous 
populations. Lord Selborne, Lord Chancellor in Gladstone’s Ministry and ardent 
supporter of the anti-imperialist policy reflected that he ‘detested, as a disgrace to the 
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Christian name, the cruelty and oppression by which, in too many cases, the path of 
civilisation has been stained.’43 Informing and fortifying this policy was the expanding 
missionary activity in the Pacific and the allied development of public campaigns by 
humanitarian pressure groups such as the Aboriginal Protection Society. A 
fundamental concern of these bodies was the ongoing subjection of Islanders to the 
activities of labour recruiters. The Presbyterian Missionaries had outlined their 
objective in 1871:  
Our aim is not to have the traffic regulated, to have its grosser abuses remain, 
but to have it abolished, to have the evil removed, the root as well as the 
branch. Our distinct aim is to have it abolished by an Act of the Imperial 
Parliament.44 
 
In combination the anti-Imperialist Liberals and the various church organisations 
were recognised as ‘that powerful party known in England as “Exeter Hall”’.45 It was 
critically argued of this collective that:  
In all their public acts and words they follow out the theory that the natives of 
the Pacific are mild, innocent savages, and all white traders and sailors in the 
Seas murdering wretches. The poor natives must be protected.46 
 
In the early 1880s this campaign against the labour trade in the Pacific intensified. 
The provocation for this was the onset in Queensland of the sugar industry’s 
explosive phase of expansion and its accordant upsurge in demand for indentured 
coloured labour. Increased recruiting activity in the Pacific to supply the growing 
needs of planters was the offensive outcome. In the ensuing critical press campaign, 
Queensland was censured for its role in the expansion of this ‘thinly disguised 
slavery’.47 Queensland had by 1883 ‘certainly acquired a bad name’ and the broader 
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significance of this would be played out in the Imperial authorities consideration of 
McIlwraith’s annexation action.48 
 
Although McIlwraith had submitted that his principal motivation for the pre-emptive 
annexation of New Guinea was the strategic threat posed by Germany’s colonising 
ambitions, this ‘startling’ action by Queensland was at once viewed, in ‘certain 
influential quarters’, with suspicion.49 The central component to this suspicion was 
the Imperial belief the purported threat from Germany was unlikely. Britain had 
developed a fixed idea that Bismarck had no colonising ambitions and this had been 
reinforced by the reports of the British Ambassador in Berlin Lord Ampthill.50 
Therefore in alignment with Queensland’s ‘bad reputation’, concerns were 
immediately raised over the colony’s motives for annexing a territory that contained ‘a 
large black population’.51 Queensland’s action was seen to be problematic on two 
grounds. First, based on the historical account of the colony’s ‘scandalous’ treatment 
of coloured races, Queensland was judged not to have ‘qualified particularly well’ to 
assume the administrative responsibilities of governing the inhabitants of New 
Guinea.52 The London Missionary Society’s Reverend W.G. Lawes stationed at Port 
Moresby put the case more forcefully:  
There must be some mistake somewhere….Nowhere in the world have 
aborigines been so basely and cruelly treated as in Queensland – the half has 
never been told – and are the natives of New Guinea to be handed over to the 
tender mercies of the men who have done these deeds?53 
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Alternatively, the Colonial Office’s Chief Clerk W. Mercer speculated that: 
 
In dealing with so large a native population, the colony will probably be more 
careful than it has been at home, for the sake of its own future, to study 
moderation and prudence, and to listen to any directions which may be given 
by Her Majesty’s Government.54  
 
The second and more provocative concern was based on Queensland’s defiant 
maintenance of a coloured labour force or more specifically the sugar industry’s 
escalating labour problems. It was therefore associatively argued that the annexation 
of New Guinea was a determined action taken by Queensland ‘in order to supply her 
sugar plantations with Papuan labour’.55 Three pieces of circumstantial evidence 
allegedly supported this contention. First, the Allgemeine Zeitung article was 
dismissed as ‘a merely speculative theory of the writer without authoritative sanction 
from the German Government’ and therefore seemingly insufficient to induce 
German colonisation of New Guinea. Second, the general belief that Queensland 
was ‘untrustworthy’56 and third, Queensland planters had approached the 
missionaries in New Guinea in early 1883 asking ‘Can we get men in New Guinea to 
work for us here in North Queensland?’57  
 
In response to the planters’ letter, the London Missionary Society’s Samuel 
MacFarlane at Murray Island and W.G. Lawes at Port Moresby depicted the state of 
play in New Guinea. They reported the ‘natives’ had experienced only sporadic 
contact with Europeans and were either ‘a wild and treacherous people’ or ‘more 
                                                 
54
 W.H. Mercer, 15 May 1883, Colonial Office Minute, ‘Annexation of New Guinea’, 14 May 1883, Queensland 
No.8239, Queensland Original Correspondence, CO234/43 AJCP. 
55
 ‘Old Country News’, Queenslander, 21 July 1883. 
56
 In a letter to Lord Derby, dated the 19th May 1883 Prime Minister Gladstone declared: ‘I hope we find ourselves 
in a condition utterly to quash this annexation effected by Queensland on her sole authority, for I suppose her to 
be untrustworthy as well as unauthorised.’ H.C.G. Matthew, (ed.), The Gladstone Diaries with Cabinet Minutes 
and Prime-Ministerial Correspondence. Volume 10. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990: 435 - 50. 
57
 W.G. Lawes, ‘Settling of New Guinea’, Letter to the Editor dated 2 February, Queenslander, 31 March 1883; 
also printed in the Liberal paper Week, 31 March 1883.   
156 
tractable’ but ‘unwilling to leave home’.58 MacFarlane concluded that ‘as to your 
immediate prospects in New Guinea, I fear the play will not be worth the candle….I 
cannot therefore advise you to risk any expenditure in attempting at present to get 
labour from New Guinea.’59 Lawes emphasised the Papuans aversion to be ‘out of 
sight of their own land’ and therefore stressed: ‘Let it be clearly understood that no 
natives are likely to be obtained here as honourable men should get them.’60 
MacFarlane and Lawes’ personal depiction of the precarious nature of 
Papuan/European contact served to reinforce the anecdotal reports detailed in the 
recurrent newspaper accounts commonly entitled ‘Massacre in New Guinea’.61  
 
Yet, it was argued that despite these ‘discouraging’ letters from MacFarlane and 
Lawes the planters continued to proceed with the labour proposal and solicited 
McIlwraith to facilitate the annexation of the territory so as to provide a ‘fresh field for 
recruiting native labour’.62 Beyond the assurance of the Times’ correspondent in 
Sydney, that ‘the labour question has no bearing on the annexation’ or the more 
abrupt dismissal of the idea as ‘an absurdity’, the context in which the annexation of 
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New Guinea took place challenges the accuracy, in contemporary and historical 
accounts, of the labour recruitment theory.63  
 
WE ANNEX NEW GUINEA. 
Figure 3.1:  Queensland Punch, 1 May 1883 
 
In January 1886 the Queensland’s Governor Sir Anthony Musgrave view on the 
matter was that ‘not much doubt is entertained by those who know most about the 
matter that the annexation of New Guinea was intended to supply black labour.’64 
Recent historical interpretation has sustained this view of McIlwraith’s principal 
motivation. Roger Thompson, for example, argued that the ‘real explanation’ for the 
annexation was the ‘potential value of New Guinea and its nearby islands as a 
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source of labour.’65 Most recently the Pacific historian Clive Moore advanced that 
Queensland’s bid to control the eastern half of New Guinea ‘had as a primary 
motivation the desire to monopolise this huge labour supply.’66 But these historical 
accounts have considered the annexation in isolation of the broader Queensland 
political context. Key factors in Queensland’s prevailing political environment, 
introduce alternative contentions to the question of whether labour recruitment was 
the foremost or sole motivation. 
 
In line with McIlwraith’s ‘bold, prompt and masterful’ style of leadership, the 
annexation of New Guinea was depicted in London as ‘a stroke of policy that will be 
likely to take rank amid the boldest acts of the kind ever done by a young 
community’.67 The Sydney Bulletin declared that ‘the annexation of New Guinea by 
the Queensland Premier is certainly the most remarkable event which has occurred 
on this side of the equator during the last score of years’.68 McIlwraith’s action was 
quite unmistakably an ‘overt act’ that attracted significant public interest and 
scrutiny.69 Moreover, as the annexation was unprecedented and unauthorised, the 
Imperial Government’s sanction of the action was a mandatory requirement. It would 
therefore seem extraordinary that McIlwraith, while fully alert to the increasing and 
authoritative campaign against the recruitment of Island labourers, would have 
chosen such a dramatic course of action based on an exceptionally vulnerable 
motive. It would seem certain that within this unfavourable context the issue of 
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Queensland’s coloured labour policy would be raised.70 McIlwraith’s awareness of 
the oppositional influence of ‘the philanthropic party in England’ was apparent in his 
telegram to the other Australian Colonies appealing for support ‘as I fear undue 
pressure upon Imperial Government to repudiate the annexation of New Guinea.’71.  
 
The Week alternatively drew a different hypothesis from the mounting Imperial 
pressure on Queensland. In late March 1883 it declared that ‘this annexation 
business is mystifying in the highest degree’ and due to ‘the utter absence of definite 
information’ it proceeded to postulate McIlwraith’s motivation. The paper theorised 
that because the Royal Commission indicated the ‘immediate interference’ by the 
Imperial authorities into the Pacific Island labour traffic, sugar planters had ‘prevailed 
upon’ McIlwraith to annex New Guinea. The essential premise of the Week’s 
argument was that if New Guinea was within Queensland’s jurisdiction ‘no new law 
nor regulation will be needed to move aborigines from one part of Queensland to 
another’ and therefore ‘it will be easy enough to get an ample supply of natives to 
come down’.72 While it seems doubtful that the pressure brought to bear on 
McIlwraith, by sections of the planter collective, would have been sufficient to induce 
such a radical undertaking,73 the supposition that the act of annexation would ease 
the path for recruitment was flawed. Queensland’s Lieutenant Governor Arthur 
Palmer’s telegram in response to Lord Derby’s enquiry whether recruitment vessels 
had departed for New Guinea, asserted that ‘if annexation confirmed cannot recruit  
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there – see Pacific Island Labourers Act – Recruiting in New Guinea would require 
new legislation.’74 The Colonial Office confirmed this assessment of the situation.75 
The pertinent section of the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1880 was the ‘Definition 
of Terms’, which outlined that recruitment was prohibited from Islands within ‘Her 
Majesty’s dominions’.76 As the eastern half of New Guinea was not in the possession 
of any civilised power there existed no legal mechanism that prevented recruitment 
from within New Guinea or its nearby islands. The advancement of recruiting vessels 
into the New Guinea region from February 1883, prompted by the success of the 
Fijian recruiter, Lord of the Isles, which had recruited 178 Islanders from New Britain 
within a few days, was therefore neither illegal nor untoward.77 Yet it was the 
entrance of Queensland’s labour recruiters into the Bismarck Archipelago, northeast 
of the New Guinea mainland, which was seized upon as the tangible evidence that 
confirmed and therefore exposed Queensland’s darker motivation. 
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Figure 3.2:  Map showing proximity of Bismarck Archipelago.78 
 
Concerns, by those opposed to coloured labour, peaked with news that the recruiter 
vessel the Hopeful had departed Townsville on 7th February 1883 with the vaguely 
described destination of the South Seas and the reports that four more vessels had 
departed Queensland in March. The swift return of these vessels, from the Bismarck 
Archipelago within three months carrying a combined total of 529 recruits, was 
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advanced as the tangible evidence of Queensland’s ulterior motive.79 The Mackay 
Mercury argued that, ‘considering that the labour traffic has been in existence now for 
many years, the sudden state of fright exhibited about New Guinea is almost 
amusing.’80 McIlwraith more forcefully refuted the ‘allusion’ that Queensland desired 
New Guinea as a ‘facility’ to obtain a large supply of coloured labour: ‘On behalf of 
the Colony I deny that we have been actuated by any such motive; nor was there the 
slightest ground for believing the statement’.81 Despite McIlwraith’s assertion 
corroborative evidence of the Queensland Government’s nefarious intent has 
historically been located in the reply sent by Queensland’s Lieutenant Governor, Sir 
Arthur Palmer, in response to the Imperial Government’s enquiry on recruitment 
activity in New Guinea.  
 
On the 4th June Palmer cabled a reply to Lord Derby: ‘Cannot ascertain that any 
labour ships have gone to New Guinea clear for South Sea Islands only; No 
labourers have come from New Guinea’.82 Yet, on the 21st May the Hopeful had 
returned to Townsville with 102 recruits from the New Britain and Duke of York 
Islands in the Bismarck Archipelago. The return of the Hopeful has been advanced 
as the evidence that contradicts Palmer’s claim that no Papuan recruits had entered 
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Queensland.83 Under Queensland’s notification system, the captain of a labour 
vessel was required by law to immediately submit a report to the local Immigration 
Agent detailing the number and origin of each recruit. These details were first 
telegraphed and then shipped onto the Brisbane-based Immigration Department. 
That Palmer did not acknowledge this information in his cable, sent two weeks after 
the Hopeful had returned, has been taken to mean that he was ‘either misled or at 
worst lying’.84 But two points should be considered that introduce a degree of 
ambiguity.  
 
First, Derby’s telegram specifically sought information on the validity of the reports ‘in 
the English newspapers that a vessel had left Mackay for New Guinea to obtain 
labour.’85 Accordingly, Queensland’s Under Colonial Secretary Robert Gray 
telegraphed A.R. MacDonald, Mackay’s Inspector of Pacific Islanders: ‘Have any 
vessels left Mackay or other port with the avowed intention of recruiting Islanders.’86 
MacDonald replied that no vessel had been cleared from Mackay for New Guinea 
and presented a sketchy report of the recruitment activity of the Fanny and the 
Hopeful in the Bismarck Archipelago.87 Second, Palmer’s non-inclusion of this activity 
in his reply indicated that he had interpreted ‘New Guinea’ as a literal reference only 
to the New Guinea mainland. This literal definition of New Guinea was a manifest 
feature of McIlwraith’s 1888 claim that while he was premier ‘everyone was given to 
understand, and did understand…that no ships were to recruit in New Guinea, and 
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as a matter of fact up to the time I left office no ship did recruit in New Guinea’.88 
Returns for this period show that 749 Islanders had been recruited from the Bismarck 
Archipelago.89 McIlwraith quite clearly did not identify this group of Islands as New 
Guinea. The interchangeable use by the Colonial Office of the terms ‘the Island’ or 
‘the island of New Guinea’ verifies the use of this definition as an accepted term of 
reference and not as a creative or tactical device to avoid the labour recruitment 
charge.90 
 
An additional feature that qualifies the labour recruitment argument was McIlwraith’s 
continued advocacy of Indian Coolie labour, despite the mounting campaign against 
the proposal, as his preferred solution to the sugar industry’s labour problems.91 
Moreover, McIlwraith anticipated the end of labour recruitment in the Pacific once 
‘Coolies’ had been introduced. The London Missionary’s Society’s James Chalmers, 
reported that he found McIlwraith, in a June 1883 interview, to be ‘a stubborn, good, 
honest Scotchman, anxious that justice should be done, and willing, if coolies could 
be obtained, that the labour traffic in natives should be stopped.’92 An intriguing 
aspect of the debate over McIlwraith’s allegedly ulterior motivation to annex New 
Guinea to supply Queensland’s sugar planters with labour is that there does not 
appear to exist any substantiative evidence beyond speculation. In fact no evidence 
has been located that contradicts McIlwraith’s statement. Yet undeniably the 
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‘mystifying’ aspects of McIlwraith’s action in conjunction with Queensland’s ‘bad 
reputation’ and the advent of recruiting in New Guinea waters did provide ample 
scope for conjecture. Arguably a more plausible rationale for McIlwraith’s course of 
action can be found in his tenuous political position.  
 
By early 1883 it was evident that McIlwraith’s political standing was precarious. The 
Queenslander, a pro-McIlwraith paper acknowledged that the life of his Ministry was 
‘near its end’.93 In view of McIlwraith’s deteriorating political position, it can be 
feasibly argued that his ‘high-handed and precipitate’ annexation of New Guinea, 
was undertaken for the reasons advanced by Sir Henry Parkes:  
The Queensland Minister acted more from a desire to captivate political 
support by a bold stroke in asserting the importance of that Colony at a time 
when popular support was certainly needed then from any more enlarged view 
of the interests of the Empire. But I do not think that there was any design 
such as I have heard vaguely charged of securing Papuan labour for the 
Queensland sugar plantations.94  
 
Approached from this perspective, a number of the anomalies evident in McIlwraith’s 
action become comprehensible. Prominent amongst these was the suddenness and 
earnestness with which McIlwraith took up the idea of annexing New Guinea. Within 
the space of one month McIlwraith abruptly revived the ‘subject of the annexation of 
New Guinea’ and carried out the formal annexation itself.95 That parliament was not 
sitting at the time was a significant factor that aided McIlwraith in completing the 
exploit quickly. Most of his Ministers were absent from Brisbane, and this therefore 
had presented the politically vulnerable premier with the prospect of acting 
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independently without challenge.96 In this particular state of affairs McIlwraith was 
able to assert that the case advanced by the Allgemeine Zeitung article, which urged 
the German government to annex New Guinea, constituted a legitimate threat and 
therefore required immediate action.  
 
Alternatively, the Colonial Office and the Week dismissed the line of reasoning 
contained in the Allgemeine Zeitung article as being an unofficial and purely 
speculative thesis.97 Prior to this it is questionable that the sketchy nature of 
Germany’s intent outlined in the article could be regard as an ‘urgent’ and legitimate 
threat. This remain the case in spite of Queensland’s propensity to be alarmed at 
unconfirmed reports of any foreign activity in the Southwest Pacific and growing 
colonial interests in the Torres Strait.98 Furthermore, given that McIlwraith was 
accredited as being ‘the most masterful political leader of the continent’, the 
possibility that he propagated the threat for alternative purposes cannot be 
discounted.99 Queensland’s particularly heightened fear of outside encroachment, 
New Guinea’s proposed natural wealth and the contemporarily acknowledged ‘fiery 
temperature of the political atmosphere in Queensland’, did present a context in 
which the Allgemeine Zeitung article could be used by McIlwraith as an effective 
pretext to ‘captivate political support by a bold stroke.’100 The independent manner in 
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which McIlwraith radically forced the pace of the annexation upholds this supposition 
that the action was a calculated and locally determined form of expansionism. 
 
The accelerated pace with which McIlwraith attempted to force his ‘brilliant master-
stroke’ indirectly conceded that the perceived threat from Germany was unlikely to 
hold up to the ‘mature consideration’ of the Imperial authorities.101 To evade this 
process McIlwraith it would seem made an effort to present a fait accompli. He 
instructed the Queensland Agent General Thomas Archer, on the 26th February, to 
urge the Imperial Government to annex New Guinea. These orders were issued on 
his own counsel and circumvented normal channels of Colonial and Imperial 
communication.102 While the appropriate channel through the Governor was also 
carried out on the 26th February, McIlwraith’s mid-March submission to the Executive 
Council of the annexation question and the resultant decision, ‘that an officer of the 
Queensland Government be at once despatched to New Guinea fully empowered to 
take possession, in the name of Her Majesty’, demonstrated McIlwraith’s haste and 
disinclination to await Imperial instructions on the matter.103 Beyond the logistics of 
sending detailed communications by sea, the Colonial Office’s discussion of 
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McIlwraith’s appeal for annexation bears out the likelihood that the consultation 
phase would be lengthy. The Colonial Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary Robert 
Herbert outlined what the Imperial Government would require to make a decision on 
such a ‘large question of policy’.104 These were, principally, a fuller explanation of the 
views and proposals of Queensland, a formal resolution from Queensland’s 
Legislature and the confirmation that no other claims existed over New Guinea.105 
McIlwraith appears to have sought the authority of the Executive Council at a stage 
when no new concrete developments had occurred. The movements of German 
vessels in and out of Australian ports was however being watched with suspicion. On 
the 19th March, four days after the Executive Council’s recommendation, it was 
reported that the German corvette Carola had departed Sydney on the 18th for the 
South Seas with the rumoured ‘object of annexation’ and this presented the viable 
pretext for immediate action.106 McIlwraith, in response and again independently and 
without consulting the other Australian colonies or the Imperial Government, ordered 
Chester to ‘immediately’ proceed to New Guinea and take formal possession.107 In 
informing the Governor of what had transpired McIlwraith was evidently alert to the 
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fact that his ‘summary step’ would not be well received in Britain and consequently, in 
order to establish his position, he urged the Governor to:  
impress upon the Secretary of State that the Queensland Government have 
acted under the full belief that the matter was too urgent to admit of the delay 
necessarily involved in waiting for instructions from the Imperial Government. 
As the possession of this valuable territory depended on mere precedence in 
the formality of annexation, and as the Queensland Government, from 
information received from various sources, had strong reason to believe in the 
possibility, and even the probability, of being anticipated in their proposed 
course of action by a foreign power – a contingency which could not but 
gravely affect the Australasian Dependencies of Great Britain…– it is hoped 
that the Secretary of State will perceive that in the step taken by the 
Queensland Government they have been guided by considerations of 
expediency, which justify their promptness in taking action in the matter.108 
 
Lord Derby outlined the Imperial Government’s interpretation of McIlwraith’s haste 
and his irregular course of action: 
Considering that telegraphic communication existed between Queensland and 
this country, it would not have involved a delay of more than 24 hours to have 
asked for the sanction of the Imperial authorities before proceeding to this act 
of so-called annexation. If, therefore, the Queensland authorities did not apply 
for leave it can only be in consequence of their entertaining decided and 
perhaps, reasonable apprehension that the sanction they asked for would not 
be granted.109 
 
Internally, McIlwraith’s Ministers later declared that ‘the Premier had done a grand 
action’ and that ‘no praise would be too strong to characterise’ his role in its 
accomplishment.110 Alternatively, Griffith ‘doubted’ whether McIlwraith’s version of the 
events ‘correctly described what had happened.’111 Open censure of the ‘boldness 
and pluckiness’ of McIlwraith’s action was largely reserved, as Griffith explained, 
‘until all the correspondence on the subject had been examined.’112 As the 
annexation had been locally received with ‘great satisfaction’ it would have been 
impolitic for Griffith to condemn it, particularly before the Imperial Government had 
                                                 
108
 McIlwraith to Governor Kennedy, 13 April 1883, Queensland Parliament, Annexation of New Guinea: 8.  
109
 Lord Derby, ‘Parliamentary Intelligence: House of Lords, 2 July 1883’, Times, 3 July 1883. 
110
 Maurice Hume Black, ‘Address in Reply’, 26 June 1883, QPD, 39 (1883): 7.  
111
 Samuel Griffith, ‘Address in Reply’, 26 June 1883, QPD, 39 (1883): 12. 
112
 Ibid, 13. 
170 
announced its verdict.113 This did not however forestall all attempts to corrode 
McIlwraith’s authority.  
 
Bolstered by a resurgence in his popularity McIlwraith frankly responded to Griffith’s 
accusation that he had ‘caught at any pretext to escape’ his current ‘humiliating’ 
political position, in particular his ‘reprehensible’ delay in recalling Parliament.114 
McIlwraith cited the annexation as one reason for the delay and went near to 
acknowledging that he had sought to captivate political and popular support by a bold 
stroke: 
had the House been sitting, and had the hon. gentleman seen an opportunity 
to damage the Government, he would certainly have weakened the hands of 
the Government in the course which they adopted. The Government in the 
action they had taken had, he thought, deserved considerable credit, and that 
credit they could only have got in the absence of the Opposition party.115  
 
That Parliament was not in session had clearly aided McIlwraith, for, as he indicated, 
it had prevented any interference or delay in his action; secondly and most notably it 
enabled McIlwraith to evade a fundamental requirement of the Imperial Government, 
a formal resolution from Queensland’s Legislature detailing the colony’s case for 
Imperial action and the Legislature’s unanimous support for the annexation.116 While 
the Imperial Government had the annexation under consideration, it is plausible that 
McIlwraith delayed the recall of Parliament to await their decision, for undeniably a 
favourable response would have further strengthened his political position. Notably, 
the pro-McIlwraith weekly the Queenslander, considered McIlwraith’s excuse for the 
delay as being ‘worse than valueless’, for as the paper argued ‘if he had had any 
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reason to anticipate that Parliament would have been opposed to the annexation, he 
should not have attempted it.’117 The independent manner in which McIlwraith had 
acted was particularly problematic for the Northern Miner: 
The question looked at from a Queensland point of view presents the saddling 
of the colony with an unknown and indefinite expenditure; usurping the power 
and functions of the Parliament, passing by with contempt that body and the 
people’s representatives and concluding an arrangement of vast importance 
both to the natives of New Guinea and of Queensland by his own sole will and 
determination….Representative Government in Queensland has become a 
hollow sham, a sickly make-believe without hollow or pith. We are under an 
autocracy and McIlwraith is exercising power as despotic and uncontrolled as 
the Czar of Russia.118  
 
Overt criticism of the character of McIlwraith and his Government emerged as a 
tactical feature of the Opposition’s campaign to counter McIlwraith’s recovering public 
appeal. Arnold Weinholt published in April a letter, which the Mackay Mercury 
paraphrased, ‘Sir Thomas is the very worst Premier of the very worst colony in 
existence.’119 Griffith’s public and political addresses contained variants on 
Weinholt’s ‘attack’ and referred to the ‘iniquity’ of the Government or his belief that 
the ‘eyes of the people had…been opened a great deal wider…to see the 
Government in their true character.’120 In July, Griffith reiterated Weinholt’s basic 
assertion and claimed that ‘Wherever this colony was known the present 
Government were regarded as the worst in any of the British dominions.’121 
Perceptibly, Griffith had interpreted the ‘deluge of ink’ that had been expended on 
editorials and news reportage of McIlwraith’s attempted annexation as unfavourable 
and therefore depreciative of Queensland. In contrast the Queenslander argued that:  
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We may thank the recent abuse showered on our colony, and the annexation 
of New Guinea, for the fact that there is now a really quite respectable number 
of Englishmen who know that there is such a place as Queensland, and that it 
has a Government of its own.122  
 
Queensland Figaro also considered the publicity positively and more directly 
associated it with McIlwraith: ‘Barnum retires; McIlwraith takes his place as the boss 
advertiser of the world. The annexation of New Guinea was the biggest 
advertisement Queensland ever got. And almost gratis.’123 The rate of private capital 
investment into Queensland in part corroborates the premise that the exposure 
engendered by the annexation was economically productive. Between 1881-1885 
Queensland attracted £12,500,000, a £9,00,000 increase on the previous five-year 
period. This was particularly impressive when compared with Victoria’s £4,500,000 
and New South Wales’ £14,500,000 for the 1881-1885 period.124 From a local 
perspective, McIlwraith’s ‘precipitate’ annexation of New Guinea did contribute to an 
upturn in his popular appeal and had associatively ‘raised the colony of Queensland 
in the eyes of the world’, but it did not succeed in diverting the Queensland public’s 
‘exceptional interest’ in the Transcontinental Railway proposal or the Coolie labour 
issue.125 That distraction was the underlying motive for McIlwraith’s attempted 
annexation of New Guinea was the 1884 judgment of the Hon. Charles Dutton:  
I maintain that those who attempted to carry out the annexation showed 
earnestness that I do not believe they felt or actually feel now. It was said at 
the time perhaps with some truth, that the purpose of that annexation was to 
divert attention from more important matters nearer home; and I am of the 
opinion that that had something to do with it.126 
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In the Imperial arena the mounting moral opposition to Queensland gaining 
administrative control of New Guinea further diminished these local gains. 
 
McIlwraith’s case for annexing New Guinea was a skilful and strategic one. It 
addressed the major impedient to all previous attempts to solicit Imperial action in 
New Guinea; the issue of colonial contributions to the expense of administering the 
territory. McIlwraith informed the Imperial authorities that Queensland was prepared 
to undertake ‘the whole cost of settlement’.127 This, McIlwraith argued, would 
‘effectively dispose of the only objection raised on the part of the Home Government, 
during previous correspondence on the subject, to the annexation of New Guinea by 
an Australian colony.’128 Second, McIlwraith re-employed the principal reasons that 
the Imperial Government had advanced for the 1879 extension of Queensland’s 
maritime boundary, and maintained that these arguments were ‘equally cogent 
toward determining the selection of Queensland as the colony under whose 
jurisdiction New Guinea should be placed.’129 Initially, the Colonial Office considered 
the acquisition of New Guinea as ‘a natural event in the development of the colony’ 
and this therefore ‘logically’ led to the opinion that the annexation of New Guinea to 
Queensland was the ‘best solution of an increasing difficulty’.130 Edward Drury, the 
General Manager of the Queensland National Bank visiting London, determined in 
his private conversation with Colonial Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary Robert 
Herbert that the Colonial Office’s position on the annexation was favourable. Drury 
informed McIlwraith, ‘I told him [Herbert] that we should take New Guinea. He said I 
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believe you will. Did not either seem much concerned about it.’131 The Imperial 
stance was however significantly altered by two factors. First the ‘rough and ready 
way’ that McIlwraith had independently proceeded to annex New Guinea without 
Imperial authorisation.132 And second, that he had ‘astonished the political coteries’ 
of Britain in particular the ‘Exeter Hall’ group that maintained a resolute policy of anti-
imperialism and were strongly opposed to the Pacific Islander labour trade.133  
 
On the 3rd July 1883, fours months after Chester took possession of the eastern half 
of New Guinea, Queensland was notified that the British Government had formally 
refused to sanction the colony’s annexation. Britain’s Prime Minister, William 
Gladstone, deemed McIlwraith’s annexation action as ‘null in point of law and 
unwarranted in point of policy’.134 The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord 
Derby, reiterated Gladstone’s line of reasoning and further submitted that the refusal 
was owing to the cost entailed in administering New Guinea, the sheer size of the 
island and ‘the unknown character’ of the country’s interior and its inhabitants.135 
Moreover, Queensland’s ‘apprehension’ that a foreign power was intent on occupying 
New Guinea was ruled to have ‘no foundation’.136  
 
The colonial reaction to this decision was immediate. After the initial colonial 
pronouncements of ‘general surprise’ and ‘great dissatisfaction’, at the Imperial 
Government’s ‘cold refusal’ to sanction the annexation of New Guinea, the colonies 
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‘energetic expression’ targeted the purported reasons and motives for the 
decision.137 Lord Derby’s ‘reasons’ in particular were dismissed as having ‘more 
show than substance’, for as the Queensland premier asserted they were issues 
‘which could easily be got over, and which in fact were got over in the propositions 
made by Queensland’.138 With the Imperial Government’s explanation generally 
rejected the focus of colonial enquiry grew more sceptical and sought to reveal the 
motivational forces behind the verdict. The section of the Imperial Government’s 
refusal that came under particular scrutiny was Lord Derby’s assertion that ‘if the 
Australian colonies desired an extension of their territory, it would be better for them 
to become federated, as they were unable singly to accomplish the task.’139 The re-
emergence of the federal topic in Derby’s despatch is particularly notable for it would 
seem that it represented the first official Imperial pronouncement on the topic to the 
colonies since 1857.140  
 
The Imperial Government had withdrawn from its active encouragement of federation 
due to the Australian colonies disinterest in and criticism of Earl Grey’s proposal for a 
‘General Assembly’ to facilitate legislative cooperation on common issues.141 The 
rationale behind Derby’s revival of the federal proposition at this time is difficult to 
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determine. In part it can be affiliated to the Gladstone government’s anti-imperialist 
doctrine. Collective colonial autonomy within this principle was a desired aim, as it 
would relieve the Imperial Government of administrative and financial responsibilities. 
Yet in view of the Australian colonial framework of independent and separate 
principalities, most starkly demonstrated by the independent manner of Queensland’s 
annexation action, it would seem implausible that Derby’s federal submission would 
entice the colonies to unite. The Sydney Morning Herald consequently articulated its 
scepticism of Derby’s curious association of the New Guinea annexation with 
federation: 
Statesmen and diplomatists do not always give their true reasons any more 
than ladies do, and we must not therefore assume that what Lord Derby stated 
in the House of Lords furnished the true causes why the action of Queensland 
in annexing New Guinea was disallowed….If to force federation was really his 
purpose, by holding out New Guinea as a bait, then it is obvious that the 
preceding reasons were simply make-believes; because it is obvious that 
federation by itself would not diminish the expense of governing New Guinea, 
nor increase our geographical knowledge of the interior, nor assuage the 
hostility of the natives. If we were to federate tomorrow would Lord Derby’s 
difficulties vanish?142 
 
From the Queensland perspective the ‘hint thrown out in reference’ to federation 
appeared ‘somewhat dubious in its intent’, for two interrelated reasons. First, the 
Queenslander questioned the inherent premise of Derby’s statement that the British 
government would willingly concede to an ‘Australian Dominion’ what it was unwilling 
to grant to an already existent and ‘unanimous’ colonial voice on New Guinea. Thus 
the paper argued ‘we fail to see that the home authorities would obtain a better 
guarantee of the bona fides of Australia under federation than has now been 
afforded.’143 Derby’s despatch of the 11th July 1883, which set forth in point detail the 
reasoning for the Imperial Government’s decision, queried the true extent of colonial 
                                                                                                                                                        
141
 Earl Grey’s Despatch, 31 July 1847 cited in Quick and Garran, The Annotated Constitution of the Australian 
Commonwealth: 81; Garis, 'Britain and the Australian Federation Movement,' 8-15. 
142
 ‘Editorial’, Sydney Morning Herald, 5 July 1883. 
  177 
support for Queensland’s action.144 Derby argued that while each of the colonial 
governments had made representations on the issue:  
Those Governments do not, as I understand, definitely endorse the proposal 
that the island should form part of Queensland, nor do they undertake to share 
the expenses…but they express in general terms a desire that it should be 
brought under British rule.145    
 
Unaware of this point of view and building on its scepticism of Derby’s advocacy of 
federation, the Queenslander hoped that a narrow attitude had not dictated the 
policy. In particular, the newspaper questioned whether ‘the underlying thought’ of 
the federal ‘inducement’ was: 
that the sinister designs on the part of Queensland in reference to the labour 
traffic could be better restrained if confederation were accomplished, then we 
not only repudiate such designs, but affirm that the very best means of 
checking them would be by the annexation of New Guinea, under imperial 
authority.146  
 
The inference made by the Queenslander that the colony’s coloured labour policy 
might be ‘better restrained’ under a federal government is notable for in effect it 
forecasted a prominent rationale for federation. Yet at this time it reflected 
Queensland’s wary perception of an alignment between the Imperial Government’s 
opposition to the labour trade and its advocacy of colonial federation. The connection 
between Queensland’s ‘bad reputation’ for its defiant maintenance of a coloured 
labour force, and the New Guinea repudiation was at first oblique, with Gladstone 
stating that ‘the particular colony of Queensland is not well suited for the position 
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which has been assigned to it by the act.’147 Derby’s despatch made the connection 
far more apparent and claimed that if the proposal, that New Guinea should form part 
of Queensland, had been permitted there would be ‘strong objections’.148 This Derby 
attributed to the colony’s unsuccessful management of ‘the difficulties…in connexion 
with the labour traffic’.149 He pointed specifically to the ‘special difficulty’ presented by 
the statements ‘in the press’ that asserted that Queensland’s desire to annex New 
Guinea, rested on its facility to provide sugar planters with ‘a large supply of coloured 
labour…without going beyond the limits of the Colony.’150 Derby’s reference to these 
newspaper reports raises a notable point concerning the content of the despatch. It 
becomes apparent that significant features of the coloured labour argument, used to 
validate the refusal, bear a striking similarity to two particular letters published in the 
London Times in mid-May.  
 
Of these two letters the most noteworthy was the publication of an anonymous letter 
from ‘a correspondent of distinction and experience’ on 15th May 1883.151 The focus 
of this letter’s ‘special objections’ was Queensland’s ‘unfitness for such a task’ as 
governing ‘a population as that of New Guinea’.152 The principal fear was that 
aspects of Queensland’s colonial settlement would be transferred to New Guinea. Of 
particular concern was Queensland’s non-recognition of ‘rights in the soil on the part 
of the native’, the ‘brutality and cruelty’ shown towards Queensland’s Indigenous 
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population and the legal and moral concerns encased in the coloured labour 
requirements of the colony’s chief agricultural industry.153  
 
 
Annexation - Carrying the blessings of civilisation into New Guinea. 
Figure 3.3:  Bulletin, 9 June 1893 
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‘If New Guinea becomes part of Queensland’, the author declared:  
its vast regions will become available as a recruiting ground for labour without 
any restrictions than those which the Parliament of Queensland itself may 
think fit to impose. The labour trade along the shores of New Guinea will be a 
coasting trade, which no Imperial legislation can regulate, and with which no 
Imperial authority can interfere….it cannot be the less unwise to place them 
[the sugar planters] in a position of temptation such as it would require almost 
superhuman virtue to resist. If a vast population of blacks be put under the 
absolute control of a handful of white landowners, it is impossible not to 
contemplate very evil results as being, to say the least, quite within the bounds 
of probability.154  
 
Employing the same cumulative form of evidence, the Aboriginal Protection Society, 
in a letter addressed to Lord Derby and reprinted in the Times on 18th May 1883, 
expressed their ‘strong conviction’ that Queensland should not be ‘entrusted’ with the 
‘work of annexing and governing’ New Guinea.155 The reasons advanced for this 
stance was the ‘irresistible’ temptation to extend the labour trade and the colony’s 
failure to ‘take proper steps for the protection of her aborigines’.156 Derby’s despatch 
encapsulated these two oppositional lines of reasoning, although more diplomatically 
encased in the assertion that Queensland’s Parliament was representative of ‘the 
white population, whose interests are altogether different from those of the coloured 
races, aboriginal and imported’.157 In addition Derby made only a broad reference to 
the ‘difficulties’ connected with the labour traffic. The alignment between the Times 
articles and Derby’s despatch suggests either a conformity of opinion or a degree of 
influence.158 The Colonial Office commented that the letter from the Aboriginal 
Protection Society ‘may perhaps on this occasion…represent something like public 
opinion in putting forward that Queensland has not qualified particularly well for 
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managing a large black population’.159 This, in conjunction with the fact that the 
Office had been ‘remonstrating with Queensland for many years’ over its labour 
recruitment practices, endorses the supposition of a conformity of British public and 
political opinion.160 On the other hand, as the author was identified as Sir Arthur 
Gordon the purpose and influence of the letter cannot be dismissed.161  
 
The considerable influence wielded by Gordon upon the Imperial Government’s 
decision on New Guinea has been well documented and largely attributed to his long 
term friendship with the British Liberal Prime Minister William Gladstone, Gordon’s 
direct knowledge of the Pacific as the former Governor of Fiji and Western Pacific 
High Commissioner, and his professional and personal reputation as a holder of ‘firm 
humanitarian views’ and his ‘consistently inimical’ opinion of planters.162 In 
combination Gordon’s anonymous letter to the Times, the associated editorial review 
and the Colonial Office minute on the letter presents a further public example of 
Gordon’s oppositional involvement. Secondly it provides an indication of the Imperial 
Government’s decision process, as it seems significant that Gordon felt compelled to 
adopt such an ‘unusual’ tactical manoeuvre.163  
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Gordon’s letter published in the Times differed, only slightly, from a private letter he 
had written to Gladstone on the 20th April 1883.164 In this first version of the letter, 
Gordon made specific reference to the fact that he had officially expressed his views 
to Lord Derby and as a result he requested that his letter should be regarded ‘as 
purely private and personal; though of course, I do not presume to dictate to you as 
to the use you make of it.’165 The reasoning behind Gordon’s change in tack, in 
making his opinions public, is open only to conjecture. Two plausible contentions are 
that Gladstone encouraged him to take such action166 or more feasibly, Gordon 
independently sought to present an authoritative counter voice to the largely 
supportive coverage that ‘McIlwraith’s mild coup d’etat’ had received in the ‘leading 
journals’ of the British press.167 The accompanying editorial comment on Gordon’s 
letter in part corroborates this latter supposition, for it noted that:  
The emotion of pleasure the news of the step taken by Queensland excited in 
England on its first publication was sufficient to warn any opponent of the 
uselessness of absolute resistance….Before the sanction is given, it is very 
proper the British nation should be taught that the prospect has its clouds as 
its brightness….Yet nobody doubts that a British annexation of New Guinea in 
one fashion or another is an accomplished event.168  
 
Public apathy was an associative feature of this sympathetic newspaper coverage. 
Gordon lamented that the issue of Queensland’s proposed annexation of New 
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Guinea ‘will probably fail to attract any very serious notice’ and as a result he actively 
sought to elevate the public profile of the New Guinea question ‘before the approval 
of the Crown and of Parliament is irrevocably given’.169 The ostensible motivation for 
Gordon’s ‘unusual’ action was his apparent assessment that the Imperial government 
were gravitating towards sanctioning the annexation.170 Through an emotive and 
public denouncement of Queensland’s native and coloured labour policy, Gordon 
controversially sought to ensure, the Times editor surmised, that ‘the annexation was 
arranged on terms which may obviate the incidental evils he most dreads’.171 The 
Colonial Office ‘regretted’ this underlying motive, for it laid Gordon ‘open to the 
charge of trying to force the hand of Her Majesty’s Government’.172 Furthermore, in 
view of the ‘exceptional position’ Gordon held within the Office, as an ‘honorary 
advisor’, his chosen course of action was judged by the Colonial Office to be ‘only a 
little less objectionable than it would be for Under Secretaries or clerks to air their 
views on this question in the public press.’173 Offsetting this criticism, however, was 
the acknowledgement that ‘[i]nternal evidence leaves no doubt at all that the public 
are indebted to Sir A. Gordon for this sketch of what ought to be done’ and most 
notably that despite Gordon’s ‘error in taste…the letter will nevertheless be found to 
be not only worth reading, but very sound in its reasoning’.174 Despite this Colonial 
Office commendation and the Week’s belief that the letter ‘no doubt assisted in no 
small degree to influence the British Cabinet in arriving at the decision they did’, no 
direct official link can be exclusively made between Gordon’s anonymous letter and 
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the Imperial Government’s decision. Yet it did arguably have a specific functional role 
in the process, to stimulate and garner opinion in the public domain.175   
 
The impact of Gordon’s negative public representation of the issue was threefold. 
First, to the Colonial Office and the British Cabinet by affiliation176 Gordon’s letter 
signified, in conjunction with the Aboriginal Protection Society’s letter, that ‘there will 
evidently be considerable opposition to annexation to Queensland’.177 Secondly, its 
authoritative influence was such that it necessitated a prompt and public repudiation 
from Queensland’s Agent General, Thomas Archer and the colony’s Chief Justice, 
visiting London, Charles Lilley.178 Both endeavoured, through letters to the editor of 
the Times, to expose the ‘fallacies’ and ‘serious errors’ contained in the letter in a 
concerted effort to negate the detrimental implications advanced by Gordon.179 And 
thirdly, whether in association or coincidentally, the mid-May publication of these two 
letters in the Times did represent a demarcation in the public’s interest on the New 
Guinea question, as evidenced by a discernable upsurge in public criticism of 
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Queensland.180 The London correspondent to the Melbourne Argus reported that ‘a 
new phase of public feeling has developed during the last few days. Serious 
uneasiness appears to be felt in certain influential quarters’.181 Walter Coote’s letter 
to the Editor of the Pall Mall Gazette, on 22nd May 1883, wanted to ‘press home the 
fact that we must be prepared…to take up a position which shall make the repetition 
of Queensland’s historical native policy an impossibility’ and further begged the 
Editor ‘to assist in the formation of a strong public opinion on this question’.182 The 
resultant focal point of public debate on New Guinea centred primarily on 
Queensland’s ‘fitness’ to govern the annexed territory and the attendant ‘moral 
responsibility’ of the Imperial Government to ensure the welfare of the ‘native’ 
inhabitants.183 This, Sir Henry Parkes noted, had been Gordon’s main objective and 
he had ‘helped this view outside to his utmost.’184 A consequent feature of this 
concentrated public and political attention on Queensland’s treatment of its 
Indigenous population and its continued coloured labour policy was that it provided a 
valid and compelling moral pretext to refuse the colony’s annexation of New Guinea; 
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a factor corroborated by its integration in Derby’s despatch as a significant causal 
justification for the refusal.185 Thus the Sydney Morning Herald editorialised that that 
the Imperial Government: 
seem possessed with the fixed idea that Queensland wanted New Guinea as 
a labour market, whereas the real fact is that New Guinea is more open to the 
labour trade now than it would have been had annexation been confirmed. 
There is no labour trade with Polynesia except subject to the Queensland 
Government regulations, and, subject to those regulations, New Guinea is just 
as open as any other island to this particular trade; but with a Government in 
New Guinea, the trade could be put under still more stringent restrictions. It is 
certainly no kindness to the natives of New Guinea to leave them as they are; 
and to suppose that we are going to avoid all difficulties by a simple abstention 
is a great mistake.186 
 
Other ‘political considerations’ clearly featured in the Imperial Government’s decision. 
In particular the economic aspects of the British Liberal government’s anti-
imperialistic policy187 and the broader diplomatic issue of maintaining cordial relations 
with Germany, in light of growing tensions with France over Britain’s continued 
occupation of Egypt.188 These matters however did not factor prominently in the 
public forum. The immediacy, with which the Queenslander and the Sydney Morning 
Herald aligned the refusal with the coloured labour question, indicates that the public 
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critique of Queensland had in effect prepared the public for the probability that the 
Imperial Government would refuse to sanction the action.189  
 
Consistent with the momentum of opinion generated against Queensland, James 
Garrick190, a member of the Queensland Liberal opposition, declared in his reply to 
McIlwraith’s parliamentary announcement of the Imperial Government’s refusal, that 
McIlwraith had ‘received exactly the sort of answer which I thought he would’.191 
Additionally, the Week concluded that the annexation was ‘a miserable, tawdry 
fiasco…from first to last’ and claimed that there were ‘abundant reasons why the 
Imperial Government should have come to the decision they have.’192 Particular 
emphasis was assigned to Queensland’s recruitment aspirations in New Guinea and 
this the paper advanced was a ‘very strong’ oppositional argument ‘in the old 
country.’193 Contrary to such opinions and the mounting negative press, McIlwraith 
asserted in parliament that he had expected ‘with confidence that a very different 
answer would be given’.194 The intonation of his ‘Ministerial Statement’, announcing 
the decision, portrayed not only McIlwraith’s incredulous reaction but provides a 
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characteristic example of his ‘blunt, outspoken’ personality and his propensity to be 
‘very head-strong and impatient of obstruction to or criticism of his proposals’:195  
I do not wish to comment on the reasons given…for the course so inimical to 
the interests of Queensland and the other Australian colonies which the 
mother-country has thought fit to adopt on the present occasion. I merely wish 
to point out that so far as Queensland is concerned- and the other colonies, 
too - I look upon the act of annexation of New Guinea to British territory – or, 
at all events, to Queensland territory – as an accomplished fact. I question – 
and with all modesty I do it – I question the legality of the decision of Mr. 
Gladstone….At the present time there is no question that New Guinea must 
form a part of the British Empire….it therefore behoves the [Queensland] 
Government to take the most definite steps to see that this question is 
settled…196   
 
Indignant and unswerving in his New Guinea objective McIlwraith took active steps to 
obtain colonial co-operation to attain redress. As Charles Bernays succinctly 
acknowledged, McIlwraith ‘was far too strong and dictatorial a man to be turned aside 
by the ipse dixit of the Colonial Office.’197   
 
McIlwraith’s exact motivation in ordering Henry Chester to proceed to Port Moresby 
and take formal possession of the eastern half of New Guinea on the 4 April 1883 
fundamentally remains an open question. The conventionally accepted version has 
been derived from McIlwraith’s consistent explanation that his ‘precipitate’ action was 
defensive, to thwart foreign encroachment into New Guinea. The irregular and 
impulsive nature of the act itself, however, raised suspicions of ulterior motives.  
 
The most obvious was that New Guinea, if annexed, would serve as a labour 
recruitment field to resolve the colony’s sugar planter’s acute labour shortage. The 
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advent of this explanation was not surprising within the context of the intensifying 
campaign, primarily by British humanitarian and missionary groups, against 
Queensland’s continued involvement in what was referred to as ‘thinly veiled slavery’. 
The independence conferred on Queensland through self-government, which 
effectively prevented any external intervention into the colony’s internal matters, had 
been the basis by which Queensland countered such opposition to its differential 
developmental methods. The colony was however increasingly alert to the 
ostracising effect of this stance. A columnist in the Queenslander denounced the 
‘iniquitous South Sea Island traffic which is dragging the fair name of Queensland in 
the dust, and branding her with the accursed mark of Cain.’198 Such a declaration 
confirms that Queensland and McIlwraith in particular was aware of the growing and 
authoritative campaign against the colony’s employment of a coloured labour force 
and this in part challenges the likelihood that New Guinea was annexed for labour. It 
would therefore seem unlikely that a ‘masterful’ statesman within this context would 
have chosen such an overt act based on an exceptionally vulnerable motivation. A 
second factor that further detracts from the labour theory was that as the eastern half 
of New Guinea was not in the possession of any civilised power, labour recruitment 
was openly permitted. Yet if the annexation of New Guinea had been sanctioned, 
Queensland’s labour vessels would have been barred from recruiting in and around 
New Guinea.  
 
A more feasible motive for McIlwraith’s ‘bold and daring’ exploit was affiliated to his 
‘barnacle tenacity’ to stay in office.199 The purported threat of Germany’s colonising 
ambition in New Guinea afforded McIlwraith with an opportunity to redress his 
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politically precarious position by captivating political support through a ‘bold stroke’ 
and diverting local attention from important internal matters. This factor was 
inconsequential in the Imperial Government’s consideration of McIlwraith’s 
independent and unauthorised ‘summary step’.  
 
The initial position of the Colonial Office was that the annexation of New Guinea to 
Queensland was the ‘best solution to an increasing difficulty’. 200 The influential 
‘Exeter Hall’ group countered this. Particularly detrimental to Queensland’s cause 
was the provocative public campaign anonymously directed by Sir Arthur Gordon. 
Based on humanitarian considerations, Gordon argued that in view of Queensland’s 
brutal and cruel treatment of its Indigenous population and its continued maintenance 
of a coloured labour force the colony was particularly unsuited for the task of 
governing a population such as New Guinea’s. Gordon’s negative appraisal of 
Queensland’s native and coloured labour policy was encapsulated in Lord Derby’s 
July 1883 despatch as a causal justification for the Imperial Government’s 
repudiation of the annexation.  
 
From a local perspective the annexation of New Guinea can be classified as a 
watershed in Queensland politics. More specifically the critical and public scrutiny of 
Queensland’s coloured labour policy provoked by the act and the colony’s 
consequent labelling as a ‘nigger establishment’ instilled an ardency into and 
broadened the appeal basis of the internal campaign to abolish this socially 
contaminating policy.201 The question of coloured labour emerged as a decisive 
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factor in the substantial election victory of Samuel Griffith. Under Griffith’s 
directorship, Queensland’s new Liberal Government introduced radical labour 
reforms to address these mounting concerns and to ‘vindicate the fair name of the 
colony, and to cleanse it from the disgrace cast upon it by the Slave Ministry of Mr. 
McIlwraith.’202 On the negative side these reforms produced a new set of political, 
social and economic issues for Queensland and its parliament. The destabilising 
impact of the separatist and white labour causes would significantly shape 
Queensland’s involvement in the federal movement. 
 
The second and more significant feature of Lord Derby’s despatch was his advocacy 
of a federal union between the Australian colonies. Queensland in particular viewed 
the proposal with scepticism, perceiving an Imperial attempt to encourage the 
formation of a federal authority capable of dismantling the colony’s coloured labour 
policy. Indirectly the colony had identified defence as an influential and practical 
function for the prospective federal government. Ironically, McIlwraith to seek redress 
for the Imperial Government’s repudiation of his annexation of New Guinea, adapted 
Lord Derby’s federal proposition and initiated a course of action that would, within 
five months, achieve the unlikely event of a unanimous colonial agreement on a 
federal proposal.  
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Chapter 4 
 
The Establishment of the Federal Council:  
‘the first beat of a national pulse’?1 
 
Harnessing an event in June 1883 regarded as ‘symbolical and prophetic’, the 
Victorian premier James Service declared his intention to launch a ‘renewed effort’ 
to awaken the federal movement ‘to life and vigour’.2 Endorsement of the federal 
objective was a notable theme throughout the ‘jubilant’ celebrations for the 
opening of ‘three miles of railway’ between Albury and Wodonga, which for the first 
time connected the railway systems of New South Wales and Victoria.3 Many 
amongst the ‘distinguished assembly’ made reference to the emblematic 
significance of the rail union to the broader question of Australian federation.4 The 
president and councillors of the Shire of Wodonga pronounced that: 
this may well be considered an event in the history of the Australian 
colonies. These lines are the first railway systems which unite capital and 
capital. This event will be but the first step towards welding the Australian 
colonies as one great nation, and is the augur which foretells how quickly 
the dawn of federation is approaching.5 
 
A representative of Victoria’s Legislative Council, N. Fitzgerald, hoped that: 
whatever differences may separate our respective legislative actions, that 
the wheels of our administrative engines will always continue to move as 
                                                 
1
 James Service, ‘President’s Speech’, 25 January 1886, Federal Council of Australasia. Session 1886.: 11.  
2
 James Service (1823-99) Scottish Merchant migrated to Victoria in 1853. First elected to the Victorian 
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3
 On the 14th June approximately one thousand Victorian and New South Wales representatives, including 
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4
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5
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smoothly as those of the locomotives which brought us here today, and that 
the bonds which unite us shall be as firm as the rails over which those 
engines travelled, and that the obstructions in either of the Parliaments to 
the grand object of federation will not be tolerated.6  
 
The overarching assessment of the ‘Albury celebrations’ was that there existed a 
‘unanimous…desire’ for federation.7 Yet intermixed amongst the pronouncements 
of support were the enduring hallmarks of Australia’s colonial development; 
intercolonial bitterness, suspicion and rivalry.  
 
A discernible feature of the speeches made by the New South Wales 
representatives was the existence of a lingering resentment to Victoria’s 1850 
separation from New South Wales. Lord Augustus Loftus, the New South Wales 
governor, ‘gracefully’ described the ‘iron link’ between the two colonies as ‘the 
fond embrace of the child by the mother.’8 Sir John Robertson9 more directly 
enquired:  
Who ever asked for separation in New South Wales? We never asked for 
separation. When we were in poverty and distress Victoria left us. We are 
now richer perhaps than they, and now they come back to us and we are 
ready to receive them with open arms.10 
 
                                                 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 In line with the celebratory nature of the occasion the Argus’ editorial review of the Albury festivities 
applauded the federal directive that was laid down, though as aside it remarked that ‘the Albury addresses 
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8
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9
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and Sydney’ and this he considered was ‘clear proof…of the absence of a Federal spirit, or of any general 
desire for Federation on the part of either Colony.’ Foster, 'Fallacies of Federation,' 79-115; Bede Nairn, ‘Sir 
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The assertion by a Victorian speaker that they ‘were proud to acknowledge the 
parent colony, although at the same time asserting their own manhood’ 
corroborated, though less overtly, the reciprocal nature of the ongoing friction 
between the ‘two most important colonies’.11 The fluctuating intensity, particularly 
of New South Wales’ aversion to and suspicion of Victoria proved to be an 
immovable impedient to the federal cause. On another level, James Service’s 
handling of the reproachful questioning of Victoria’s 1850 separation highlighted 
the perpetual wrestle for precedence between colonial realities and the federal 
ideal. Service jovially responded to Lord Loftus’ and John Robertson’s invitation 
‘for Victoria to come back to her mother’ by declaring that ‘I can do little better than 
say on behalf of Victoria I will try and come back to my mother. (Laughter and 
applause).’12 As premier and duty-bound to defend his colony, Service detailed the 
‘reason’ for Victoria’s separatist action. To defuse the situation and to continue his 
dual role as a colonial premier and an advocate of federation, Service stressed the 
destructive effect of the issue:  
Rivalries, jealousies, and ignorance arise from long separation. Now we are 
hugged together in bands of iron. We will have nothing like the cowcatcher 
on the locomotive to sweep away the material objects on the rail, but we 
have to sweep away the rivalries and jealousies which embitter a nation 
and destroy it.13 
 
The requisite need to temper the influence of colonial individualism was a 
significant theme of the gathering and in its prominence the extent of the divide 
between the colonies was demonstrated. The Victorian representative of the 
colony’s Legislative Assembly, the Honourable G.B. Kerferd noted in his address: 
I say it is an extraordinary thing that I, in addressing you in New South 
Wales, feel myself to be a foreigner in a foreign land ….Let us abolish that 
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wretched distinction that when you cross the stream we crossed today you 
find yourself in a foreign land and treated as the subject of another 
country.14  
 
The development of greater commercial and passenger interaction, generated by 
the linkage of the two colonies by the ‘iron horse’, it was hoped would facilitate a 
‘more intimate knowledge’ of each colony by the other.15 ‘Federation’, the Victorian 
Duncan Gillies16 asserted, ‘can never come to these colonies until we know each 
other a little better, then that union will be fostered which will be the means of 
bringing about true federation, which is nothing unless it is preceded by mutual 
self-respect.’17 The joint emphasis on the destructive qualities of colonial 
isolationism and the consummate ‘desirability’ of federation, articulated at Albury, 
was reasonably interpreted as an indication that the federal sentiment was 
‘undoubtedly gaining strength’.18  
 
A ‘matter of doubt’, for the Queenslander, was the capacity for such sentiment to 
be transferred into the local arenas.19 The underlying principle for such scepticism, 
the paper explained, was that ‘[u]nder the influence of an enthusiastic gathering 
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  197 
like that assembled at Albury many antagonisms lie dormant, but when the 
representatives returned to their own political atmosphere too often these adverse 
views revive with increased force.’20 Despite identifying the omnipresent influence 
of localism, the Queenslander saw in the ‘discussion by so many representative 
men at one time’ an auspicious sign that federation had ‘entered the domain of 
practical politics, and consequently as only awaiting a favourable opportunity for 
full discussion in an intercolonial conference.’21 An alternative assessment of the 
significance of Albury was made by the Sydney Morning Herald, which 
substantively challenged the precept that federation had become a practical 
question for statesmen to ‘deal with’. It noted that despite ‘a great deal of festive 
talk about federation’ there still remained no practical proposals for its 
advancement.22 The central issue being contested by both these views was the 
question of timeframes: did the Albury pronouncements indicate that federation 
was imminent, or a proposal for the future? 
 
Elevating the issue beyond rhetorical debate were the ‘stirring’ events associated 
with Queensland’s annexation of New Guinea, which unexpectedly and forcibly 
thrust the federal question into ‘the range of practical politics’.23 To Thomas 
McIlwraith, the Imperial Government’s repudiation of his New Guinea annexation 
had presented the colonies, ‘in connection with the recent [Albury] proceedings a 
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most favourable opportunity…for a decided effort in the cause of federation.’24 This 
chapter will examine the process by which a seemingly incongruous event, the 
Imperial Government’s refusal to sanction Queensland’s independent and 
discredited action in New Guinea, fostered the formation of Australia’s first federal 
body, the Federal Council of Australasia. In the overall chronicle of the federal 
movement to this point, the establishment of this centralised legislative Council 
plainly presents as a significant and practical advancement on the essentially 
rhetorical model of federation that had preceded it. Yet, the Council’s 
contemporary and historical status in the federal movement was and is diminutive. 
Notably, in contrast to this undervaluing of the Federal Council, the ‘precipitate’ 
action of Queensland in annexing New Guinea has been historically elevated as 
the precursor for the later federation movement.25 The inherent quandary to be 
probed is why a subjective event, which prompted the establishment of the 
Federal Council, has achieved prominence rather than the resulting product of that 
event.  
 
The 3rd July 1883 notification that Britain had formally refused to confirm the steps 
taken by Queensland in its April annexation of New Guinea prompted an 
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immediate colonial reaction. The significant bearing that Queensland’s coloured 
labour policy or more particularly the Imperial government’s ‘fixed idea that 
Queensland wanted New Guinea as a labour market’, had had on the decision 
was colonially recognised but generally dismissed.26 Colonial censure of the 
verdict revealed a divide between what the Imperial Government regarded as the 
central issue and the colonial perspective. Thus, while the question of coloured 
labour had factored prominently in the decision, the more contentious issue for the 
Australian colonies was that the Imperial Government had dismissed an urgent 
and seemingly valid colonial case for Imperial protection from the danger of foreign 
encroachment. 
 
In the debate on the New Guinea question in the House of Lords on 2nd July 1883, 
Lord Derby presented the Imperial view of the purported foreign threat, one that 
confirmed that the Imperial authorities were dissatisfied with the case put forward 
by Queensland:  
The explanation given comes to no more than this – that there were strong 
reports throughout Australia of the intention of some power – nobody knew 
what Power – to seize some part – nobody knew what Part – of New 
Guinea. For these reports it does not appear that there was a shadow of 
proof forthcoming. They were simply a creation of the anxiety of the 
colonists in the matter.27 
 
Prime Minister Gladstone more forcefully declared that Queensland’s foreign 
occupation fears were ‘an apprehension which we have no reason to entertain’.28 
Derby endeavoured to reassure the colonies and decreed that any settlement of 
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New Guinea by another ‘Power’ would be regarded by Britain as ‘an unfriendly 
act’.29 In this debate it was a speech by Lord Carnarvon, a former Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, which presented the most astute summary and 
acknowledgement of the developing colonial point of view. He stated that:  
it is difficult for us to place ourselves at the Australian standpoint and to 
understand the anxiety with which the bare possibility of a foreign 
settlement close to their shores inspires the colonists. It may be, as Lord 
Derby holds, that they underrate their own power, but it is equally open to 
them to argue that we underrate the vulnerability of their interests.30  
 
Confronted by the Imperial Government’s adoption ‘of a course so inimical’ to their 
interests, the colonies ‘unhappily’ concluded that their welfare had ‘been 
subordinated to the exigencies of party politics and European diplomacy’.31 The 
colonies therefore generally resolved that ‘if the mother-country refuses us 
protection’ then combined and ‘concerted’ colonial action was required to settle the 
question ‘from a defence point of view.‘32  
 
Defence had been Victoria’s declared motive, prompted by Queensland’s 
annexationist policy in New Guinea, for its intensified campaign to persuade the 
Imperial Government to annex the New Hebrides to thwart French designs. 
McIlwraith initially ascribed culpability for the Imperial Government’s negative 
verdict to Victoria’s action:  
Had the New Guinea and Queensland question stood alone, I believe the 
answer would have been favourable; but when the other colonies went on 
to annex more territory the Government thought fit, under pressure at 
home, to take a different course than they would otherwise have taken. I 
think that it is unfortunate for us in respect of the New Guinea question that 
the southern colonies proceeded to annex certain of the Pacific Islands.33 
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In the weeks that followed the decision, Victoria emerged as Queensland’s 
strongest supporter and accordingly by mid-July McIlwraith had modified the tenor 
of his argument. In a Memorandum dated 17th July on the topic of the Imperial 
Government’s refusal and notably circulated to the other colonies’ premiers, 
McIlwraith incorporated Victoria’s Pacific concerns to give emphasis to the 
necessity for combined colonial action: 
If Her Majesty’s Government does not feel that the annexation of New 
Guinea, or the islands adjacent to Australia, is of much importance to the 
empire at large as it is to the Australian Colonies, let some means be 
devised by which those islands may be held and governed for the benefit of 
the Australian people.34  
 
In outlining his position on the decision McIlwraith was resolute that he had ‘easily 
combated’ the various reasons assigned to the refusal and officially reaffirmed his 
conviction that the action ‘ought to have been accepted’.35 From this perspective 
he therefore urged the other colonies to make ‘several and united representations’ 
to compel the Imperial Government to reconsider their decision.36 The ‘real reason 
for the refusal’ McIlwraith acknowledged, though he discreetly phrased it was ‘the 
difficulty of providing for the government and protection of the native races’ and 
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this he believed could be met with ‘sanction and authority of the united colonies’.37 
Though he later emphatically denied that Queensland had been ‘activated by any 
such motive’ as labour recruitment this statement did concede the influence that 
Queensland’s coloured labour policy had had on the Imperial Government’s 
decision.38 The implication within this memorandum was however that this 
‘difficulty’ had been used to countermand the broader colonial unease over foreign 
encroachment. Thus drawing on the colonial discontent engendered by the 
decision as an additional example of the Imperial Government’s reluctance to 
address colonial concerns and employing Derby’s conditional advocacy of 
federation, McIlwraith laid forth the case for a federal union between the Australian 
colonies: 
There can be no doubt that the refusal to annex New Guinea, together with 
the possible acquisition by foreign powers of some of the Pacific Islands 
contiguous to Australia, does raise very serious questions intimately 
connected with the future interests of the Australasian Colonies….I submit 
that a case has arisen which many be made use of to call into existence the 
higher forms of government required to give effect to this policy of 
annexation….It is not possible to give authoritative effect to the wishes of 
the people of Australia in anything beyond their own domestic interests, 
except through the intervention of Her Majesty’s Government…Here is work 
for the united Colonies to do, if they can be got to unite. I suggest that a 
convention of delegates should be held to discuss the basis upon which a 
Federal Government could be constituted.39  
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The sincerity of McIlwraith’s appeal for federation at this point in time is open to 
inquiry on two interrelated grounds. First, McIlwraith’s concept of nationalism was 
dualistic, in which the narrower model of Queensland nationalism plainly held 
primacy over the broader Australian form. Such pre-eminence typified the 
collective strength of Queensland’s regional nationalism, which was the product of 
a complex amalgam of historical, economic and environmental factors and was 
embodied in Queensland’s ‘urgent, underlying, and inextinguishable’ demand for 
progress.40 In this context, previous proposals for federation had been met with 
indifference in Queensland. The intersection of this precedent with McIlwraith’s 
personality, his failing political position and the colonial opposition to Queensland’s 
coloured labour policy further challenges the genuineness of McIlwraith’s federal 
appeal. Arguably, his federal proposition was either an expedient course to bolster 
his popular appeal or a conciliatory step designed to bring about his goal of 
annexation, by satisfying the conditional federal ‘inducement’ contained in the 
Imperial Government’s decision on New Guinea.41 Contemporary reservations 
over the impulse behind McIlwraith’s appeal for federal union were isolated and 
focused on the implication of the proposal and its potential ramifications. The 
Sydney Morning Herald for example argued: 
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Is this to be understood to imply that a certain feeling of irritation, which the 
rebuff has undoubtedly produced, might be turned to account for bringing 
the colonies more closely together? If so, the reason urged in favour of a 
movement is rather a reason why anything of the kind should be 
delayed….Few things are more to be depreciated than the commencement 
of a movement in that direction on the strength of a belief that we have 
suffered at the hands of the Imperial Government an injury or a slight. The 
circumstances might afterwards be forgotten, but the feeling would remain, 
and our future history would be affected by it.42 
 
Tasmania’s premier, William Giblin, feared that the assemblage of a Federal 
Convention, ‘for the purpose of expressing more forcibly and more collectively our 
dissatisfaction with the decision…would be the beginning of difficulties the end of 
which I do not profess to be able to foresee.’43 It was evident that an ‘indignant 
attitude’ had arisen in the Australian colonies consequent to the Imperial 
Government’s refusal.44 This sentiment had, the English press believed, the 
potential to give ‘rise to a dangerous agitation in the colonies’, but doubts were 
expressed, locally and in Britain, over the colonies’ capacity to effectively harness 
the situation and convert it into a binding federal union.45 The principal barrier to 
this conversion was the enduring prevalence of colonial individualism and doubts 
were held whether the ‘humiliating snub’ of the New Guinea repudiation 
commanded the necessary potency, as an issue, to override provincialism and 
                                                 
42
 ‘Editorial’, Sydney Morning Herald, 9 July 1883. 
43
 W.R. Giblin to McIlwraith, 30 July 1883, ‘New Guinea Protectorate: Despatches and Other Papers Relating 
to Establishment and Administration’, Journals and Printed Papers of the Federal Council. 1 (1886): 36.  
44
 The London Standard cited in the Queenslander, 14 July 1883. 
45
 The Queenslander considered it unlikely that the federation proposal would succeed for ‘the intimation that 
the British Government will not do its duty to the colonies…because they cannot agree to federate, may create 
a new impediment instead of removing the difficulties already in the way of federation.’ The London Standard 
doubted whether the federation of colonies would ‘be brought about for some time to come.’ The London 
Economist, on the question of Australian federation feared that ‘the financial and tariff differences of the 
various colonies will prove an almost insuperable obstacle.’ In the opinion of ‘the great war correspondent’ 
Archibald Forbes, who toured Australia in 1883: ‘Federation is as much a chimera under the present 
conditions as it would be a necessity under the other conditions’ such as war. ‘The Refusal to Annex New 
Guinea’, Queenslander, 7 July 1883; The London Standard cited in the Queenslander, 7, 14 July 1883; The 
London Economist, cited in the Queenslander, 28 July 1883; ‘Summary for Europe’, Queenslander, 16 June 
1883; Archibald Forbes, 'The Present and Future of the Australasian Colonies,' Nineteenth Century, 14: 80 
(October 1883): 720-32. 
  205 
provoke combined action.46 Such reservations were seemingly corroborated in the 
variable intensity of the colonial response to the rejection of Queensland’s action. 
 
In New South Wales, at the end of July, it was reported that the ‘annexation 
business still looms up, and though it has not yet acquired the dignity of a burning 
question it excites some interest.’47 In Queensland, ‘Endymion’ reproached 
Queenslanders for their lack of action: 
It takes very little short of an earthquake or a general election to move the 
public of this city of Brisbane, or surely we should not have left it to 
Melbourne citizens to call the first public meeting on the subject….Certain it 
is that Queenslanders are a long-suffering race. The colony may be 
slandered in the vilest manner….Still the working man rises not in his 
wrath…Looking at our national character in this light, it does not seem 
wonderful that no public demonstration has been got up in favour of New 
Guinea for Australia.48  
 
In contrast the interest aroused in Victoria was according to the colony’s governor, 
the Marquis of Normanby, ‘very deep’ and he had ‘never known any question in 
Victoria which has commanded such universal support’.49 The provocation for 
Victoria’s numerous and ‘enthusiastic’ public meetings throughout the second half 
of 1883 was not exclusively connected with the repudiation of Queensland’s 
annexation, but rather a combination of factors associated with James Service’s 
broader annexationist policy.50  
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At the root of Victoria’s ‘intense indignation’ was the imminent danger presented to 
the Australian colonies by both the ‘recent outburst of French enterprise’ in the 
Pacific and more provocatively the legislative progression of France’s ‘Relapsed 
Criminals (Recidivistes) Bill’.51 This signalled France’s intention to increase the 
number of convicts to be transported from France to New Caledonia and 
additionally proposed an extension of France’s penal settlements to the New 
Hebrides.52 The direct threat imposed by the regional presence of an additional 
20,000 French criminals, officially described as ‘dangerous, steeped in vice, 
debauchery and crime’, was threefold. First, it was ‘almost certain’ that following 
the ‘planting of convict settlements in these parts…the Islands’ would be left open 
to ‘annexation by other nations’.53 Second, it would significantly compound the 
existent problem of the increasing frequency with which French convicts escaped 
and landed in Australia and thirdly, the close proximity of this enlarged convict 
establishment would negatively impinge on Australia’s post-convict reputation.54   
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Following the end of Britain’s transportation of convicts to Australia, the Australian 
colonies had adopted, a Colonial Office paper reported in 1883:  
several legislative measures, which were designed to protect the persons 
and property of the settlers from the violence and depredation to which they 
appeared to be exposed by the diffusion of a…convict caste, and to clear 
the Colonies from the imputation under which they then laboured, or feared 
themselves to labour, of being receptacles of the criminal classes.55  
 
The proposed French scheme then, to make ‘the Pacific Islands the receptacle for 
the dangerous classes of France’ was, from Service’s perspective, a ‘crisis [in] 
Australian history’ and therefore he ‘strongly urged’, as a pre-emptive measure, 
that the Imperial Government annex the ‘New Hebrides and the islands up to New 
Britain’ before France stepped in.56 For a community normally adsorbed by 
provincial matters the ‘depth and earnestness’ of Service’s and the Victorian 
public’s conviction on this essentially external subject was, as the historian Roger 
Thompson noted, ‘remarkable’.57 While the impetus for Victoria’s ‘concerted action’ 
was the colony’s ‘strong sense of present danger’ at the escalating threat of 
foreign intervention in the Pacific, the linchpin to its stridency was Service’s 
prominent role in galvanising public and political support for his annexationist 
policy, which he profiled as ‘a measure essential to our safety and welfare’.58 On 
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the broader Australian front, Service advocated that the position of the colonies 
consequent to the Imperial Government’s refusal and the ‘events’ in the Pacific 
made ‘the necessity for Federation…so peculiarly apparent’.59 Pivotal to Service’s 
growing influence was the strength of his local political position. At the head of a 
strong coalition government, Service was afforded the uncommon advantage of 
time and political freedom to prioritise his non-domestic annexationist and federal 
objectives.60 In the pursuit of these directives a notable feature of Victoria’s 
associated and ‘most cordial and friendly’ support of Queensland’s New Guinea 
and federal aspirations was the absence of references to the objectionable 
coloured labour question.61  
 
Victoria had been a vocal opponent of Queensland’s continued reliance on 
coloured labour and a Brisbane correspondent in Melbourne had characterised the 
situation in June as, ‘it has been rather a fashion here lately to go in for abusing 
Queensland about the Polynesian labour traffic.’62 The merger of Victorian and 
Queensland interests, in response to the Imperial Government’s refusal, initiated 
an apparent suppression of Victoria’s activism on coloured labour.63 Not only did 
Queensland’s general domestic issues receive ‘a good deal of attention’ in the 
Melbourne papers but the Argus additionally did the ‘colony full justice’ through its 
defence of Queensland’s government and planters from ‘the slanders current at 
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home as to the treatment of kanakas.’64 Feasibly, Victoria endeavoured to 
dissociate the coloured labour issue from the New Guinea annexation, because 
this stigma to all intents and purposes constituted a valid reason for Victoria and 
the other Australian colonies opposed to coloured labour to accept the Imperial 
Government’s decision as warranted in the circumstances. Within the dynamics of 
Service’s active expansionist policy, vocal and unanimous colonial opposition to 
the decision was crucial to bring about a change to the Imperial Government’s 
persistent anti-Imperialistic policy. Coloured labour in this dynamic therefore 
presented a potentially distracting and divisive influence.  
 
Undeniably the coloured labour question factored prominently in the Imperial 
Government’s deliberations on Queensland’s annexation of New Guinea. But in 
the colonial arena the issue was tactically excised as a motive for annexation and 
was replaced by the more provocative threats of foreign occupation and the 
convict menace. Without the taint of coloured labour, the Imperial Government’s 
refusal could be represented as neglect of legitimate colonial concerns and as 
‘holding Australia back from acting in her own interests.’65 An associated feature of 
this representation was the commendation of McIlwraith’s attempted annexation 
as a bold, independent and self-protective move that was reminiscent of the 
exploits of Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh and Cecil Rhodes; or as John 
Douglas phrased it ‘[h]enceforth it will be recorded in our history as a dashing 
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exploit carried out at the instigation of one who had a comprehensive grasp of the 
situation.’66 In the contemporary record of the federal process it was the frequency 
with which this refashioned version of McIlwraith’s annexation of New Guinea was 
advanced, stripped of its problematic features that laid the foundations for its use 
as the suitable and stirring precursor of the later federation movement. From 
Service’s Victorian perspective, then, these ‘events’ rendered ‘now’ as the 
‘opportune’ time for cooperative action in the ‘direction’ of federation.67  
 
Such an attitude did not however accommodate the dynamics of each individual 
colonial setting. In Queensland, in stark contrast to the Victorian situation, the 
political atmosphere for McIlwraith had grown ‘darker and yet darker.’68 From mid-
1882, two matters had attracted ‘the greatest attention…of the public’ in 
Queensland; the coloured labour question and the land grant railway proposal.69 
Despite a lengthy recess of parliament and McIlwraith’s ‘bold yet timely’ 
annexation of New Guinea, the ‘momentous character’ of these matters had 
continued to rouse ‘strong manifestations of political feeling’.70 At the beginning of 
July, the topic of ‘supreme importance’ was the second reading of the 
Transcontinental Railway Bill, in which ‘hung the fate of the McIlwraith Ministry.’71 
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The predicted defeat of McIlwraith’s bill took place on the 5th July, when the 
question was resolved in the negative by 27 votes to 16, and as a result of this 
‘state of affairs’ and with ‘regret’ McIlwraith waited on the Governor to request the 
dissolution of parliament in pursuant of a general election.72 That the ‘lion was not 
quite gone’ was demonstrated by McIlwraith’s subsequent defeat of the Liberal 
opposition on the Appropriation Bill, and it was consequently claimed that he went 
to the polls retaining a ‘majority on general matters’ and thus the outcome of the 
election was ‘extremely difficult to forecast.’73 At this juncture, the external issues 
of the New Guinea ‘rebuff’ and the French convict threat intersected with 
Queensland’s ‘little political world’ and affirmed the precedence of the colony’s 
internal affairs.74  
 
Considering the ‘exceptional interest’ in the debate on the Transcontinental 
Railway Bill and the Coolie labour issue in general, it was not surprising that in the 
‘turmoil of a general election’ the Queensland public were ‘immersed in…local 
contentions.’75 The Queenslander consequently claimed that ‘[a]fter the election, 
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there comes next in interest our New Guinea annexation’.76 This perception of 
local matters was strongly contested by the Week:   
The attempt to make it appear that the people of Queensland, or any 
considerable minority of the people, care two straws about New Guinea, or 
feel the least interest in its annexation to Queensland, is about as 
barefaced a fabrication as was ever attempted.77 
 
Discounting the obvious political bias of each paper, the notable feature of these 
two divergent opinions is that the level of public interest was in itself a contestable 
issue.78 In an election environment, the popular advantage that this external matter 
held within the local political arena was under challenge.   
 
Within the Queensland context the prospective political and populist appeal of an 
extension of the colony’s territory had undoubtedly factored in McIlwraith’s 
decision to pursue the formal possession of New Guinea. ‘The most masterful 
political leader’, as Deakin later succinctly described McIlwraith, had executed the 
action, in an effort to bolster his failing political position and to divert the public’s 
concentrated focus away from ‘local contentions’.79 Or as the Queensland Punch 
satirically phrased it: ‘Play New Guinea a little stronger, Mac….put it so as to catch 
the imagination more effectively’.80 What was effectively invoked was 
Queensland’s underlying insecurity or ‘selfish fear’ of any external intrusion on or 
appropriation of the colony’s wealth.81 Accordingly, McIlwraith’s action of annexing 
New Guinea to thwart German designs, was judged locally to be ‘most popular 
here’ and furthermore throughout April, May and June the ‘Griffith oracle had been 
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dumb on the question’.82 That Griffith, in effect, considered it politically imprudent 
to overtly challenge the motivation of McIlwraith’s action, demonstrated the 
existent, though carefully fostered association between foreign/external threats 
and an upsurge in public support. More particularly, Griffith’s noncommittal stance 
allowed him time to determine the extent of local support.83 For McIlwraith, the 
Imperial Government’s sanction of his course of action was imperative to induce 
the full force of political and populist backing. The July refusal consequently 
negated the popular attraction of the annexation, a factor illustrated by the Week’s 
claim that there was a want of interest, or more critically by the Queenslander’s 
censure of the public for their lack of remonstration. McIlwraith’s own appeal for 
public action further confirmed the diminished allure that the annexation held 
locally: 
We hope that Australia will continue to raise her united voice in protest 
against this indignity. And it is not sufficient that the Governments alone 
should act, for it is very desirable that, as in Melbourne, the citizens should 
give expression to their views in public meetings.84  
 
To wrest back public interest emphasis was laid on the ‘humiliation’ engendered 
by the decision for which ‘no self-administered solace can utterly obviate.’85 
                                                 
82
 In the days immediately after Chester’s proclamation Griffith publicly acknowledged his support for the 
annexation of New Guinea to Britain. At the same time he referred to ‘the coloured labour question’ as ‘the 
stated intention’ of the annexation but made little further comment on the matter. Griffith later explained that 
‘before expressing a definite opinion’ he wanted to refer to the correspondence before and after the 
annexation. ‘Summary for Europe’, Queenslander, 16 June 1883; ‘The Ministerial Banquet at Dalby’, 
Queenslander, 16 June 1883; ‘Hon. S.W. Griffith at Roma’, Queenslander, 7 April 1883; QPD, 39 (1883): 13. 
83
 Until the Imperial Government had accepted or adopted the act McIlwraith’s annexation had no legal force. 
On receipt of the Imperial Government’s decision Griffith consulted ‘such of my friends as I have been able to 
see’ and decided that ‘it would not be expedient to take any action with reference to the refusal of the Imperial 
Government to ratify the attempted annexation.’ In the context of his anticipated political defeat of the 
McIlwraith ministry Griffith’s question of expediency seemingly related to the possible effect that his support of 
McIlwraith’s action would have rather than on his attitude towards the Imperial Government’s decision. Griffith 
was far more orthodox in his interactions with the Imperial government and arguably would have accepted the 
authority of the decision courteously. Griffith to A. Archer 4 July 1883, cited in Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith. 
89 
84
 ‘The Premier’s Blunder’, Week, 14 July 1883; ‘Endymion’, ‘Light and Shade’, Queenslander, 21 July 1883; 
‘The Premiers Despatch on New Guinea’, Queenslander, 28 July 1883. 
85
 ‘Our Brisbane Letter’, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 July 1883. 
214 
Secondly, McIlwraith was touted as the staunch defender of Queensland’s security 
and thirdly, the purported sense that ‘we are in great danger’ was intensified.86   
 
Advanced as an additional indicator of ‘how eagerly the eyes of another nation are 
turned towards colonial acquisition in this part of the globe’ were the ‘defence and 
disgrace’ concerns associated with France’s Recidivistes Bill.87 The ‘intolerable 
nuisance’ of being ‘plagued with escapees’ from France’s penal settlement in New 
Caledonia, was not a new nor unfounded source of irritation for Queensland.88 In 
1881, the colony’s legislature had been prompted to pass a Bill ‘to prevent the 
influx of foreign and other criminals into Queensland’, and the issue had featured, 
though not prominently, in McIlwraith’s reasoning for his April annexation of New 
Guinea.89 More immediately, the continued diplomatic difficulties associated with 
the extradition of three French escapees arrested in Queensland and the 
newspaper reportage of the legislative progression of the Recidivistes Bill had 
sharpened the public focus on ‘the careless action of her French neighbours’.90 
‘Subsequent events’ had confirmed a definitive shift in France’s activities in the 
Pacific and this purportedly ‘rendered the Australian people still more sensitive 
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to…danger’.91 ‘Disquieting’ for the Queenslander was the report that a French 
vessel of war had ‘hoisted the French flag on the islands of Mallicolo and 
Erromanga’ in the New Hebrides and this action seemingly corroborated France’s 
intentions to extend its penal settlements into the New Hebrides.92 To demonstrate 
the ‘evils and dangers which loom ahead’ and to reinstate some of the vehemency 
that was displayed in the ‘old…agitation against convictism’ the Queenslander 
evocatively aligned the New Guinea issue with the newer threat of French designs 
in the Pacific:  
It is quite clear that…Queensland especially, cannot risk the danger of a 
foreign Power in the occupation of New Guinea menacing the rapidly 
growing trade of Torres Strait. We have already suffered enough from the 
convict settlement in New Caledonia, and the liability to another such den of 
Continental infamy, within a few miles of our north-eastern boundary, 
cannot be endured.93  
 
In his ‘energetic representations’ to the Colonial Office McIlwraith employed the 
same associative argument that the deepening threat presented by ‘these 
spreading hordes of criminals….connects itself with the New Guinea question’ and 
this combination compellingly demonstrated that Imperial action in the Pacific was 
‘doubly necessary’.94 In the Imperial domain Robert Herbert, the Permanent 
Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office and previously Queensland’s first premier, 
considered the French convict issue as an ‘extremely serious matter’.95 Yet Lord 
Derby held ‘suspicions that the Queensland people are making the most of this in 
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order to strengthen their case for annexation’.96 On the Queensland domestic 
front, the combined external concerns of New Guinea, New Caledonia and the 
New Hebrides failed to instigate any real degree of public concern.97  While the 
Queenslander could argue that ‘public sentiment requires no other safety-valve 
than the columns of the daily Press’ it was apparent that in the ‘wordy warfare’ of 
an election campaign the public’s focus had been maintained on domestic issues, 
in which ‘‘loans,’ ‘land grants,’ and ‘coolies’ are heard above the general din.’98 An 
additional indicator of the pervasiveness of the transcontinental and coolie issues 
was the lack of references to the New Guinea and French matters in McIlwraith’s 
election speeches and, most notably, his withdrawal at the end of July from active 
involvement in the Intercolonial convention he had initiated on the federal idea.99 In 
fact it would seem that the only electoral advantage derived from the annexation of 
New Guinea was that extracted by Griffith who used it to personally attack his 
opponent.  
 
Motivated by local political factors, in particular the negative prospect of being 
popularly associated with McIlwraith, Griffith had decided that ‘it would not be 
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expedient to take any action’ against the Imperial Government’s decision.100 
Alternatively, Griffith seized the opportunity to link McIlwraith with Queensland’s 
discomfiture at being the focus of Imperial and humanitarian scrutiny.101 Griffith’s 
published election manifesto referred to the annexation as the ‘[i]ll-advised and 
precipitate action of the Government, which…has certainly not tended to advance 
the reputation of the public men of Queensland.’102 At a public meeting at Town 
Hall Griffith detailed more fully his criticism:  
Lately we had heard a good deal about the annexation of New Guinea. That 
was a matter in which the Premier had been going to cover himself with 
glory. He (Mr. Griffith) was afraid he had only succeeded in covering himself 
with ridicule, and he was afraid he would also bring ridicule upon 
Australia….[W]e were told that the Premier had not consulted Parliament 
for fear it would have thwarted him. Did he suppose the hands of the 
Imperial Government were going to be forced by such a man as Sir Thomas 
McIlwraith?….Now this matter was to be the foundation of a movement for 
the federation of the Australian colonies. He desired to see federation; but 
he hoped that when we set about it we would do so in a sensible manner, 
and not make ourselves ridiculous in the eyes of the world. A Sydney 
newspaper had recently referred to Sir Thomas McIlwraith and his 
colleagues as men who had run away from their policy and contemptuously 
said, “These are the men who presume to take the load in Australian 
federation”.103  
 
The Queenslander was ‘sorry to notice’ the Liberal’s proclivity to ‘sneer’ at the 
federal proposal and hoped that it was ‘merely a temporary symptom of party 
exasperation.’104 The dynamics of Queensland’s turbulent political environment 
had intensified the immediacy of local matters, and this had effectively barred the 
development of a broader appreciation of the external security concerns and the 
associated necessity or desirability for collective action. Within this context, as the 
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Queenslander noted, ‘Federation [wa]s not a word to conjure with in 
Queensland.’105 
 
Queensland’s indifference to the idea of federal union was not the only impedient 
that confronted the Victorian Premier James Service in his endeavour to convene 
an Intercolonial Convention ‘to take federate action on the annexation question’.106 
Prior to McIlwraith’s July abdication of the ‘honour’ of being the convenor of the 
Convention there existed ominous signs from New South Wales.107  In a letter to 
the Editor of the Sydney Morning Herald, a New South Wales parliamentarian, L.F. 
Heydon108 questioned Victoria’s enthusiasm for federation:  
Some persons say that federation of these colonies must come some day. 
That day will reveal its own necessities; for the present, would not even 
such persons say, let us wait until Sydney is so far larger than Melbourne 
that, after the union, a Victorian majority cannot take the capitalship away 
from Sydney, or a slice of territory, or half of our unsold lands, or alter our 
railway rates so as to draw wool to Melbourne? Victoria is in such a hurry. 
And all on a sudden, too….And why does she not apply the grand and lofty 
idea of Australian federation to other Australian colonies, say Tasmania…or 
South Australia?  Could it be because Tasmania was poor, and small, and 
had sold all her land, that federation with her was not nobis. So much for 
the shallow device of Australian federation, conceived, when it came to suit 
their turn, by Victorian cleverness and audacity, addressed not quite 
unsuccessfully to New South Wales gullibility and sentiment.109 
 
The notion of federation as essentially a Victorian plot was a recurrent theme in 
New South Wales’ consideration of the federal proposal and arguably McIlwraith’s 
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withdrawal did nothing to ameliorate the situation. At this tentative stage it was the 
pressures of political survival that directly fashioned New South Wales’ 
participation.110   
 
The defeat of Parkes’ ministry in January 1883, after the unusually long tenure of 
four years, instituted an unstable phase in New South Wales’ politics. The next 
four years saw, as Parkes depicted it, ‘the birth and death of four Ministries’.111 
Throughout 1883, the preoccupation of the government formed under Alex Stuart 
was the extensive overhaul of New South Wales’ land legislation. While Stuart had 
agreed to attend the ‘Convention of delegates’ his equivocation on the date for the 
meeting was perceived as New South Wales’ ‘cold and impassive’ position on the 
annexation and federal issues.112 Time constraints were a significant contributive 
factor: unlike his Victorian counterpart, Stuart’s local political position did not afford 
him the time or political freedom to actively pursue an annexationist policy or the 
federal idea. Second, but interrelated and reflective of the broader New South 
Wales position, Stuart acknowledged that he did not have that ‘same impulsive 
spirit’ on the annexation issue and differed from Service on the best mode of 
meeting the ‘threatened evil’ in the New Hebrides.113 Stuart contended that an 
Australian-directed annexation of the New Hebrides would be a ‘direct violation’ of 
the agreement between Britain and France, which precluded either taking 
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possession of the group islands.114 On the New Guinea question he was ‘strongly 
impressed’ with Britain’s proposal to establish a Protectorate and on the ‘necessity 
for immediate Federation action’ Stuart openly declared that he did not hold 
‘strong views’ on the question.115 In essence, Stuart was content to leave external 
matters for the Imperial Government to take the action it deemed necessary.  
 
A more forthright example of ‘loyalist’ reverence for Imperial authority was 
demonstrated by Tasmania’s Premier William Giblin who questioned whether ‘it 
was wise, or even becoming, to assume a semi-hostile position to the Imperial 
Authorities’.116 The provisional intimations of ‘partial separation from the mother-
country’ enmeshed in Queensland’s initial response to the New Guinea decision, 
had troubled the conformist Giblin.117 The actions outlined in McIlwraith’s 
memorandum were consequently seen as ‘going too fast and too far’ for him.118 
Further he objected to any subordination of Imperial interests by the colonies.119 
Tasmania, the Queenslander declared was ‘quite content to look out, like an 
unfledged young one, from the safe shelter of the ancestral nest.’120  The disparate 
reaction among the colonies to the question of colonial annexation made Service’s 
achievement of assembling delegates from all of the Australian colonies, New 
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Zealand and Fiji in Sydney in late November 1883 to consider the federal issue, a 
masterpiece of negotiation.   
 
The variously entitled ‘Anti-Convict‘, ‘Annexation’, ‘Australasian’ or ‘Federation’ 
Convention was touted by the New South Wales Premier Alex Stuart as being ‘one 
of the greatest occasions that have yet been recorded in the annals of these infant 
countries’.121 The magnitude of this assembly was that it constituted the first 
intercolonial meeting convened specifically to consider the federal topic. Though 
eulogised as ‘the most important thing…that has yet taken place in Australia’ and 
celebrated as the ‘starting point’ of the federal movement, it was however plagued 
from the beginning with the familiar irritants of suspicion and indifference.122 
Despite the location of the Convention being shifted from Melbourne to Sydney to 
accommodate the parliamentary labours of New South Wales and to ‘assure’ New 
South Wales that Victoria’s federal enthusiasm was neither ‘selfish’ nor designed 
to ‘entrap’, it was evident that there existed lingering uneasiness in the host colony 
over the Convention.123  
 
New South Wales did little to hide its enmity to the purpose of the Convention. It 
failed to extend the courtesy of meeting the various colonial premiers on their 
arrival in Sydney and this ‘considerably chagrined’ the intercolonial delegates.124 
Furthermore, the colony’s contingent was ill prepared for the Convention’s work, 
and voiced its animosity by contesting the ‘trifling issue’ of whether the title 
‘Convention’ should be given to the gathering and by openly accusing Victoria as 
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using the forum as ‘an indirect process to take possession of the Riverina, and 
force her tariff on the eastern colonies’.125 Service, in an attempt to appease, 
successfully nominated Stuart as Chairman of the Convention and deferred from 
replying to the provocative speech of New South Wales’ Colonial Treasurer, 
George Dibbs.126 An additional conciliatory measure was the listing of the colonies 
alphabetically rather than by the standard population method.127 New South 
Wales’ apprehensiveness was seemingly tempered by the actual work of the 
gathering; the Melbourne Argus claimed that ‘by the third day the New South 
Wales mind is convinced that after all, Victoria is not playing a deep game.’128 
Differences in opinion on the annexation question and the federal idea were a 
fateful feature of the Convention, as each colony’s position had been made known 
in the lengthy negotiation process, all except Queensland.  
 
The colonial decision to alter the number of delegates to attend the Convention 
was problematic for Queensland’s conservatives. To endorse the ‘importance of 
the present occasion’ and in line with the precedent set by Canada’s federal 
process, both Service and McIlwraith had advocated that four delegates be 
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appointed from both sides of each colony’s parliament to ensure that the 
Convention was a ‘thoroughly representative’ body.129 All of the colonial 
governments however voted against this proposal and this resulted in non-
selection of members from the parliamentary opposition. The most notable impact 
of this decision was the non-attendance of the Convention’s ‘prime mover’ Thomas 
McIlwraith, who had been defeated by the Liberal leader Samuel Griffith in 
Queensland’s General Election.130 The absence of McIlwraith, the ‘natural leader’ 
of this important intercolonial gathering, prompted further acclamation of his New 
Guinea action.131 The Victorian correspondent to the Queenslander emphasised 
that McIlwraith, ‘must be credited with setting the ball rolling, for the initial step was 
undoubtedly his’.132 The Argus, extended its expression of regret and requested 
that ‘if etiquette permitted them’ it would be ‘glad’ if a resolution could be passed 
by the Convention to formally acknowledge McIlwraith’s ‘services’.133 To a member 
of Queensland’s Legislative Council, the absence of McIlwraith at the Convention 
equated to ‘performing the play of Hamlet with the chief character absent.’134 In 
addition to affirming McIlwraith’s designation as the protagonist who had brought 
the questions of annexation and federation ‘within the range of practical politics’, 
his absence introduced an element of uncertainty in regard to Queensland’s 
position on the matters before the Convention.135 
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Griffith, in his election ‘crusade against his rival’ McIlwraith, had been critical of the 
attempted annexation of New Guinea and the reactive federal proposition and this 
had accordingly raised concerns over Griffith’s likely enthusiasm for the purpose of 
the Convention.136 Alfred Deakin’s summation was that at this point in time Griffith 
had not developed ‘the force and depth of his Federal aspirations.’137 Thus, while 
Griffith regarded it as ‘extremely fortunate…that the accidents of political life’ had 
placed him a position to be present at the Convention as Queensland’s principal 
representative, the Brisbane Courier feared that the efforts of the Convention 
would be minimised by the ‘frigid indifference of the representatives from 
Queensland’.138 More optimistic was the Victorian delegation, which had 
anticipated that they would receive ‘the hearty support of Queensland’ in their 
proposed annexation and federal resolutions.139 The position Griffith proceeded to 
undertake in the Convention’s deliberations was that of an active moderator 
between the ardour of Victoria and the tentativeness of New South Wales, South 
Australia, and Tasmania.  
 
Griffith countered, to the disappointment of the Argus, Service’s resolution, urging 
the Imperial Government to annex or establish a protectorate over all the islands 
from New Guinea to the New Hebrides.140 Griffith advanced a more moderate 
proposal that confined Imperial action to New Guinea. Debate on the Victorian and 
Queensland annexation resolutions and Tasmania’s more cautious one, revolved 
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principally around the diplomatic bearing they would have on the Imperial 
Government. Most were particularly mindful of the ‘extreme delicacy’ of the 
Western Pacific situation, in view of the 1878 ‘understanding’ between Britain and 
France that neither Government would take possession of the New Hebrides and 
this effectively barred the Convention from submitting a resolution that sought any 
‘inconsistent’ action from the Imperial authorities.141 Reverence and loyalty to the 
British connection also permeated the deliberations. The declared ‘main object’ of 
New South Wales was to ensure that ‘opinions should be couched in language of 
statesmanlike moderation, so as to facilitate the action of the Imperial 
Government, and to prevent its embarrassment with any foreign power’.142 Griffith 
was also seen to be ‘cautious and prudent’, and showed ‘a proper appreciation of 
the difficulties of the Imperial position’.143 He had in line with this made a ‘careful 
revision of the language used.’144 It was clear to the Argus that:  
the colonies are not prepared to go so far as is Victoria….there seems to be 
a serious lack of unanimity as to the annexation of the isles from New 
Guinea to the New Hebrides….The idea has been attributed to the 
delegates who would leave the isles alone, that we should not ask too much 
from the Earl of Derby.145  
 
Arguably, McIlwraith’s presence at the Convention would have aided Victoria’s 
stronger line on the annexation issue, although his particularly critical stance on 
the Imperial Government’s repudiation may have been tempered by the 
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Convention’s conditional endorsement of action over New Guinea.146 Undermined 
by Griffith, whose resolutions were seen to ‘belittle’ the Victorian scheme, Service 
forcefully reasserted the Victorian position and effectively portrayed the shifting 
nature of colonial alliances and the enduring suspicion of Victoria: 
He urged that Victoria was entitled to large consideration, and the interests 
of that colony ought not to be overlooked….Victoria now said, “Secure the 
New Hebrides for us”.…which was to them a matter of much greater 
importance than the annexation of New Guinea. He went on to say that but 
for the enthusiasm shown by Victoria, and the pressure brought to bear on 
the question by that colony in connection with Queensland, New Guinea 
would have been lost, and if Queensland succeeded in getting New Guinea 
she would be entirely indebted for that success to the other colonies.147   
 
The resultant series of eight resolutions on the interconnected issues of 
annexation and the French convict threat contained Griffith’s more moderate New 
Guinea line. This provoked the Argus to comment that the tentativeness of 
colonies had indicated that the prevailing colonial conviction was ‘that there [wa]s 
some impropriety in a vigorous remonstrance’ with the Imperial Government.148   
 
The formulation of a colonial response to the disturbing wave of foreign activity in 
the Pacific was a prominent consideration of the Convention. Yet in the resolutions 
decided by the Convention no attempt was made to justify Queensland’s original 
action. The resolutions articulated the colonial desire for the Imperial government 
to institute a forward policy in the Pacific for defensive purposes and not for 
territorial expansion. This was subsequently perceived as amounting to Australia’s 
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‘Monroe doctrine over the Western Pacific’.149 The ‘highly detrimental’ impact of 
further foreign acquisitions in the Western Pacific to the safety and well-being’ of 
the colonies was affirmed, but the Convention refrained from ‘suggesting’ any 
steps to be undertaken by the Imperial government. It was the colonies ‘confident 
belief that the Imperial Government will promptly adopt the wisest and most 
effectual measures for securing the safety and contentment of this portion of Her 
Majesty’s dominions.’ The Convention was however, ‘emphatically of the opinion’ 
that New Guinea should be immediately incorporated into the British Empire, with 
the costs defrayed by the colonies. ‘In the strongest manner’ the colonies 
protested against France’s intention to transport relapsed criminals to the Pacific 
Islands and as a result urged the Imperial Government to ‘use every means in its 
power to prevent the adoption of this course.’ Additionally the Convention ‘invites’ 
the Imperial Government ‘to make such serious recommendations on this subject 
as may be deemed expedient’. These resolutions were communicated to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies with the ‘request…for such action as Her 
Majesty may think proper to direct, with a view to giving effect to the earnest desire 
of her loyal subjects in Australasia.’ 150  Pacific concerns had taken precedence in 
the Convention’s proceedings and it was not until the seventh day of the 
Convention that Griffith’s resolution on the desirability of creating a Federal 
Australasian Council was presented for serious debate.151  
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In contrast to all previous colonial considerations of the federal question, the 
Convention proceeded through the debate and amendment phase of its 
deliberations on the Federal resolutions and the ‘Draft Bill to constitute a Federal 
Council of Australasia’ at a ‘rapid rate’ and achieved a ‘remarkable unanimity 
among the delegates.’152 The explanation for this uncharacteristic colonial 
consensus centres on the narrowness of the federal objective and the resultant 
prescriptive nature of the proposed federal scheme.  
 
The establishment of some permanent form of federal organisation was a 
mandatory feature of the Convention’s work; it was not only the professed reason 
for the gathering but it was an essential requirement to fulfil Lord Derby’s 
recommendation that ‘if the Australian colonies desired an extension of their 
territory, it would be better for them to become federated, as they were unable 
singly to accomplish the task.’153 The ‘general tenor’ therefore of the Convention 
was that if the colonies presented ‘an unbroken front…all their reasonable 
demands would be conceded.’154 Delegates consequently spoke ‘with hope and 
confidence of the prospect of establishing some central body which shall at least 
symbolise a united Australia.’155 Motivated by ‘practical expediency’ and 
symbolism the Convention initiated and adopted a federal scheme that deliberately 
attempted to evade the problematical aspects of Australia’s entrenched model of 
colonial individualism and independence.156  
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The blueprint from which the Convention, and Griffith in particular, drew 
substantial inspiration was Sir Henry Parkes’ ‘abandoned’ 1881 Federal Council 
proposal.157 At an Intercolonial conference in Sydney, Parkes had submitted a 
memorandum that, in essence, had argued that because Australian conditions 
were not then conducive to the construction of a complete federation, a more 
refined body ‘to meet the circumstances of the present Australian situation’ should 
be established.158 This would ‘lead men to think in the direction of federation, and 
accustom the public mind to federal ideas and….pave the way to complete federal 
organisation.’159 For practical purposes Parkes’ logic was adopted by the 
Convention who ‘recognising that the time has not yet arrived at which a complete 
Federal Union of the Australasian Colonies can be attained’ proceeded to submit 
‘provisions best adapted to secure…[what] is now capable of attainment.’160 
Unanimous agreement was the principal objective and the overarching challenge 
had been to mediate a federal framework that would be acceptable to all the 
colonies. The resultant draft bill for a Federal Council, composed of two 
representatives from each colony and established to deal biannually ‘with such 
matters of common Australasian interest’, did in effect reveal the extent of colonial 
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independence and the consequent misgivings of the federal principle yet 
simultaneously represented the first tangible advance on the federal question.161  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Queensland Punch, 1 January 1884 
 
Within Australia’s firmly entrenched pattern of colonial separatism the 
independence and authority of each colonial legislature was sacrosanct and 
accordingly represented the principal hurdle to be negotiated if agreement was to 
be reached. Thus, to negate colonial apprehension the ‘greatest care’ was taken 
to preserve the independence of the local Legislatures.162 The preamble of the 
draft Federal Council Bill expressly specified that ‘such matters’, which required 
‘united action’, were only those that could be dealt with ‘without unduly interfering 
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with the management of the internal affairs of the several Colonies by their 
respective Legislatures’.163 To reinforce this assurance the Council’s ‘functions, 
powers, and authority’ were clearly ‘defined’ and the proposed ‘matters of general 
interest’ were ‘specified’ and ‘subject to the provisions’ contained in the Act.164 The 
consequent prescriptive nature of the draft Bill indicated to the Sydney Morning 
Herald that what had been suggested was:  
rather a Federal Council in name than in reality; for it is not proposed that 
there shall be any central organisation with taxing powers, or with legislative 
powers, that can override the local governments already established. What 
is now proposed…is…a sort of joint committee…to exercise certain strictly 
prescribed duties’. 165 
 
The inherent paradox of the enforced adaptation of the federal principal was that 
to obtain endorsement of the plan to create a central legislative body, the 
Convention was compelled to acknowledge and preserve the sanctity of each 
colony’s colonial legislature. Thus the two fundamentally antithetical principles of 
colonial independence and federalism coexisted in the draft Federal Council Bill to 
offset anxiety, facilitate colonial agreement and accomplish the ‘first step’ towards 
a complete federal union of the colonies.166 The ‘beginning’ was purposefully ‘not 
very ambitious’, but it was a calculated and practical recognition of the colonial 
situation.167 The proposed Federal Council was positively acknowledged as an 
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‘impotent body’ with no executive authority.168 It was therefore a ‘burlesque’ of the 
federal principle but it was purposely so because, as the Tasmanian Premier 
William Giblin remarked, it had to soothe ‘the susceptibilities of every local 
Legislature; letting them feel…that the 21 leading men whom they have selected 
to represent them would not…lose sight of the interests of any local Legislature in 
the Australasian group.’169 A ‘slight attachment’ was manifestly all that was 
intended or in fact all that could be expected at this point in time.170 Its anticipated 
broader contribution, the Argus declared, was that ‘it sets the colonies travelling 
upon the road to union, and turns them away from the path which some of them 
have seemed to prefer, and the end of which is disintegration.’171   
 
Despite the evident disparity between the adopted federal scheme and 
McIlwraith’s initial federal proposal for a ‘combination among the Australian 
colonies…for both legislative and executive purposes’, the overarching 
assessment of the Federal Bill was positive.172 The Convention was consequently 
lauded as producing ‘the greatest work done since Captain Cook discovered the 
land’ and as being ‘far more successful than was anticipated by many’.173 A 
degree of scepticism had prevailed throughout the Convention’s sittings for it was 
feared that ‘local jealousies and rival ambitions were still too strong to prevent 
anything being done’.174 Localism had been a persistent and obstructive force at 
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Intercolonial Conferences, the colonies’ customary consultative forum, and on 
almost all previous occasions had barred the establishment of any permanent 
agreement between the colonies. The Convention’s decision not to make its 
deliberations public, through its exclusion of the press, precludes a definitive 
assessment of the actual impact of localism on the proceedings. Leaked reports 
from delegates did indicate that at the commencement of the Convention there 
were ‘some extremely anxious moments….More than once…the delegates were 
on the point of an explosion’.175 Under Stuart’s directorship these initial tensions, 
principally generated by New South Wales’ aversion to Victoria, ‘thawed’ and 
fostered an environment which enabled the idea of the Federal Council to be taken 
up ‘most heartily’ by all ‘even the New South Wales delegates’.176 There was, 
Service reported, ‘less difficulty’ in dealing with the Federal proposal than there 
had been with annexation issue.177 Ostensibly, the Convention’s ‘historical 
circumstances’ and the delegate’s unanimous desire to ‘extend our vision’ had 
effectively removed many of the antagonisms attributable to localism.178 
Conciliation at significant or festive intercolonial gatherings was seemingly a 
recurrent trait: it had been the source of scepticism at the Albury celebrations, 
when it was generically argued that under the influence of enthusiastic gatherings 
‘many antagonisms lie dormant’, but on the representative’s return to their ‘own 
political atmosphere’, ‘adverse views’ were revived with increased force.179 The 
applicability of this line of argument was further corroborated by the state of affairs 
that immediately followed the Sydney Convention, which encapsulated the 
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causative factors that precluded the Federal Council from securing a ‘fair trial’.180 
In a speech immediately after the Convention Service prophetically noted the 
fundamental obstacle: ‘we have yet to go through the ordeal of submitting to the 
respective Parliaments of the various colonies the action we have taken.’181 
 
‘Ominous signs’ from the New South Wales legislature emerged before the 
Convention had concluded its business.182 The initial ‘grievance’ centred on the 
extent to which the colony’s three delegates could be considered representative of 
the people of New South Wales.183 This was sufficient evidence for the 
Queenslander’s New South Wales correspondent to pre-empt the probable failure 
of the Federal Council: ‘it will be a thousand pities if the important work of this 
convention is to be utterly thrown away.’184 Within three days of the Convention’s 
closure a series of indictments had been generated against the Federal proposal. 
The fervency with which the adversaries submitted their case bordered on the 
hysterical, with one member of the New South Wales legislature declaring that 
every member of the Convention would have been ‘found guilty of high treason 
against the constitution of this country.’185 Chief amongst the charges was the 
disturbing perception that the Federal Council Bill was being submitted to the 
Imperial Government for sanction at a ‘railroad pace’ and before ‘this enormous 
constitutional change…had been discussed by the local legislatures’.186 Second, it 
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was mistakenly believed that the draft bill would invest the Federal Council with 
‘the power of completely stamping out this parliament and sweeping away our 
laws’ and finally, the New South Wales delegates were accused of consenting to 
the Federal resolutions and the draft bill without consulting their Parliament.187 
Contributing significantly to the volatility of this ‘outburst in the Legislative 
Assembly’ was Service’s ‘indiscreet speech’ at a Melbourne banquet for the 
Convention’s delegates just three days after the Convention ended.188   
 
In stark contrast to the diplomatic position Service had essentially undertaken 
throughout the Convention, his speech to the representatives of Victoria’s ministry 
and the colony’s public institutions was, in its first half, an unconcealed 
denunciation of New South Wales’ initial ‘ignorance’ of the Convention’s purpose 
and of Sydney’s ‘most intense jealousy’ of Melbourne.189 Service did then proceed 
to applaud the ‘hearty…spirit’ with which the New South Wales delegates 
undertook the Federal initiative, crediting each of them with significant 
contributions to the final result and concluding by calling for ‘three hearty cheers 
for our friends of New South Wales’.190 The ‘overweening impertinence’ of the first 
half of Service’s speech was reported to have ‘almost dr[iven] the Sydney people 
mad.’191 A ‘considerable quantity of bitterness’ was as a result infused into the 
already antagonistic rivalry between New South Wales and Victoria.192  The retort 
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of one member of the New South Wales legislature was that Service’s statement 
on Sydney’s ‘intense jealousy’ was ‘as false as Hades was black’ because:  
there was no jealousy in this colony about Melbourne, for we have nothing 
to be jealous of….It was going something beyond endurance when they 
were told that Victoria did this and that, and she in fact posed before the 
world as the leading colony of the Australian group, which she was not. 
New South Wales was as far above her as the heavens were above the 
earth.193 
 
Service’s ‘irreparable blunder’ galvanised New South Wales’ ‘natural tendency’ to 
view with suspicion anything endorsed by Victoria.194 The ‘worst’ effect of this, 
Deakin asserted, was that the ‘Federal Council became branded as a Victorian 
invention. As such it became a point of patriotism with many New South 
Welshmen to belittle and oppose it.’195 At its most extreme the Federal Council 
was perceived by New South Wales as a ‘conspiracy between Victoria and 
Queensland‘ and moreover it was argued that ‘[i]t ought not to be forgotten that if 
we…get this federal council saddled upon us we shall never be able to get rid of it 
without bloodshed.’196 The continued maintenance of a majority opinion against 
the Federal proposal in the New South Wales legislature resulted in the colony 
never participating in the Federal Council. The ‘non-conformity’ of New South 
Wales irrevocably weakened the Federal Council from its inception, for it 
prevented the Council from being a truly representative body of all the Australian 
colonies and consequently it lacked the ‘prestige necessary for its effective 
existence’.197  
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Paradoxically, as the unity of the colonies was collapsing Britain was under the 
erroneous perception that a full federation had been agreed to by the Convention. 
A telegram had been mistakenly sent without the words ‘not yet’ and subsequently 
read ‘That this Convention, recognises that the time has arrived at which a 
complete Federal Union of the Australasian Colonies can be attained’.198 The 
English press published this version and as a result of this ‘extraordinary mistake’ 
Imperial action on New Guinea was temporarily stalled. Lord Derby, based on this 
‘misunderstanding’, resolved that if the Australian colonies were about to federate 
and assume their own authority then the Imperial Government would ‘do nothing 
with a view to the annexation of New Guinea until Australia was federated.’199 The 
Convention’s resolutions pertaining to the annexation question were generally 
considered by the British press as being ‘moderate and careful’ yet privately Derby 
considered them to be ‘mere raving’ and Gladstone thought them ‘preposterous 
proposals’.200 In Derby’s consistent attempt to arbitrate a cautious course on the 
Pacific question he was, at this time, aided by the slowness with which the 
Australian colonies proceeded to submit the Convention’s federal resolutions to 
their respective parliaments. Derby therefore argued, in May 1884 that in the 
‘absence of joint action by the colonies’ there existed no grounds for a 
reconsideration of the annexation question and this strategically transferred the 
initiative back onto the colonies.201 As ‘further delay seem[ed] unavoidable’, Derby 
was ‘disposed’ to arrange during the intervening period for a High Commissioner 
to be stationed with ‘large powers of independent action’ on the eastern coast of 
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New Guinea if the colonies would contribute £15,000 to the cost of this 
arrangement.202 Though presented in the context of a response to the 
Convention’s resolutions on the Pacific, Derby’s proposal to extend the authority of 
the Western Pacific High Commission over New Guinea had its origins in the 
recommendations of the October 1883 report from the Western Pacific Royal 
Commission.203 To affect a more rigorous standard of supervision over the labour 
trade was the basis of the Commission’s recommendations, delivered in direct 
response to Queensland’s attempted annexation of New Guinea and the 
associated increase in recruitment activity in these waters.204 Derby’s proposal 
was not therefore an anticipatory action waiting for a broader annexation policy; on 
this front his ‘immovable placidity’ remained.205 To ease colonial apprehension 
Derby reaffirmed the Imperial Government’s ‘confident’ belief that ‘no foreign 
Power contemplated interference with New Guinea’.206 The inaccuracy of the 
Foreign Office’s assessment of German designs in the Pacific proved to be the 
catalyst that finally effected a decisive change in the Imperial Government’s 
consideration of the Pacific question. In response to the changing dynamics in 
Pacific the colonial need for combined or federal action was sharply impressed 
upon the Australian colonies. A secondary though more durable impact of 
Germany’s Pacific exploits was the contemporary and historical elevation of 
McIlwraith’s bold annexation action.  
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In June 1884, the German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck publicly announced 
Germany’s intention to pursue a government-endorsed policy of granting 
protection over the nation’s commercial interests on the African coast and in the 
Pacific.207 In view of the Foreign Office’s persistent assertion that Germany did not 
hold expansionist ambitions in the Pacific, Bismarck’s declaration though it did not 
specifically cite New Guinea was received with surprise and alarm. Derby 
immediately advocated action and proposed the establishment of a protectorate 
over eastern New Guinea. Cabinet approved this on 6th August 1884. This 
decision was reversed three days later after Germany’s ambassador in London, 
Count Munster had acquainted British Foreign Secretary Lord Granville with 
Germany’s undertaking to maintain and extend its presence into the northern 
portion of New Guinea under the conviction that it was a legitimate ‘field for 
German enterprise’.208 In the subsequent negotiation phase over boundaries 
Britain was restricted by broader issues, in particular its requirement to maintain 
congenial relations with Germany to ensure support for its ongoing and 
deteriorating action in Egypt.209 The geographical limitation of Britain’s protectorate 
in New Guinea was as a consequence restricted to the southeastern portion of the 
island.  
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To the Australian colonies, uninformed of the diplomatic reasons for the 
protectorate’s establishment and its reduced territorial boundaries, the October 
intimation that a protectorate was to be proclaimed was received as a surprise 
shift in the Imperial Government’s position. Its limited scope was to Griffith a 
satisfactory ‘first step towards carrying out the resolutions of the convention with 
regard to New Guinea’.210 To Service, the more insistent advocate of a broader 
annexationist policy, the decision was a bitter disappointment for its limitation laid 
the northern portion open for German occupation.211 Bismarck, acting ‘outside the 
negotiations that were going on’, had in fact proceeded to implement Service’s 
forecast of events.  
 
In a telegram sent on the 19th August Bismarck forwarded his instructions to the 
German Consul-General in Sydney. The German explorer Dr Otto Finsch left 
Sydney in September and proceeded to carry out these instructions ‘to hoist the 
German flag in the archipelago of New Britain and along…the northeast coast of 
New Guinea which lies outside the sphere of interest of Holland and England.’212 
Throughout October and November suspicion and anxiety mounted in Australia, 
as the colonies pieced together, through information gleaned principally from 
foreign sources, that the Imperial government had ignored their concerns and 
appeals to placate Germany. The November proclamation of the protectorate was 
consequently stigmatised by McIlwraith as a ‘mere sham’ and by Service as a 
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‘farce’.213 In contrast, both Griffith and Stuart maintained their faith in the Imperial 
government to display ‘a most friendly spirit towards the Australian colonies in their 
desire to incorporate New Guinea within the British Empire.’214 Early warnings of 
Finsch’s objective in the Pacific were dismissed, but the full extent of his activities 
and that of two German warships were reported to the Admiralty by Commodore 
Erskine on 17th December.215 Formal notification from Germany was received two 
days later. The Australian colonies received unconfirmed reports from a special 
correspondent of the Daily Telegraph at New Britain on the same day.216 Hugh 
Romilly, the Deputy Commissioner of the Western Pacific stationed in New 
Guinea, aware of ‘the wholesale German annexations’, accurately anticipated on 
13th December that the Australian colonies will ‘no doubt…be furious’.217  
 
McIlwraith considered the news of Germany’s annexation of northeastern New 
Guinea as exemplifying ‘the grossest piece of treachery on the part of the English 
Government to the colonies that has ever been perpetrated.’218 The target for the 
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‘severest censure’ was Lord Derby whose action Service described ‘as one of the 
most melancholy and marvellous illustrations of political imbecility that has ever 
been recorded in history.’219 Romilly reported from Cooktown in early January 
1885 that the ‘Australians are too frantic for words about the German annexations. 
Lord Derby, in effigy, is suffering many indignities at their hands.’220 An additional 
constituent feature of the Australian reaction to the ‘German invasion of New 
Guinea’ was the laudatory references to McIlwraith’s foresight.221 ‘Exactly what we 
expected’ was the Queenslander’s view and this characterised the colonial belief 
that McIlwraith’s 1883 perception of German ambitions in New Guinea was valid 
and astute.222 It was therefore argued that if McIlwraith’s foresight had been 
heeded then New Guinea would not have ‘passed into the hands of a foreign, and 
at the present moment a decidedly unfriendly, Power’ nor would the ‘need for the 
present humiliating concession…have arisen.’223  
 
The chronological development of Germany’s annexationist aspirations in New 
Guinea contradicts this supposition. It is apparent that decisive action by Germany 
did not precede McIlwraith’s attempted annexation but was in fact a reaction to it. 
The cumulative effect of the intensity of the Australian colonies’ campaign for the 
annexation of New Guinea provoked alarm and protest from the existent German 
commercial interests in the area. In response to the numerous and spirited 
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petitions protesting these colonies’ escalating action and their indifference or 
denial of Germany’s legitimate interests in the Pacific, Bismarck adopted a more 
aggressive colonial policy. Diplomatic negotiations with Britain sought and 
obtained, through Munster’s 9th August meeting with Granville, Britain’s recognition 
of German interests in northeastern New Guinea.224 Rejected was the Australian 
proclivity to consider the entire eastern portion of the island as ‘a natural 
dependency of Australia’.225 The secrecy of these diplomatic considerations and 
negotiations between Britain and Germany precluded an Australian awareness of 
the situation and thus facilitated the perception that Bismarck had robbed ‘us of 
our inheritance’ and that Britain had ‘deliberately and coolly betrayed’ the 
Australian colonies.226 Within this highly emotive context McIlwraith’s initial 
annexation action on the ‘mere rumour that Germany had designs upon New 
Guinea’ was legitimatised and therefore lauded as a valid pre-emptive or 
defensive act.227 Though factually flawed and stripped of its problematic aspects, 
this assessment ensured that McIlwraith and his ‘daring act of annexation’ were 
officially accepted and preserved as a historically significant event in the colonial 
record.228  
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To the Australian colonies, the New Guinea crisis exemplified the subordinate and 
ineffective position that they occupied within the bureaucracy of Imperial 
governance. Initially, the colonies’ demonstrated their resentment of this state of 
affairs by proclaiming that irreparable damage had been caused to the 
Imperial/colonial relationship. This sentiment expanded to a determined stand that 
it was time that the colonies separated from the Mother Country and assumed 
complete responsibility over their own interests for, as the Queenslander argued in 
January 1885, ‘Providence helps those who help themselves.’229 Such a 
proposition belied the reality of the colonies’ enforced dependency on Britain. On 
the abatement of colonial fury it was transmuted into an appeal for the necessity of 
the ‘Colonies to put forth her federated strength.’230 
 
Throughout 1884 the draft Federal Council Bill had languished in the Imperial 
arena, largely because of the extent of ‘business’ before the Imperial Parliament 
and more particularly because New South Wales had continued to delay its 
consideration of the Federal resolutions.231 In November 1884, Lord Derby 
received an Address from the New South Wales Legislative Council requesting the 
Federal Council Bill be submitted to the Imperial Parliament.232 The peculiarity of 
the New South Wales situation was that both the Legislative Assembly and the 
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Legislative Council had considered the question on the same day, 30th October 
1884. The result was that the Lower House had voted against the Federal 
resolutions but the Upper House had passed them and thus forwarded the 
Address.233 The receipt then of this Address from New South Wales did not 
indicate a significant shift in the colony’s stance on the Federal Council proposal; 
rather, considerable opposition remained.  
 
New South Wales’ opposition to the Federal proposal was two-pronged. The more 
potent of the two arguments against the Federal Council was based on suspicion 
of the motives of Victoria: from this ‘lurking notion’ came the contention that New 
South Wales was being ‘hood-winked’ into adopting a Bill that contained powers 
which would effect an ‘invasion of the independence of local legislatures’ and 
‘override our liberties’.234 ‘Let us not be a party to our own degradation’ was the 
principle premise of this argument.235 The second and less emotively charged 
argument assailed the proposition of the Federal Council from the opposite 
direction, and asserted that it was too premature and too limited and would not 
serve to advance the cause of ‘real federation’.236 The chief protagonist of this line 
of argument was Sir Henry Parkes and his reasoning was that: 
In every federal body which is to act for independent legislatures, there 
must be sufficient largeness and sufficient power to preserve its 
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authority….the convention met to consider this most difficult and greatest of 
subjects [federation] at a time when opinion was not matured, when it was 
still perplexed by conflicting interests….[T]here are incurable causes of 
immediate failure in…such a rickety institution….[I]s it not better to let the 
idea of federation mature, to grow in men’s minds, until the time comes, if 
we are to federate, that we can have a solid, enduring structure of 
federation?…Now, I venture to ask the Committee…to pause, and not 
create an impediment in the way of federation. I ask them not to diminish 
the chance of successful federation at some near future time.237 
 
Adherents to this line of reasoning existed within the parliaments of the other 
colonies, most notably Victoria and Queensland and from this form of protestation 
against the Federal Council there developed a concerted advocacy for a ‘sure and 
solid federation of the colonies’.238   
 
Efforts by the Imperial Government to amend the draft Federal Council Bill to 
placate New South Wales failed and the bill continued to be ‘distasteful’ to the 
colony in July 1885. Stuart as a result requested that the Imperial Government 
postpone its consideration of the Bill for another session to enable New South 
Wales to submit further amendments that would present a better ‘chance of this 
Colony coming in’.239 Service argued that it was ‘no fault’ of the consenting 
colonies that the ‘new views of Sydney’ had not been sent in time for discussion 
and successfully appealed to the Imperial authorities to ‘let nothing now stop the 
way’.240 On the 14th August 1885 the Imperial Parliament passed the Federal 
Council of Australasia Act and between September and December Western 
Australia, Fiji, Queensland, Tasmania and Victoria consecutively passed the 
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Federal Council (Adopting) Act.241 It was, one contemporary asserted ‘sad to 
see…New South Wales humbugging, and by their own false political wisdom left 
out in the cold – separated from the happy Australian family!’242  
 
The elation provoked by the Imperial Government’s decision and by the 
promptitude with which the consenting colonial parliaments proceeded to pass the 
Adopting Bill was swiftly overtaken by the disturbing signs and ultimate ‘defection’ 
of South Australia at the final stage.243 The prospect of less than half of the 
Australian population being represented at the Council and the inconvenience of 
none of the assenting colonies sharing a border, Griffith argued, would create ‘a 
federal council that would really be very lame and incomplete.’244 In the 
Queensland arena McIlwraith advocated perseverance, for a limited collective 
‘would not be a fiasco…it would…be a good step in the right direction towards 
federation’. In Victoria, Service was also encouraged not to abandon the whole 
enterprise.245 The assemblage at Hobart for the inaugural meeting of the Federal 
Council of Australasia on the 25th January 1886 was nonetheless ‘shorn of the 
grandeur which we had hoped would attach to it’.246 Optimism and caution 
however permeated through the speeches. Service declared in his Presidential 
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Speech that the Council would ‘no doubt be regarded by the nations of the world 
as the embryo of a great Consolidated Dominion’.247 Griffith ‘descanted’ that: 
this first session of the Federal Council initiates a very important era in the 
history of this part of Her Majesty’s dominion; and it is of the greatest 
consequence that what we do should be done wisely and 
considerately…that we should encourage…the other colonies which at 
present hold aloof, to believe that the powers conferred by the Enabling Act 
on the Federal Council were wisely conferred, and that the Federal Council 
can be trusted to exercise them with discretion.248   
 
The anticipation was that the ‘force of circumstances’ would ‘compel’ New South 
Wales to enter the Federal Council. This did not transpire and without the 
participation of New South Wales and South Australia, except for one session, the 
limited nature of the Council’s representation and its output afforded ‘plenty of 
matter for the scoffer.’249   
 
From a statistical point of view the productivity of the Federal Council was not 
overwhelming. In its fourteen-year existence the Council sat for only 42 days and 
produced only ten pieces of legislation.250 An additional detail, that elicits doubt 
over the extent of influence that the Federal Council exercised in the Imperial 
domain, was that of the eleven addresses made to the Queen only four received 
replies.251 ‘Ill-starred as the career of the Council may appear’ it did exercise a 
discernable influence directly and indirectly upon the federal cause.252  
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A repeatedly stated objective of the Federal Council was that it ‘would form a tie 
which did not now exist’.253 Despite the irregularity of the Council’s meetings and 
the disparaging synopsis of the Federal Council as only being ‘fruitful…of picnics 
for Premiers’, the interaction between the leading statesmen of the participating 
colonies was a functional and necessary contribution to the establishment and 
maintenance of intercolonial ties.254 Griffith’s biographer Roger Joyce argued that 
the main significance of the Federal Council for Griffith was that it kept him in close 
contact with the leaders of the other colonies.255 As a forum for advancing ‘matters 
of federal concern’ the Council served as a formative ground for federal action and 
from its ranks Griffith and Tasmania’s Andrew Inglis Clark emerged as two notable 
federalists.256 Griffith and Clark reproduced in detail a number of the legislative 
powers conferred on the Federal Council in their capacity as the principal authors 
of the draft 1891 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Bill.257  
 
The Federal Council, moreover, extended two distinctive though indirect 
contributions to the federal movement. First it confirmed the utility of the defence 
argument in generating colonial cooperation. The Brisbane Courier succinctly 
stated the ‘impulse given by the movement of foreigners in the Pacific carried the 
federal tide onward with such a rush that it seemed as if about to attain its object 
and complete the union of the colonies.’258 Second, it can feasibly be argued that 
‘the foundation stone of the Australian Dominion’ had been laid with the Federal 
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Council.259 An associated feature of the sustained criticism of the Federal 
Council’s ‘consumptive existence’ was the advocacy for, and the subsequent 
development of, a ‘grander movement’ for the complete federation of the 
Australian Colonies.260 South Australia’s entrance into the Federal Council for the 
February 1889 session, Deakin contended, was one instance of the Federal 
Council serving to ‘‘spur the sides of the intent’ of those outside its ranks’.261 In 
South Australia’s combination with the Council, New South Wales found itself 
isolated from the federal compact, which stimulated Parkes in particular ‘into fresh 
activity’.262 Under Parkes’ new federal directive the Federal Council was practically 
and historically relegated from the federal cause. To his mind, ‘the first movement 
worthy of the noble object of bringing all Australia under one National Government 
arose from my invitation in October 1889.’263   
 
At the commencement of 1883 the idea of Australian federation was, to the 
Queensland Punch, a topic worthy of parody:  
The Australian is nothing if not paradoxical, if we leave the parent colony 
out of it for a little bit. Ever since we cut the painter from New South Wales 
we have done nothing but celebrate Separation Days and spout nonsense 
about the roaring benefits that must prove necessarily attendant upon 
Federation. Botheration, is, to the intelligent outsider, the not very unnatural 
result.264 
 
Federation was quite clearly considered contrary to the preferred and entrenched 
pattern of colonial isolationism. If the federal cause was to advance from rhetoric 
to a practical consideration, it needed to countermand the zeal with which each of 
the Australian colonies revered and preserved their independence. Colonial 
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events, such as the railway union between New South Wales and Victoria in June 
1883 afforded the opportunity to symbolically represent and promote the federal 
objective. The rhetoric of these ‘festive’ events did however indicate that there 
existed a developing colonial interest in political federation. Yet the sentiment 
behind these ‘plausible platitudes’ on the federal idea was routinely abandoned 
under the pressure of local issues and the resurgence of intercolonial rivalry and 
jealousy.265 What was required to transcend these durable features of the 
Australian colonial experience, the colonies’ acknowledged, was ‘a favourable 
opportunity…for a decided effort in the cause of federation.’266  
 
This opportunity materialised the Imperial Government’s July 1883 repudiation of 
Queensland’s attempted annexation of New Guinea, in April to avert German 
occupation. Affronted by the Imperial Government’s, action Queensland’s Premier 
Sir Thomas McIlwraith sought redress and colonial support. Federative action was 
necessary, the Secretary of State for the Colonies Lord Derby argued ‘if the 
Australian colonies desired an extension of their territory’.267 McIlwraith took 
immediate steps to initiate this course of action and called for a Convention to 
consider the basis upon which a Federal Government could be constituted. 
Despite the varied responses from the colonies the Convention was convened in 
late November 1883, with the notable absence of McIlwraith who had been 
defeated on the prominent local political issue of the transcontinental railway 
scheme. Despite the durability of intercolonial tensions, the Convention achieved 
its principal objective in the establishment of some sort of permanent federal 
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organisation. Reflecting the unique character of this Convention was the 
declaration of the New Zealand Premier and delegate. Major H. A. Atkinson 
believed that whatever the result, the actual assemblage of all the Australasian 
colonies to consider the federal topic was significant enough for him to state ‘that 
the first beat of Australian life has been given’.268 Thus the December 1883 
colonial agreement to establish the Federal Council of Australasia, a legislative 
body sanctioned to ‘deal with a few simple issues only’, could be heralded as ‘the 
first stepping stone to a grand union of the various Colonies of Australia.’269 To 
combat colonial fears of any potential encroachment on the authority of their 
independent legislatures the federal beginning was deliberately modest, and the 
Federal Council was therefore a practical concession to the overarching 
individualism of the Australian colonies. Consequently, the subjects that the 
Federal Council could deal with were ‘few in number, and by no means 
important’.270 Although an ‘impotent body’, the historical significance of the Federal 
Council lay in the fact that the 1883 colonial compact to establish this modified 
federal body constituted the first concrete and practical advancement on the 
federal question after more than thirty years of rhetoric.271 To the Melbourne 
correspondent of the Sydney Morning Herald, the significance of the 1883 
achievement was such that he declared that ‘when the history of this epoch comes 
to be written, this first beginning of comprehensive Australian nationality will 
occupy several chapters.’272 Prevailing circumstances and subsequent events 
initiated the erosion of this expectation of historical significance. The most 
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insidious was the resurgence of the intercolonial hostilities between New South 
Wales and Victoria, which undermined the symbolism of the Federal Council 
achievement. A further testament to the strength of intercolonial frictions was the 
colonial inability to harness, through collaboration, the discontent invoked by 
Germany’s December 1884 annexation of northeastern New Guinea. The Argus 
expressed with regret in January 1885 that: 
Australia was not of one mind, was not zealous in the matter, and allowed 
local jealousies to interfere. We are still without federation, and, unless 
some minds in Australia change, may long remain without it.273 
 
The Federal Council of Australasia occupies a contradictory position. Its 
establishment did constitute as the Times asserted ‘an epoch in Australasian 
history’ but ‘its birth’ was ‘almost unnoticed’ by the general public.274 In 
acknowledgement of the existent conditions of the Australian colonial situation the 
Times concluded that ‘Australasian Federation has been born perhaps rather 
prematurely.’275 Divergent interests and the colonial disinclination to alter the 
paramount status of their local legislatures continued to impede the federal cause. 
Local or internal issues remained the priority of each colonial government. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Griffith’s Liberal Reforms 1883-1888: 
 ‘An entire revolution in the Government’.1  
 
In January 1886, when the Federal Council was set to convene for its inaugural 
meeting in Hobart, it was publicly acknowledged in Queensland that the federal 
idea had ‘so little hold on the mass of the people’.2 More particularly the motivating 
forces behind the establishment of the Federal Council and its procedural 
functions were ‘neither understood nor appreciated’.3 The cause of this state of 
affairs was not so much opposition to the federal ideal but the subtle and more 
potent force of indifference.4 Interest in the federal topic had, temporarily, been 
peaked in Queensland by the proceedings of the 1883 Federation Convention in 
Sydney. Appealing for Queenslanders had been the ‘credit’ conferred on the 
colony by the ‘honourable record’ of its new premier Samuel Griffith.5 This colonial 
pride however quickly receded under the pressure of local issues roused by 
Griffith’s ‘new track of progressive reform’.6 This peak and decline of interest 
typified two interconnected factors of the federal cause. First, that the advocates of 
federation were a limited collective of politicians who, under the influence of 
‘enthusiastic’ gatherings, were prone to indulge in the ‘usual gush and twaddle’ on 
the federal topic but were unable to convey or foster this sentiment in their own 
local arenas.7 Thus, as was evident in the Queensland context, the federal topic 
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had for the most part featured as a tangential consideration consistently 
marginalised by the more immediate and pressing matters of local concern. This 
dynamic was not confined solely to Queensland. George Dibbs8 contended that 
the reasoning for the contrast between New South Wales and Victoria’s federal 
enthusiasm was the difference in intensity of the demands of each colony’s 
domestic affairs:  
in Victoria they have not had so much concern with legislation on local 
affairs, they have had no exciting discussions on the land question, no large 
loans to float, no civil service bill to carry, nor a very large railway policy to 
develop…It is notorious that in Victoria there have been no home matters or 
politics of great moment to engage attention, that the Government…for 
want of exciting matters at home they go abroad for them.9  
 
Queensland’s local circumstances, in contrast to Victoria, had and continued to be 
‘pregnant with momentous events’.10 In line with this, reservations were voiced 
when it was believed that peripheral external matters were encroaching on local 
considerations. ‘The public hope,’ the editor of the Queensland Review George 
Craig appraised in mid-1886, was ‘that the Premier will not shelter himself too 
much behind the praiseworthy obligation of intercolonial and foreign duty’.11 While 
the Queensland press had ‘rendered noble service in…educating public opinion’ 
upon the federal subject, the weight of their reportage consistently reflected the 
primacy of local issues.12 Foremost amongst these issues, during 1883-1888 
period, were the reform of land legislation, economic and climatic factors, the 
coloured labour question, the resurgence of Northern separatism and working 
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class activism. That these dynamic issues had been a perennial feature of 
Queensland’s developmental record positions them as legitimate markers of 
Queensland’s social, economic and political context. The purpose of this chapter is 
to depict the matrix of local issues and associative elements that surfaced and 
preoccupied Queensland in the late 1880s and 1890s. Particularly pertinent to 
Queensland’s involvement in the federal movement was a tripartite intersection 
between the coloured labour question, the consolidation of white labour and the 
politicisation of Northern separatism. The composite effect of the political and 
social convergence of these matters was twofold. First, it formalised a distinctive 
and enduring set of Queensland issues that focused public and political attention 
locally and as a result influenced the Queensland response to the federal topic. 
Second, it fostered the formal elevation of racial homogeneity as a practical and 
motivational argument for federation. What in effect transpired was a simultaneous 
but adverse development, the intensification of both Queensland provincialism and 
the broader idea of colonial federation.  
 
Land policy reform, rail construction and the labour problem were, Griffith declared 
in the 1883 election campaign, the ‘questions of the gravest importance, upon 
which the future history of the colony, will in a great measure depend.’13 His 
success at this election and his resultant position as the ‘head of a new 
Government’ was to the pro-Liberal newspaper the Week just reward for Griffith’s 
‘years of steadfast, painstaking opposition’ and his ‘fidelity to the country’s 
interest’.14 Griffith’s intransigent determination and the obvious popularity of his 
policy platform essentially comprise the only semblance of similarity between his 
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political style and that of his rival McIlwraith.  
 
Griffith presents as a more enigmatic figure than McIlwraith, though his supporters 
were as equally loyal and praiseworthy. Yet, a notable feature of this praise was 
the lack of personable references. Griffith’s most outstanding quality it would seem 
was his work ethic. A contemporary of Griffith’s, T.S. Oswald noted that ‘He is as 
ornament of ability and hard work in any Ministry, and as such commands and 
deserves the respects of all writers and statesmen’.15 George Craig, though he 
opposed Griffith’s Government argued that:  
the worst enemy of Mr. Griffith cannot but admit his great energy, industry, 
hardihood, versatility, patience, administrative tact, love of ramble, general 
information and intelligence. He is capable of doing the work of six 
Ministers, of ruling the whole of Australia, of directing the military forces and 
commanding the Australian fleet, of gaining the ear of radical democracy; 
and it is no idle prophecy to state that he will soon be Sir Samuel Walker 
Griffith.16  
 
A corollary of Griffith’s ‘indomitable industry and perseverance’ was that even his 
supporters described his demeanour as being ‘cold and unsympathetic’.17 The 
Northern Miner maintained in November 1883 that Griffith had ‘improved in 
geniality and bonhomie’ particularly since his ‘trip to the North’.18 This trip the 
paper argued had ‘knocked the forensic starch out of him and developed several 
latent good points’.19 Alfred Deakin’s estimation of Griffith at the 1883 Federation 
Convention in Sydney counterbalances the Northern Miner’s depiction. Deakin 
portrayed Griffith as being ‘lean, ascetic, cold, clear, collected and 
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acidulated….[with a] sceptical and almost cynical manner.’20 Yet, contrary to this 
aspect of his personality Griffith’s supporters openly revered him. W. Kinnaird 
Rose’s memoir sketch of Griffith for the ‘Gallery of Eminent Australasians’ in Once 
a Month portrays this:  
A lawyer and statesman, he has already left his impress for good on the 
statute book of one of our largest colonies; he has inaugurated great 
political and social reforms….Speaking generally, he has like Mr. 
Gladstone, a high ideal of public duty, and cannot conceive the possibility of 
a divorce of ethics from politics….there is something to admire in the bold 
and heroic measures which he has taken to….As a Parliamentary tactician 
he has no equal in the Queensland legislature….His skill won for him the 
admiration, not alone of his followers, but of the Opposition; and we know of 
nothing finer in political warfare than Mr. Hume Black’s ungrudging 
testimony…to the consummate ability of the man….’We are all proud of 
him; Queensland is proud of him; Australia ought to be proud of him,” said 
Mr. Black….Mr. Griffith is a strong and commanding personalty, destined to 
attain to yet greater triumphs, and to sway in no inconsiderable degree the 
future of Australia.21   
 
Such high esteem was too excessive for an anonymous writer who declared in 
response to Rose’s article that ‘I object to set up a god in Brisbane.’22 Religious 
symbolism was a notable and recurrent feature of the tributes paid to Griffith. ‘One 
of the People’ in May 1888, after Griffith’s electoral defeat declared that: 
The hearts of thousands are with him, that the present disappointment rests 
heavily on them….They still look to him as the Saviour of the land for the 
people…[and] his followers still enthusiastically and trustfully believe in him 
and his grand ideas for Queensland....For myself I would rather be Sir 
Samuel, (a patriotic, unselfish, noble and gifted statesman for good) though 
fifty times defeated, than Sir Thomas McIlwraith though as many times 
elected.23  
 
The characterisation of McIlwraith as the ethical and political antithesis of Griffith, 
though strictly inaccurate, was an effective political device that gained currency in 
the social and political conflict that arose in the early 1880s. This ‘political warfare’ 
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was in response to McIlwraith’s Transcontinental Railway scheme and ‘Coolie’ 
labour proposal.24 Broadly stated, Queensland had reached a junction in its 
development in which the resilient model of economically expedient policies, to 
generate and maintain rapid progress, was increasingly under challenge by the 
Liberal/white labour alliance, primarily on the basis that such policies lacked social 
accountability. McIlwraith’s policies exemplified the Queensland maxim that 
progress and economic prosperity were synonymous and within this dynamic the 
creation of wealth through greater development was the principal objective.25 
Broader social considerations of the equitable distribution of wealth and racial 
exclusiveness were not specific concerns. Alternatively, McIlwraith’s opponents 
emphasised the prospective social impact of his policies. Griffith therefore argued 
that McIlwraith’s development policy was:  
to make big contracts, to create vast estates, to encourage the creation of 
great monopolies, to gamble with the resources of the colony, to introduce 
into the colony two classes of people only – great capitalists and poor 
labourers – and generally act as the high priest of the great god Mammon.26  
 
The proposed introduction of Indian ‘Coolie’ labour was advanced as the definitive 
example of McIlwraith’s disregard for the colony’s social welfare. The 
‘statesmanlike point of view’ Griffith argued: 
was to look a little forward and see what the consequences of adopting a 
given policy will be. We were told that if we introduce coolies from India we 
should develop the sugar interest and create enormous wealth….The 
question we had to ask ourselves was, What is to be the destiny of this 
country? How do you intend it to be inhabited? By white men or black?27  
 
The racial arguments advanced by Griffith, though criticised as being ‘nothing but 
claptrap’ to gain the popular vote, were an emotive and decisive factor in the 1883 
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election campaign.28 The urban electorates and the burgeoning pressure group of 
white labour were particularly receptive to Griffith’s Liberal platform of social 
progress. Griffith advocated progressive reform to furnish ‘the greatest good for 
the greatest number’ and to safeguard ‘Queensland as the inheritance of Europe, 
and not of Asia.’29 The 1883 election was consequently canvassed as a contest 
between the malevolence of McIlwraith’s economic policy and the benevolence of 
Griffith’s social policy.  
 
The electoral success of Griffith thus represented a significant shift away from 
economic prosperity being the principal gauge of Queensland’s progress. Griffith’s 
new Liberal Government commanded a two-thirds majority in the Legislative 
Assembly, ‘a majority never before possessed by any Premier in this colony.’30 
The convincing nature of Griffith’s triumph was optimistically portrayed as a sign 
that the ‘storms of the year have passed away, and…dawned…[was] a condition 
of political peace and commercial prosperity.’31 Contrary to this expectation the 
central pieces of Griffith’s progressive reforms, encapsulated and enacted in the 
1884 Crown Lands Act, and the 1885 Act to Further Amend the Pacific Island 
Labourers Act of 1880, and To Put a Limit to its Operation deepened old divisions 
and engendered new ones.  
 
‘By far the most important political question of the day’ it was declared at the end 
of 1883 was the ‘Land Question’.32 Queensland’s principal asset was and 
continued to be the land within its borders and thus land policy and economic 
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policies contingent on land policy remained an integral feature of Queensland’s 
politics. Embodied therefore in the kinds of initiatives introduced and the particular 
land management policies adopted were the political attitudes and ideological 
dispositions of each different government. Griffith had campaigned strongly 
against McIlwraith’s vision of national progress and had condensed McIlwraith’s 
policy of rapid development to one core principle that ‘there was nothing in the 
world but money’.33 Under this pretext McIlwraith’s administration, it was argued, 
had forced the pace of Queensland’s development too rapidly by providing the 
pastoral, sugar and mining industries with unlimited access to land. In contrast to 
McIlwraith’s essentially economic view that the best form of land use was simply 
the most profitable, Griffith’s new directive approached the land question from a 
socio-political perspective. Griffith pursued the Liberal ideal; in particular the 
broader social goal of a more equitable use of the colony’s major natural resource 
to encourage the development of small agricultural farms to foster closer 
settlement. This objective essentially mirrored the 1860s land policy developments 
of the southern colonies, euphemistically referred to as ‘unlocking the land’ from a 
pastoral monopoly.34 Charles Dutton, Minister for Lands in the new Liberal Cabinet 
was given the responsibility of drafting Queensland’s comprehensive bill to enact 
these Liberal ideals.  
 
Elected for the first time at the 1883 General Election, Dutton was aptly described 
as an ‘absolute novice in Parliamentary life’.35 Aside from his ‘beginner’ status, the 
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more intriguing aspect to Dutton’s appointment to the important land portfolio was 
that he was long-standing pastoralist and furthermore he represented the pastoral 
electorate of Leichhardt.36 As a pastoralist and a Liberal, Dutton was, as Bernays 
succinctly stated, ‘a most unusual product of the time’.37 His selection in Griffith’s 
Cabinet was initially ‘regarded as a concession’ to the squatters ‘who had thrown 
off their allegiance to Sir Thomas McIlwraith’ in protest to the Transcontinental 
Railway proposal and joined Griffith’s ranks in 1883.38 There also existed 
reservations that Dutton’s ‘sympathies and views’ were ‘not in harmony’ with 
Griffith’s and it was therefore believed that his influence in Griffith’s Ministry ‘will 
not be great, because, though he is in it, he is not of it.’39 The exact extent of the 
association between Dutton and Griffith is unclear but it is apparent they had 
developed some form of an association in the early 1880s.40 Dutton’s reputation 
was of ‘an able man, a thinker, and a theorist’ and Griffith believed him to be 
‘eminently qualified to deal with the Crown lands of the colony.’41 Various 
speeches by Dutton and Griffith had provided a ‘sketch’ of the key features of the 
new land act and had provoked by March 1884 ‘great expectations’ of the ‘radical 
reform in our land system’.42 Immense importance was placed on the forthcoming 
legislation, with the Northern Miner declaring that ‘the land question remained the 
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piece de resistance of the next session, the crux on which the fate of the present 
ministry depends.’43  
 
In a confidential memorandum to Griffith, Dutton outlined the main objectives of 
the ‘Crown Lands Bill 1884’:  
To prevent the monopoly of land by a few, to ensure the gradual extension 
of occupancy by holders of moderate areas, to bring occupancy of 
moderate areas within the reach of men with small capital, and to secure to 
every member of the community a participation in some portion of the 
increasing value of land – to which as a worker he must have contributed – 
the basis of all previous land legislation, alienation is now abolished.44  
 
The workings of the Crown Lands Act came into operation in April 1885.45 The 
central feature of the Act was the Government resumption, on the surrender or 
expiration of a pastoral lease, of up to a half of the land previously held under the 
lease.46 This ‘resumed’ part was then subdivided into blocks of 1,280 acres (512 
hectares) for ‘agricultural farms’ and 20,000 acres (8,094 hectares) for ‘grazing 
farms’.47 The lease arrangements for these two agricultural pursuits were fifty 
years for agricultural farms with the provision made for freehold purchase after ten 
years and for grazing farms a basic thirty-year lease. Occupancy and 
improvements were a mandatory condition for both leases; in particular fencing of 
the area was required within five years for an agricultural farm lease and within 
three years for a grazing lease.48 The main enterprise was to provide cheap land 
to encourage closer settlement through a more intensive, agricultural use of the 
land. Oscar de Satge presented the dynamics of the intended process: 
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Grazing farms pave the way, at no very distant date, for smaller holdings 
growing endless crops of wheat and maize; for the breaking up of the big 
stations now taking place to introduce the smaller lessee.49 
 
Acknowledging that pastoralism was and continued to be the most productive and 
profitable form of land use, the squatters were offered, in compensation, greater 
security of tenure over the ‘retained’ portion of their leases. The Brisbane Courier 
affirmed that ‘the theory that the squatter should be merely a temporary tenant, to 
be turned out as soon as the agriculturalist appeared on his land, has been 
abandoned.’50 Lease periods were set at fifteen years for pastoral leases in 
‘unsettled’ districts and ten years in ‘settled’ districts. Amendments to the Act in 
1886 extended, under certain conditions, the ‘unsettled’ lease to twenty-one 
years.51  
 
A second and pivotal objective of the Land Act was to significantly increase the 
colony’s income. The Act, it was claimed, was expected to stimulate an ‘immediate 
and unprecedented’ amount of land selection and this therefore would increase 
the number of rent payers.52 Second, the Act had introduced a higher rent charge 
for pastoral leases. Thus it was speculated that the projected income returns from 
the new level of land occupation would be sufficient to ‘relieve us from the 
necessity of raising public revenue by Customs duties or other forms of taxation.’53 
The estimated revenue to be generated from the Land Act, it was claimed, would 
be sufficient to offset the cost of the Government’s new public works program. Or 
more particularly it would cover the interest on the colony’s £10,000,000 loan. This 
                                                 
49
 De Satge, Pages from the Journal of a Queensland Squatter: 351. 
50
 ‘Editorial’, Brisbane Courier, 27 November 1884. 
51
 Bernays, Queensland Politics During Sixty (1859-1919) Years: 321, 323. 
52
 Dickson, Colonial Treasurer believed that it was ‘no unreasonable thing to imagine’ that 600 grazing farms 
of 10,000 acres each would be taken up in the first year, yielding, at the statutory minimum rent of 1½d. per 
acre, £37, 500 per annum. Agricultural selection it was estimated would yield at 3d. per acre £8, 000 per 
annum. Under the new rent level pastoral leases would contribute an extra £100, 000 per annum. Dickson 
cited in ‘Crown Lands Bill’, 27 August 1884, QPD, 43 (1884): 450. 
266 
loan represented Queensland’s largest to date and had been raised at the end of 
1884 to fund, primarily, an ‘immense’ government directed and financed program 
of railway construction.54 The financial policy of the Liberal Government was 
therefore inextricably bound up with its land policy. 
 
Hinging on each government’s approach to the land question was its economic 
and political survival. The projected overall increase in revenue derived from the 
Land Act did not materialise and as a result serious difficulties subsequently arose 
in the repayment of Griffith’s railway development loans.55 The colony’s financial 
position was further exacerbated by the negative impact of a continuing drought in 
which the pastoral sector ‘suffered most severely’.56 The reduction in productivity 
and profitability of this industry was a major economic concern as pastoralism 
continued to be the basis upon which ‘very largely depends the welfare of the 
colony.’57 In this worsening economic environment the critics began to bewail 
Griffith’s ‘Radical, if not Communistic’ land reform policy.58 Albert Wright was 
particularly critical of the idea of closer settlement: 
Could anything be more opportune than the present series of droughts in 
exposing the folly and fallacy of the prevailing craze for “close 
settlement”.…it should be sufficiently plain to all who have lived during the 
last three years in the Leichhardt and Western districts that cultivation will 
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entail ruin on all who are dependent on it, and grazing on the scale provided 
for by the Land Bill, except perhaps in particularly favoured spots, and 
where land is suitable for sheep, will be found to be the greatest delusion 
ever indulged in by the “great Liberal party”.59 
 
The serious economic repercussions of Griffith’s ‘rash and lavish policy’ were a 
significant contributor to the retraction of the boom conditions that had prevailed 
under McIlwraith’s directorship. By late 1885 the colony was under the negative 
effect of an economic recession.60 A deficit of £99,197 was recorded in August 
1885; by 1886 this figure had doubled to £221,865 and in the following year 
amounted to £455,885.61 Unemployment became widespread throughout the 
colony. As early as September 1885 it was reported that ‘the scarcity of 
employment now in the North is simply deplorable.’62 In December 1883 the 
Queenslander had commented that there existed ‘no need for any such extreme 
measure’ as ‘relief works’ for the unemployed.63 By June 1886, the extent of the 
downturn in employment was reflected in the Government’s establishment of a 
Relief Board in Brisbane to aid those in distress.64 As economic conditions 
deteriorated Griffith’s opponents began to emphasise the ‘very marked difference 
between the financial policy’ of his Government and that of McIlwraith’s.65 A 
difference it was argued that was bound ‘very materially to affect the prosperity of 
the colony both in the present and in the future.’66 What the people wanted, 
‘Financier’ declared, was not ‘Radicalism…but the sturdy progression of a 
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McIlwraith.’67 To direct public attention to the economic failure of Griffith’s socio-
political approach and highlight the necessity of returning to the proven economic 
policies of McIlwraith was the underlying motive of George Craig’s mid-1886 
article: 
It is not my latest wish to stand aside much longer and allow demagogues 
to misdirect the destiny of Queensland in the future. It appears to me that 
social or ultra-radical democrats have become a power in the colony….Mr. 
Griffith is the idol of the hour seated upon the peacock throne….Instead of a 
bold, vigorous, and progressive policy, the Government, apart from the 
untold effects of drought, have plunged the colony into a state of industrial 
and commercial coma, and made it stink in the exchanges of Sydney, 
London, and Melbourne.68 
 
In an attempt to redress the miscalculation on the financial effect of the Crowns 
Land Act and to counter the fall in productivity brought about by the ‘severity of the 
drought’ Griffith’s administration was forced to break with its pledge that public 
revenue would not be raised through new ‘Customs duties or other forms of 
taxation’.69 In September 1885 an ad valorem charge of 5 per cent was introduced 
for beer, spirits and mining and agricultural machinery, products previously 
imported free of charge.70 This new form of taxation presented McIlwraith with an 
opportunity to deride the Government:  
Extravagance in the South had made it necessary to find more revenue, 
and a tax had been put on the handiest article imported…beer (which was 
chiefly drunk by the working classes)….the Government were in want of 
funds, and taxed whisky, beer, and machinery. This, he thought, showed 
not only want of imagination, but want of knowledge, and of an interest in 
the great industries of the colony which must be condemned by the electors 
of both North and South Queensland.71   
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McIlwraith’s specific reference to the working class was a tacit acknowledgment of 
this sectors significant support of Griffith’s administration but at this point in time 
such criticism ‘fell without effect.’72  
 
 
THE WORKING MAN’S FRIEND! 
S― G― (to the Queensland Working Man.) “Here, Mr. Honest Sweat, you seem a 
fine lusty fellow; you shall carry this load as well, for my friend Landed Property, Esq. 
Another £90,000 a year wont hurt you!” 
 
Figure 5.1:  Queensland Punch and Figaro, 5 September 1885 
 
Griffith had retained, despite the current state of ‘gloom…and adversity’, his strong 
Ministerial majority and popular appeal.73 This contrasted sharply with McIlwraith’s 
position. The ailing leader of the Opposition was portrayed as ‘the head of small 
minority in our present legislature’ and his diminished authority was such that ‘he 
could not get a man a billet as a gatekeeper on a Government Railway at 
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present.’74 Economic factors did progressively erode the public’s confidence in 
Griffith but at the end of 1885 they were masked by the social and political focus 
on the ‘deliverance of Queensland from the disgrace and ignominy of real 
slavery’.75  
 
The question of coloured labour was one of the most controversial and enduring 
matters in Queensland politics. During the 1883 electoral campaign one of the 
‘great war cries’ was ‘Queensland for Europeans’.76 Griffith had campaigned 
strongly on the anti-Coolie anti-coloured labour platform and asked the electorate 
to grant his party the opportunity ‘to set ourselves resolutely to work to see that 
this should be a white country’.77 Griffith was ostensibly adopting a ‘decided stand’ 
on the question of coloured labour.78 Yet, an indeterminable feature of this stance 
was whether it was based on conviction or simply a political issue that offered ‘a 
short cut to office’.79 There did exist sufficient indicators to support the claim that 
he was a ‘political juggler’.80 J. Hamilton outlined in a debate on the Indian 
Immigration Bill in November 1882, that he had examined all of Griffith’s speeches 
on the subject of coloured labour and ‘on no occasion had the leader of the 
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opposition [Griffith] advocated the total exclusion of black labour’.81 The 
Queenslander commented in July 1883 that ‘no living man can glean from Mr. 
Griffith’s declarations in respect of coloured labour anything on which to base a 
settled policy.’82 Broadly stated, it would seem that Griffith throughout his political 
career presented a pragmatic flexibility on the coloured labour question, an 
adaptability that was essentially guided by populist and economic factors.83 Prior 
to mid-1883 Griffith had been in essence an advocate for tighter regulatory control 
over the labour trade.  
 
Griffith’s election manifesto, published in August 1883, laid emphasis on the 
‘gravity and difficulty of the labour question’.84 Griffith employed conventional 
racialist arguments to depict the negative social ramifications of coloured labour 
and though he did not overtly declare an abolitionist platform the language he 
used led reasonably to that inference.85 In an election speech in Brisbane in mid-
August Griffith declared that:  
The kanakas had contributed to the development of the sugar industry, and 
it would be unfair to say they should suddenly be stopped; but it must be 
understood that they are not to be the labour of the future….We had seen 
how there had grown up a strong vested interest in kanakas, which could 
only be cut down by degrees and by affirming at the earliest possible 
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moment that the labour of the future is to be white and not black.86  
 
The Queenslander in response queried: ‘Does he seriously mean what he said, 
that he would have no coloured labour in this colony in the future’.87 The more 
potent racialist arguments employed in Griffith’s platform dealt with the 
controversial question of ‘Coolie’ labour. Invoked with effect were the subjective 
arguments that engendered and reflected the colonial fear of Asia that of being 
numerically overwhelmed in conjunction with the broader threat of disease. Griffith 
thus declared that ‘he dreaded coolies’ because there ‘were unlimited numbers of 
them’ and predicted that if ‘Coolie’ labour was introduced ‘we should have 
1,000,000 coolies in the colony in a short time’ and ‘deadly Asiatic diseases…with 
them’.88 In this environment the ‘white population’ Griffith argued would ‘sooner or 
later give place’.89 To avert this alarming prospect a Liberal administration would 
‘at once’ introduce preventative legislation.90 Griffith, it was argued ‘found it 
pleasanter, and from an electioneering point of view more profitable, to swim with 
the popular current.’91 A political opportunist was how his opponents perceived him 
but arguably as a candidate endeavouring to form government it would seem 
illogical for Griffith not to harness the evident anxieties of the public.  
 
The public’s protest against McIlwraith’s proposed introduction of Indian ‘Coolies’ 
had been widespread and organised, with Anti-Coolie Leagues established 
throughout the colony. The entanglement of the Pacific Island labour question with 
McIlwraith’s 1883 ‘extraordinary undertaking’ in New Guinea crystallised 
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opposition, in the south in particular, against the continuation of any form of 
coloured labour.92 The New Guinea incident had furthermore added a new 
dimension to the existent economic and social contamination fears. The attempted 
annexation of New Guinea had prompted an intense public scrutiny of 
Queensland’s Indigenous and coloured labour policies. The composite effect of 
the public denouncement of Queensland by humanitarian and religious bodies and 
the Imperial Government’s refusal to sanction the annexation on the basis of ‘the 
difficulties…in connexion with the labour traffic’ was that coloured labour was seen 
in the public and political domain to have cast a ‘foul stain…on the fair fame of 
Queensland’.93 To remove this indignity emerged as a compelling argument 
against the colony’s continued reliance on a coloured labour force. The Colonial 
Office noted in early 1884 that ‘there have been traces lately that the 
“stigma”…cast upon the Colony has done good rather than harm.’94 Existent 
urban-based campaigns against coloured labour were stepped up in response to 
the events surrounding New Guinea and abolition became an imperative ‘for the 
sake of the honour of Queensland’.95 The extent of popular feeling garnered 
against coloured labour by the controversies of 1883 was such that even the pro-
McIlwraith and planter newspaper the Queenslander conceded that:  
The Pacific labour trade is doomed. We have done what we could to purify 
it and failed. It cannot be made pure except by the maintenance of 
conditions so stringent that they must kill it. If we ourselves do not put a 
stop to the traffic we may be sure that, sooner or later, the Imperial 
Government will intervene, and its intervention will have the sympathy of all 
our Australian neighbours.96 
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The labour reforms outlined in Griffith’s platform, whether based on principle or 
expediency, were acknowledged as being ‘instrumental’ in the Liberal party’s 
attainment of its ‘very large majority’ in parliament.97 Moreover, it was claimed that 
‘the grand verdict of the polling booths’ had provided Griffith with the mandate for 
abolition.98  
 
On the accession of his Government Griffith immediately directed his attention to 
the prompt resolution of the ‘Coolie’ labour issue. In the first few weeks of his 
administration, Griffith officially terminated the negotiations between Queensland 
and the Indian Government for the introduction of Indian ‘Coolies’.99 Second, he 
undertook to repeal the 1862 Indian Immigration Act. The Legislative Council 
blocked this endeavour, but Griffith’s determination to fulfil his electoral promises 
was apparent.100 The Northern Miner an overtly working class and racial 
newspaper rejoiced at Griffith’s action. Griffith, the paper figuratively declared, was 
plucking out the ‘rotten material’ and laying down ‘a solid and enduring foundation 
of white marble to endure for ages’.101  
 
The second and more prominent facet of Griffith’s labour policy addressed the 
question of Pacific Island labour. A Bill to amend the 1880 Pacific Island Labourers 
Act was introduced in January 1884. The central tenet of this Bill was to restrict the 
employment of Pacific Islanders to ‘field work’ in the cultivation of sugar cane, 
cotton, tea, coffee, rice and spices, or other forms of tropical or semi-tropical 
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production.102 Griffith argued that much of the opposition to coloured labour had 
arisen from the fact that this cheaper form of labour had been employed in areas 
that brought them into competition with white workers.103 In the Legislative Council 
it was questioned whether ‘the superior Chamber’ should pass a Bill that was a 
politically expedient measure on behalf of the new Government.104 Griffith 
acknowledged that the Bill was ‘a modus vivendi to meet present conditions…an 
attempt to mitigate’ white labour’s concerns over economic competition.105 He 
further emphasised that the underlying reasoning for his action was that ‘every 
kanaka engaged in these occupations is displacing a white man.’106 Griffith had 
actively garnered working class support and it had contributed significantly to his 
electoral success. The pace at which the Bill was introduced and the fact that 
Griffith stressed that it was not the ‘final settlement’ of the issue, did reflect a 
pressing need to mollify the vocal concerns of a significant sector of his political 
supporters.107 Legislative action on the ‘Kanaka’ question was promptly followed 
with further restrictions on the Chinese, perceived as the more contemptible threat 
to white labour. The Northern Miner succinctly declared that the purpose of the 
amendments to the Chinese Immigrants Regulation Act was ‘to screw down the 
Chinese’.108 While these measures were generally described as ‘bold and heroic’, 
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the developing white labour pressure group categorised them as moderate 
reforms and accordingly continued to press for more radical policies from the 
Liberal Government.109 Yet they were sufficient, the Northern Miner asserted, to 
‘prove to the people of England that Queensland is determined to wipe away the 
black spot on her escutcheon and no longer submit to be called a slave colony.’110  
 
The ‘disgrace’ of slavery was however promptly reinstated in 1884 when a series 
of allegations surfaced against the labour trade. What was revealed through these 
indictments was the extent to which Queensland’s labour vessels had employed 
nefarious methods to secure recruits from New Guinea’s waters in 1883 and 
1884.111 The ‘prejudice of the public mind’ against the continued maintenance of 
‘Kanaka’ labour was as a consequence further provoked and this again 
reinvigorated community appeals for abolition.112  
 
In mid-December 1883, Reverend James Chalmers, a missionary stationed in 
New Guinea, forewarned in a letter to the Brisbane Courier that abuses had 
occurred:  
From time to time we see the labour question commented on in your 
columns, and are much interested to notice that of late your influence 
seems to go against the “iniquitous” kanaka labour traffic. I use the word 
“iniquitous” advisedly, and when facts that will soon be published, or 
perhaps laid before the home officials, are read by you, you too, I doubt not, 
will use the same word. That your Mr. Griffith should in the least 
countenance it is to us astonishing and unexplainable. Is it possible that he 
can quietly endure having his country spoken of as a nigger establishment, 
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and his compatriots as slaveholders. It is said, and is, I believe, going to be 
proved, that a large majority of your kanakas have been stolen.113 
 
In early 1883 an intensive recruitment campaign by Queensland labour vessels 
had been instigated by the success of the Fijian recruiting vessel Lord of the Isles 
in the Bismarck Archipelago. Fourteen of the subsequent thirty-two voyages 
undertaken by Queensland labour vessels in this region were investigated.114 The 
disclosure of the extent to which recruiters had used ‘cruelly deceptive and 
altogether illegal’ methods resulted in several criminal prosecutions and the 
establishment of a full-scale government investigation.115  
 
Criminal charges were brought forward against several personal on a number of 
vessels but the ‘murderous atrocities’ that occurred on board the Hopeful’s May to 
July 1884 voyage became the most infamous.116 In early December 1884 the 
Hopeful’s recruiting agent, Neil McNeil, and the boatswain Barnard Williams were 
convicted of murder and sentenced to death to be carried into effect on the 29th 
December.117 This was an extraordinary event and the conviction came ‘with a 
shock on the community’ and prompted ‘widespread and earnest agitation’ over 
the severity of the sentences.118 Well-attended public meetings sought ways ‘to 
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obtain mitigation of the sentences of death’.119 Within one week, twenty-two 
petitions were submitted, some signed by thousands, and each appealed to the 
Governor to ‘extend his prerogative of mercy’.120 The extent of this action was not 
reflective of any change in tact on the coloured labour question quite the contrary it 
presented through these forums a clear expression of the public’s opposition. 
Petitioners, and speakers at the various public meetings, identified themselves as 
opponents to the labour trade and further declared that they were ‘horrified and 
disgusted by the atrocities’ and felt ‘keenly the disgrace inflicted thereby on the 
colony’ and were in sympathy with the ‘Government vindicating the honour of 
Queensland’.121 In the appeal for mercy one line of reasoning was repeatedly 
advanced. The guilt of the two men was generally accepted but it was argued that 
they were ‘victims of an accursed system’, that had operated under the authority 
and with the support of each Government throughout its twenty year existence.122 
More particularly under Government sanction the crimes of kidnapping and 
murder, which the two had been convicted of, had been ‘winked at in the past.’123 
It was therefore argued that the two should not be executed because of 
Queensland’s past policy, for in effect ‘from the Governor down to the most 
humble individual they were all guilty of the crime.’124 In this emotive atmosphere 
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the Executive Council reconvened on the 23rd December to reconsider the 
sentences. Griffith was opposed to reducing the sentences but by a majority of 6 
to 2 execution was commuted to life imprisonment.125  
 
As a direct result of the extent of the atrocities detailed in the various criminal 
trials, Griffith appointed in December 1884 a Royal Commission to further inquire 
into the circumstances under which island labourers had been introduced into 
Queensland.126 The Commission’s report, handed down in May 1885, not 
surprisingly condemned the recruiting methods used on all the voyages 
investigated.127 Though the report made no specific recommendations a series of 
actions were instituted in response to it.128 Those identified as being directly 
involved in illegal or questionable practices were dismissed and debarred from 
future employment in the labour trade. A permanent embargo on recruitment in the 
New Guinea region was applied and in June and July 1885, 404 of the 625 
Islanders recruited by the labour vessels investigated by the Commission were 
repatriated.129 The most significant action to emerge from this ‘record of brutality of 
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the worst possible kind, of simple indifference to human life and human suffering in 
the pursuit of unhallowed gain’ was the enactment of legislation in November 1885 
that set the timeframe for the termination of the labour trade.130  
 
The recruitment scandals that unfolded during 1884 and the wide-ranging publicity 
given to them did provide the most compelling argument for the abolition of the 
labour trade. Yet, it is apparent that Griffith had begun to formulate this measure 
before the extent of the abuses was known. In February 1884 Griffith made his 
first direct reference to the possibility of abolition. He informed Governor Musgrave 
that if the regulations introduced by the government, to ensure that no license was 
issued to a vessel unless the master and crew including the recruiting agent were 
approved by the government, ‘are unavailing I think that it will be imperative for the 
honour of the Colony to refuse to grant any licenses to labour vessels.’131 
Fundamentally, Griffith was still promoting a regulatory approach rather than 
abolition. In May, as indictments against the labour trade were beginning to 
emerge, Griffith refined his position:  
This government is deeply sensible of the scandal that has been brought 
upon this Colony and the British flag by the want of due supervision of the 
Pacific labour trade, and is firmly resolved that if their endeavours to 
remove the cause of the scandal prove ineffectual no alternative will be left 
but to put an end to the trade itself.132 
 
Though Griffith evidently continued to hope that stricter regulations would avert the 
necessity to terminate the trade his intention was clear. The impetus for a 
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definitive solution was undoubtedly the public and political reaction to ‘all the 
abominations and horrors of this slave trade’.133 Entwined in the public protests on 
the ‘undue severity’ of the sentences imposed on the Hopeful men in December 
1884 was a public acknowledgement that the cases had created a 
‘prevailing…feeling of gratitude that these things were likely to be put to a stop.’134 
By January 1885, it was apparent to W. T. Wawn, the Captain of the labour vessel 
the Lizzie, that Griffith’s protestations and determination to stamp out abuses in 
the labour trade were the precursors to his real objective of ‘stopping it 
altogether’.135 The proceedings and the May report of the Royal Commission had 
‘exposed before the world so completely’ the ‘evil’ entailed in the labour trade and 
this to all intents and purposes prevented any ‘justification for its continuance.’136  
 
In October 1885, on the introduction of the bill ‘To Further Amend the Pacific 
Island Labourers Act of 1880, and to put a Limit to its Operation’ Griffith declared 
with confidence that the Bill’s intent had both political and public endorsement.137 
The limited opposition to the Bill, particularly to Clause 14, which contained a 
‘matter of very considerable importance’, substantiated his contention.138 Clause 
14 decreed that after 31st December 1890 no licences would be granted for the 
recruitment and introduction of Islander labour into the colony: ‘black labour was to 
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come to an end.’139 The sugar industry was effectively granted, Griffith argued, an 
eight-year ‘breathing time’ to secure with government assistance an alternative but 
acceptable source of labour from Europe.140 Northern representatives argued that 
the Bill would ‘be the last straw on the camel’s back….it will be the death knell of 
this lingering [sugar] industry.’141 Such practical or economic considerations were 
however overridden by the Bill’s social objective. Thus, Thomas McIlwraith though 
he did not believe that North Queensland’s sugar industry could be carried on 
successfully without ‘black labour’ conceded that he would support the Bill 
‘because the colony could not go on creditably before the world and continue the 
South Sea Island traffic.’142 The necessity and determination to ‘purify’ 
Queensland of ‘the evil odour and bad fame’ that its coloured labour policy had 
brought on the colony ‘throughout the world’ had been a recurrent and decisive 
feature of the political and popular debate on the issue.143 The permanent solution, 
presented in this Bill, outwardly fulfilled this purifying function.  
 
A notable feature of this debate, beyond the remarkable ease with which this 
radical measure was adopted, was that no reference was made to the agitation for 
the territorial separation of Northern Queensland into a self-governing colony. In 
the Queensland context at this time the question of separation was a much 
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publicised and controversial issue that had been provocatively tied to the coloured 
labour question. In April 1885, Griffith in an official letter to Governor Musgrave 
had categorised the Northern separation campaign as a planter-based agitation 
designed solely to circumvent his new coloured labour restrictions.144 The 
contentiousness of this theory had the effect of altering the entire complexion of 
these two local issues. Moreover, the volatility of the local debate on separation 
would contribute significantly to a persuasive national and racialist argument for 
federation and at the same time established an enduring local force that would 
significantly influence Queensland’s involvement in the federal movement.  
 
Figure 5.2:  Queensland Punch and Figaro, 27 February 1886 
 
At intermittent periods throughout the 1860s and 1870s separatist agitation had 
essentially been a barometer of the central and northern regions discontent with 
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the administrative policies of the Brisbane-based government. The manner in 
which public works expenditure was regionally distributed was the fundamental 
irritant. In the northern and central regions of the colony it was repeatedly argued 
that the south was consistently and prejudicially apportioned the bulk of the public 
revenue. Bowen’s Port Denison Times therefore argued that: 
‘We have been and are politically tyrannised over and robbed by 
Brisbane…our position has resembled that of the outlying provinces of the 
early Roman Empire, which were left to the tender mercies of needy pro-
consuls.’145 
 
The pattern of government action that had emerged in response to these early 
manifestations of separatist sentiment was generally a nominal attempt to placate 
them through partial concessions. This did not address the issue of regionalism 
and served only to demonstrate that separatist agitation proved an effective lever 
to extract concessions from parliament. Fiscal concerns by the 1880s were no 
longer the main concern. Separatism in the northern portion of the colony emerged 
as a symptomatic expression of two interconnected factors. First, the different 
stage of economic and social development in the region and second as a 
consequence of this there emerged a growing divide between the regions principal 
economic and social interests and that of the south. The basis therefore of the 
northern regions concerns was their belief that the south, through their numeric 
dominance in the Parliament, had and continued to impede the progress of the 
north by consistently relegating their needs and interests as secondary to the 
south’s. In July 1882 the Member for Mackay, Maurice Hume Black declared in 
Parliament that  
he would be the last to hope for a difference of interests between North and 
South. As long as they remained one, he believed Queensland was 
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destined to become the greatest of the Australian colonies….At the same 
time, should the time ever come when it would be necessary for the 
protection of the rights of the North that it should separate, the North would 
have nothing to lose, and the South everything.146  
 
The formation of an official representative body, the Northern Separation League, 
in Townsville in July 1882 confirmed an intensification of the North’s general 
discontent with the Brisbane-based Government’s administration of their region. A 
fundamental but problematic feature of the League’s initial structure was its 
intention to be a cohesive non-partisan organisation. The concerns and aims of 
the north, it was argued, cut across party politics. But in the politically volatile 
environment engendered in 1882/83 by McIlwraith’s Transcontinental Railway and 
‘Coolie’ labour proposals such party neutrality could not be maintained and as a 
result the League’s organisers suspended activities.147 Separatist action was 
‘revived with vigour’ in September 1884 with Separation Leagues formed in twelve 
of the North’s principal towns.148 The grievances outlined at these initial meetings 
did not tender one particular compelling issue but rather a conglomerate of 
matters. These ranged from the local discontent over the region’s lack of 
parliamentary representation, the unfair allocation of public works particularly 
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railways or the more specific antagonisms of the economic impact of the Crowns 
Land Act and the ad valorem duty on machinery.149 The question of coloured 
labour did factor amongst these irritants but it was not the foundational basis for 
the movement. It featured as one of the many grievances held against the 
southern government. Moreover, its influence was of a diverse nature. Thus 
Townsville’s North Queensland Bulletin argued in August 1884 that Griffith’s 
labour policy would ‘hasten Separation, by binding Northern centres of population 
together to protect themselves against being robbed of their right to develop the 
natural wealth of North Queensland.’150 Townsville was the headquarters of the 
separatist cause and its economic basis was not dependent upon the sugar 
industry. Furthermore, many of its Committee members were vehemently opposed 
to coloured labour. The premise that was being advanced by the North 
Queensland Bulletin and one that was repeatedly expounded, was that the North 
under the current system of governance was at the ‘mercy of an unvarying 
sectional majority’ primarily composed of southern members.151 With eight 
northern members in the Legislative Assembly’s total of fifty-five, the North argued 
that: 
with all the apparent freedom and power of what the Premier calls 
“Constitutional Government,” they have left to them not the slightest real 
control over their own political affairs, their public loans, or other public 
works…for almost all practical purposes they might as well leave their 
electoral right unemployed.152  
 
The legislative enactment of Griffith’s labour policy was an extraordinary but 
representative example, the North argued, of how the South’s ‘overwhelming 
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preponderance in numbers’ imposed policies that were detrimental to their 
‘industrial progress.’153 Griffith’s reforms brought the separatist issue ‘to a head’ for 
it manifestly demonstrated the ‘entirely diverse interests of tropical and sub-
tropical Queensland’.154  
 
To the sugar industry in particular, Griffith’s restrictive labour policy was a 
compounding problem for an industry already in difficulty. Under the mounting 
pressure of ‘three bad seasons in succession’, a fall in world sugar prices, 
increased competition from cheaper imports from China and Java, and a ‘most 
critical and alarming’ shortage of labour, the planters believed Griffith’s policy was 
an unmitigated harassment of a valuable industry at a time when government 
assistance was required.155 The prevailing belief was that the sugar industry was 
‘on the verge of ruin’ and within this context separation was canvassed as an 
‘antidote’ to forestall the industry’s ‘utter disintegration’.156 Griffith’s ‘nasty jar’ 
prompted the sugar planters to support the separatist cause and its objective of 
establishing a ‘completely new regime’ in the North.157 The planter’s support was 
however both beneficial and problematic for the separation movement.  
 
As the principal industry in the North, sugar cultivation contributed significantly to 
the region’s prosperity. The attachment of the planters’ to the separatist cause did 
strengthen the authority of the campaign numerically and collaboratively. Beyond 
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the direct economic repercussions on the sugar industry from Griffith’s so-called 
‘harassing’ and ‘strangling’ policies, there were associated economic implications 
for the mercantile and service centres that were directly and indirectly reliant on 
the sugar industry.158 The spread of unemployment, the reduction in wage levels 
and the generalised commercial depression in the North intensified the resentment 
towards Griffith’s administration and associatively garnered support for separation 
from ‘every class and industry in the North’.159 To this diverse collective, which 
included leading merchants, traders, professional men, tradesmen, artisans, 
property owners and clergymen, the coloured labour question was not the specific 
concern but rather the broader economic and regional factors reflected in Griffith’s 
action on the ‘Coolie’ and coloured labour question.160 Fundamentally, that it 
represented ‘a sample of the fetters of all kinds which compulsory union with the 
south imposes on their progress.’161 In the context therefore of an economic 
downturn in the sugar industry Griffith’s labour policy, as the separation historian 
Christine Doran argued, ‘affected the timing, not the substance, of the separation 
case.’162 The involvement of the planters in the movement did afford it the 
opportunity to present a powerful and coordinated case for separation yet, 
alternatively, it laid the cause open to the charge that separation ‘was a thinly 
disguised design for the introduction of coloured labour.’163  
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In January 1885, the London-based J. E. Davidson, a former planter for twenty 
years in the Mackay district, and J.B. Lawes wrote to Lord Derby to express their 
‘sympathy with the present movement for the separation of the Northern, or 
tropical, from the Southern, or temperate portion of the Colony’.164 This essentially 
private letter, unconnected with the Separation League, was the main source from 
which Griffith extracted the damaging allegation that the want of coloured labour 
was the fundamental reason for the planter initiated separatist action. Lord Derby 
had forwarded this letter to Griffith for his ‘observations upon the statements and 
arguments’ and Griffith’s lengthy April 1885 reply, published in the Brisbane 
Courier and the London Times, activated a fierce and enduring debate on the 
separatist issue.165 It is evident that Griffith had formed his opinion on the 
motivations behind the separatist agitation prior to this letter and had merely 
harnessed the opportunity to officially discredit the movement. In a later statement 
Griffith referred to a petition that had been presented to Parliament in October 
1884.166 The sole request of this petition, signed by 1574 northerners, was for the 
Indian Immigration Act to be amended so it could be ‘put into practical working 
form’ to ‘remedy’ the sugar industry’s labour problem.167 The Davidson and Lawes 
letter, Griffith purported, ‘backed up’ this petition in London.168  
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Davidson and Lawes had presented three ‘principal reasons in favour of 
separation’ one of which was the ‘absolute diversity of interests’ between the south 
and the north ‘on the subject of coloured labour.’169 They contended that ‘coloured 
labour was absolutely necessary for tropical agriculture’ and that this form of 
labour had been denied ‘by the representatives of the South’ to the detriment of 
the North-based sugar industry.170 Griffith’s ‘observations’ on this letter focused 
on:  
the question of coloured labour, which I infer to be the main ground of their 
action. I suppose indeed that there are few persons in the colony who have 
not been aware from the first that the present agitation originated with the 
planters of Mackay, who have been disappointed in their desire to secure 
the introduction of coolies from India. Much care has, however been taken 
to conceal this aspect of the question; for there can be little doubt that if it 
were put forward openly as the ground for advocating Separation, the 
movement would almost immediately collapse….The ‘planters’ party’….now 
ask for self-government in Northern Queensland, that they may have the 
opportunity of introducing another kind of coloured labour under conditions 
to be fixed by themselves.171  
 
Griffith, it was argued, had ‘resorted to a deliberate system of 
misrepresentation…to do incalculable harm in misleading and deceiving the 
population of the country to the real issue at stake between the North and 
South.’172 Griffith’s action was considered of ‘so grave a character’ that a public 
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and prolific letter writing campaign was commenced to ‘refute and hurl back the 
misstatements in his teeth’.173 
 
In a letter to Governor Musgrave, the Council of the Northern Separation League 
repudiated in detail Griffith’s ‘designing and disingenuous innuendos’.174 
Displaying their obvious animosity towards Griffith the Council challenged the 
proposition of a concealed motive: 
The main assumption in his letter is that almost everyone in the Colony has 
been aware from the first that the main object of the movement was to 
obtain coolie labour; the second, that if that object were put forward openly 
the movement would collapse; the inference is drawn that, therefore, it was 
concealed. But how can that be concealed of which almost everyone is 
aware? And if the movement, so far from collapsing, is growing stronger 
day by day – as it is, – one of two conclusions is inevitable: either the 
people of the North, with full knowledge that coolie labour is the ultimate 
object of that movement, nevertheless support it, and inferentially, coolie 
labour in the bargain; or that they believe its advocates to mean what they 
say, and decline to suspect them of designs repeatedly denied in every 
possible form of contradiction.175 
 
To counter the specific contention that the present movement was initiated and 
financed by the ‘planting party’ a group of twenty Mackay planters wrote to Lord 
Derby in May 1885 and declared ‘that the charge so insinuated by Mr. Griffith we 
empathetically deny’.176 Furthermore, they stressed that they would not ‘allow 
ourselves to be made the political stalking-horses from which to attack the 
movement for Separation, believing, as we do, that the movement rests on other 
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and more substantial grounds’.177 Support for separation in the North had as a 
result of this controversy ‘gained ground enormously’.178 This factor and the 
veracity of the claims that separation was being advocated by ‘the whole people 
and not by a section only’ was most forcefully demonstrated in June 1886. 
Submitted to A.H. Palmer, Queensland’s acting-governor, was a ‘monster petition’ 
appealing for separation that was 620 feet long and signed by 10,006 of the 
11,800 names on the North’s electoral roll.179 The petition based its appeal for 
territorial separation on four grounds, the misappropriation of revenues and loans, 
the inadequacy of representation, a diversity of interests, and the remoteness of 
the seat of government.180 The fundamental basis of these arguments bore a 
striking similarity to those advanced by the Moreton Bay District in their 1850s 
case for separation from New South Wales.181 Yet, this apparent semblance failed 
                                                 
177
 Ibid. 
178
 The popularity of separation was also demonstrated in more unusual ways, for example Alex Ivimey 
detailed that in Townsville there was an enormous increase in the sales of a soap product called ‘Separation 
soap’. It sales rose from 8 tons per month in March 1884 to an average 25 tons a month by 1888. Second, 
there was ‘a good deal of outward visible signs of Separation in Townsville’ in particular the word 
‘SEPARATION’ was illuminated by gas light above Alderman Hanran’s door, the Oyster Saloon and Café, and 
the Saddler shop. Joseph Ahearne, Vice President North Queensland Separation Council Delegate to London, 
‘The Separation of North Queensland’, Letter to the Editor, Times, 4 February 1886; Aleck J. Ivimey, Mining 
and Separation in North Queensland. Brisbane: Woodcock and Powell Printers, 1888: 26-30.   
179
 Griffith challenged the authenticity of signatures and had the petition analysed. He determined that 3,860 
could not be identified as being at any time residents of the north, 349 had left and 111 had signed tow or 
more times. Griffith argued that the genuine supporters were less than 6000. The petition was shipped to 
England and arrived on the 10 September and was presented by Edward Cunningham to Edward Stanhope, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies on the 11 September 1886. ‘Queensland’, Times, 11 September 1886; 
Joyce, Samuel Walker Griffith: 106; Joseph Ahearne, ‘North Queensland Separation Movement’, Letter to the 
Editor, Times, 23 June 1886. 
180
 These principal grounds were comparable to the ones advanced by the Moreton Bay District in their 1850s 
‘fight’ to gain independence from New South Wales. Reference to the earlier and successful separation 
agitation was frequent and illustrative comparisons were routinely made. In particular between Moreton Bay’s 
population and economic position at separation and the North’s current position to demonstrate that the North 
was in far stronger position than Moreton Bay when it was granted self-government. The strategy adopted by 
the North Queensland Separation League also rested on this earlier separatist cause and Thankfull Willmett’s 
interpretation of Imperial legislation. In essence it was believed that the power to create a new colony upon 
petition of the inhabitants of any territory rested exclusively with the Crown. Moreover, as Willmett informed 
Governor Musgrave, ‘the interference with or approval of the colonial legislatures’ was not required. Ibid; 
Willmett to Musgrave, 16 November 1886, QVP, 1 (1886): 433. 
181
 The similarities between the Moreton Bay separation agitation in the 1850s and the North’s case are 
numerous and beyond the obvious parallels in the basic reasons advanced for territorial separation it is 
interesting to note that the South employed an argument against Northern separation which had greatly 
offended them in the course of their campaign; that the North was incapable of governing itself. William 
Brookes the Member for North Brisbane declared in 1884 that ‘the North had not the materials out of which 
they could be separated. They had neither the money nor brains.’ William Brookes, QPD, 43 (1884): 278 cited 
in Doran, ‘North Queensland Separatism the Nineteenth Century’: 212. 
  293 
to weaken the South’s avowed opposition to the movement. The petition did 
however demonstrate the North’s ‘wonderful’ unanimity on separation and the 
issue was now rated as ‘the most important matter in the North’ but it did not 
remove ‘the black labour question from the distracting position it has so 
prominently held in the discussions on North Queensland’.182  
 
The League’s repeated assurances that coloured labour was not the basis of the 
movement had succeeded in only converting a number of northern anti-separatists 
who had held strong reservations over the true motivation of the cause.183 The 
principal centre of northern opposition was the mining-based town of Charters 
Towers. In April 1885, Charters Towers had initiated the formation of Anti-
Separation Leagues in the North yet by November the League was in decline. The 
Northern Miner, owned by Thaddeus O’Kane, a key protagonist in the formation of 
the Anti-Separation committee outlined the basic reasoning for the altered stance: 
The apprehension of a Coolie invasion and of Northern Queensland being 
turned into a slave state has, since then, caused us to oppose the 
movement for Separation: but that apprehension has been removed, in a 
great degree, by the declarations of the Townsville…Separation League.184 
 
The League’s repudiations had been ineffective in the South. Three 
interconnected components contributed to this. First, the authoritative influence of 
Griffith who ‘had entered into a sort of war against the whole question’ of 
separation.185 Second, the South was and remained the most fervent opponents to 
any form of cheap imported coloured labour. Third and most notably Griffith’s 
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provocative amalgamation of the separatist cause with the issue of coloured 
labour had occurred when public sensibilities were being outraged by the much 
publicised detailing of the ‘revolting cruelties of the Queensland labour traffic.’186 In 
this context, the implied threat that ‘the planters of Queensland desire the creation 
of “a slave state in Northern Queensland”’ was a particularly confrontational and 
frightening proposition that had significant reverberating effects.187 In the midst of 
this developing and heated internal dispute Griffith and the Colonial Treasurer 
James Dickson left the colony to attend the first Federal Council meeting in Hobart 
in January 1886.  
 
The significance of the inaugural sitting of the Federal Council was eulogised by 
the Queensland press ‘as an earnest of the coming Australian nationality’ for the 
Council was canvassed as ‘the body around which as a nucleus federated 
Australia will ultimately crystallise’.188 The ‘confidence’ and ‘interest’ espoused in 
the Brisbane Courier’s editorial was not however reproduced in the generally bland 
factual reports of each day’s proceedings, nor did it translate into any real display 
of public interest.189 Though the Federal Council meeting was heralded as 
‘undoubtedly an event of great interest’ it did not supplant, in the Queensland 
arena, the more immediate local focus on separation, economic and climatic 
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matters.190 The primacy of these local issues to the Queensland mind was 
depicted in George Craig’s caution to Griffith: 
There is a time when statesmen, like redoubtable warriors, must lift the 
visor in the midst of carnage to see if their forces have not advanced too far 
into the fray, to prevent their being outflanked. Such noble charges made by 
the heroic Premier into the fights of Federation…and New Guinea Question, 
command the warmest admiration, but though having thus far marched into 
the bowels of the questions without much impediment, he must look around 
and not neglect the internal affairs of the colony.191 
 
In evidence was the inherent tension in Queensland between provincialism and 
federalism.  
 
This factor, not always so explicitly declared, was a persistent and influential 
feature of Queensland’s involvement in the federation movement.192 Local matters, 
as a fundamental rule, were expected to be the focal point of each Government, 
and within this dynamic federation was an acceptable distraction if local concerns 
were accorded priority. Contentment with the current system of colonial 
governance was the underpinning of the general indifference shown towards the 
federal objective. ‘An Australian’ in a letter to the Editor of the Times, explained:  
Australians appreciate the advantages that federation would bring them, but 
the rival jealousies as much as the respective interests of the colonies 
make them disinclined to sanction any change in their constitutions….they 
are convinced that the constitutions that has suited them so long will 
continue to benefit them still.193 
 
An intriguing aspect to Griffith’s involvement at the Federal Council’s inaugural 
meeting was his tabling, in this new national forum, of a prominent local 
Queensland dispute. Griffith laid before the Council ‘certain correspondence’ on 
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the ‘Proposed Separation of Northern Queensland.’194 His reasoning for this action 
was that he believed:  
that the matter was of general Australasian interest. Several important 
questions are involved in the proposed separation – amongst them, the 
[coloured] labour question, which affects Queensland especially, but it also 
affects in a minor degree some of the other colonies. That it is a question 
upon which it is desirable that there should be a general expression of 
public opinion throughout Australasia.195  
 
The Council initiated no debate on the matter, the motion was simply seconded by 
Dickson, put and passed. Furthermore, Griffith’s tabling of the Separation question 
received no press coverage. This brief incident however is particularly noteworthy 
for three reasons. First, it represents the initial intersection between the two 
movements of Northern separation and federation, one that was variously 
maintained throughout the late 1880s and 1890s. At the 1888 Federal Council 
meeting Dickson tabled further correspondence on the separatist issue. He 
explained that his objective was to ensure that the Federal Council records 
contained ‘as closely as possible the history of any political or social movement in 
the colonies of Australasia.’196 Separation was therefore distinguished as a 
significant colonial movement. The second feature of interest was Griffith’s 
unrelenting and evocative alignment of coloured labour with North Queensland’s 
separatist demands. This disputed but effective proposition had engendered 
strong internal and external opposition to the separatist cause. The intrinsic threat 
was that ‘a colony of caste’ would be established in North Queensland, one 
antagonistic to the homogenous development of a white Australia.197 The third and 
interconnected feature was that Griffith had put forward the issue of Queensland’s 
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employment of coloured labour as a question that had national (Australian) 
implications and one which required mutual consideration. In the context of an 
intensifying ethnocentric campaign for a white Australia, it is feasible to argue that 
Griffith had advanced the local Queensland issue of separation to assist the 
federal cause by promoting a practical racial dilemma suitable for and requisite of 
combined federal action. While it is apparent that the Council did not openly 
appreciate the purpose of Griffith’s action, as no debate was initiated, the 
rudimentary components of the racial argument entwined in the separatist cause 
would acquire greater coherence and develop into a significant rallying force for 
federation.  
 
What is perplexing about Griffith raising the coloured labour issue in this forum at 
this time was that he had, prior to the Federal Council meeting, submitted and 
passed local legislation that had set the timeframe for the abolition of this 
problematic form of labour in Queensland. Coloured labour in Queensland was 
technically a receding issue and Griffith’s Government had been praised for ‘their 
firmness in clearing the colony of this curse of coloured labour.’198 Arguably 
Griffith’s underlying intent was to malign the northern case for separation and 
harness broader opposition. The attainment of Northern separation would, to 
Griffith’s mind, unquestionably lead to coloured labour being re-introduced into the 
new colony, a state of affairs hazardous for the federal movement. Indirectly, 
Griffith’s unusual action had indicated the force of the separatist movement and 
the significant political and social bearing that the two distinctive though entangled 
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issues of coloured labour and Northern separatism had on the domestic affairs of 
Queensland and ultimately on the other colonies.  
 
Maurice Black, the Member for Mackay acknowledged that Griffith in raising the 
‘coolie cry, has adopted the best means…to checkmate this movement.’199 The 
alignment of coloured labour with separation did effectively tip the balance of non-
partisan opinion against separation and brought cohesion to the opponents of 
coloured labour. Most notably, it outlined the prospective development of a 
disquieting state of affairs that had broader national (Australian) implications. 
Racial ideas were at this time acquiring a new significance in all the colonies and 
what was evident was a more coherent articulation of racial difference and its 
impact on national progress. The ‘grave political and social question’ entailed in 
the North’s demand for separation, Griffith repeatedly claimed, was that the 
proposed introduction of coloured labour would preclude the new colony from 
being ‘governed on the model adopted by the rest of the Australian Colonies.’200 
The overarching threat imposed by the prospect of this ‘colony of caste’ in 
Northern Queensland was that it would institute a condition of social and political 
affairs radically different to the other colonies and therefore detrimental to the 
broader development of federation. More specifically, it was argued that the 
anticipated social and political dynamics of this new colony would be hostile to the 
development in the other colonies of free and centralised democratic institutions. 
Second, its racial basis would retard the development of a homogenous national 
Australian sentiment. It was therefore argued that ‘there could be no real 
federation of such a colony of caste, with the vigorous democracies of the 
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South.’201 The Brisbane Courier’s editorial on 21st August 1886 thus considered 
the broader influence of this local contention: 
The importance of the separation movement is determined rather by its 
bearing on the future of Australia than merely on the convenience of this 
particular colony….One point to which we think separationists…should 
address themselves, is the effect that the separation of tropical Queensland 
is likely to have on the future dominion of Australia…we do not refer to the 
possibility of slavery, or any nonsense of that sort talked by people who 
ought to know better; but to the obvious effect of labour and employer being 
separated by the broad bar of colour and race. Northern aristocracy – a 
race aristocracy, will confront the Australian white democracy…we may 
leave to our children such a legacy of evil as that from which America has 
only rid herself by the most terrible fratricidal war which modern world has 
seen.202  
 
A significant galvanising force in the development of this focus on the social and 
political impact of coloured labour was the increasing activism of the ‘working men 
of Queensland’.203 The prominence of racial factors in the burgeoning labour 
movement’s platform was such that the President of the Northern Separation 
Council, Thankfull Willmett argued that ‘their powerful influence’ was the main 
reason why Griffith ‘studiously ignores our repeated assurances on the question of 
coloured labour’.204 The basis of the alliance between Liberal and labour was an 
enduring point of debate, yet arguably at this time there was little difference 
between the social and economic agendas of the two groupings, and their political 
alignment was fundamentally one of mutual reliance. Griffith’s opponents however 
considered that the form and pace of his progressive labour reforms were not the 
product of Liberal ideology but that ‘of white labourers thinking…being brought to 
imagine by artful stump orators.’205 Reservations were consequently held over 
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whether Griffith’s opposition to coloured labour was one of principle or simply 
political expediency: 
But the fact is the Ministry find the labour question a red rag to dangle 
before the working men of the colony, jealous encroachment upon their just 
industrial rights by an alien race, jealous of the power of capital clashing 
with labour, and jealous of the influence of plutocracy over democracy. So 
long as Mr. Griffith continues to please such a jealous political 
temperament, so long will he probably remain in power.206 
 
Certainly the heightened sensitivity to the presence of racial minorities engendered 
in Queensland in the early 1880s did contribute to Griffith’s political success. Yet, 
concurrently it proved to be a catalyst for the further organisation of labour, which 
ultimately resulted in the fracturing of the alliance.207 Albert Hinchcliffe, a leading 
contemporary labour advocate remarked of this period that ‘to circumstances we 
owe everything, and circumstances have been singularly favourable in the Banana 
Land to the organisation of labour….“No Kanaka labour” has thus been a 
watchword’.208 The process by which white labour in Queensland emerged as a 
significant pressure group was favourably provided for by the legislative and social 
circumstances engendered by Griffith’s Liberal administration. Aside from the 
reforms introduced to address the coloured labour question, Griffith’s additional 
legislative initiatives did demonstrate his accord with and desire to retain the 
support of the labouring classes. The political organisation of white labour was a 
notable derivative of these initiatives.  
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In September 1885, the Trades and Labour Council was established in Brisbane 
by ten unions. In September 1886 the Council sought from Griffith’s Liberal 
Government their legal recognition. Griffith’s response was the Trade Union Act, 
which established unions as legal organisations.209 The extension of unionism 
throughout Queensland was a consequent result and between 1887 and 1888 the 
number of registered unions in the colony doubled from sixteen to thirty-two.210 
Another initiative sought by the Trades and Labour Council was acceded to in 
November 1886 with the passage of the Employers Liability Act. This Act extended 
the legal responsibility of employer’s for personal injuries suffered by employees in 
defined occupations, in essence it introduced a form of workers compensation.211 
Two further acts the 1886 Member’s Expenses Act and the 1887 Electoral Districts 
Act though not specifically framed for the labour sector did assist the organisation 
or more specifically the politicisation of labour. The payment of Members of 
Parliaments expenses up to £200 per year was an essential precondition for the 
participation of working class candidates.212 Second, the 1887 increase in the 
number of representatives for the Legislative Assembly to seventy-two was an 
additional aid for the working class cause.213 The basis of the redistribution of 
seats was population and this therefore favoured the urban centres and 
associatively the largely urban-based nascent labour movement. The 1887 
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establishment of an official labour political body, the Workers Political Reform 
Association, was the cumulative effect of these legislative measures. The declared 
objective of the Workers Political Reform Association was:  
To unite the political strength of the various bodies which sympathise with 
the Labour reform movement, and to initiate such political action as shall 
secure to the labouring masses that legislative power which by right 
belongs to them, the majority, but which is at present owing to lack of unity 
among the workers held by a self interested minority, and used by it in a 
manner antagonistic to their general welfare.214 
 
Four labour candidates were subsequently endorsed for the 1888 General 
Election, three of which were for Brisbane-based seats.215 That the labour 
movement was not yet strongly established was demonstrated in the unsuccessful 
candidacy of these labour representatives. Yet indicative of the rising political 
influence of the ‘working man’ was both Griffith and McIlwraith’s endeavours to 
acquire their political support in the election campaign.  
 
By 1887 Griffith’s political position was failing and by September his defeat was 
being predicted. The ‘lamentable state of the Finances of the Colony’ was the 
principal cause of the growing and ‘strong feeling’ against the Griffith 
administration.216 The August 1887 attempt by Griffith to redress the colony’s 
financial situation, through the introduction of a controversial land tax to raise 
revenue, resulted in an irrevocable reduction in his popular appeal and the 
disintegration of his Ministerial majority.217 Parliament was prorogued in early 
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December 1887 and electioneering began in earnest. The proposed land tax in 
particular and the economic management of the colony more generally emerged 
not surprisingly as the most prominent issues in the campaign. Griffith 
endeavoured to ascribe much of the responsibility for the colony’s mounting 
unemployment and deficit to the ‘consequences of the most disastrous period of 
drought that has ever afflicted Australia’.218 McIlwraith derisively dismissed this 
defence and attributed ‘the cause of the financial disaster’ to the Liberal 
Government’s ‘ignorantly extravagant’ expenditure of public money, and to the 
Crown Lands Act, which was ‘ignorantly destroying one of our best sources of 
revenue.’219 In the volleying of claim and counter claim a convincing manoeuvre by 
McIlwraith and his supporters, was the promotion of McIlwraith as the ‘great 
statesman who is to wrest Queensland from beggary’.220 McIlwraith’s 1879-1883 
premiership had demonstrated his ‘masterful grasp of the process of material 
advancement’ and in the context of Queensland’s worsening economic position 
these qualities were again revered.221 McIlwraith and his new National party were 
returned to office with a significant majority of 44 seats to the Liberals 25, with 3 
Independents. The ‘unsuccessful financial management of Griffith’s government’ 
was a significant determinant in the result yet it cannot be viewed in isolation from 
the perennial and dynamic issues of separation, coloured labour and the labour 
movement.222  
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Despite the disappointment of the Imperial Government’s June 1887 rejection of 
North Queensland’s ‘monster’ petition for territorial separation, the movement 
itself, as Governor Musgrave reported had ‘not by any means ceased.’223 The 
basis for the refusal was Sir Henry Holland’s, the Secretary of State for the 
Colonies conclusion that the North had not presented ‘a sufficiently strong case’ to 
justify the introduction of special Imperial legislation.224 The overarching concern 
for the Imperial authorities was the problematic precedent that Imperial action 
would set. The Secretary of State explained in his June 1887 despatch that: 
Imperial legislation, not supported by resolutions or legislation of the 
Colonial Parliament, for the purpose of taking away a portion of the territory 
formally placed under the control of the local legislature by the Constitutions 
Acts, would be a very serious interference with that responsible government 
under which the settlement of the colony has been developed.225 
 
Recognition of this right of self-government and the Imperial Government’s 
consequent reluctance to intervene in the domestic affairs of the colony without 
the consent of parliament would prove to be the permanent impediment to all 
demands for territorial separation. Yet, at this point in time there was some solace 
for the separatist cause in the June despatch as the idea of Imperial intervention 
was not totally dismissed. Sir Henry Holland conditionally acknowledged that 
Imperial action ‘would be only justifiable if, after a prolonged trial, all other means 
of removing any administrative defects or inequalities should prove ineffective’.226 
To fulfil this condition the north and the southern-based government of 
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Queensland were instructed to institute and ‘test fairly’ Griffith’s proposed 
decentralisation scheme.227  
 
Griffith’s plan ‘to remove, as far as practicable, the evils of undue centralisation in 
the administration of the Government’ consisted of three bills, which were 
introduced into parliament in August 1887.228 The Financial Districts Bill would 
divide the colony into three districts for financial purposes with each division 
allocated a separate account for revenue and expenditure; the Local 
Administration Bill provided for the establishment of branches of government 
departments in the central and northern districts with the authority to conduct the 
ordinary executive functions of the Government; and the Real Property (Local 
Registries) Bill would establish branches of the Registrar of Titles Office in 
Townsville and Rockhampton.229 Griffith immediately encountered opposition to 
his plan from the south, and from the north. James Garrick, Queensland’s Agent 
General in London encapsulated the basis of this dual opposition, ‘Your plan is 
almost more than the South will be disposed to give, while it is less than the North 
will take.’230 Despite significant resistance from within Griffith’s own Cabinet and 
the opposition of several southern members the trio of legislation did pass the 
second reading phase. With a general election pending, the extent of southern 
opposition, revealed in the narrowness of the vote on the Financial Districts and 
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the Local Administration Bills, was for Griffith, a matter of concern.231 In an attempt 
to restore party unity Griffith abandoned the two bills.  
 
The divisiveness of the separatist issue proved to be a strategic dilemma for both 
Griffith and McIlwraith in their election campaigns. Both leaders were contesting 
the seat of North Brisbane and thus their election notices were addressed to this 
southern-based electorate. The inherent problem in this was that their election 
manifestos were also regarded as the formal statement of each party’s policies to 
attain government. The challenge therefore was not to be at variance with the 
views of their southern constituents while at the same time presenting an opinion 
that did not alienate the North. Both consequently were portrayed as only ‘touching 
on’ the separatist issue.232 Griffith outlined his qualified intention to renew his 
decentralisation plan ‘with such modifications as may be desirable.’233 McIlwraith 
alternatively contradicted his previous, though conditional, support of the 
separatist cause and put forward, for the first time, the dictum ‘Federation before 
Separation’, which was to be utilised as a powerful slogan by the movement’s 
opponents: 
The Separation of North from South Queensland is to many a vital question. 
I have not been opposed to Separation, but I think no separation should 
take place until the Colonies are federated. We exercise an influence on 
that question as a United Queensland, which I am afraid we should lose 
were we divided, and it will be true policy to subordinate the lesser question 
to the greater.234 
 
Separation as an election topic was in the south essentially a non-issue. 
Alternatively in the north where separation was the ‘most important subject’ a 
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wordy editorial debate unfolded.235 The debate was however particularly one-sided 
with the Liberal newspapers endeavouring to draw separatist support away from 
their traditional political alignment with McIlwraith’s Conservative party. Thus it was 
argued that while Griffith’s scheme was deficient it was more concrete than 
McIlwraith’s postponement. The Liberal newspaper the Mackay Mercury therefore 
pressed two lines of argument. First, ‘That the North can expect no help from Sir 
Thomas McIlwraith’ and second that ‘Sir Thomas McIlwraith is not a 
Separationist…so his views on other subjects are of comparatively little interest to 
North Queensland.’236 Countering these claims John Macrossan,237 the political 
leader of the separation movement, defended McIlwraith’s ‘vague’ electoral 
statement on Northern separation. Macrossan reaffirmed that ‘Sir Thomas 
believed in Separation but as a Southern statesmen he could not say so.’238 
Regionalism thus featured, as a significant component in the Northern campaign 
and the effect of the Liberal strategy was discernible in the reduced number of 
Conservative separatist members returned. Prior to the 1887 redistribution of 
seats, nine of the ten northern members were separationists, in 1888 eleven of the 
sixteen candidates elected were in favour of separation.239 Party politics therefore 
prevented the establishment of a northern bloc in parliament to press the 
separatist cause but it was hoped that Macrossan and Black’s Cabinet positions in 
McIlwraith’s new ministry would accrue some benefit for the North.  
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A peculiar feature of the involvement of the separatist question in the election 
campaign was McIlwraith’s incorporation of the federal topic. Beyond the broad 
assertion that McIlwraith was in effect postponing separation there was little 
comment on his prioritisation of federation. Yet, indirectly, the derisive comment of 
one northern newspaper the Mackay Mercury did portray the general perception 
that federation was still a long time off: ‘Sir Thomas threw in…his opinion that we 
should not have Separation until there is a confederated Australia. Surely this will 
not be long – a matter of five or twenty years at the outside.’240 McIlwraith’s 
incorporation of the federal question was an extension of his strong opposition to 
the Naval Defence agreement brokered by Griffith at the Colonial Conference held 
in London in 1887. Griffith had committed Queensland to pay an annual subsidy of 
£15,000 to maintain a British fleet to protect Australia’s coastline. In the debate on 
the Naval Defence Bill, introduced into parliament at the end of the 1887 session, 
McIlwraith questioned Griffith’s ‘imperialistic tendencies’ and his authority to make 
this commitment without the sanction of parliament.241 Second, he criticised Britain 
for evading its responsibility and throwing undue burden on her colonial 
possessions. Griffith was ‘much embarrassed’ by the extent of the hostility 
engendered by the bill and as it was expected to become a ‘bone of contention at 
the forthcoming election’ he abandoned it.242 A secondary feature of McIlwraith’s 
opposition was the damaging impact that this defence agreement had had on the 
federal cause:  
A heavy blow was dealt to these [federal] hopes by the acceptance of an 
invitation from the Imperial Government to a conference in London to 
consider questions which formed the very foundation on which our united 
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Australia was to rest. The result was inevitable. The second session of the 
Federal Council met, and they had nothing to do. Their raison d'être has 
almost gone, for this Imperial Conference had taken out of their hands the 
question of federal defence. 243 
 
Griffith made no direct reference to the Naval Defence Bill in his election statement 
and on the question of federation he broadly stressed the ‘necessity for united 
action’ and his determination to assist ‘to bring about this result.’244 As arguably 
Queensland’s most prominent federalist Griffith’s brevity on the topic revealed that 
federation was not a subject of any real consequence in the election.245  
 
In stark contrast to the 1883 election the issue of Queensland’s importation of 
coloured labour did not in 1888 generate extensive or spirited debate. Griffith’s 
legislative reforms of the Pacific Island labour trade had ostensibly settled the 
issue internally and had, as he claimed, ‘effectually retrieved the character of 
Queensland in the eyes of the world.’246 Alternative opinions challenged the 
redeeming qualities associated with Griffith’s termination of the labour trade. The 
London Times’ portrayed Britain’s inherent suspiciousness of Queensland in its 
comment on the Pacific Island Labour Amendment bill: ‘The people of England 
had a strongly rooted feeling that Queensland was emphatically a slave 
country’.247 Governor Musgrave was of the same mind and remained sceptical of 
the colony’s socio-political reform. In a series of confidential despatches to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Musgrave presented his opinion on the 
Queensland situation as it related to the future administration of New Guinea. 
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Musgrave’s ‘great objections’ to Queensland assuming administrative control was 
that it would subject New Guinea:  
to the Council of a comparatively uneducated community which has shown 
itself notably regardless of the commonest rights of humanity in respect of 
the black native tribes within its own territory – to say nothing of what has 
been disclosed of the Kanaka labour trade. Nothing in the history of the 
Slave trade or of slavery in the West Indies is more shocking than 
occurrences which have taken place in Queensland….It is not that the 
community is without men of humane and philanthropic minds; but that 
even if such as these should be in the temporary possession of 
administrative power the moral tone on these matters of the mass of the 
people is low and no Ministry ventures to do that which is unpopular with 
any large section of political supporters….It does not lead me to believe that 
H.M. Government would be justified in confiding the future fortunes of the 
people of New Guinea to the protection of the public opinion of 
Queensland.248 
 
‘The course of recent events’, Musgrave argued in late October 1887 had ‘only 
strengthened the views expressed’ in his previous despatches.249 The growing 
political instability in Queensland was the underlying basis of Musgrave’s concern. 
Thus while he believed that Griffith was ‘more actuated by principle than most of 
his contemporaries. He may from motives of expediency submit to have his hand 
forced.’250 The increasing likelihood of a change in administration presented for 
Musgrave the most alarming prospect that of the ‘return to power of those who 
originally forced the annexation of New Guinea’.251 To counter the lingering and 
negative association between his action in New Guinea and the recruitment of 
Pacific Islanders, McIlwraith pledged not to reverse Griffith’s legislation, which 
terminated the recruitment of labour in the Pacific. Second, he declared that he 
was now against the introduction of ‘Coolie’ labour and furthermore guaranteed 
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that he would not re-opened negotiations with the Indian government.252 Griffith 
was ‘unable to believe in the genuineness of their [the Conservatives] conversion’ 
yet McIlwraith’s ‘frank and explicit’ statements on the issues were effective.253 Alert 
to the increasing weight of public opinion, engendered by the escalating 
social/racial debate, McIlwraith had modified his pure economic focus. Whether a 
deliberate political stratagem or a true revision of his principles McIlwraith’s 1888 
election statements effectively evaded the 1883 criticism that his policies lacked 
social foresight.254 More particularly it defused the potential contentiousness of the 
coloured labour question, which had in 1883 given ‘Sir Samuel all he is worth – an 
absolute dictatorship of Queensland’.255 An acknowledged force in extracting such 
a policy shift was the increasingly influence of the organised pressure group of 
white labour. 
 
In 1888, Aleck Ivimey cynically depicted the growing influence of labour: ‘In 
Queensland, where the working man is the shrine that both political parties affect 
to adore, some little consideration to his susceptibilities, even only for policy’s 
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sake, might be expected to be made.’256 Both political leaders, as evidenced in 
their election manifestoes, clearly recognised the importance of the labour vote in 
the election and accordingly openly bid for their support. Griffith’s election 
statement made a direct reference to the underlying basis of labour’s problems:  
The relation between labour and capital constitute one of the great 
difficulties of the day. I look to the recognition of this principle that a share of 
the profits of productive labour belongs of right to the labourer as of the 
greatest importance in the future adjustment of those relations….I entertain 
a strong hope that before long this principle will form part of the positive law 
of Queensland.257 
 
Griffith’s pro-labour statements were at this time genuine and increasingly based 
in ideology. In December 1888, after reading Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, Griffith 
expanded his election statements in an article entitled ‘Wealth and Want’.258 In this 
paper he attacked capitalism as the source of ‘sweating’ and argued that one of 
the government’s principal functions was ‘to protect the weak against the strong, to 
secure to every man real freedom’.259 The advancement of aspects of socialist 
philosophy by Griffith did correspond with the increasing interest of labour leaders 
in British socialism. Yet in early 1888 the electoral appeal of his pronouncements 
was diminished by more pragmatic concerns. Under the impact of an economic 
recession or more particularly the onset of widespread unemployment and the 
reduction in the real wages and living standards of the working class the 
Liberal/labour alliance had begun to dissolve. The Trades and Labour Council, to 
address the developing social and economic concerns of the workers, had 
expanded the principle of co-operative action through unionism and sought 
political action to obtain the better representation of the workingman. Increasingly 
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problematic for the Liberal partners of the alliance were the more radical policies 
entailed in the labour platform: the legalisation of the eight-hour day, government 
funded provision for the unemployed and the need for significant electoral reform, 
in particular one-man one-vote.260 Splintering the association further was Griffith’s 
treatment of the Chinese question.   
 
At the time of the 1888 general election Queensland, as with the other colonies, 
was in the midst of an intense burst of anti-Chinese activity.261 By early 1888, Anti-
Chinese Leagues had been formed throughout the colony and matters were 
further agitated by the worsening economic situation and by a vitriolic press 
campaign of ‘blanket racism’.262 The most extreme exponent of this persuasive 
form of writing was that by William Lane,263 the unofficial leader of the anti-
Chinese cause and the principal writer for the Boomerang. Lane’s overarching 
premise was that there was ‘a true racial struggle…going on…in Australia and 
Australia is the prize….These clannish and unchangeable coolies and Chinamen 
will surely clean the white man from the far South – if we let them.’264 Lane skilfully 
and fervently presented his argument through a variety of literary devices; as 
editorials, as emotively charged exposes on Chinese shops, gambling halls and 
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opium parlours and through a serialised dystopian novel entitled ‘White or Yellow? 
A Story of the Race War of AD 1908’.265 All of which fuelled an already volatile 
environment. In early May 1888 this largely rhetoric based ‘Anti-Chinese storm’ 
broke into ‘the most violent episode’ of the 1888 racial crisis.266 The vehemence 
and the ‘lawlessness’ of the 2000 strong mob in Brisbane, which proceeded 
almost uninterrupted by police was widely reported in the Sydney Morning Herald, 
Melbourne Argus and the London Times. Not surprisingly, in this charged social 
atmosphere the question of Chinese immigration had featured prominently in the 
election campaign.  
 
Though both leaders had advanced an avowedly anti-Chinese line there was to 
the voting public a discernible difference in the force of each’s case. McIlwraith 
had adopted the succinct and aggressive line of ‘total exclusion’.267 Griffith, in 
contrast, put forward a series of proposals to address the Chinese problem. The 
principal action was to increase the entrance tax for the Chinese to a ‘practically 
prohibitive’ rate.268 The straightforwardness of McIlwraith’s plan appealed to the 
majority, for his policy as the Queensland Figaro commented did not ‘beat about 
the bush….[and] can be understood by all. It is – total and immediate exclusion of 
Chinese.’269 Griffith alternatively was criticised for it was believed that he evinced 
only a ‘dim perception of the necessity of drastic treatment of the Chinese 
nuisance.’270 At the core of this anti-Chinese sentiment, as with the entwined 
coloured labour/separation question, was the strongly held belief that the 
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continued presence of these ‘aliens’ would invariably have a negative impact on 
Australia’s racial composition and its democratic principles.271 William Lane 
therefore declared that ‘we want a race war which will weld us whites into a 
homogenous mass.’272 To reveal the extent of this purported racial threat moral, 
eugenic and economic fears were canvassed widely. Incorporated in the various 
predictive scenarios were the lurid images of the corrupted innocence of white 
women and the disfigurement associated with Asiatic vice and disease. The 
Bundaberg Tribune argued in February 1888 that ‘any attempted amalgamation of 
the leprous heathen with the pale-faced races of the west can only result in the 
racial deterioration and the moral extinction of the latter’.273 The Northern Miner 
warned its working class readers that if they were inactive ‘they will be drowned in 
a deluge of Chinese, or be wiped off by leprosy and small-pox’ or more specifically 
that ‘the Chinese…. all are working together to pull down the miner’s wages’.274 In 
this tense atmosphere McIlwraith’s more decisive stance on the Chinese held a 
greater appeal to the urban electorates and to white labour.275 The endorsement of 
four Labour candidates had rather prematurely been described as the existence of 
a ‘Third Party’, and whilst the Boomerang dismissed the assertion as a ‘bogey’ its 
comments on the underlying strategy of the ‘newly organised Labour party’ is 
notable for to all intents and purposes both scenarios did eventuate. The 
Boomerang outlined that Labour ‘must of very necessity either drive the two old 
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parties into one or draw one of the two into accepting its platform whereupon it 
becomes merged again in the advance guard of that progressive party.’276 The 
latter occurred in 1888 with McIlwraith in effect diverting the workers support away 
from the Liberals with his modified economic and ardent anti-Chinese policies. The 
political combination of the two old parties as a defensive move against Labour 
would have arguably been unimaginable in 1888 yet this would take place July 
1890.  
 
In 1883 Griffith had been elected on a platform of major reforms for the social 
improvement of Queensland. Public reaction to McIlwraith’s transcontinental 
railway and ‘Coolie’ labour proposal and the attempted annexation of New Guinea 
had provoked a widespread desire for political change. To Griffith ‘there never was 
in the history of this colony a more important period in its public affairs than the 
present. The tide was just on the turn.’277 The overwhelming vote attained by 
Griffith reflected, a Northern Resident declared ‘an entire revolution in the 
Government of the colony.’278 In essence Queensland’s political culture had 
moved away from traditional economic doctrines towards a consideration of the 
social question. 
 
‘The crux on which the fate of the present ministry’ depended was the Crown 
Lands Act.279 While described as ‘perhaps the most important milestone in our 
career, so far as Land legislation is concerned’ it was the failure of its financial 
clauses that incrementally weakened the basis of Griffith’s popular and ministerial 
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support.280 An additional effect and one prompted by the colony’s mounting deficit 
and growing unemployment was the public desire to return to the proven economic 
applications of Sir Thomas McIlwraith, Queensland’s ‘unrivalled financier’.281 The 
electoral victory of McIlwraith in 1888 did not represent a complete return to the 
halcyon days of economically expedient policies rather; it was a practical but 
conditional transfer. To win electoral support McIlwraith had modified his economic 
stance and had pledged to retain the Liberal government’s significant labour 
reforms.  
 
Though land reform had been heralded as ‘the cardinal question of the day’ it was 
arguably the subject of coloured labour that was the most decisive and defining 
issue of the 1883-1888 period.282 Griffith’s various amendments of the Pacific 
Island Labourers Act indirectly and directly initiated a series of significant 
developments. Of particular relevance to Queensland’s involvement in the federal 
movement was the conversion and consolidation of Northern grievances into a 
formally organised separation movement and second, the growth and politicisation 
of a white labour collective. These two dynamic internal pressure groups 
increasingly preoccupied and influenced local politics in Queensland. Archibald 
Meston predicted in June 1888 that McIlwraith would have a difficult time ahead in 
view of the variant groups that had assembled under his political banner: 
A choice crowd indeed to arrogate to themselves the position of ‘National 
Democrats’! Ye Gods! What with the Separationists, the Ultra Squatters, the 
Protectionists, the Kanakaists, and other incompatible sections he has a 
cheerful time ahead. Do not despair!’283 
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On the broader national Australian front, the onset of separatist agitation and the 
development of a labour agenda had furthered the emergent rationality of racial 
homogeneity as an Australian ideal and its consequent role as a practical and 
motivational argument for federation. This rhetoric of race against coloured 
intruders had created a semblance of cohesion amongst the autonomous colonial 
entities. Robert Thomson thus argued in 1888:  
The population of the whole island is, with utterly insignificant exceptions, of 
a purely British character, and instead of differences of opinion on the 
question of servile labour, there is such identity of interests and of 
sentiments on the question of coloured labour, as to form a distinct bond of 
union between the masses in all parts of the continent. In all of these 
circumstances the pathway to Australian Federation is a much smoother 
one than that which lay before Franklin and his coadjutors.284 
 
White Australia as a national and racial construct had begun its development as a 
determinate in the federal cause. In the domestic politics of Queensland the 
entanglement of the coloured labour question with the regional demands for 
territorial separation and the political activism of labour would intensify in the 
1890s. The political and social instability produced by these three but interrelated 
internal issues was such that it enforced a narrow domestic focus and this led to 
Queensland assuming a somewhat ambiguous position in the renewed 1890s 
federal movement. While key political figures such as Griffith played an influential 
role in progressing the political movement for federal union, local matters 
persistently curbed the formation of any sustained internal interest in the cause. 
This therefore was problematical for the proposed political merger of all the 
Australian colonies. Yet, at the same time Queensland’s ongoing internal debate 
on Melanesian labour aided the federal cause by providing a cohesive national  
racial objective. 
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Chapter 6 
 
‘Queensland and Federation. 
Why Does She Not Co-Operate’1 
 
 
‘The first movement worthy of the noble object of bringing all Australia under one 
National Government,’ Sir Henry Parkes claimed in 1892, was that which arose 
from his October 1889 initiative.2 Through a masterstroke of political influence and 
manoeuvring Parkes revived the federal sentiment associated with the ‘great and 
pressing’ question of colonial defence and succeeded in lifting ‘Federation above 
the dust of party politics, and an armoury of arguments.’3 The springboard for 
Parkes’ action was the October 1889 report of Major General Bevan Edwards on 
the state of the Australian colonial defences, which ‘nearly frightened the various 
Colonies concerned into union.’4 Edwards argued that if the colonies were 
required to depend on their own local forces ‘they would offer such a rich and 
tempting prize’ and thus without a federation of the military forces their ‘position 
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would be one of great danger.’5 Edwards later claimed that Parkes, ‘saw at once 
that combined action for the purposes of defence was impossible without a 
Federal Government to direct and control it. He therefore became the champion of 
the great question of Colonial Federation.’6 What resulted were two ‘memorable’ 
intercolonial gatherings that exclusively considered the ‘weighty question’ of 
Australian federation.7 The first assembled in Melbourne in February 1890 where 
two representatives from each of the Australian colonies and New Zealand 
discussed whether the ‘time [was] ripe for the further extension of Federation’.8 
The Australasian Federation Conference unanimously resolved that:  
the best interests and the present and future prosperity of the Australian 
colonies will be promoted by an early union under the Crown, and while 
fully recognizing the valuable services of the members of the Convention of 
1883 in founding the Federal Council, it declares its opinion that the seven 
years which have since elapsed have developed the national life of 
Australasia population, in wealth, in the discovery of resources, and in self-
governing capacity, to an extent which justifies the higher act, at all times 
contemplated, of the union of these Colonies, under one legislative and 
executive Government on principles just to the several Colonies.9  
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The next step, it was resolved, was to summon a National Australasian 
Convention to consider and report upon an adequate scheme for a Federal 
Constitution. After considerable activity between the various colonial premiers the 
Convention convened in Sydney in March 1891. The forty-six delegates from the 
various Australian colonies and New Zealand represented, Parkes’ declared, 
‘beyond all dispute the most august assembly which Australia had ever seen’.10 
Much historical significance was therefore bestowed on the Convention. The 
Queenslander lauded it as marking the arrival of a new epoch in Australian history, 
the ‘Federal Epoch’.11 In accordance with its sole mandate the Convention drafted, 
amended and adopted ‘The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Australia’ and 
recommended that it be submitted to each colony’s parliament for approval.12 
Robert Garran recounted in 1897 that by successfully framing a ‘Commonwealth 
Bill’ the Convention had:  
caught, and crystallized into a definite shape, the vague, floating ideas 
which had long been in the air; and it thus afforded for the first time a 
practical standpoint from which to debate the whole subject and upon which 
to found a national sentiment.13  
 
The prominence that Queensland’s premier Sir Samuel Griffith had attained at the 
Convention was prestigious for the colony. Alfred Deakin claimed that ‘by its close 
Griffith's influence had become supreme.’14 Griffith had been appointed the Vice-
president of the Convention; he had been ‘accorded the distinction of [being] the 
third’ speaker, which it was presumed to mean that Queensland now ranked third 
amongst the colonies, and most notably he was one of principal drafters of the 
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Constitution.15 The Sydney Morning Herald rightly noted that Griffith had been ably 
assisted by the Tasmanian Andrew Inglis Clark and the South Australian Charles 
Kingston but concluded that the Constitution Bill ‘was largely [Griffith’s] own 
offspring; the language of it, terse and free from legal subtleties, is his; and most of 
the ideas which it contains have emanated from his active brain.’16  
 
 
Figure 6.1:  The Boomerang, 17 January 1891  
 
The Queensland tributes were more exalted. W. Kinnaird Rose declared to Griffith 
that ‘in the history of the Great Austral Nation hundreds of years hence your name 
as the Maker of Australia…will stand out more prominently than those of Jefferson 
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and Adams in America for you are alone.’17 Griffith’s acclaim assumed and 
continued to occupy the centre of Queensland’s ‘Federation mosaic’ for it was the 
pinnacle of Queensland’s formal involvement in the movement.18 ‘After a splutter 
of fire’ the federal question immediately became a ‘dead rocket’ in Queensland 
and remained so until 1899.19 This chapter will examine the dynamics of this state 
of affairs in Queensland during the 1890s. Whilst a conglomerate of economic, 
personal, political and climatic factors implicated in Queensland’s hesitancy are 
overviewed, this chapter core focus is on the significant and continued bearing that 
Queensland’s perennial issues of separation, coloured labour, and the emergent 
labour movement had on the federal cause. The notable variant in the 1890s was 
that while Queensland had little interest in or involvement with the advancement of 
the federal cause, internally the broader question of federation ‘got mixed up’ with 
these perennial matters and did in fact exert an influence.20 The manner in which 
separation, labour and federation intersected in Queensland in the 1890s can be 
characterised as a period of mutual hindrance. This was manifested most 
decisively in the intersection between the ‘momentous question’ of separation and 
federation.21   
 
Why Queensland ‘reverted to the lethargy of indifference’ and remained outside 
the formal process of negotiations does not feature in the conventional accounts of 
the federation movement.22 Primarily this was because such an explanation was  
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not within the scope of enquiry, which centred on the movement’s formal political 
negotiations at the various intercolonial conferences and conventions. 
Contemporarily there was much public commentary on why Queensland had 
‘turned its back’ on federation.23 Routinely, Queensland’s ambivalence was 
ascribed to the colony’s apprehension that a ‘Federal Law’ would be introduced to 
abolish the employment of coloured labour.24 Queensland’s local press however 
outlined quite distinctly that Queensland had dropped the federal question due to 
the pressures of local issues. As early as July 1891 Queensland Punch observed 
that:  
Australian Federation seems to crab it along sideways, and it does not 
appear likely to promise any definite results for years to come….We in 
Queensland have our Strike absorbing all our attention, and the Northern 
and Central Separation questions mingling with the Federation issue.25 
 
The New South Wales politician J.C. Neild, based on his visit to Queensland in late 
1892, was ‘strongly impressed’ by the lack of interest shown in federation but directly 
attributed this to domestic issues:  
With the momentous question of the subdivision of her own vast territory 
persistently forced upon her; with a phenomenal conflict occurring annually in 
her pastoral districts; with the coloured labour problems demanding 
consideration and solution, to say nothing of the antics of Socialists and the 
turmoil of party politics, Queensland has her hands fully occupied without 
seeking extended responsibilities in the unexplored realms of Australian 
Federation.26 
 
Manifestly, local issues continued to eclipse any consideration of the federal 
question in Queensland. That ‘there was more urgent business to be dealt with by 
the legislatures’ of each colony had been the ‘fatal impediment to [federal] action’ 
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from 1860.27 An 1875 critique remained applicable in the early 1890s: 
Absorbed by local matters, occupied with questions of no more than 
provincial interest, essential yet not supreme, the Australian colonies 
appear to have no time to spare for the consideration of those subjects of 
weightier import which tower a head and shoulders above minor 
themes….things of national importance, intimately connected with the future 
of Australia, are allowed to pass.28 
 
From 1891 to 1895 Queensland was not alone in its indifference to the federal 
proposal. In this period the movement for federation stalled in all of the colonies as 
a result of the enormous political and social consequences associated with the 
onset of a severe and worldwide economic depression.29 The severity of the 
depression in the Australian colonies was in a large part attributable to the great 
influx of British capital into the colonies during the 1880s. By 1890 Australia’s 
reliance on British finance was such that 40 per cent of the colonies export income 
was required to service its debt to Britain.30 From 1889 however Australia’s export 
income was declining due to the onset of drought conditions and falling wool 
prices. The continuation of high levels of capital inflow temporarily concealed 
these factors. The 1891-92 confluence of internal conditions with the external 
event of the collapse of London’s large financial institutions triggered widespread 
bank failures and soaring unemployment in all the colonies, except Western 
Australia. Each colony that came under the grip of the worst depression Australia 
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had experienced, not surprisingly became ‘absorbed’ by ‘political vicissitudes, and 
the stress of urgent local questions’.31  
 
In Queensland the impact of the 1890s depression was extended and devastating. 
The colony had been economically teetering ‘on the brink of a volcano’ since 1887 
and the ‘lamentable state’ of the colony’s financial position had been a prominent 
and determining issue in the 1888 election defeat of the Griffith government.32 
Attempts to reduce expenditure and the introduction of a revenue raising policy of 
full-scale protection failed to prevent the colony recording a deficit of £483,970 in 
1890, making Queensland’s total deficit £969,000.33 Queensland’s tenuous 
position was further aggravated by the return in 1889 of severe drought conditions 
and the escalation in industrial disputes, which climaxed in 1891 with a six-month 
pastoral strike. At breaking point Queensland attempted in mid-May 1891 to raise 
a £2,500,000 loan in London for public works and to cover £1,170,950 interest 
debt that fell due on 1 July 1891.34 The Times referred to Queensland’s 
‘surprisingly unwise action’ as a ‘fiasco’.35 The ‘rebuff’ by the London money 
market the Australian Insurance and Banking Record commented ‘was as 
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complete a failure as has yet been suffered by an Australian colony.’36 
Queensland’s entrenched policy of extensive borrowing for public works, 
principally for the construction of railways and secondly to meet interest payments 
on already borrowed capital was widely held, by mid-1892, to be ‘responsible 
almost solely for the stagnant depression that now afflicts us.37 The failure to 
secure the 1891 loan reflected a growing impatience with the way in which 
Queensland utilised loan money. The Times declared in July 1891, that by the 
‘present fiasco’ Queensland had been ‘shown the necessity of 
discontinuing…expenditure of money raised by loan upon public works.’38 
Stemming from the failure of the government loan, overseas and individual 
investors, throughout 1891 and 1892, began and continued to withdraw their 
money from Queensland banks and finance companies. The cessation of all public 
works and considerable retrenchment in the Civil Service further compounded 
soaring unemployment, especially in Brisbane and in turn further depressed the 
economy. By February 1892 Queensland’s general business was paralysed and 
property was judged to be ‘practically valueless.’39 By May 1893 Queensland’s 
leading financial institution the Queensland National Bank and thirteen other banks 
had suspended business.40 Then when ‘financial troubles seemed 
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insurmountable…the great floods came’.41 The depression reached its nadir in 
1893 and a gradual recovery followed. In 1895 a substantial surplus of £104,738 
was achieved.42 The Queensland premier and treasurer Hugh Nelson however 
warned in his July 1895 Financial Statement that: ‘We are not yet so far out of the 
wood that we can begin to holla’.43  
 
Under the exemplary conditions created by the colony’s worsening financial 
position an extraordinary coalition was formed in 1890 between Sir Samuel Griffith 
and Sir Thomas McIlwraith. Even though the possibility of this coalition had been 
discussed in political circles it still provoked a shocked response from many. A.G. 
Stephens consequently declared:   
no more unlikely thing could have happened. The two had been opponents 
for so long…their conflict had on many occasions been so bitter…that 
obviously only an extraordinary concatenation of circumstances could have 
brought about a coalition about.44 
 
More unexpected was the 1893 departure from political life of these two prominent 
figures in Queensland’s political, social and economic development.45 What 
followed the commanding leadership styles of Griffith and McIlwraith was, as 
Duncan Waterson phrased it, ‘the lackluster continuous ministries with their 
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absence of vibrant personalities’46 In October 1893 Hugh Nelson succeeded as 
premier.  On the issue of territorial separation, Nelson’s 1893 -1898 premiership 
did however present a decisive degree of consistency with his predecessors.47  
 
The separatist issue was one that encapsulated many of Queensland’s distinctive 
qualities. At its core the perennial demands for the territorial subdivision of 
Queensland were both symptomatic and representative of Queensland’s strident 
developmental ethos and resultant political culture. Autonomy and economic 
prosperity were Queensland’s two persuasive themes and not surprisingly they 
constituted the core objectives of each region’s demands for their separation from 
Brisbane’s administration. To safeguard the complete integrity of Queensland’s 
hard fought right ‘to be [the] masters of their situation’, the Queensland parliament 
routinely opposed all petitions for separation and remained indifferent to 
federation.48 What transpired in the 1890s was that each movement became the 
counteroffensive measure to the other. Federation became the ‘red-herring 
drawn…across the trail’ of separation while alternatively separation was described 
as being ‘from the Devil while Federation is from Heaven.’49  
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In 1886 the subject of North Queensland’s territorial separation was indelibly 
interlinked with the broader matter of Australia’s political federation through the 
contentious claim of Samuel Griffith that the main reason for separatist action was 
to secure a coloured labour force. The intrinsic threat of ‘a colony of caste’ being 
established in North Queensland, one antagonistic to the homogenous 
development of a white Australia remained a compelling force in the federal 
movement.50 The Brisbane Courier outlined the broader ramifications of this local 
contention: 
The importance of the separation movement is determined rather by its 
bearing on the future of Australia than merely on the convenience of this 
particular colony….One point to which we think separationists…should 
address themselves, is the effect that the separation of tropical Queensland 
is likely to have on the future dominion of Australia….a race aristocracy, will 
confront the Australian white democracy…we may leave to our children 
such a legacy of evil as that from which America has only rid herself by the 
most terrible fratricidal war which modern world has seen.51  
 
During the 1890s the bearing that Queensland’s coloured labour policy had on the 
question of federation was more consistently and intensely played out in the 
southern colonies. The basis for the ongoing and external disparagement of 
Queensland was Griffith’s February 1892 announcement that the importation of 
‘Kanaka’ labour would be extended for ten years.52 Under Queensland’s 1885 Act 
to Further Amend the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1880, and To Put a Limit to 
its Operation the importation of Pacific Island labour was to cease entirely in 1893. 
The impact of the economic depression was the underlying basis for Griffith’s 
volte-face on his staunch opposition to the employment of coloured labour. In a 
frank statement outlining his decision Griffith accorded ‘much of the blame or 
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credit’ for ‘the existing state of things’ to himself or more specifically to the impact 
of his reforms during his 1883-1888 premiership.53 While Griffith’s decision, 
Governor Norman reported immediately ‘had an excellent effect, and has put heart 
into the Planter community’ it was not well received in the southern colonies.54 The 
Presbyterian Missionary John G. Paton pleaded with Griffith not to renew the 
labour traffic:  
But surely Sir Samuel, you whose praise has been proclaimed all over the 
world, for your humane and wise policy getting this labour traffic 
suppressed in Queensland, because of its crimes and murders, will never 
be to also to condone all by proclaiming its continuation for another ten 
years….I plead most earnestly with you in the interests of humanity, for you 
over honour, and the honour of Queensland  and Australia on no account to 
renew the Polynesian Labour Traffic.55  
 
Griffith was vehemently attacked by the Bulletin who referred to him as ‘Samuel 
Griffith – Nigger Driver’ and his ‘conversion to black labour’ was plainly declared 
as being antithetical to the ‘necessity for preserving Australia for the Australians’.56 
In March 1892 the Pacific Island Labourers (Extension) Act was introduced to the 
Queensland Parliament and passed with little protest. The independent manner in 
which Queensland had acted gave greater cause to the necessity for a Federal 
body to arbitrate such ‘contentious political questions’.57 Henry Parkes condemned 
Queensland’s ‘readiness to engage in a parleying with slavery’ and put it forward 
as a definitive rationale for federation:  
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Queensland has considered the question without your leave or advice, and 
has decided for herself. Sir Samuel Griffith has gone through his 
recantation, and has deliberately shifted his footing from the rock to the 
sand….Queensland has acted within her constitutional right, and she knows 
it, and proudly tells the intermeddlers around her to mind their own 
business. But there is above and beyond Queensland a more powerful 
voice – the voice of the free people of Australia….If her neighbours have no 
status for active interference, they have the right and the duty of 
remonstrance; and the right and duty to let the world know that this 
diseased passion for degraded labour is confined within the borders of 
Queensland….the colonies…should speak out the true voice of all and 
insist upon the preservation of this Australian land for an Australian 
Commonwealth58    
 
Throughout the decade there was an ‘ominous silence’ on the question of 
indentured Melanesian labour in the Queensland Parliament while in contrast 
external forces harnessed the issue as a rallying force for federation.59 A Federal 
parliament, it was repeatedly argued, would ‘put a very speedy and effective check 
on the coloured aliens’.60 Though Griffith publicly acknowledged in October 1890 
that the ‘coloured labour’ charge was defunct in North Queensland’s separatist 
demands the region remained the exemplar case for ‘White Australia’.  
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The Bulletin’s map of Australia - showing the progress of federation up to date. 
Figure 6.2:  The Bulletin, 4 February 1899 
 
Within Queensland, contrary to the colony’s indifference to the federal question, 
the prospect of the coming federation was employed as a tactical device to impede 
the separatist aspirations of north and central Queensland. One of the 
fundamental assumptions of both the Northern and emergent Central Separation 
Leagues, based on an examination of the relevant Imperial Acts, was that the 
power to grant territorial separation rested exclusively with the Crown.61 It was also 
determined that the consent of Queensland’s parliament was not required as a 
pre-condition to the implementation of the Crown’s separation powers for it was 
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not ‘even alluded to’ in the Imperial legislation.62 The opposing views of the 
Queensland government were therefore judged to be immaterial to the 
consideration of their petitions to the Queen. This fundamental position perpetually 
determined the strategies of separationists.  
 
Each successive Queensland government had opposed any regional demand for 
the subdivision of the colony. Separatists therefore strategically bypassed the local 
parliamentary process and presented their case by means of letters, petitions and 
deputations directly to the British Colonial Office. The central issue therefore was 
whether the Crown lawfully had the power to erect, by Letters Patent, a separate 
colony out of the territory of Queensland. The Colonial Office referred the matter to 
the Crown Law Officers. Their report concluded that the powers conferred by the 
1855 Imperial Act had been exhausted by the creation of Queensland and that a 
new Act would therefore be necessary to grant the Crown the power to divide 
Queensland. This proved to be an impenetrable barrier for the separatist cause. 
The Imperial Government could not interfere, without the assent of the 
Queensland Parliament, with the internal affairs of Queensland. To ‘give the go-by 
to a Responsible Government’ legislature’ would have assuredly provoked 
significant protest and resentment from not only Queensland but from all the 
Australian colonies who jealously guarded their powers of self-government.63 The 
opinion of the Queensland parliament consequently became a precondition for 
Imperial action.  
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In March 1890, Queensland’s Premier Boyd Morehead, in a report on a letter 
declaring the case for northern separation and addressed to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, argued that it was inopportune to consider the separation of 
northern Queensland in view of the probable federation of the Australian colonies, 
which would establish a parliament capable of adjusting the boundaries of the 
several colonies.64 This was at odds with Morehead’s known support of 
separation. Queensland’s Agent General remarked in December 1888 that 
Morehead ‘talks freely of separation’.65 The reasoning Morehead outlined to 
Parliament was that ‘as Premier I was bound, even if it was a bad case, to protect 
the integrity of the colony.’66 There was, in evidence, a tacitly accepted view that 
the preservation of the colony’s integrity was, despite personal views, the higher 
duty of each government. Weakening Morehead’s federal argument was the 
assertion by Queensland’s Governor Sir Henry Norman that it ‘may be a long time 
before Federation is accomplished’67. The Colonial Office stalled and then 
concurred with Morehead’s referral of the question to the federal parliament. 
Federation as a consequence increasingly played a prominent part in the 
arguments against separation.    
 
A feature of Griffith’s second premiership (August 1890 to March 1893) was a 
determination to subordinate the cause of separation through the advancement of 
                                                                                                                                                    
63
 Robert Herbert, 18 January 1885, Colonial Office Minute, 16 January 1885, Queensland Despatch No.88, 
CO234/46 Queensland Original Correspondence, AJCP. 
64
 On the retirement of Sir Thomas McIlwraith due to ill-health Boyd Morehead became the head of the 
Government in November 1888. Bernays succinctly described Morehead’s ministry as ‘unsuccessful’ and its 
short-lived reign ended in August 1890 when the Morehead Government resigned over the land tax proposal.. 
Morehead to Governor Norman, 28 March 1890, QVP, 1 (1890): 822-23; Bernays, Queensland Politics During 
Sixty (1859-1919) Years: 74. 
65
 James Garrick to Griffith, 28th December 1888, 'Sir Samuel Walker Griffith Papers. Correspondence, 1887-
1891. MSQ 187',  
66
 Morehead, QPD, 62 (1890): 1367.  
67
 Sir Samuel Griffith remarked of Norman’s sympathetic leaning toward separation and his resultant 
comments to the Secretary of State that he had been “made the victim of a company organised Separation 
336 
the federal objective. Griffith informed Lady Musgrave in October 1890 that ‘the 
separation question is very much in my hands at present’.68 In correspondence 
with Sir Henry Parkes he emphasised the interconnection between separation and 
federation: 
 I…have for some time been intending to write…but all my spare moments 
have been taken up with the difficulties connected with the Separation 
question in this colony, which is, as you know, intimately connected, with 
the question of Federation.69  
 
In Townsville in December 1890 Griffith informed separationists of the futility of 
their petitions:  
I tell you that your deputations to Lord Knutsford are simply beating the 
air….I venture to say that you may send as many as you like, but you will 
be told on every occasion that you must first go to the Queensland 
Parliament.70 
 
Griffith not surprisingly urged the Colonial Office in December 1890, to postpone 
its consideration of a joint petition of the Northern and Central Leagues until the 
Federal Convention in Sydney, in March 1891, had decided upon the respective 
powers of the federal and state governments. Griffith had however clearly stated in 
the Queensland Parliament, in July 1890, what form the powers of the Federal 
government were likely to assume:   
the Federal Parliament shall be prohibited from altering the boundaries of 
any colony without its express consent, and I think that may be taken for 
granted. No colony is going to give a Federal Parliament the power to cut it 
up into pieces at the sweet will of the other colonies.71  
 
With Griffith as one of the principle authors of the 1891 Commonwealth Bill, 
Clause 5 Chapter VI consequently stated: ‘A new state shall not be formed by 
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separation of territory from a State without the consent of the Parliament thereof’.72 
Leading Central separationists, John Ferguson, John Murray and George Curtis, 
immediately sent telegrams of protest to Griffith, Parkes and McIlwraith, asserting 
that the inclusion of such a clause was a gross injustice and effectively blocked the 
creation of any new states.73 Griffith contradictorily replied that ‘after Federation 
there would be no difficulty in Parliament agreeing to such a division of 
Queensland’.74 Griffith’s adoption of the slogan ‘Federation before Separation’ 
denoted clearly the primacy of the federal cause to that of the separatists. 
Underpinning this was firstly the fundamental concern that the division of 
Queensland would weaken the colony’s negotiating power in both the federal 
process and the future federal parliament, and secondly the potential economic 
ramifications of separation.  
 
The North Queensland Separation League countered the first of these arguments 
by citing Parkes’ 1889 statement that ‘such a subdivision of colonies of excessive 
area as would secure at least ultimate equality of federal power must precede 
either Colonial or Imperial Federation of Australia.’75 In the North and Central 
districts it was therefore argued that separation would assist federation by serving 
to equalise colonial territories. Governor Norman’s assessment of the question 
argued the federal advantages of Queensland remaining one colony and outlined 
the inherent problem for separationists:  
Looking at the question of separation from a general Queensland point of 
view…there can be no doubt that in a Federated Australian Parliament the 
views and interests of Queensland would be more likely to have weight if 
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Queensland was one great and increasingly colony as at present…instead 
of being two or three smaller colonies….As to the question of separation 
standing over in order that it may be dealt with in a Federal Parliament, 
there seems to be a good deal in the contention that it may be long a long 
time before federation is accomplished, nor does it seem that there is any 
particular reason why, if the Northern Queenslanders desire separation, 
their desire should be subject to the approval of Tasmania and other distant 
colonies with which hitherto they have had little or no connection.76  
 
In 1898 Queensland’s Premier James Dickson restated the fundamental concern 
that Queensland’s position would be weakened if the colony joined the federal 
compact as three colonies: 
The multiplication of small and feeble States does not command itself as a 
desirable feature in Imperial policy. A divided Queensland would become 
an insignificant factor, impotent for good, but not incapable of proving a 
source of embarrassment, in any scheme of Australian or Imperial 
federation.77 
 
Economic factors were a prominent and recurrent feature of all petitions for 
separation and centred primarily on the disproportionate distribution of the 
colonies revenues and allocation of consolidated loans. Extensive financial 
statistics were produced and incorporated to support each region’s case of neglect 
and misappropriation and to demonstrate their financially capacity to maintain a 
separate government.78 The impact of separation on Queensland’s economic 
prosperity was the counter response. Morehead canvassed the problem of the 
difficulty of arranging the division of the loans debentures raised in London by 
Queensland as a whole. He therefore declared that ‘a very serious responsibility to 
the public creditor is involved in the question of this separation and 
dismemberment of the colony.’79 Premier Hugh Nelson in February 1894 made 
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reference to Queensland’s weaken financial position consequent to the economic 
depression:  
No time could be worse chosen for bringing into prominence a disturbing 
topic of this nature than the present period, when the united efforts of the 
whole colony are required to make head against the disastrous effects of a 
crisis which has hardly yet passed over.80 
 
The Colonial Office generally consented to these economic arguments either on 
the basis that they were a valid claim or that they provided a reasonable means to 
extricate the Imperial government from action. A Colonial Office minute in 
response to Nelson’s letter demonstrated the latter:  
It is desirable to avoid as long as possible questions which provoke 
controversy locally. The line to take at the present moment seems to me to 
be that indicated at the conclusion of Mr. Nelson’s letter – that the present 
financial and commercial position of the colony is unfavourable to any 
scheme of territorial separation.81 
 
The Colonial Office to prevent the encouragement of sectional tendencies made 
use of the progress of the federation movement as a convenient pretext for 
delaying legislative action on petitions for separation, and ultimately avoided the 
need to intervene in what was considered a local contention. Imperial interference 
it was argued was ‘inconsistent with the respect which they [the Imperial 
Government] were bound to show to the legislatures of self-governing colonies.’82 
The reservation of the Imperial authorities was further assisted by Griffith’s 1891-
1892 scheme to create separate Provincial Legislatures.  
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Figure 6.3:  The Boomerang, 10 October, 1891 
 
Griffith’s provincial scheme was first an acknowledgement that some modification 
of the system under which the colony was administered was required and second 
it was an attempt to find a compromise that would have had the potential to 
combine the advantages of decentralisation without destroying the political unity of 
the colony and the advantages of a central government. A Bill to ‘Provide for the 
Division of the Colony of Queensland into Provinces, and for the Better 
Government of the Colony’ was introduced into parliament in August 1892 and 
provided for the establishment, in Southern, Central and Northern districts, of 
separate legislative and executive authorities with full powers of legislation and 
government.83 As ‘a viable option’ to separation Griffith’s provincial scheme was 
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seen, the Review of Reviews remarked, as ‘the political germ of the Federal 
Australian Commonwealth.’84 The North opposed ‘Griffith’s Federation scheme’ 
arguing that it was not a reasonable substitute to territorial separation and that it 
should more accurately be titled the ‘Brisbane Preservation Bill for it can be plainly 
seen that its main object is to benefit the south at the expense of the North.’85 The 
Bill was however rejected in the Legislative Assembly on the basis of an 
amendment that objected to the proposed establishment of a Central Province and 
advocated ‘the division of the colony into two provinces’.86 In August 1892 Griffith 
successfully reintroduced an amended Bill, which proposed a bi-provincial 
arrangement with the centre forming part of southern Queensland. In the 
Legislative Council on the 27 October 1892 ‘it met with a very short shrift indeed’ 
being rejected by 17 to 9 on technical grounds, that as a measure for the 
amendment of the Constitution, it had not been carried by a two-thirds majority in 
the Assembly.87 Central members bitterly resented their district’s exclusion from 
the scheme, and an ‘Indignation meeting’ was held in Rockhampton to protest the 
action where, ‘[t]hree members of Parliament [were] burnt in effigy and while they 
were burning…an alderman fired a cannon…and blew them to pieces.’88 That the 
North ‘had turned dog’ on the Centre resulted in an irreparable split of the alliance 
between the two movements.89  
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A revival of the now distinct central and northern separation movements followed 
the failure of Griffith’s provincial scheme, and each group re-opened 
correspondence with the Colonial Office through the submission of ‘extraordinarily 
able and argumentative documents’.90 Separation as an issue began to wane in 
North Queensland after 1894 and progressively the North’s ambivalence to the 
South was redirected towards support for Federation for it was argued that it 
‘offered a solution to Northern problems’ by conferring the same benefits as 
separation.91 In the same period the movement for federation had stalled in all the 
colonies as a consequence of political, social and economic dislocation of the 
1891-1893 depression.  
 
Contrary to the 1895 revival of the federation movement in the other Australian 
colonies Queensland remained ‘especially lukewarm’ to the proposal.92 Renewed 
activity however drew forth another evasive answer on separation from the 
Colonial Office. In January 1896 consistent with the Colonial Office policy of 
deferment Joseph Chamberlain, the new Secretary for State, postponed a 
decision on separation until the attainment of federation. While asserting that the 
question of separation was ‘pre-eminently one which should be decided by local 
agreement’ Chamberlain consoled the separatist cause by referring them to the 
future federal government: 
Her Majesty’s Government would not be justified in asking the Imperial 
Parliament to undertake so delicate and difficult task, especially in the face 
of opposition of a large majority of the representatives of the colony. Most, if 
not all, of these difficulties will disappear should the several colonies of 
Australia enter into a federal union at an early date…. then the extension of 
complete autonomy in purely local matters will be comparatively easy, and 
the people of Central Queensland will no doubt find the Federal Parliament, 
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when constituted, ready to listen to any reasonable scheme which may be 
submitted to it.93 
 
This outlook diverged significantly from Griffith’s 1890 view and the 1891 
Commonwealth Bill which both had outlined the difficulties of attaining territorial 
separation after federation. Informing Parliament of Chamberlain’s statement, the 
Member for Rockhampton, George Curtis stated that ‘Separationists desirous of 
obtaining the management of their own affairs…have been told quite recently by 
Mr. Chamberlain….that they must look to a future federal parliament for the 
realisation of their aspirations.’94 The fortunes of separation were again entwined 
with those of federation. That the two movements could be seen as 
complementary bolstered support for federation from both the North and Central 
districts. A. Heron-Wilson, a Member of the Queensland Legislative Council, 
asserted in a interview with the Sydney Morning Herald in January 1897: ‘[w]ith 
regard to Central and North Queensland there is no doubt a number of people 
would go for Federation on any ground to enable them to get the separation from 
Southern Queensland they have been asking for so long.’95 This dual approval of 
the two movements was not new: Henry Lawson had noted that in Rockhampton, 
the headquarters of the Central Queensland Territorial Separation League, in 1891  
‘they Rave for Federation while they Howl for Separation’.96 Separatist issues 
however took precedence in the 1896/97 debates on the Federal Enabling Bill.  
 
In 1896 Premier Nelson submitted to Parliament for debate, the Federal Enabling 
Bill, which provided for the representation of Queensland at the proposed Federal 
Convention in Adelaide. On the motion for the second reading Curtis moved an 
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amendment to provide direct popular election of delegates rather than the 
proposed scheme of the government to have the delegates elected by the 
members of the House of Assembly. Nelson’s bill departed substantially from the 
understanding made at the 1895 Hobart Premier’s Conference and as a result he 
received strong criticism from all Colonial Premiers except John Forrest, the 
Western Australian Premier, who had adopted a similar scheme.97 The bill did 
however provide for the election of delegates on the basis of the three districts, the 
proportion of five delegates to southern electorates, two for the Central and three 
for the North.98 The Legislative Assembly passed the bill, in July 1896. The 
Legislative Council objected to the fact that both Houses were not involved in the 
election and sought amendment. The Assembly denied the representative 
character of the Council as it was a nominee house and consequently refused to 
amend the bill. The deadlock resulted in the Bill being laid aside.99  
 
The veracity with which Nelson put forth the case for federation is however 
tempered by his overt advocacy of the Federal Council. He believed that the 
limited compact enacted in the Federal Council, ‘sufficed for all practical 
purposes.’100 Moreover, in January 1897 at the Federal Council meeting in Hobart 
Nelson, aided by Queensland’s Attorney-General Thomas Byrnes, introduced a 
motion to make provision for ‘the functions, powers, and authority of the Federal 
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Council of Australasia’ to be strengthened by making representation on an elective 
basis.101 The motion was strongly debated and was defeated by the casting vote 
of the Council’s President Sir Edward Braddon Tasmania premier. That Nelson 
acknowledged in November 1896 that ‘he did not attach so much importance to 
the Federal Convention as some people did’ positions the separation question as 
a convenient matter to preclude Queensland’s representation at the Convention.102  
 
Two further attempts were made in 1897 to pass the Enabling Bill. Central and 
Northern members again submitted an amendment to have delegates elected 
through popular election. They asserted that this ‘was far more beneficial in the 
interests of Federation and of Queensland.’103 Mr Stewart, Member for 
Rockhampton North, saw the government’s proposal as an indication that it was 
‘afflicted with a disease which might very well be termed ‘electrophobia’. They 
have as much fear of appealing to the country as a mad dog has of drinking 
water.’104  Furthermore, as the bill proposed the election of delegates as one 
division, it was urged that three separate electorates be constituted. Curtis 
asserted that this would prevent southern Queensland, where ‘a considerable 
portion of whom…are absolutely hostile to Federation’, dictating the choice of the 
colony’s representatives through their majority and consequently ‘prejudice and 
disadvantage the people of Central and Northern Queensland who…are in favour 
of Federation.’105 Curtis argued that representation would protect their interests 
and enable the alteration of the new state clause in the Federal Constitution, which 
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was ‘a distinct menace to the rights, claims, and aspirations of the people of 
Central and Northern Queensland’.106 Although Nelson did not object to the three 
electorates, no such provision was embodied in this Bill and on this ground Curtis 
moved against it and this was carried by an alliance of separationists, Labour 
members, and some southern members who opposed the bill as protectionists. As 
a result Queensland did not participate in the 1897/98 Federal Convention. Nelson 
claimed that the government had been ‘made slaves to the separationists, and 
nothing else.’107 Sir James Dickson asserted in May 1899 ‘One thing is very 
obvious from the division…that several gentlemen who were Federationist’s 
placed separation before Federation.’108 This claim was to be played out more fully 
during Queensland’s 1899 federal referendum campaign.  
 
Of the 1897 draft Constitution Sir Henry Norman, by now Queensland’s ex-
Governor, stated: ‘The draft no doubt requires much revision, but whether it will be 
made more palatable to Queensland after vision than it is at present is doubtful.’109 
For Central Queensland separatists the most indigestible aspect of the 
Commonwealth bill was the retention of the new state clauses of particular note 
was Clause 123. This clause provided that ‘a new State may be formed by 
separation of territory from a State, but only with the consent of the Parliament 
thereof’ and was based on Griffith’s draft bill of 1891.110   
  
The inclusion of Clause 123 was a huge blow for the Central Queensland 
Territorial Separation League, because the Central district had sent Queensland’s 
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only petition to the Federal Convention. The petition asked: ‘[t]hat as an act of 
simple justice…that provision may be made…for the admission of the present 
colony of Queensland into the federation as three separate autonomous Provinces 
or States.’111 To meet the case of Northern and Central Queensland a clause was 
proposed, at the Melbourne session of the convention, to reserve the powers held 
by the Queen ‘in respect of the division of Queensland into two or more 
colonies’.112 Northern and Central Separation Leagues telegraphed their support 
for the clause. At this time Barton consulted with the Queensland government. 
Premier Nelson’s reply was that the proposed clause would injure the prospects of 
federation in Queensland. The clause was as a result dropped and the original 
New State clause adopted.113 Curtis stated at a Conference of Central Separation 
Members in January 1899 that as a result of this ‘obnoxious clause….a crisis had 
been reached in the history of the movement’.114  
 
By 1899, the connection between federation and separation was more prominent 
in the Central districts than in the North, separationists did however compose a 
significant sector of the northern opposition to the Commonwealth Bill, colloquially 
referred to as ‘Anti-Billites’. The bearing that the separatist issue had in 
Queensland’s consideration of the federal proposal was dramatically illustrated in 
S.A. Rosa 1899 claim that: 
It is not surprising the Queenslanders are not federal enthusiasts, for should 
any slight disturbance occur in connection with their coloured labour 
question, or with the agitation for separation, it is very probable that federal 
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troops from another State would be employed to invade Queensland and 
massacre Queenslanders.115 
 
In Queensland’s July to September 1899 referendum campaign the links between 
separation and federation were more fully played out in Central Queensland.116 
 
 
Figure 6.4:  The Worker, 1 July 1899 
 
The principal topic of the central separationists’ campaign was the impact that 
federation would have on their demands for separation, in particular the pivotal 
Clause 123. It was as a consequence repeatedly argued that while Central 
Queensland was in favour of federation, but it could not support the Bill because of 
‘the injustice, unwisdom, and dangerous’ provisions of the123rd clause.117 
Acceptance would extract ‘a far greater sacrifice…than any other part of Australia’, 
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and sound the death knell of their prospects of attaining self-government in Central 
Queensland.118 Separation it was declared must be paramount over federation: ‘If 
there are any men in Central Queensland they will raise the standard of 
‘Separation First,’ total separation from the iniquitous union forced upon the people 
of Australia’.119 So concentrated was the argument on Clause 123 that the Daily 
Record gratefully acknowledged Mr. Penington for sending in ‘a letter that does 
not even mention the 123rd clause.’120  However there was to be little deviation 
from the separatist’s strategy throughout the referendum campaign.   
 
In spite of Dickson’s assertion in January 1899 that separation was dead, except 
for a ‘few enthusiasts in Rockhampton who are still crying in the wilderness,’121 a 
concerted campaign was mounted by federationists to abate separatist opposition 
to the bill. The strength of the campaign draws into question Dickson’s claim and 
highlights that separation in Central Queensland was still a political force that 
needed to be contended with. The Central Queensland Federation League issued 
several handbills on the topic of separation, in which different argumentative 
strategies were employed. One argued ‘that Federation won’t make the Central 
Queensland Separation problem a whit worse or better than it is now’ and directed 
separatists’ attention to the Imperial Colonial Boundaries Act of 1895 which like 
Clause 123 also required the consent of a self-governing colony for the alteration 
of boundaries.122 An alternative approach was based on the amendment 
capabilities of Clause 127. The handbill outlined in detail, including a suggested 
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draft amendment, two courses of action that would provide for the division of 
Queensland into three states after federation had been achieved. The author 
exploited regional distrust of the southern government to further push the point 
that the mode of amendment in the Commonwealth bill was likely to be ‘favourable 
to Central and Northern Queensland’, it was asserted that ‘[p]ossibly Mr Dickson 
did not fully comprehend the effect of the amendment to clause 127 when he gave 
it his sanction.’123   
 
The conflicting arguments raised by separatists’ and federationist’s’ over the 
likelihood of separation being achieved post-Federation, promoted through the 
rival dictums of ‘Separation First’ and ‘Federation before Separation’, created 
confusion in the minds of Central voters. Separatists consequently argued that the 
federation before Separation case represented a deliberate tactic by the southern 
opponents of separation in their to ‘squash’ separation and they warned the:  
Men of the Centre…do not let these political stockmen, with their loud 
cracking whips, round you up like so many cattle, and having goaded you to 
a momentary frenzy, rush you blindly into this Federation paddock. Ware 
barbed wire! 124   
 
The question of separation was still of sufficient importance at the end of the 
referendum campaign to attract eight out of eight letters to the editor in 
Rockhampton’s Morning Bulletin on 31 August 1899.125 
 
The federalist campaign was well organised and held a definite advantage over 
the anti-Billite cause. Press coverage and the distribution of numerous handbills 
provided in regional areas a wide range of coverage of the federalist case. Public 
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speakers, mostly politicians, including a number of converted advocates of 
separation first, who performed an important part of the ‘yes’ case and in their 
attempts to change the allegiance of voters they often astutely modified their 
arguments for federation in accordance to regional concerns. In the north Robert 
Philp, once a prominent member of the Townsville Separation League, drew on 
the idea that federation, through the establishment of intercolonial free-trade, 
would confer the same benefits as separation. Philp consequently argued, at a 
Billite meeting in Townsville in July 1899, that federation would in fact provide the 
means for achieving separation, because through its introduction of intercolonial 
free-trade the main reason of the South for retaining the North would be 
removed.126 In August 1899, James Drake toured Central Queensland ‘as a 
missionary in the cause of Federation’.127 While Drake stated later of 
Rockhampton that the central issue was, ‘the 123rd clause, morning, noon, and 
night’ he wisely made no specific mention of the clause. Rather he promoted the 
reform capabilities of the bill and only vaguely prophesied that after federation was 
achieved, the way would be opened at once for the subdivision of the ‘unwieldy 
states’.128 Curtis rebuked Drake for his avoidance of the topic in the Morning 
Bulletin, while on the same day ‘A Voice from the Back Blocks’ bemoaned the 
federalists’ ‘labyrinth of irrelevant data’ presented to show how easy it would be to 
attain separate states.129 
In the latter stages of the campaign the level of disparaging and abusive remarks 
increased. George Wilkinson questioned whether it was necessary for the 
‘champions’ of the Commonwealth Bill to buttress their case with so many harsh 
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epithets: “Here are a few specimens culled at random…’local aunties;’ ‘flaunting 
their parochial petticoats;’…’separation-firsters;’ ‘poly glot anti-feds;’ ‘ultra-
seps’’..130 The Queenslander accused Curtis, who was described by his 
supporters as ‘the great apostle of Separation First’, of being blinded by his love of 
separation and further that ‘he must be aware that his proposals would only rouse 
anger or the ridicule of the other colonies. Nothing would so block separation 
along Federation lines as the block of Federation by the aid of separatists.’131 
Conspiracy theories also surfaced: Curtis claimed that on good authority he had 
been told that £6000 had been sent from New South Wales to Brisbane ‘to buy the 
Queensland vote.’132 The Rockhampton Morning Bulletin claimed, in late August, 
that Philp’s warm advocacy of the Bill was the result of an arrangement between 
Philp and Dickson whereby, on the establishment of the Commonwealth the North 
would be granted separation and ‘the Central District lamb be gobbled up between 
the North and the South’133 While the Northern Queensland Register found the 
accusation worthy of ridicule, such a claim drew heavily on the Central district’s 
long-standing resentment of the North. The Week also complained that the 
Premier and the Treasurer were ‘stirring up bitter feeling and strife in the North’.134 
Tensions were clearly mounting,  ‘E. N. R’, asserted in his 1899 pamphlet, ‘[i]n 
Queensland at any rate it is plain…that there is dangerous material ready to take 
fire if the friction between the South and the Centre and North increases.’135 
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Separation was but one of a vast array of issues aired in Queensland’s ten-week 
referendum campaign. By the day of polling 2nd September, an exceptional 
atmosphere of tension and excitement in Queensland had developed: 
A great fight was to be fought, but not with fire and steel. Queensland stood 
in the centre of all Australian thought. In her hands rested for the time much 
of the wider hope of ‘That Commonwealth which yet shall be Mistress o’er 
the Southern Sea!”136 
 
The results of the referendum results would validate James Drake’s August 1899 
assessment of the separatist issue: ‘opposition is confined to the Separation party 
in Rockhampton and a few of the wild extremists in the West.’  Almost 77 per cent 
of Rockhampton’s eligible electors turned out (the second highest turnout) to vote 
overwhelmingly against federation.137 The Central West voted for federation, 
although its electorates had significantly lower ‘YES’ votes than similar adjoining 
electorates to the north and south. Separation and the concentration on Clause 
123 clearly affected the attitude of Rockhampton to federation but as a whole 
Central Queensland separation did not decisively impact on the referendum result. 
North Queensland alternatively voted 4 to 1 in favour of federation, such a strong 
result in the north it has been asserted was partly attributable ‘to the feeling that an 
affinity existed between federation and separation, and that federation offered a 
solution to Northern problems.’138 Further it may be presumed that die-hard 
separationists made up a significant proportion of the 16 per cent ‘NO’ vote in the 
North.139 It is therefore evident that despite the persistence and formidable support 
of the separation movement federation was given primacy over the hope of a 
separate political existence. Although anti-Billites in the South were almost silent 
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on the issue of separation throughout the campaign it immediately attacked the 
outcome of the referendum and claimed that ‘[t]he tail was wagging the dog. 
Having failed to obtain separation, the Separationists are now dragging Southern 
Queensland into a union which it is inclined to regard with rather craven fear.’140 
The bearing that the various separatist causes had on the referendum verdict was 
practically the last direct influence of the question upon Queensland’s politics. The 
new state clauses of the Commonwealth Constitution affected the decline of 
separatist activity to that of spasmodic and ineffective action.  
 
Capitalising on Major General Edwards’ October 1889 ‘exposure of the 
defenceless position of Australia against attack’ Sir Henry Parkes initiated ‘a new 
era in the Federal movement.’141 The necessity for a national scheme for defence 
became the basis of removing the question of federation from ‘the mere 
sentimental airiness in which it has existed for some years past, and brought it into 
the region of practical politics.’142 The 1891 construction of the ‘The Constitution of 
the Commonwealth of Australia’ signalled to many that Australian federation might 
be ‘adopted without delay as the Federal Constitution of Australia.’143 The reality 
proved more difficult. Alfred Deakin’s 1895 assessment of the situation was that 
‘The Commonwealth Constitution was a fine structure, but it was like Robinson 
Crusoe’s canoe; when he had built it he had difficulty in getting it into the water.’144 
A significant obstacle to colonies taking any further action on the Commonwealth 
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Bill was that they had ‘found themselves in a vortex of financial disaster’.145 The 
onset of a severe and world wide economic depression sharply turned attention 
from the federal question towards the more urgent local matter of averting their 
colony’s economic ruin. Whilst the other Australian colonies renewed their federal 
efforts from 1895 Queensland remained indifferent and the ‘federation ship 
continue[d] to sail on without Queensland.’146 Throughout the decade local issues 
persistently eclipsed any consideration of the federal question in Queensland. One 
issue that influenced the federal idea’s progress in Queensland was the perennial 
demand for the territorial subdivision of the colony. The coexistence of separation 
and federation, the Queensland Punch satirically depicted in July 1891 possessed 
the hallmarks of an impending conflict: 
There’s bound to be a row,  
We think we hear it now. 
There’s Separation and the Strike, 
There’s Federation and the like – 
There’s bound to be a row.147 
 
Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century the relationship between 
federation and separation was a recurrent issue for debate. The revival of the 
federal prospects in the early 1890s saw the relationship become more intimate, 
with federation repeatedly impinging on separatist attempts to achieve territorial 
division. To protect the integrity of Queensland’s autonomy and economic 
prosperity was the fundamental underpinning of each successive government’s 
opposition to demands for the subdivision of the colony. Inconsistent with 
Queensland’s lack of interest in the advancement of the federal cause, the 
purported imminence of federation was used as compelling grounds for the 
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Imperial Government’s deferment of any pronouncement on the separatist 
petitions of North and Central Queensland. The fatal impediment to the separatist 
cause was the inclusion of the ‘New State’ clause in the Constitution Bill, which 
stated that ‘a new state shall not be formed by separation of territory from a State 
without the consent of the Parliament thereof’.148 Efforts to counter this clause 
were derailed when an amendment to have Queensland’s delegates to the 
1897/98 National Australasian Convention elected from three electorates was 
defeated. Central and northern members with the aid of Labour members in 
response voted against the Federal Enabling Bill and as a result of ‘internal 
political difficulties’ Queensland was not represented at the final and decisive 
1897/98 Australasian Convention on the federal question.149 The retention of the 
new state clause in the 1897/98 reworked Constitution Bill as Clause 123 
prompted Central Queensland separationists to oppose federation on the terms 
proposed and despite a concerted campaign by federationist’s, Rockhampton, the 
seat of central Queensland’s separatist campaign voted decisively against 
federation. For North Queensland the prospective ‘delights of federation’ of 
conferring on the north the same benefits as separation produced an 
overwhelming majority for federation in the region, which to the consternation of 
Southern Queensland resulted in Queensland being ‘dragged into the Federation 
by the Northern vote’.150 In the Legislative Council in October 1899 W.H. Wilson 
declared that ‘the people of Queensland have given their verdict….The time for 
contention on the question of federation has…passed’.151 
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Conclusion 
 
Queensland is in many respects the most interesting colony of the 
Australasian group….every phase of colonial life may be found in Queensland. 
Unfortunately every fault of colonial life may also be found there – and not 
seldom in an exaggerated form.1  
 
 
The creation of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901 through the political 
federation of the six Australian colonies ‘is a story rich with alternative versions and 
different perspectives.’2 The present study offers a new perspective on Queensland’s 
involvement in the Australian Federation Movement. The Queensland chapter has 
long been one of the unresolved ‘dark spots’ in the movement’s historiography.3 This 
study attributes the tendency to ‘gloss over’ Queensland’s part in the movement to 
fixed elements within the standard analytical approach to the federal topic, principally 
the enduring historiographical focus on the formal political negotiations that occurred 
at the various intercolonial federal conferences and conventions in the 1890s. In the 
foundational texts on the federal achievement these intercolonial proceedings 
emerged as the significant markers that delineate the movement’s progress towards 
the inevitable accomplishment of nationhood. In documenting the celebrated moves 
that shaped the destiny of Australia the principal authors, who were also the principal 
‘actors in the political drama’, set aside those features that detracted from the central 
theme of progress. Those prominent internal colonial issues that shaped a colony’s 
response to the federal idea were marginalised. The basic shortcoming of the 
conventional account of federation was that it obscured the complexity of the multiple 
realities within the Australian context in which there existed six distinct and 
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independent ‘nations’. In effect the federation movement was artificially lifted out of 
the individual and dynamic settings of each Australian colony to establish a ‘shared’ 
national account of federation. Yet, it is the position of this study that it was within 
these geographically and politically bounded communities that the federal idea was 
considered, ignored and ultimately decided upon. There were as a result, as Brian de 
Garis argued ‘six federation movements rather than one’.4 Despite significant 
developments in the study of Australian history, the Australian Federation Movement 
continues to be largely depicted in the orthodox manner with the intercolonial 
conferences and conventions of the 1890s remaining the principal staging posts for 
the extended historical narratives. From the Queensland perspective this is 
particularly problematic. The continued application of this interpretative framework 
will effectively maintain the marginal status of Queensland in the federal account for 
fundamentally Queensland’s participation in the federal movement did not adhere to 
the movement’s orthodox markers.  
 
Queensland’s involvement in the federal movement was contemporarily described as 
being ‘somewhat different from that of the other colonies’ and this was primarily 
because Queensland did not send delegates to the 1893 Corowa Conference or to 
the 1896 Bathurst Convention or to the final and decisive 1897/98 National 
Australasian Federation Convention.5 Yet, despite these absences Queensland did 
vote in September 1899 to join the federal compact. The standard markers of the 
movement’s progress therefore cease to be tenable in the Queensland context. To 
construct a more complete depiction of Queensland’s part in the political movement 
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to create Australia’s federal system of government, this thesis has argued that 
federation was essentially a peripheral matter that had to negotiate a course through 
and interact with the internal social, political and economic dynamics of the colony of 
Queensland. 
 
The start date for this study was set by the almost simultaneous occurrence of 
Queensland attainment of its independence and self-government in December 1859 
and the first political consideration of the federal question by Queensland’s Executive 
Council in June 1860. The 1859 – 1901 timeframe, while it is at odds with the usual 
1890s focus, presents a distinct period to examine the corresponding (in time) 
developments of the new colony of Queensland into an independent social, political 
and economic entity and the federal idea into a nationally defining question. The 
origins of internal matters that develop into perennial concerns for Queensland are 
distinguishable, in conjunction with the emergence of a distinctive pattern in 
Queensland’s contemplation of the federal question.   
 
Understanding what type of community Queensland was and was becoming are key 
components to examining Queensland’s participation in the Australian Federation 
Movement. The foundational period of Australia’s youngest colony Queensland had a 
deep and lasting impact upon the form and manner of the colony’s political culture 
and the subsequent focus and direction of its actions.  
 
In December 1859, after a protracted and bitter campaign, the Moreton Bay District 
depreciatingly described ‘as a miserable hole’, gained its territorial separation from 
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the ‘Mother’ colony New South Wales.6 Though scant on population, revenue and 
political experience there was locally boundless optimism over the future prospects of 
this ‘favoured infant nation’.7 As a consequence there existed from the outset a 
fervent determination to rapidly overhaul Queensland’s delayed start and propel it 
towards a leading position among the other Australian colonies. This and the under-
developed nature of the colony’s vast expanse of territory led to the implementation, 
by successive Queensland governments, of a particularly strident developmental 
regime. The dynamics of Queensland’s entrepreneurial style of politics introduced 
individualistic policies and qualities, which had an enduring and often turbulent 
impact on the colony’s local political environment.  
 
At the commencement of Queensland’s process of development, the land within its 
territorial borders was the colony’s principal asset and pastoralism its only 
economically productive industry. The vital link therefore between economic 
prosperity, pastoralism and the continual expansion of the frontier was immediately 
established and reinforced through favourable land legislation introduced by a 
pastoralist-dominated parliament. The pace and extent of the resulting ‘squatting 
stampede’ instituted characteristic elements that had a lasting though variable 
bearing on Queensland’s consideration of the federal question, that of regionalism 
and the colony’s pragmatic adoption of economically expedient policies.8  
 
The pre- and post-separation incursions of pastoralists into Queensland established 
a decentralised pattern of settlement, one that deviated markedly from the centralist 
tendencies of the other Australian colonies. Regionalism was the inevitable 
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consequence of the establishment of numerous scattered centres of population in 
Queensland, each of which held firm affiliations to their own locality and region. The 
importance of regionalism in Queensland’s domestic politics is difficult to exaggerate. 
It instituted a community-enforced independence within parliament to ensure that the 
advocacy of an electorate’s interests was the local representative’s primary concern 
and not that of party considerations. A ‘kaleidoscope pattern of divisions’ emerged, in 
which alliances shifted from issue to issue on the basis of an overriding impulse for 
development and the potential for regional gain.9 What transpired was a 
‘contemptible history’ of regional wrangles over the allocation of government-financed 
public works, the frequent stalling of the legislative process, a growing antagonism 
between the regions and recurring demands for the territorial division of the colony.10 
Regionalism was a perennial and preoccupying concern in Queensland’s domestic 
affairs.  
 
The second distinctive feature to emerge in this formative phase of Queensland’s 
development was allied to the new colony’s desire to lay its economic foundations at 
an accelerated pace. Within Queensland, the economic success of the pastoral 
industry had culminated, as stated, in the idea that progress was inseparably linked 
to the colony’s expanding pastoral frontier. The strength therefore of the colonists’ 
demand for the rapid and absolute control over the colony’s principal asset, the 
140,000,000 acres of land within its borders, fostered government measures that 
were solely conducive to material advantage and were largely unmindful of 
principles, moral factors or the long-term effects. The occupation of vast tracts of 
Aboriginal land had resulted in the whole squatting frontier becoming ‘a line of 
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perpetual conflict’.11 In this violent contest over the right to occupy the country, 
Queensland resorted to ‘an expedient to which no decent community ought to stoop’ 
a government-sanctioned ‘system of native slaughter…merciless and complete’.12 
The vanguard of this policy was the dispersal and retributive work of the Native 
Mounted Police. Internal and external criticism of this policy and the manner in which 
it was pursued was of little consequence. Self-government had granted 
Queenslanders the right to be the administrators of their own affairs and more 
importantly, impervious to any external interference into its internal dealings. The 
sanctity of the independence bestowed on Queensland at separation was a potent 
and pivotal element in Queensland’s perception and projection of itself. It was 
primarily influenced by an ‘undercurrent excited by self-interest and selfish fear’ 
invoked after years of neglect under Sydney’s administration and the bitter campaign 
for the colony’s territorial separation and resulted in an essentially ‘Queensland 
versus the rest of the world’ mindset.13  
 
This defensive mindset proved to be an effective counterforce to the mounting 
criticism over the colony’s contentious introduction and maintenance of a highly 
unfree coloured labour force. Economically rationalised as ‘the means by which 
Queensland might exalt itself into an immensely wealthy State’, it was proposed as a 
temporary expedient to solve the economic problems associated with the colony’s 
chronic labour shortage and to aid the development of the burgeoning sugar 
                                                                                                                                                        
10
 ‘Moreton Bay Separation’, Moreton Bay Courier, 6 April 1859. 
11
 Coote, History of the Colony of Queensland; From 1770 to the Close of the Year 1881. Volume 1.: 93. 
12
 G.S. Lang, The Aborigines of Australia: In Their Original Condition and In Their Relations With The White Men. 
Melbourne: Wilson and Mackinnon, 1865: 45-46; Wisker, 'The Victim of Civilisation,' 540-51; Raymond Evans, 
‘’Musketry and Terror’: The Pattern of European Conquest’, Evans, Saunders, and Cronin, Race Relations in 
Colonial Queensland: A History of Exclusion, Exploitation and Extermination. Third Edition. 47-54. 
13
 Coote, History of the Colony of Queensland: 253. 
  363 
industry.14 The internal political, social and economic repercussions of Queensland’s 
1863 adoption of a coloured labour policy were enduring and extensive. The part that 
the labour trade played in Queensland legislation and administration extended over 
forty years. It was a subject Charles Bernays stressed that ‘could by no means be 
overlooked when relating the political history of the State.’15 The force of the issue 
was such that its impact was far-reaching and extended into the wider political and 
social realms of the other Australian colonies and into the Imperial domain. 
Moreover, it permeated the broader question of political federation in a dynamic yet 
varied manner.  
 
Queensland’s first recorded deliberation on the question of a federal union between 
the Australian colonies was undertaken in June 1860 and in view of the close 
proximity of this date to the initiation of the colony’s independence it was not 
surprising that the Executive Council ‘entertained serious doubts’ over the federal 
idea as it was feared that a central government ‘might…tend to limit the complete 
independence of the scattered communities peopling this continent one of the 
other.’16 The evident reluctance of the Council to consider a proposal that would 
involve the relinquishment of any of Queensland’s newly gained authority became a 
characteristic trait of Queensland’s involvement in the federation movement but it 
was not a stance peculiar to Queensland. Each of the Australian colonies adopted a 
similar rationale for their disinterest in the Victorian proposal for an intercolonial 
conference on the federal question. Responsible government was too new and the 
colonial administrations too pre-occupied with the business of domestic politics to 
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consider an abstract idea that may weaken their autonomy. Self-government, it was 
contended, had already bestowed on them individually ‘all the elements of national 
life and prosperity’.17 Each as a consequence had cultivated their own distinct 
requirements and interests and politically and economically demonstrated their intent 
to maintain an autonomous and separate existence.  
 
In this framework of separateness of development the focus and direction being 
initiated in the new colony of Queensland corresponded with that undertaken earlier 
in the other Australian colonies. In particular Queensland’s narrow and self-interested 
focus on its internal development, its implementation of policies that were framed 
solely in accordance with its own immediate interests and informed by the overriding 
objective of dignifying Queensland. This study has argued that Queensland was at 
an earlier stage in the colonising process and this set Queensland’s vision of national 
progress on a far narrower economic provincial focus than that of the more 
established southern colonies which yielded a developing broader national Australian 
idea of progress canvassed in the emerging concept of political federation.18  
 
Isolationism was however a characteristic stance of each colonial government and it 
was preserved through the evident tensions between the colonies, which the 
Brisbane Courier argued sprang ‘from precisely the same causes that have produced 
wars between independent nations – rivalry, jealousy, and conflicting interests.’19 
Equating the Australian situation to that of the various rival nationalities of Europe 
                                                 
17
 Parkes, ‘An Australian Nation’: 330. 
18
 Queensland’s earlier stage of development has been compared with that of the southern colonies on the east 
coast. Western Australia presents as a colony at a comparable stage of development to Queensland. Not 
surprisingly at the 1891 Federal Convention the newly proclaimed self-governing colony of Western Australia was 
reluctant to give up any of its newly won autonomy by federating with the more populous east coast colonies. 
Refer to Brian de Garis, ‘Western Australia’, Irving (ed), The Centenary Companion to Australian Federation. 
Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 2001:286-325.  
  365 
was a common contemporary device that decisively demonstrated the colonies 
perception of themselves as distinct nationalities within the Australian continent. In 
this environment the federal idea not surprisingly had a ‘painful and languid 
existence’.20  
 
Despite the evident failings of the initial proposals for federation this early period 
does contribute a distinctive character to the federal account. In a broad sense the 
depiction of each colony’s stalwart identification as an independent entity develops a 
fuller appreciation of the true extent of the difficulties that had to be overcome. More 
specifically, it established that the deliberative process on the federal question would 
occur within the contexts of each colony. Absorbed by local matters and occupied 
with questions of provincial interest each assessed the federal proposal in terms of 
the benefit it would bring the colony weighed against what would be surrendered. 
Thus Queensland had failed in 1870 ‘to discover what Federation, at present, would 
effect for this colony.’21  
 
By the early 1880s Queensland was being both lauded as the ‘most enterprising of 
the Australian colonies’ and censured for so clearly marking out ‘a colonising career 
dissimilar from that of her elder sisters’.22 The basis for both these views was the 
‘astonishing’ pace and form of Queensland’s development.23 The period of Sir 
Thomas McIlwraith’s premiership (1879-1883) marked the resounding triumph of 
Queensland’s ‘urgent, underlying and inextinguishable’ development ethos.24 The 
force of McIlwraith’s character was portrayed in the similarity of the descriptive terms 
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used by both his admirers and critics: strong, bold, able and determined. To one 
anonymous supporter he was much more: 
Australia has not so far produced an abler or more honourable statesman than 
Sir Thomas McIlwraith. We may look around in vain among Colonial 
statesmen of the past or present, for even his equal in grandeur of intellect, in 
comprehensiveness, and originality of design, in fixity of purpose, in decision 
of action, and all the premier qualities essential to the successful ruler of a 
young country.25 
 
Queensland was to McIlwraith a great enterprise, and his declared intent to institute 
‘a much greater development of this country than there had been in the past’ 
appealed to and reflected the developmental aspirations of Queenslanders.26 
Progress in Queensland had and continued to be measured in economic terms and 
McIlwraith’s ‘almost magical’ results in restoring the colony by 1881 to a state of 
prosperity restored ‘hope that Queensland will soon be recognised as the Colony of 
Australasia.’27  
 
In McIlwraith’s program for the colony’s material development two elements proved 
corrosive to his strong political position, the land grant railways scheme and the 
proposed introduction of Indian Coolie labour. In the turbulent political environment it 
was the question of Coolie labour that proved to be the more prolonged and volatile 
issue, for it prompted a social debate over what type of society Queensland was to 
be. Queensland approached a junction in its development in which the resilient 
model of economically expedient policies, to generate and maintain rapid progress, 
came under challenge by a new Liberal/white labour alliance, primarily on the basis 
that such policies lacked social accountability. McIlwraith’s policies exemplified the 
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Queensland maxim that progress and economic prosperity were synonymous, and 
within this dynamic the creation of wealth through greater development was the 
principal objective.28 In the turbulent course of events that transpired regionalism 
became more virulent. An interregional divide developed over the colony’s continued 
maintenance of a coloured labour force allied to each region’s stage of development, 
which exemplified the divergent interests of the southern and northern regions of the 
colony. The more developed south voiced its great anxiety and alarm over the Coolie 
labour proposal while in the north the employment of coloured labour was portrayed 
as the secret of their success and an indispensable feature for their future prospects. 
Intensifying this internal debate was the negative public campaign in the southern 
colonies and Britain against Queensland’s ongoing importation of ‘a race of island 
unfortunates, who serve the purpose of making money for their employers’.29 
Humanitarian and missionary groups depicted Queensland’s use of an indentured 
coloured labour force as ‘the slave trade under a new name.’30 Censure from the 
southern colonies centred on a broader concern over the type of society that was 
being permanently established in the northern colony. It was therefore argued that 
the character of the institutions that had been developed in Queensland deviated 
socially, morally, and economically from the other Australian colonies. Queensland 
remained defiant to these external criticisms of its internal policies, epitomising the 
inviolability of colonial independence, which had reserved to each colony ‘the right to 
be masters of the situation’.31 Yet it was apparent by 1883 that the external and 
internal pressure groups would continue to rail against Queensland’s stance on 
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coloured labour and that Queensland was under Imperial and inter-colonial scrutiny. 
By May 1882 McIlwraith’s ministry was considered to be ‘in their dying and decaying 
days.’32 Against this backdrop McIlwraith took in April 1883 the ‘summary step’ of 
annexing the eastern half of New Guinea action which incongruously ‘opened the 
door’ to a concerted colonial effort on the federal question.33  
 
McIlwraith consistently presented his reasoning for his independent and unauthorised 
action was that it was a defensive measure to thwart German occupation of New 
Guinea. The irregular and impulsive nature of the act however raised suspicions of 
an ulterior motive that the annexation was undertaken solely to obtain a new field for 
the recruitment of coloured labour to relieve the colony’s sugar planter’s acute labour 
shortage. The Imperial government, encouraged by a concerted campaign outlining 
Queensland’s ‘unfitness’ to govern New Guinea, placed great weight on the 
indictment against Queensland and it featured prominently in the Imperial refusal to 
sanction the annexation. This study contends that it would be unlikely that McIlwraith 
(considered a ‘masterful’ statesman alert to the intense scrutiny of and campaign 
against the colony’s employment of a coloured labour force) would choose such an 
overt act based on an exceptionally vulnerable motivation. Rather it is proposed that 
a more feasible motive for McIlwraith’s ‘bold and daring’ exploit was affiliated to his 
‘barnacle tenacity’ to stay in office.34 The purported threat of Germany’s colonising 
ambition in New Guinea afforded McIlwraith with an opportunity to redress his 
politically precarious position by captivating political support through a ‘bold stroke’ 
and diverting local attention from important internal matters. The chain of events it 
initiated was more decisive.  
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From a local perspective the annexation of New Guinea can be classified as a 
watershed in Queensland politics. Critical and public scrutiny of Queensland’s labour 
policy provoked by the annexation and the colony’s consequent labelling as a ‘nigger 
establishment’ instilled an ardency into and broadened the appeal basis of the 
internal campaign to abolish this socially contaminating policy. The question of 
coloured labour emerged as a decisive factor in Samuel Griffith’s resounding election 
victory. Under Griffith’s leadership, Queensland’s new Liberal Government 
introduced radical labour reforms to address these mounting concerns and to 
‘vindicate the fair name of the colony, and to cleanse it from the disgrace cast upon it 
by the Slave Ministry of Mr. McIlwraith.’35  
 
The second significant consequence of the New Guinea episode was the impetus it 
gave to the federal cause. There emerge an evident difference in what the Imperial 
government regarded as the central issue and that of the colonial perspective. The 
question of coloured labour had factored prominently in the Imperial government’s 
decision, but the more contentious issue for the Australian colonies was that the 
Imperial Government had dismissed an urgent and seemingly valid colonial case for 
Imperial protection from the danger of foreign encroachment. Britain’s refusal to 
protect the colonies in conjunction with increased French activity in the Pacific 
tendered defence as a pressing basis for combined and concerted colonial action to 
address external security concerns. McIlwraith incorporated the purported imminent 
danger posed by France and the Imperial government’s proposition that ‘if the 
colonies desired an extension of their territory it would be better for them to become 
federated’ to advocate that a convention be convened ‘to discuss the basis upon 
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which a Federal Government could be constituted.’36 Despite the durability of 
intercolonial tensions, the Australasian Convention achieved its principal objective of 
establishing some sort of permanent federal organisation. The unanimous decision in 
December 1883 to establish the Federal Council of Australasia constituted the first 
concrete and practical advancement on the federal question after more than thirty 
years of rhetoric and should be acknowledged as ‘the first stepping stone to a grand 
union of the various Colonies of Australia.’37 The federal beginning had been 
deliberately modest so as to avert colonial suspicions of any encroachment on the 
authority of their independent legislatures. The symbolism of the Federal Council 
achievement was undermined by the resurgence of the intercolonial hostilities 
between New South Wales and Victoria, which resulted in New South Wales’ defiant 
refusal to join the Council. The London Times astutely noted that ‘Australasian 
Federation has been born perhaps rather prematurely.’38 Britain’s establishment of a 
protectorate over the southeastern portion of New Guinea in November 1884 though 
it validated the colonies’ original fears of foreign encroachment it additionally 
removed the urgency that had induced the colonial demand for combined action. As 
a result at the time of the first inaugural meeting of the Federal Council in January 
there existed in Queensland no understanding of what were the motivating forces 
that led to the Council’s establishment or its procedural purpose. The pressure of 
local issues provoked by Griffith’s progressive reforms rendered the federal topic of 
little consequence when compared to the more immediate concerns of the colony.  
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Sir Samuel Griffith’s 1883-1888 premiership represented an important juncture in 
Queensland’s developmental process. In this period broader social considerations 
came to supersede economic prosperity as the principal gauge of Queensland’s 
progress. The definitive marker of this juncture was the setting of a time limit for the 
end of Queensland’s exploitation of a highly unfree coloured labour; black labour, it 
was declared, was to come to end. Griffith’s platform of political and social reforms, 
though lauded as a entire revolution in the government, in effect deepened old 
divisions and engendered a new set of political, social and economic issues that 
directed and maintained attention internally. The particular focus of this study was the 
tripartite intersection of the coloured labour question, the politicisation of white labour 
and the conversion of northern grievances into a formally organised separation 
movement. The political and social instability produced by these three but interrelated 
internal issues was such that it enforced a narrow domestic focus and resulted in 
Queensland being assuming a somewhat ambiguous position in the renewed 1890s 
federal movement. On the broader national Australian front, the onset of separatist 
agitation contentiously allied to coloured labour and the development of a labour 
agenda furthered the emergent rationality of racial homogeneity as an Australian 
ideal and its consequent role as a practical and motivational argument for federation. 
The ‘grave’ political and social concern intrinsic in the north’s demand for separation 
was that ‘a colony of caste’ would be established in North Queensland, one that 
would be antagonistic to the homogenous development of a white Australia. The 
rhetoric of race against coloured intruders had created amongst the autonomous 
colonial entities a semblance of cohesion. 
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The 1890s did constitute the most concerted and progressive phase of the federal 
movement; yet this was not the case in Queensland where it was acknowledged that 
‘there was no colony in which federation has received such scurvy treatment as our 
own’.39 The volatility of local issues had continued to eclipse any consideration of the 
federal question. An additional component that influenced Queensland’s position on 
the matter was the concurrent existence of the separation, labour and federation 
movements. Separation and federation were closely linked throughout the 1890s. 
The Queensland and Imperial governments employed the impending federation of 
the Australian colonies as the means to defer any serious consideration or decision 
on the petitions from northern and central Queensland for their territorial separation. 
Central Queensland’s open opposition to federation as a consequence of the ‘gross 
injustice’ of the new state clauses was decisively demonstrated in their parliamentary 
bloc of the Federal Enabling Bill that resulted in Queensland being absent from the 
1897/98 National Australasian Convention.40 North Queensland’s ambivalence was 
converted on the basis that ‘Federation offered a solution to Northern problems’ by 
conferring the same benefits as separation.41 The strength of the yes vote in the 
north was a decisive factor in Queensland being ‘dragged into Federation.’42 On the 
federal proposal the Labour party in Queensland shifted from indifference to 
suspicion to support. In the parliamentary deliberations of the various Federal 
Enabling Bills labour members pressed for electoral reform and bargained their 
support for federation on the condition that one-man, one-vote be introduced. The 
strategy failed to elicit the desired reform in local parliament but extracted a promise 
from Dickson to abolish plural voting if the colony voted for federation. The prospect 
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of attaining universal suffrage and the abolition of plural voting through the new 
federal government enacted labour’s last minute conversion from opposition to 
general support. Regional and sectional objectives were the deciding force in 
Queensland’s narrow affirmative vote to enter the federal compact. Queensland, 
Premier Dickson declared to the other premiers, ‘no longer shall Queensland…suffer 
the reproach of being laggard in all that conduces to Australian nationhood and 
to…federal co-operation…she is determined to take her status as one of the original 
States of United Australia.’43 
 
The federation of the Australian colonies ‘did not take place in a vacuum’ and this 
factor is particularly evident within Queensland. The colony’s internal and perennial 
issues of coloured labour, separation and the emergent labour movement individually 
and in combination carved out a distinctive obstacle course for the federal question to 
negotiate.44 Queensland was as a result not so much a ‘maverick’ colony (for it did 
not make a concrete decision to resolutely oppose the federal proposition), but rather 
the colony’s indifference to the idea of federation was linked to its developmental 
process. Queensland was ‘but an infant’ compared to the older more established 
colonies and had been too deeply engaged in the practical business of developing its 
immense territory and addressing the internal matters that its developmental policies 
raised to assume an active or leading role in a question that it essentially feared 
would weaken its authoritative control ‘to be [the] masters of their situation.’45  
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The final convolution in Queensland’s involvement in the Federal movement was that 
the principal domestic impediments to the colony’s consideration of the federal 
question in the 1890s, in particular the separation and labour movements, emerged 
as decisive factors in Queensland’s narrow affirmative vote to join the federal union. 
Queensland’s new premier Robert Philp believed in February 1901 that ‘the 
Commonwealth had a great future before it’ but he hoped that ‘there would be no 
nasty legislation; that they would go slow.’46 By February 1902 Philp was ‘thoroughly 
disgusted’ and ‘up in arms against the Commonwealth.’47 The question of coloured 
labour, which had most decisively represented Queensland’s enforcement of and 
devotion to its independence, emerged as the first challenge in State-Commonwealth 
relations.  
 
The Federal Parliament passed as its first legislative measure in October 1901 the 
Pacific Islands Labourers Act, which effectively terminated Queensland’s 
employment of coloured labour. The prospect of a ‘White Australia’ had been a 
decisive force in the federal accomplishment and the abolition of coloured labour was 
a predicted and much anticipated event. The first Federal Act provoked emphatic 
protest from Queensland who equated the speed of the Federal Parliament’s action 
to that of ‘a bull in a china shop tossing and goring to show the infinitude of their 
power, without any more consideration or responsibility than a lunatic with a lighted 
torch near a haystack.’48 Under challenge was Queensland’s much prized 
independence to be not only the administrators of their own affairs but resistant to the 
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external interference into its internal dealings. Alfred Deakin inventively described the 
situation: 
One cannot have an omelette without breaking a few eggs nor a Federal 
Union without sacrifice of State independence. Our Provincial Parliaments 
are…beginning to realise this, and to rue the deprivation of power and prestige 
from which they are suffering….they are now taking up arms against the 
Frankenstein they were compelled to create.49  
 
The problem, Queensland’s most renowned federalist Sir Samuel Griffith reflected, 
was not the idea of federation itself but the way in which the Federal authority had 
been put into operation.50 Fulfilled to many in Queensland was the prophesy ‘that the 
[federal] step is a wrong one, fraught with terrible disaster and ill in the future to come 
for us. [Queensland] will live to repent the day when they voted in favour of the 
Commonwealth bill.’51  
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Biographical Appendix 
 
 
Sir Charles Cowper (1807-1875)  
Pastoralist, New South Wales Member of the Legislative Assembly and 
Legislative Council and Premier. Cowper was elected in 1843 at the first 
elections under the new Constitution for the County of Cumberland. 
Throughout his political career he held positions in the Legislative Council 
1843-1850, 1860 and was Premier of five occasions, August – October 1856, 
January 1858 – October 1859, January 1861- October 1863, February 1865-
January 1866, January - December 1870. In December 1870 he was 
appointed Agent General for New South Wales. Cowper opposed the federal 
ideas of Earl Grey and persistently maintained his aversion to the idea of 
political federation.52 
 
John Douglas (1828-1904) 
Squatter, Queensland Member of the Legislative Assembly, Premier and 
Federalist.  Member of New South Wales Legislative Assembly 1859-1861; 
Member of Queensland Legislative Assembly 1863-9 and 1875-1879; Premier 
8 March 1877 – 21 January 1879; Queensland Agent General 1869-1871; 
Administrator and Government Resident Thursday Island 1885-1904. Though 
Douglas was never bestowed any level of acknowledgement comparable to 
Queensland’s other prominent federalist’s in particular Samuel Griffith, he can 
credibly be advanced as Queensland’s earliest and most persistent advocate 
for federation. In 1900 Douglas asserted that his ‘first declaration for 
federation’ was a ‘flaming paragraph’ in his 1859 address to the electors of 
Darling Downs. Throughout the 1880s and the 1890s in particular he regularly 
made supportive speeches and statements on the federal topic in an 
endeavour to enliven Queensland’s consideration of the question.53 
 
Sir Charles Gavan Duffy (1816-1903)  
Irish nationalist, Victorian statesman and federalist emigrated from Great 
Britain at the end of 1855. In 1856 he was elected to Victoria’s first parliament 
under responsible government. Duffy himself reflected on his federal labours 
throughout the late 1850s and 1860s: ‘In the Federal movement, I not merely 
took the principal part but practically did everything.’ Charles Pridham 
criticised Duffy’s approach in 1876 – ‘A man with half an eye recognises in Sir 
C. G. Duffy…the mere rhetorician, simple that and nothing more.’ Duffy 
relegated the obstacles to federation as ‘insignificant’ to the grand 
fundamental goal and insisted upon the necessity of promoting a national 
feeling. The association between Duffy’s advocacy of federation and his later 
arrival in Victoria was that it arguably freed him of provincial pride and 
consequently enabled a broader range of vision. Duffy’s last public action on 
the federal question was his chairmanship of the 1870 Royal Commission ‘to 
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consider and report upon the necessity of a Federal Union of the Australian 
colonies’.54 
 
Carl Feilberg  
As the political reporter for the Brisbane Courier and the Queenslander 
Feilberg had been a close observer of the dynamics in Queensland’s political 
arena. In 1881, in defence of an allegation of slander against him Feilberg 
wrote to McIlwraith in order to clear himself of the charge and the two became 
correspondents. In mid-1882, Feilberg moved to Melbourne to take the 
position of Sub-editor for the Melbourne Argus, in it’s testimonial to Feilberg 
the Queensland Punch stated that ‘Carl has influenced public opinion in this 
colony to an extent that probably very few are aware of….The literary 
pretensions of Queensland are considerably diminished by his severance from 
the colony.’55   
 
Samuel Walker Griffith (1845-1920)  
Born in Merthyr Tydvil, South Wales on 21 June 1845. At the age of nine 
Griffith and his family came to Australia and first took up residence at Ipswich, 
then Moreton Bay settlement, followed by Maitland New South Wales and 
settling permanently in Brisbane in 1860. His education was partly received at 
a private school in Sydney and partly at the Maitland High School. In 1863 he 
was awarded a BA degree with first class honours from the Sydney University. 
In 1867 after two years in Europe on a Mort Travelling Scholarship Griffith was 
called to the Queensland Bar and established a lucrative legal practise.  In 
1870 he completed a MA degree at the Sydney University. Griffith first entered 
parliament at the age of 26 as the Member for East Moreton in March 1872. 
His ambition was quite apparent and quickly rewarded by his appointment to 
the position of Attorney General in the Macalister Cabinet in August 1874, and 
his rise to the leadership of the Liberal party in January 1879. Griffith remained 
a Member of the Queensland Legislative Assembly until 1893 principally 
representing the seat of North Brisbane. He was the uncontested leader of the 
Liberal Party until 1893, Premier from November 1883-June 1888, August 
1890-March 1893 when he retired from office to assumed the position of Chief 
Justice of Queensland a position he held until 1903 when appointed the first 
Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia retiring in July 1919.56 
 
 
William Edward Hearn (1826-1888)  
Political Economist, University Lecturer whose notable students included H.B. 
Higgins, Isaac Isaacs and Alfred Deakin and Members of the Victorian 
Legislative Council. In 1854 the Irish born Hearn was appointed first professor 
of modern history, literature, political economy and logic at the newly 
established University of Melbourne. His appointment as Queen’s Counsel in 
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1886 was a recognition of his scholarly work. Active in the public affairs Hearn 
published pamphlets, lectures and wrote extensively though anonymously for 
the Melbourne Argus.57  
 
Thomas McIlwraith (1835-1900)  
Born in Ayr Scotland in May 1835 and educated at the Ayr academy and the 
University of Glasgow, where he trained as a civil engineer. Persuaded in 
1854, by his older brother John’s economic success in Melbourne, to 
immigrate to Victoria. McIlwraith’s sixteen-year involvement in Victoria laid the 
foundational basis for his later success, in particular the profitable intersection 
between his practical ability, enterprise and railways. Between 1856 and 1860 
he was employed by Victorian railway department and from 1860 to 1864 as 
chief engineer for the large railway contractors Cornish and Bruce. McIlwraith 
profited professionally and financially from his significant involvement on the 
Melbourne to Bendigo and Melbourne to Sandhurst railway lines. To 
McIlwraith especially, it was said, was ‘due the honour of carrying through to 
completion large and important works which that firm were then engaged.’ His 
elevation to partner and after the death of one of the firm’s principals, to senior 
partner further highlighted his key role. McIlwraith invested in 1864, in 
partnership with Joseph C. Smyth, his profits from railway construction into 
eight runs in the Maranoa district of Queensland. By 1870 he had permanently 
diverted his capital and energy from Victoria to Queensland. In November 
1882 he was conferred the Imperial honour of a knighthood. 58 
 
Sir Henry Parkes (1815-1896)  
Parkes ‘first came to notice’ as an advocate for federation in 1867, at a 
conference held in Melbourne to discuss postal communication with Europe. 
In 1875 ‘The Essayist’, in the first of a series of articles published in the 
Queenslander entitled ‘The Federation of Australia’, judged Parkes as 
possessing more ‘statesmanlike qualities…than any other Australian Minister’, 
and in his position as premier of New South Wales he ‘could give full weight to 
his opinions.’ Parkes’ ministry resigned in January 1875, however Parkes 
returned to the position in March – August 1877 and 21 December 1878 – 4 
January 1883.59 
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